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Abstract 
 
This case study provides the basis for a potential linking of the work of Marxist 
intelligence historians and the disciples of the insecurity state thesis.  The rise of 
“Reasoning otherwise” as described by Ian McKay, refers to the erosion of the liberal 
order on the part of Canadian socialists in the early part of the twentieth century.  This 
process was speeded up in direct response to the wartime economy which through state 
intervention also saw the undermining of the liberal principles of free market economics 
and manpower management.  The rise of the insecurity state was part of the state’s move 
away from the foundational liberal order.  Ultimately the insecurity state’s existence 
depended upon the growth of industrial capitalism in Canada and directly related to the 
evolution in reasoning otherwise.    It was in the heavily populated and ethnically diverse 
urban centres where state fears about the growth of unions and the spread of communist 
revolutionary ideas, as well as other causes of civil unrest, originated.  It was these areas 
that warranted, in the eyes of the Department of Militia and Defence, the deployment of 
intelligence officers, watchers, and infiltrators.  In parts of Canada where industrialization 
had not produced the same social tensions, there was less need to develop a new level of 
security.  Berlin, Ontario, within Military District 1, a centre of German settlement for the 
previous century, was not a large industrial centre and therefore, had not evolved to the 
same level of class or ethnic diversity and segregation. Here the insecurity state had yet to 
develop as a mechanism of social control in response to industrial urbanization, and the 
war as it had in Toronto or Military District 2 more generally.  The small scale of Berlin, 
with community organizations, well established local leaders and emphasis on municipal 
power as a means of negotiating the individual and the collective, proved a sufficiently 
coherent basis for intelligence gathering. Here, there was no the need to take the drastic 
wartime measures in the name of security required in Toronto and Winnipeg and 
Montreal.    
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Terrorism - “Schrecklichkeit” – has always formed a part, not only of German military 
inclination, but of German military policy. 
       -James W. Gerard 
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Ernest Denton, Rescue of the Kaiser’s Bust in Victoria Park, August 
1914 (Source: Kitchener Public Library, Waterloo Historical Society 
photograph collection PO09302) 
Ernest Denton, 118th Battalion Soldiers in Victoria Park (Source: 
Kitchener Public Library, Waterloo Historical Society photograph 
collection PO10396) 
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Introduction 
 
Although their number is not as large as it should be, they have 
acquired a good position, particularly in our province.  The 
German-Canadians are loyal subjects of the British crown and no 
one will hold it against them if they keep the old country in their 
hearts  
 —L.J. Breithaupt1 
 
For the people of German ancestry, the people of Germany were 
not their enemies, the country was. 
       —Mrs. Grace Cressman2 
 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Great War, the Waterloo Historical Society 
published a brochure highlighting Berlin Ontario’s participation in the war effort and 
paying tribute to the brave men who had left Berlin for the Western Front and never 
returned.3  In the years since the collective memory of the war in Kitchener/Waterloo is 
that of a dark chapter in the history of the community and popular/public history has 
contributed to this perception.   
 This is evident in oral history projects conducted years after the events.  The 
subjects interviewed recalled everything from a coal shortage, to the debate over 
renaming of the city, to the conduct of the 118th Overseas Battalion raised in Berlin, 
North Waterloo and the surrounding area.  Reminiscences of the behaviour of the 
battalion range from drunkenness to property damage. Soldiers painted graffiti on George 
                                                          
1 Quoted in Kellie Johnston, “‘No one will hold it against them if they keep the old country in their hearts’ 
The Breithaupt Family Resistance to Anti-German Sentiment in Berlin Ontario, 1914-1916 Waterloo 
Historical Society 102 (2014): 58.  Hereafter WHS. 
2 Kitchener Public Library, Central Grace Schmidt Room, Mrs. Grace Cressman, quoted in Robert Douglas 
et al. “Oral History of Waterloo County, World War 1 in Waterloo County” (Wilfred Laurier University, 
1975) 2.   
3 Peace Souvenir: Activities of Waterloo County in the Great War, 1914-1918 (Kitchener: Kitchener Daily 
Telegraph, 1919) and W.H. Breithaupt “Presidents Address” WHS 6 (1918), 11.  
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Lang’s house because he was German, stormed pulpits, raided German clubs, bullied 
Lutheran pastors, and threatened men that “they’d knock your bloody hat off” if they 
looked eligible for service but had not signed up.4  In these oral history projects, nearly 
everyone remembered the anti-German sentiment but other than the better known 
incidents involving the 118th, nobody recalled, or at the least they were not recorded, how 
it affected everyday life.  The only specifics mentioned related to wartime rationing of 
food and coal or, for those who served, the lice infestation in the trenches.5 
 Other events that occurred in Berlin coupled with the behaviour of the men of the 
local battalion became part of a debate over the loyalty of the city.  Was this ancestral 
German city loyal to the cause?  Framing the history of Berlin/Kitchener under this 
debate has created a uniform orthodox narrative. In the opening month of the war, the 
bust of Kaiser Wilhelm I in Victoria Park would be torn down by vandals and thrown into 
the lake.6  Soon thereafter, the bust was recovered and placed in the care of the German 
Concordia Club.  Two years later in the winter of 1916, the Concordia Club was 
ransacked, the bust found, taken away, and was never seen again.  Later that same month, 
the German pastor Tappert was taken from his home by the same soldiers and beaten.  As 
the war dragged on, the story was that simply being German meant cooperation with the 
enemy.   
The 118th Battalion proved unable to recruit the required 1100 men, and 
accusations against the people of Berlin of harbouring German reservists and spies was 
common.  To counter the perceived German threat, German language instruction in 
                                                          
4 Douglas et al. Miss Ruby Fischer, Mr. Snyder, Mr. Shaeffer. 
5 Ibid, Mr. Allan Wagner, and Mrs. Shuh. 
6 Wilhelm I was the first Emperor of unified Germany.  
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Berlin was outlawed, German language newspapers were initially censored and then 
banned, Germans-Canadians who had not become naturalized before 1902 were stripped 
of their voting rights, and the name of Berlin was changed to Kitchener.  
 
Regional and Propaganda Historiography 
 
The question of loyalty discussed in period newspapers and literature frames these 
events as the result only of the city’s German ancestry while ignoring broader history and 
historiography of the Great War.  By contrast, this study will address a wider range of 
issues.  The limited studies on Berlin’s history during the war, are preoccupied by the 
loyalty question and related literature concerns the effects of wartime propaganda on 
newspaper debates and censorship in Berlin and Canada.7  From the vast literature on 
Canadian society at the beginning of the twentieth century, this thesis combines two 
relatively recent contributions to offer a new understanding of how Canadian society was 
changed by the war.  These theories are Ian McKay’s liberal order framework and 
Wesley Wark’s insecurity state. I argue that Canada was moving away from the liberal 
order upon which the country was founded as it became increasingly subject to the 
concerns of the insecurity state.  This was not a uniform process and so how exactly the 
liberal order changed in Southwestern Ontario rather than loyalty is the over-riding 
question. 
This is a social history of intelligence seeking to understand intelligence gathering 
in Canada during the war through an understanding of Canadian society and its 
                                                          
7 See for example W.R. Chadwick The Battle for Berlin Ontario: An Historical Drama (Waterloo: Wilfred 
Laurier University Press, 1992).  This study reads in the style of a satire with colourful social commentary 
and treating the historical figures of Berlin as characters in a play.  In fact, the book was intended to be a 
play which first required the back story. 
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relationship to intelligence gathering.  Canada has had the good fortune of advancing the 
field of intelligence history beyond that of Great Britain (and the United States) by 
incubating social history of intelligence through the works of a number of political 
scientists, political economists and Marxist historians.  This study asks, how did 
Canada’s insecurity state evolve? Did the growing intelligence community fit within the 
principles upon which the country was founded?  Furthermore, how did this ever-
increasing apparatus of intelligence deal with the supposed threat to Canadian security 
posed by the German element which has been so villainized in the orthodox narrative of 
Berlin Ontario during the war?          
 The standard work on the subject is Jeffrey A. Keshen’s Propaganda and 
Censorship. 8  Keshen combed the records of the Secretary of State and the papers of the 
Chief Press Censor Lieut-Col. Ernest J. Chambers and found the censor’s office 
disturbingly vigilant in ensuring Anglo-imperial conformity in “what was fit to print.”9  
This creates an image of a strong centralized means of controlling public information 
which would, for other scholars, prove fruitful for explaining wartime rioting.  Keshen 
argued that censorship resulted in Canadians becoming so detached from reality that it 
contributed to the inability of returning soldiers to adapt to civilian life.10  Berlin Ontario, 
in Keshen’s account, was a hotbed of property damage and rioting caused by accusations 
                                                          
8Jeffrey A. Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship During Canada’s Great War, (Edmonton: The University 
of Alberta Press, 1996).  Other studies worth mentioning are Jeffrey A. Keshen “All the News that was fit 
to Print: Ernest J. Chambers and Information Control in Canada, 1914-1919” Canadian Historical Review 
73 no. 3 (1992): 315-343 Peter Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words: British, American and Canadian 
Propaganda and Fiction, 1914-1933 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987) a more 
general overview, and a fascinating international and temporal study is Robert Darton, Censors at Work: 
How States Shaped Literature (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 2014).  
9 Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship, xiv. 
10 Ibid, xv. 
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of disloyalty  by German Canadians becoming the norm.11  One result was the censorship 
of Berlin’s German language newspaper, the Berliner Journal which he argues was 
assisted by accusations of disloyalty from A.C. Laut of the London Advertiser, and the 
Great War Veterans’ Association.12         
Likewise, Patricia P. McKegney’s study of wartime Berlin demonstrated that the 
English-language newspapers, having received censored wartime news, actively 
participated in an imperial propaganda campaign against all things German.13  According 
to her, this ultimately shaped the experience of war in Berlin.  This lens offered a rare 
opportunity to observe the effects of an imperial image of the war and its goals on the 
hearts and minds of Canadians, with a far greater potential for the study of wartime 
propaganda than permitted by Keshen’s classic account. Unfortunately, McKegney relied 
exclusively on local sources (with special emphasis on the Berlin News-Record and 
minimal use of the Daily Telegraph or the Berliner Journal) without connecting them 
directly to the mechanisms of British propaganda and so produced a chronicle of the 
events that occurred in Berlin during the war, rather than an analysis of the impact of 
British propaganda on such events.14  She argued that the propaganda efforts failed in 
Berlin because the Germans had not been convinced of the just cause of the 
British/Canadian war effort.  
The question remains, how did the strong censorship program in Ottawa affect 
ethnic relations in Canada?  Historians have looked beyond the confines of Berlin to 
                                                          
11 Ibid, 7-8. 
12 Ibid, 82-83.  The GWVA was Canada’s most influential association of Veterans and later merged with 
other groups to form the Royal Canadian Legion. 
13Patricia P. McKegney, The Kaiser’s Bust: A Study of War-Time Propaganda in Berlin Ontario, 1914-
1918 (Wellesley: Bamberg Press, 1991), 191-192. 
14 Ibid, 91. 
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other centres with substantial German ancestry.  Peter Moogk, described a shift of 
demonization from the Chinese to the Germans in the city of Vancouver.  Like 
McKegney, Moogk suggests that the trigger for this shift was the propaganda campaign 
of 1915.  While the Canadians were fighting the German Army in Flanders, a tale of a 
crucified soldier reached the Vancouver press, when combined with the coverage of the 
sinking of the Lusitania in May, created a narrative that this was a war not against the 
German Kaiser and Prussian militarism, but against the German, the barbaric Hun of the 
propaganda poster.15  In Winnipeg, historian Art Grenke described the German 
community as anxious to remain under the radar as ethnic and class tensions were 
accelerated by wartime manpower management in the city of strong British identity.  
Strikes would be blamed on the greed of aliens who used wartime labour shortages to 
undercut the English workforce.  At the same time, there was an element within 
Winnipeg that proved a liability.  He said the German language newspaper Der 
Nordwestern, favoured the German narrative of the war over the English, and 
occasionally reprinted German propaganda that originated in German-American papers.16  
Before the end of the war, it was shut down by the Chief Press Censor.17  Although the 
legitimacy of accusations of sympathy with the enemy remains questionable, Grenke did 
successfully demonstrate the effects of wartime propaganda on the local population.  By 
the time of the General Strike of 1919, elements within Winnipeg’s establishment had 
been convinced that it was all the fault of the foreigners.  
                                                          
15 See Peter Moogk “Uncovering the Enemy Within: British Columbians and the German Menace” BC 
Studies 182 (Summer 2014): 45-72. 
16 Art Grenke, “The German Community of Winnipeg and the English-Canadian Response to World War I” 
Canadian Ethnic Studies/Etudes Ethniques au Canada 20, no. 1 (1988): 25-29.   
17 Ibid, 33 and Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship, 83. 
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When discussing the history of German-Canadians it is impossible to ignore the 
contributions of Heinz Lehamn and Gerhard P. Bassler.  Bassler translated and compiled 
the classic work by Lehmann The German Canadians.18  Through extensive archival 
research, Lehmann chronicled the experiences of German immigrants across Canada 
from before the British conquest of New France to before the Second World War.  His 
focus was on the shared experience, rather than the culture or languages of the German-
Canadians and for good reason.  Given the political climate of the Germany in which 
Lehmann lived, he chose not to discuss German culture or society as belonging to a 
people or volk as he did not wish to become associated with the use of this concept by 
right-wing nationalists of the 1930s.19 
Hostility towards people of German ancestry was a shared experience throughout 
the Empire and Bassler would go on to write on the German experience in 
Newfoundland.  While German-Newfoundlanders posed no threat to the security of the 
island or its people, the government and communities of Newfoundland handled the 
stresses of total war by creating a German scapegoat.20  The result was a campaign that 
all but destroyed any sense of a local German culture and identity.   
These themes also played out in the examination of the Australian home front in 
Gerhard Fischer’s Enemy Aliens.  Though the distinction between alien and citizen is at 
times lacking, Fischer’s description shows some similarities to Canada in the experience 
of the ethnic German population.  Working from Michael McKernan, he described 
                                                          
18 Originally five books, the remnants that survived were translated and compiled into one collection, with 
the research re-examined and verified, by Gerhard P. Bassler See Editor-Translator’s note, Heinz Lehmann, 
The German Canadians, 1750-1937: Immigration, Settlement & Culture translated by Gerhard P. Bassler 
(St. John’s: Jesperson Press, 1986), xxi-xxii. 
19 See Gerhard P. Bassler “Heinz Lehmann and German Canadian History” in Lehmann, xx-xxxi. 
20 Gerhard P. Bassler. Vikings to U-Boats: The German Experience in Newfoundland and Labrador 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 144-145. 
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German-Australians as having worked to establish themselves as part of Australian 
society, and yet wartime hysteria, Irish nationalism and the rise of radical labour would 
propel a new perception and fear of what it meant to be an outsider.21  One prominent 
German community was Eudunda in Australia’s Military District 4 which, throughout the 
war, would be kept under the close observation of intelligence officer Captain 
Woodcock.22  This was a direct response to rumours that circulated about the intent of the 
German community and unconfirmed reports of saboteurs and German army recruiting 
officers wandering the streets of Eudunda. 
The power and influence of rumour on issues of national security demonstrates 
that propaganda is only a portion of the history of othering in Canada during the war.  
The historian is required to view Berlin, Ontario’s experience in the wider historical 
context of Canada’s national development and the struggles for hegemony within the 
ethnic and class structures already in place.  It is also necessary to consider the various 
means by which the Canadian state attempted to deal with the perceived German threat to 
Canada. Such a combination provides a better lens to view the treatment of German 
Canadians in Berlin and the rest of Ontario or even Canada as a whole.      
 
 
Class, Ethnicity, Power and Regional History  
 
Regional history in the Canadian tradition has meant the insertion into Canadian 
historiography of the local customs, values, and identities previously neglected in the 
                                                          
21 Gerhard Fischer, Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920 
(Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1989), 63-64 and Michael McKernan, The Australian People 
and the Great War (Melbourne: Nelson, 1980), 177. 
22 Ibid, 66-67. 
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grand narrative of national development.23  This older narrative focused exclusively on 
high politics of national development, environmental determinism, “great men”, 
economics and the goods being produced, while the shift to regional history meant 
recognizing the agency of everyone outside the metropolitan centres.24  Since the 1960s, 
as part of  what Dirk Hoerder has called the decolonization of Canadian society,25 the 
focus shifted to the histories of working men and expanded to include women and 
immigrants in both cities and on Canada’s frontiers.  Regional historians critiqued the 
geographical determinism of Canadian historiography and challenged as Eurocentric the 
reduction of their regions to mere hinterlands.26   
Canadian regional histories decentralizing the metropolitan have yielded 
promising avenues of further research.  Robert Rutherdale’s Hometown Horizons, 
explored how the war was experienced at the local level from outside the predominant 
imperial narrative.  Ottawa and the war in Europe were worlds away for the people of the 
three communities he examined.  By considering their lived experiences as central, 
Rutherdale’s interpretation challenged the grander narratives that have dominated 
                                                          
23 This was the legacy in Canadian historiography of sectionalism stemming from American historians such 
as Turner and the Beards.  Innis outright rejected the principles of sectionalism in the conclusion of The 
Fur Trade in Canada yet the agency of geography in the course of Canadian history endured through an 
economic lens.  See Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic 
History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 383-385 and Donald Creighton, The Empire of the 
St. Lawrence (Toronto: The McMillan Company of Canada Limited, 1970), 19-21.  Innis himself suffered 
from what we would now call PTSD from his service as a signalman in the Great War. 
24 This evolved out of William Morton’s breaking of the historical tradition of the imperialist Laurentian 
thesis. See Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing: 
1900 to 1970 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 241-242. 
25 See Dirk Hoerder, “Towards a History of Canadians: Transcultural Human Agency as Seen Through 
Economic Behaviour, Community Formation, and Societal Institutions” Histoire Sociale/Social History 38, 
no. 76 (2005): 434-435.  
26 For an overview see Gregory S. Kealey “Introduction” The Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers 
canadiens de sociologie 13, no. 2 (1988), 3-5 and P.A. Buchner “Acadiensis II” Acadiensis I (1971): 3-9.   
24 
 
Canadian wartime historiography.27  Unfortunately, Rutherdale’s greatest strength was 
also a significant handicap.  For example, when discussing the demonization of enemy 
aliens, he could not draw direct connections between the occurrences in his three towns 
because the theme was three very different towns in three different parts of the country. 
Nor could he logically connect perceptions between the communities of Lethbridge, 
Guelph, and Trois-Rivères beyond a shared set of experiences of fear and xenophobia.28   
It remains an historical problem whether events in one community, or 
misrepresentation of said events, could be causally connected to views in another.  This is 
important considering the role of organizations like the Canadian Press, the national news 
agency, and the effectiveness of the Chief Press Censor described by Keshen.  Such 
shared reporting meant national news was presented in the same light across English-
speaking Canada.  Strict wartime censorship of dissident publications further solidified 
these national narratives.  Therefore, any story coming out of Toronto or Ottawa of 
enemy alien activities or anti-German or Austrian rhetoric would be reported in exactly 
the same manner in the pages of local newspapers via the Canadian Press.  Suddenly the 
smaller community, while still predominantly influenced by local dynamics of class 
race/ethnicity and gender was drawn into a national/imperial experience.   
To understand how ideas and perceptions spread through the community, the 
wider historiography is useful.  Before the events in Berlin can be understood, the 
historian must also understand the recent evolution of Canadian capitalism that came to 
                                                          
27 Robert Rutherdale, Hometown Horizons: Local Responses to Canada’s Great War (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2004), xiii. 
28 See for example ibid, 119-120. 
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define “The Nation Transformed.” and how with it, the perception and control of ethnic 
relations during the Great War were managed in Ontario. 
 
 
Liberalism and the Canadian Transformation 
 
Following the publication of the centennial series of Canadian history, Canadian 
historians generally consider the period 1896-1921 as an age of transformation.29  The 
debate has been over the precise nature of this transformation.  The Great War did not 
occur within a vacuum which is precisely the reason it was written as part of the story of 
this wider transition.  By 1914, the old order established under Confederation was already 
beginning to see significant challenges brought forth by urbanization, industrialization, 
and growing ethnic-based, nativist, tensions between the various groups in Canada, 
especially French Catholics and English Protestants.  
The founding principle of Confederation was, above all else, a top-down liberal 
revolution.  It should come as no surprise as the transition into capitalism in the western 
world is synonymous with liberal democratic societies, where economic values become 
distinct from the social.  In liberal society, individuals, in theory, are free to pursue their 
own interests, to participate in an open labour market, to practice their own religion, and 
to partake in their own cultural practices.  This particular form of free market capitalism 
is rooted in individualism and property rights and is dependent on a relatively small state 
based on an inclusive political system involving free and open debate.  In Canada, these 
                                                          
29 See Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada, 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1974) and Mariana Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap and Water: Moral 
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political values were based on British constitutional Whig traditions dating back to the 
Glorious Revolution that overthrew James II. 30 
There were obvious exclusions from the rights of the liberal political system 
based on gender and ethnicity but these were tied more to liberal values.  Property rights 
were the basis for free market individualism and they would serve as basis for exclusion, 
othering and demonization.  The result would be the destruction of cultures in Canada 
that were not based on liberal concepts of private property including, most notably, First 
Nations.31  
Utilizing Fernande Roy and C.B. Macpherson, historian Ian McKay defined the 
accepted individual as a male who, within his own private life, is by design free to self-
regulate personal activities without state intervention.32  This is what Macpherson had 
defined as possessive individualism.  Possessive individualism meant commodifying an 
individual’s personal capacity and skillsets (and by extension freedom) for consumption 
in the open market.33 Property should be understood as not a tangible thing as it is written 
on a deed, a lot and the building standing on it, property meant rights: property in life and 
liberty.34     
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Clarendon Press, 1962), 3. 
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An ongoing conversation about the origins in mid-nineteenth century Canada of 
the liberal order is relevant here.  It has drawn distinctions between liberal values and the 
liberal order that Canada would adopt.  In McKay’s original framework, the imposition of 
the liberal order was a top-down affair accomplished by a class and ethnically 
homogenous group of men.  Robert Sweeny in his study of industrialization of Montreal 
critiqued this aspect of the framework as simultaneously too broad and too narrow 
because it had failed to account for the broad appeal of nineteenth century liberalism that 
cut across class and ethnic lines.35  Put simply, the continued popular appeal of liberal 
values shaped how and where the liberal order in the early twentieth century would 
change.  In Berlin during the Great War, this tension between values and order proved to 
be significant. 
Much has been said about the relationship between liberal hegemony and class-
based hegemony.  If anything, liberalism served to reaffirm the dominance of the 
bourgeois class in Canada and elsewhere.  It would also serve the interest of Canada’s 
wealthy middle class who would rise to dominate municipal politics.  In Berlin, the 
establishment of industry would give rise to a German “ethnic elite.”36  Aya Fujiwara, in 
her study of the formation of multiculturalism in Canada, argued that it was such ethnic 
elites who were able to use their prominent positions to mold their respective ethnic 
groups and their relationship to the wider society.  Furthermore, their relationships are 
                                                          
35 See Sweeny, 324-326. Ian McKay et al., “MacDonald Prize Roundtable on Why Did We Choose to 
Industrialize” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 28 no 3 (2017): 90-113. 
36 For a defining characteristic is inequality in freedom of choice as a product of wealth accumulation.  It 
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what defines an ethnic identity beyond a common language, religion or culture.37 There is 
also an inherently gendered dynamic to ethnic elitism.  As the liberal subject was male by 
default, the liberal order reinforced patriarchy.38  In Joy Parr’s classic Gender of 
Breadwinners, she saw gender and class as inseparable in social existence.  Daniel 
Knechtel, son of a German immigrant and the largest employer in Hamburg, Ontario had 
crafted himself as the epitome of Christian masculinity, in spite of not siring any 
children.39  It was factory-based paternalism.   
Paternalism, masculinity, class and ethnic identity are also the basis for the studies 
of Berlin’s ethnic elite by Barbara Lorenzkowski.  In Sounds of Ethnicity, (based on her 
Pierre Laberge prize winning thesis) she examined the folklore, dialects, and the process 
of “myth making” in the German communities of Buffalo, New York, and Berlin Ontario 
by using sound as a category of analysis.  It had already been established that a number of 
dialects existed in Berlin and Waterloo County ranging from hoch Deutsch to 
Pennsylvania German. Hoch Deutsch was championed, as it was in Germany, by the 
urban middle-class.  The Amish communities in Wellesley, originating from Bavaria and 
Alsace, brought their own Alsatian and other forms of “upper German” while 
Pennsylvania German survived among the more conservative Mennonite groups.40  For 
Lorenzkowski, this meant a great deal for culture and the effects of language 
protectionism in the region.  Working from the ideas of Jonathan Zimmerman, she argued 
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(Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2012), 158. 
38 For a discussion see Adele Perry “Women, Racialized People and the Making of the Liberal Order in 
Northern North America” Liberalism and Hegemony, 274-279 in his reconsideration, he had not considered 
the effects of the uneven evolution of capitalism that defined the parameters of the liberal order. 
39 See Joy Parr, The Gender of Breadwinners: Women, Men, and Change in Two Industrial Towns, 1880-
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that language was not a marker of ethnic identity, in the pure sense of the protectionist 
rhetoric of the German community, but a marker of a unique local hybrid identity.41  Thus 
her intermediary between the German communities was not the language, music, or other 
cultural staples, it was the romanticized volk they aspired to but could never achieve.  
This theme is also present in her studies of German schooling in the region.42  
It is no coincidence that the men of Berlin, of German descent, who fought 
against the forces of cultural assimilation before 1914 and fought the smear campaigns 
against the Germans during the war, were part of a well-established and close-knit, 
sometimes intermarried, middle-class ruling elite, or “ethnic elite” in Berlin.  They were 
factory owners, newspapermen, school administrators, even politicians and legal 
professionals.  These men used their positions in the community to form organizations 
including a shadow schoolboard, to protect German language education, (the schulverein) 
the Waterloo Historical Society, to take control of the historical narrative of the region, 
and later the Citizens League, to fight the decision to rename their city.  Their position 
and their right to protect their cultural heritage were enshrined in the philosophical 
underpinnings of property rights in Canada’s liberal order.    Individuals in a liberal 
society were by definition free to choose (and live by) their own religion, speak their own 
language and practice their own culture.43  They were also free to form organizations 
within the municipal regime to further safeguard such freedoms.  
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Individualism and Cultural Belonging 
 
Ethnically-based organizations may appear to make little sense in a society that 
promotes possessive individualism.  McKay himself described the liberal order as “cold” 
because of the centrality of individualism.  In a fundamental sense, this emphasis ignores 
the instinctual need of human beings, as social animals, to feel a sense of belonging 
leaving Canadians wanting in the search for community ties.44  
Community ties can also be considered under a different lens: social control and 
class formation.  In the influential study on the formation of the English middle-class R.J. 
Morris demonstrated that through municipal politics and just as importantly (if not more 
so) voluntary organizations, an identifiable and coherent middle class could define 
morality in the community as a means of social control of the labour force45  This was 
essential as the middle class itself was divided by religion and political loyalties.  His 
examples, discussed at length in the second half of the study, include the formation of the 
town mission gardens, music associations, and education boards.  Thus, activities and 
associations formed in the name of community were closely tied to the interests of the 
middle-class administrators and was the social foundation on which their class organized 
itself.   
Members of the German ethnic elite found the liberal hegemony of Canada 
familiar.  The first generation of tradesmen and later industrialists to settle in Waterloo 
County had left lands like Wüttenburg, and Baden which were transitioning from a moral 
to a liberal economy with the decline of the protective guilds and negotiating state and 
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municipal power.  Michael Schäfer in his study comparing Edinburgh and Leipzig, 
demonstrated the British tradition had allocated powers between the municipalities and 
the central state and Germany operated in a different system.  The German model was 
described as “universal competence” meaning the municipal regime was free to yield 
power that was not specifically allocated to the state.46  One result of this negotiation was 
a disaster in Hamburg.   Richard Evans, (in outright rejection of the Sonderweg theory of 
German history of his mentors) began by studying liberalism and the cholera epidemic in 
Hamburg.  His quantitative analysis showed that through a process of continued 
disenfranchisement similar to Northern England, the German liberal bourgeoisie 
consolidated its power in Hamburg and created a city with many of the qualities of a 
liberal order “utopia”, including severe social inequalities, and establishing trade as the 
city’s most important lifeline.47  The cholera epidemic of 1892, would end in disaster for 
Hamburg.  What rendered the city vulnerable was the Hamburg elite’s fear of financial 
ruin if they cut off trade and enforced a quarantine. 
The exact nature of German liberalism was later described by Geoff Eley.48  After 
pointing out the problem in German liberal historiography of the interchangeable use of 
economic and political definitions of liberalism, Eley argued that the formation of the 
German national identity was a triumph of contemporary liberalism.  Bismarck had 
brought to Germany the ascendency of liberal values in the same manner as the founders 
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of Canadian confederation.  Suddenly, the German bourgeois had been elevated to 
positions of political and cultural influence at the expense of groups who could not, by 
design, reap the social and financial benefits of the new order.   
The place of community within Canadian liberalism was explored by Michèle 
Dagenais, in her reflection on local government.  This is essentially a clarification on how 
the liberal order actually worked on the front line of introducing liberal hegemony to the 
peoples of formerly Upper and Lower Canada.  The individual, as perceived by the Adam 
Smith, the father of laissez-faire economics, shared a common interest with the 
community and therefore could be relied on to promote them.49  According to Dagenais 
the exercise of “peace, order and good government” required on the job training in self-
government at the municipal level.  Here is the power of the individual at the local level 
in the liberal experiment: 
 
Citizens could learn to set objectives and rely upon themselves to meet them.  In 
other words, they could learn to govern their own conduct, thus acquiring 
expertise in public life that could later be applied at other levels, notably when 
choosing elected representatives.50  
 
The power of the municipal is therefore an expression of the power of the individual 
within the liberal order.   
Berlin negotiated this power dynamic with its ethnic elite.  While the German (as 
a construct) had embraced the values of nineteenth century liberalism, being an ethnic 
group in the centre of Orange Ontario and having an inherent sense of pride in their 
cultural heritage meant that community organizations were essential.  To be German 
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meant belonging to something larger than the individual.  The class privilege of the ethnic 
elite would allow a negotiation here, and since (as in Adam Smith) the individual shared 
a common interest with the community, any group organization, schools, singing club, 
historical society, Citizen’s League, was ultimately an extension of the interest of the 
liberal individual in Berlin.  This was not dependent on the ethnic elite’s privilege, but 
inherent in the nature of civil society in a liberal order.  For historians including R.J. 
Morris, the liberal values are developed by people organizing themselves into social and 
cultural organizations primarily on the local level.  The Great War would pose a threat to 
this local dynamic yet simultaneously motivate Berlin’s ethnic elite to cling to the 
founding principles of liberalism as a defence mechanism against external threats to this 
shared value system and way of life.   
 
Intelligence and Social History  
 
By the end of the Great War, McKay has established that Canada’s liberal order 
was beginning to unravel.  Key principles of liberalism had not survived the war or the 
labour revolt.  McKay’s Reasoning Otherwise describes the critique of liberal principles 
by Canadian socialists and others on the Canadian left.  What is needed is a study of a 
similar shift away from such principles by the state in its conduct of the war.  Thus a 
measure for the state’s attack on the liberal order proposed here is the increasing role of 
Canada’s domestic intelligence to help maintain “order” in the society.  There are two 
distinct schools of thought in intelligence historiography.  The first is represented by  
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official and popular histories that focus on major events and “great men” 51 and the other 
school consists of social histories of intelligence produced in Canada largely through the 
efforts of Marxist historians.  There is merit to examining the history of counter as well as 
domestic intelligence despite these separate schools of thought.  The efforts of the 
German military attachés in the United States to cause havoc on the Canadian home front 
in order to impede the imperial war effort, which are chronicled in official and popular 
histories, were used to justify the expansion of Canada’s intelligence apparatus.  There 
exists, however, a literature that looks beyond the chronicle, to examine the history 
through the lens of class and the struggle for hegemony.  Here the focus shifts from 
external threats to the use of state powers, including the use of intelligence officers, to 
control the population.  
The most comprehensive study of Canada’s military intelligence history and 
capabilities remains S.R. Elliott’s Scarlett to Green.  Being an official history, it is highly 
valuable in tracing the command structures as well as official policies and procedures.  It 
is not without its problems.  In his efforts to write a grand narrative of the development of 
the forces, including battlefield reconnaissance, Elliott could only dedicate a small 
section to domestic intelligence and an even smaller section to the domestic sphere of the 
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Great War.  Thus, these sections are far from comprehensive.  Nowhere are the activities 
of District Intelligence Officers linked to the instances of sabotage described on the home 
front.52 Additionally, nowhere is it mentioned that intelligence officers had to collaborate 
with the police forces and civic authorities when investigating potential threats.53  Nor is 
this collaboration present in either official or unofficial histories of the RCMP, and its 
predecessor the RNWMP.54 
When Canadian labour historians examined the struggles of the working class, 
they discovered that the unions and the radical left were continuously being monitored by 
Canada’s domestic intelligence networks.  Suddenly the writing of the history of 
intelligence need no longer rely on the methodologies of military/official historians and it 
could now apply the theories and methods of social history.  A pioneer in this field is 
undoubtedly Gregory S. Kealey, a Macdonald-prize winning social historian and 
founding editor of Labour/Le Travail.  Searching for sources on radical movements 
associated with the strike wave of 1919, he began to systematically use access to 
information requests to obtain period reports from the NWMP, the Dominion Police and 
the RCMP.  Kealey’s exposure of the extensive nature of the Canadian state’s use of 
intelligence against the subjects he studied elevated him to one of Canada’s leading 
intelligence historians.55  One of his most significant contributions was Kealey’s on-
going battle with Canada’s Security and Intelligence Service for the release of literally 
mountains of classified materials.  He, along with Reg Whitaker and a small army of 
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graduate students, compiled and published a massive eight volume series, R.C.M.P 
Security Bulletins spanning the inter-war years.  These documents show that the targets of 
surveillance identified by 1919 remained unchanged for decades.  Since this alarming 
discovery, labour and gender specialists have written on the secret war against 
progressive movements in Canada: the labour revolts of 1919, One Big Union (OBU), the 
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), socialists, communists and homosexuals.56  This 
revisionist literature created a more inclusive history that was the antithesis of official 
histories.57     
In their 2012 book on the subject, Greg Kealey, Andrew Parnaby and Reg 
Whitaker, examined the history of the resistance to this political policing.  They argue 
that throughout the last century, the Mounted Police, CSIS and other organizations, were 
keen to cover up their operations that corresponded to the defence of the hegemonic 
status quo.58  Their analysis revealed the extent of the tactics used to maintain hegemony 
over Canadian workers and with it, the preservation of Canada’s exploitive capitalist 
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system.  These tactics were also contextualized as an evolution in Canada’s spying 
capacity and many of these themes are repeated in the recent Spying on Canadians.59     
Developing simultaneously with this Marxist school, was the interpretive 
framework that has defined the study and application of social theory in Canadian 
intelligence for the past twenty years: the “insecurity state” thesis.  Wesley K. Wark 
developed the idea that Canada’s security services were shaped by attitudes prevalent in 
more powerful states, particularly Britain.60  In this model, the attention of intelligence 
officers is diverted from one threat to another based on the fears of the day, whether it be 
the American Union Army, Fenians, Central Power sympathisers, communists and labour 
unions, the Japanese, Soviet spies, homosexuals or most recently international terrorism.  
Wark argues that 1914 marks the beginning of Canada as an insecurity state and this 
insecurity drove the rapid expansion of its counter-intelligence capabilities during the 
Great War.61  In this model, because Canada could rely on Great Britain and the United 
States, foreign intelligence gathering was not as important to Canadians authorities.62 
 
Insecurity and Reasoning Otherwise 
 
The rapid expansion of military intelligence during the war caused significant 
changes in offices, duties, personnel, and records management. Unfortunately, in 1920 
when the RCMP was created as the central force for national policing, security and 
counter-intelligence much of the material created during the war by the Corps of Guides, 
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the Military Intelligence Branch, the Dominion Police, and the Royal North West 
Mounted Police was lost.   Following the merger, the original case files or fonds created 
in these early years of Canadian intelligence were destroyed and/or broken up.63  
Currently, the collections at Library Archives Canada in the Record Group 24 series, 
labelled Department of National Defence, which includes files inherited by the RCMP, is 
organized neither by the offices that created them, nor geographically by Military 
District.  The surviving files have been re-compiled by subject and date which leaves the 
historian with an arduous task of reconstructing the processes and procedures that created 
the documents.64   
From what has survived, it is still possible to understand the processes of 
intelligence gathering, the duties and responsibilities of officers and from there examine 
how the rise of the insecurity state relates to Canada’s founding principles of liberalism.  
The District Intelligence Officers, recruited from the disbanding Corps of Guides, often 
had their own agendas based on their white middle-class values. 
In the case files, it is clear that Intelligence Officers worked for the Department of 
Militia and Defence but the delineation between the Department of Militia and Defence 
and the State Department is also vague.  The man in charge of censorship, Ernest 
Chambers and a number of his deputies were formerly from this department and the 
Corps of Guides.  Censorship and limiting the spread of pro-German propaganda was a 
concern of both departments and they would be in constant communication.  The 
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intelligence officers also held a great deal of influence over regular army officers.  During 
the process of recruiting men for overseas battalions, the intelligence officers would 
intervene and make recommendations on who was to be discharged on suspicion of 
disloyalty.  The standard procedure was to discharge non-naturalized men of enemy 
nationality but sometimes there would be judgement calls made on the part of intelligence 
officers which unit commanders had to obey.    
This was the nature of intelligence in Military District (MD) 2.  This raises a 
question, were the procedures similar in MD 1 and did Canadian Intelligence worry about 
Berlin Ontario?  The answer, as we shall see is no.  The responsibilities were passed 
down almost entirely to local law enforcement depending on resources and priorities of 
superiors.  While it has been suggested that this depended too, on population distribution 
and the size of the district for which the intelligence officer was responsible, I conclude 
that there was never an intelligence officer appointed to the district.   
The commander of Military District 1, Colonel Shannon, received the same orders 
as other commanders to appoint an intelligence officer to his district.  He would have 
other priorities.  On his own prerogative, he prioritized gathering intelligence in the 
United States (Michigan) over domestic intelligence despite the fact that his district was a 
centre of German settlement.  The ethnic elites of Berlin had spent the previous decades 
constructing an image of the German-Canadian community that would come to be 
perceived differently as the imperial rivalry between Great Britain and Germany 
escalated into war.  Compounded by atrocities in Belgium, the sinking of the Lusitania, 
and low recruitment levels in Berlin, the German would be constructed as a disloyal 
liability, an enemy of Canada.  Oftentimes, words led to violence and vigilantism 
40 
 
described in the oral history accounts.  Where in Toronto such a tense situation would be 
handled by an intelligence officer, instead in Berlin local authorities, newspapermen, and 
regular army officers would control the situation.  Because this kind of “othering” based 
on ethnicity rather than class and economic values is fundamentally illiberal, the gradual 
implementing of the insecurity state apparatus, represented a decisive measure in the 
process of eroding the liberal order on the part of the state in favour of a more centralized 
strong-arm tactic, of social control.  This enables an examination of the home front in a 
very different lens than was possible in McKegney or Rutherdale because it 
acknowledges the non-linear development of reasoning otherwise as a stage in Canadian 
history.  
I will argue this case study provides the basis for a potential linking of the work of 
Marxist intelligence historians and the disciples of the insecurity state thesis.  “Reasoning 
otherwise” as described by Ian McKay refers to the erosion of the liberal order on the part 
of Canadian socialists in the early part of the twentieth century.  This was speeded up in 
direct response to the wartime economy which, through state intervention, also saw the 
abandonment of the liberal principles of free market economics and manpower 
management.  The rise of the insecurity state was part of the state’s undermining of the 
liberal order.  Ultimately the insecurity state’s existence depended upon the growth of 
industrial capitalism in Canada and directly related to the evolution in reasoning 
otherwise.    It was in the heavily populated and ethnically diverse urban centres where 
state fears about the growth of unions and the spread of communist revolutionary ideas, 
as well as other causes of civil unrest, originated.  It was these areas that warranted, in the 
eyes of the Department of Militia and Defence, the deployment of intelligence officers, 
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watchers, and infiltrators.  In parts of Canada where industrialization had not produced 
the same social tensions, there was less need to develop a new level of security.  Berlin, 
Ontario, within Military District 1, a centre of German settlement for the previous 
century, was not a large industrial centre and therefore, had not evolved to the same level 
of class or ethnic diversity and segregation. Here the insecurity state had yet to develop as 
a mechanism of social control in response to industrial urbanization, and the war as it had 
in Toronto or Military District 2 more generally.  The small scale of Berlin, with 
community organizations, well established local leaders and emphasis on municipal 
power as a means of negotiating the individual and the collective, proved a sufficiently 
coherent basis for intelligence gathering. Here, there was no the need to abandon the 
liberal order and to take the drastic wartime measures in the name of security required in 
Toronto and Winnipeg and Montreal.    
 
Notes on Terminology and Organization  
 
A word on terminology is necessary to conclude. The term “enemy alien” was 
used during the war to describe non-naturalized, predominantly male, immigrants from 
the Central Powers.65  At the outbreak of the war, thousands rushed to attain their 
naturalization papers and the rest were forced by law to register or face internment.66  In 
fact, as described by Rutherdale, the demonization of the German “enemy alien” 
expanded beyond the immediate influence of the war.  The term was also reapplied in 
                                                          
65 There is also an international literature pertaining to the experience of enemy aliens in the British empire.  
For an introduction of the legislative process and the Alien Act and internment in Great Britain see John 
Clement Bird “Control of Enemy Alien Civilians in Great Britain, 1914-1918” (PhD Thesis: University of 
London 1981) See also Panikos Panayi, Prisoners of Britain: German Civilians and Combatant Internees 
During the First World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).  
66 Barbara M. Wilson (ed.) Ontario and the First World War: 1914-1918: A Collection of Documents 
(Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1977), lxxi. 
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some cases to Canadian citizens of German ancestry as a smear tactic.  It was not that 
they were born to a people with which Canada was now at war; it was rather the very 
nature of their being, their culture, heritage, and inherent character that was now under 
attack.67  Often in English language newspapers in Berlin, the term “enemy alien” was 
used as a smear for “Canadians of German ancestry” or “German-Canadians.”  The latter 
terms refer to those born in Canada but are descended from German immigrants and 
settlers and identify themselves as German by ethnicity.  Whenever the question of 
loyalty was introduced into the discourse, being born in Canada seemed to make little 
difference in the eyes of hardened imperialists, especially during Berlin’s name change 
debate.  
“Ethnicity” and “race” are often used interchangeably because they have similar 
parameters and applications.  Contrary to the language of the time, neither are discussed 
from a scientific biological perspective by social historians, who instead treat them as 
social constructs.  It is indicative of a label or framework which individuals use to 
describe a group either from the outside or from within.  Conflict theorists, and this 
includes Marxists and disciples of Foucault, tend to emphasize the importance of negative 
labelling as an exercise of power on the part of one group over another.   
Ethnicity and race are also a means for self-identification with a larger community 
of people.  Sociological models of the internalization of an ethnic identity focus on a 
learning process referred to as ethnic socialization, which foregrounds reliance on a 
                                                          
67 Rutherdale, 121, an entire chapter of Hometown Horizons was dedicated to this very subject.  Kordan 
would add that the war reinforced rather than established who was friend or foe (or to use Andrew 
Parnaby’s terminology was “in” or “out”) but rather impressed upon people the idea that the “enemy alien” 
was “a problem.” Bohdan S. Kordan, No Free Man: Canada, The Great War, and the Enemy Alien 
Experience (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 7. 
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family and community environment in providing the staples of the culture associated with 
an ethnicity or race.68  The majority of works on German-Canadian communities use this 
framework. 
The thesis has been divided into two sections.  Part I describes the formation and 
effectiveness of the liberal order in Berlin and the resultant effects the war had on the 
German community.  Part II describes Canadian intelligence operations and the 
geographically uneven rise of the insecurity state.   
The first chapter contextualizes the region of Waterloo and the Germanic roots of 
the city of Berlin.  A part of this process was the rise of the German ethnic elite and their 
established narrative of German ancestry and heritage within Canada’s liberal order. It is 
also the story of how these ethnic elites entered the public discourse over the delicate 
balance between society and the individual and how “collectiveness” functions within an 
order that emphasises the individual. 
The second chapter recalls the history of anti-German sentiments in Berlin and 
elsewhere in Ontario during the war. It traces the attempts of the ethnic elite to preserve 
the image of the German-Canadian against the onslaught culminating in the loss of many 
of the cultural staples of the German community including the German language 
institutions and even the name of the city.  In spite of the shift away from the principles 
of liberalism and liberal democracy elsewhere in Canada, the chapter also shows that the 
solutions to the problems in Berlin remained overwhelmingly grounded in nineteenth 
century liberal traditions. 
                                                          
68 Alicia Fedelina Chávez, and Florence Guido-Dibrito “Racial and Ethnic Identity and Development” New 
Directions and Continuing Education 84 (Winter 1999): 42. 
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The third chapter outlines the history of recruitment in Berlin which was intended 
to quantifiably “prove” their loyalty to Canada and the Empire.  Despite this emphasis on 
loyalty in Berlin, the effects of the 1916 decline in volunteer recruitment led to an attack 
by soldiers of the 118th Overseas Battalion on all things German in the community.  The 
empirical quantitative evidence does not support the accusation made against the German 
community that the low recruitment levels were the result of their disloyalty to Canada 
and the British empire. 
Part II opens with chapter four, which contextualizes the threats posed to Canada 
by German operatives in the United States that have been presented in popular histories 
as constituting the “real” threat Canada faced.  The insecurity state was dependent upon 
the duality of the real and perceived threat to national security often relying on allies for 
guidelines.  This is important because the perception of the internal threat is dependent 
entirely on the fear of external threats.  The German operatives in the United States 
alarmed British and American authorities and the threat to Canada was handled mostly by 
them.  In Military District I, where the insecurity state was yet to evolve and focus the 
attention of intelligence gathering inwards, Colonel Shannon in Command focused his 
attention on the United States. 
Chapter five directly contrasts the mechanisms of the liberal order with those of 
the insecurity state.  It does so by showing the differences in the handling of dissidence 
and dissent in Military District I, Southwestern Ontario including Berlin and Military 
District II, including Toronto.  Here we see local authorities and members of the ethnic 
elites in Berlin doing essentially the same job as Military Intelligence Officers, 
investigating potential spies and saboteurs, enforcing censorship, and ensuring the 
45 
 
discharge of potentially disloyal enemy aliens from the Canadian Expeditionary Force in 
two profoundly different ways.   
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Chapter 1: Preserving the German in  
Ontario Before 1914 
 
Of the Germans, as a whole it need not 
hardly be said that they are among our best 
immigrants. In one sense they are “easily 
assimilated”, and yet in the long run it 
would seem as if it is often the others who 
are Germanized. However this may be, and 
not withstanding some faults, we welcome 
the German. 
                    -James S. Woodsworth1 
 
 
North America would prove a refuge for religious refugees after the Protestant 
Reformation in Europe dismantled any illusions of a shared identity under the umbrella of 
Christendom.  From this religious conflict would emerge the first group of Germans to 
immigrate to the United States.  They were the Mennonites, descendants of the 
Anabaptists who gained a foothold in the western provinces of the Holy Roman Empire 
as well as Switzerland, the Low Countries, and select communities in what is now 
Poland.  Anabaptists suffered the same kinds of persecution as other reform groups since 
their belief that baptism should take place at mature age was declared a heresy.2  Their 
beliefs also included a more literal interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount.3  This 
teaching would come to mean pacifism as followers would never take up arms against 
their enemies, which is still a fundamental teaching among the Mennonites. Leaving 
                                                          
1 James S. Woodsworth Strangers Within our Gates: or Coming Canadians (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1972), 84, first published in 1909. 
2 Michael G. Baylor, The German Reformation and the Peasants War: A Brief History with Documents 
(Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2012), 30. 
3 “But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and 
pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you.” Matthew 5:44 King James Version. 
47 
 
Central Europe to seek asylum in Great Britain would open the New World to them as a 
permanent place of refuge from religious persecution.4    
 Later events would scatter the German settlers, as well as the Mennonites, 
throughout what would become known as British North America.  In keeping with their 
teachings, Mennonites would play no part in the American Revolutionary War and their 
stay in Pennsylvania would not be affected.  For other German settlers of Presbyterian or 
Lutheran faith the question became one of loyalty.  The Revolutionary War would force 
United Empire Loyalist descendants of German settlers to migrate northwards.5  This 
exodus brought them into the Maritime provinces, as well as the Niagara Region and 
York in Upper Canada     
Further north than the settlements in Niagara, the chain of events that transformed 
the forests and swamplands of the Grand River into the centre of German settlement was 
actually an accident that followed a shaky land acquisition deal on the part of Richard 
Beasley.  In fact, historian Heinz Lehmann credits the “dirty deal” with ensuring German 
domination of the region.6  It is also an historical curiosity.  Up until then, the vast 
majority of settlement, and establishment of farming communities, tended not to stray far 
from the border region or the coasts of Lake Ontario and Lake Erie.  In 1796, 
approximately 94,000 acres of land was purchased indirectly from the Six Nations.  
Beasley, according to the deed, was not allowed to further subdivide and sell property 
until he had paid off the mortgage yet financial troubles would compel him to violate the 
agreement.  Anxious to draw settlers into the region, Beasley began selling plots of land 
                                                          
4 “The German Reformation” The Church of England Quarterly Review Vol. 32 (1852): 299. 
5 See Ross Fair, “‘Theirs was a Deeper Purpose:’ The Pennsylvania Germans of Ontario and the Craft of 
the Homemaking Myth” Canadian Historical Review 87 no. 4 (2006): 664-665. 
6 Lehmann, 69. 
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to Mennonites from Pennsylvania.7  Once they learned that Beasley did not technically 
own the land he was selling, the settlers were concerned about losing everything, 
including their deposits.  In response, the settlers turned to their brethren in Lancaster 
County Pennsylvania for help.  They agreed and convinced of the fertility of the soil in 
Ontario formed The German Company to purchase the remaining land.8  This started 
another great exodus from the United States into Canada. This time Mennonites pioneers 
trekked through the woods and hunting trails of Southern Pennsylvania to a swampy 
region of Upper Canada.9 
Slowly over the course of the century, the Pennsylvania Mennonite settlers would 
gradually disperse throughout the countryside and sell their land to incoming German 
pioneers to the Waterloo region, and the Scottish in Guelph.  Some were Auswanderers 
from Germany who needed to find a new market for their skillsets.10  In spite of the 
restoration efforts in Germany after the fall of Napoleon, there was a slow abandonment 
of the old guild system of artisans that controlled prices and trade capacity.  Tariffs were 
being lifted and free market liberalism was beginning to sweep the German domestic 
                                                          
7 I.C. Bricker, “The History of Waterloo Township up to 1825” WHS 21 & 22 (1934), 86-9.  This article 
also contains a comprehensive list of plot purchases by the settlers.  
8 Transcripts of the purchases from the six nations and also the purchase by the Germans were reproduced 
in WHS 7 (1919), 84-87 and 87-90 respectively. 
9 The route was described by I.C. Bricker using period maps and folk stories of the journey see I.C. Bricker 
“The Trek of the Pennsylvanians to Canada in the Year 1805 WHS Vol 22 (1934): 123.  Marlene Epp has 
been pointed out that the literature on Mennonites has been rooted too heavily in folk tradition, 
mythmaking and trans-national narratives. Marlene Epp, “Pioneers, Refugees, Exiles, and Transnationals: 
Gendering Diaspora in an Ethno Religious Context” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association Vol 
12(2001): 138 and 140-141.  
10 “Auswanderer” refers to skilled and semi-skilled migrants, Mack Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 
1816-1885 (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1964), 47. See question in text. 
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economy in places like Hamburg, Württemberg, and the Hesse-Darmstadt region11 where 
the tanners that would settle in Canada originated.     
 In the 1830s, the first of the new group of German settlers chose Berlin as the 
name for the small hamlet that emerged.  It consisted mostly of log houses on private 
land, farms, grain and lumber mills, and the earliest roads which were cut through the 
woods by the landowners.  Joseph Schneider, who owned a lumber mill, built one such 
road from his log home to what is now the intersection of King and Queen Street.12 
Jacob Hailer was the first German-born pioneer settler to the Waterloo region.  He 
immigrated to Baltimore, Maryland from Baden and in 1833 purchased a plot of 
Mennonite land.  There he built his workshop and began crafting furniture and wagon 
wheels.  Direct immigration from Germany would peak over the next ten years because 
of events that occurred in Germany.  The liberal revolution was slowing eroding the old 
order in Central Europe, specifically the guild system that regulated German craftsmen, 
creating an employment crisis, and in the south east states including Baden and 
Wüttemberg, the potato crops were failing.13       
The years 1867 and 1871 would bring further changes to the immigration 
dynamic.  Canada and Germany were now nations and no longer ideas or approximations 
on a map.  Canada’s first national government, under Sir John A. Macdonald, would push 
through an aggressive immigration policy in order to settle the western frontier.  While 
                                                          
11 See Theodore S. Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany, 
1815-1871 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 27-29 and Waldtraut Elisabeth Vey “The German 
Immigrants of Waterloo County, 1840-1900” (Master’s Thesis University of Western Ontario, 1977), 15-
16. 
12 W.B. Utley, “Joseph Schneider: Founder of the City” WHS Vol. 17, (1929): 113-115 Schneider Haus has 
been restored and is now a museum standing on Queen Street Between Schneider Avenue and Schneider 
Creek.  In 2016 transit construction crews working on King Street uncovered the corduroy road from circa 
1815 see “Under Uptown Waterloo, 2016” WHS Vol. 104 (2016): 194 and back cover. 
13 Parr, The Gender of Breadwinners, 125. 
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British subjects were the preferred group, for the purposes of agriculture, the Macdonald 
government was forced to look elsewhere due to the pool of available farmers in Great 
Britain having been drained by the transitions of enclosure, urbanization and heavy 
industry.  Between 1870 and 1890, the Germans would be considered a viable alternative 
by Macdonald and his deputy minister John Lowe.14  While Germans were the third 
largest immigrant group, it was not an easy trip to Canada.  The migration by Germans to 
Canada often passed through the United States.  Steamships ferried immigrants on the 
Bremen and Hamburg-New York route with regular service provided by the Nord 
Deutscher Lloyd and Hamburg America Lines.  The route to Quebec City, on the other 
hand, was still dominated by smaller sailing ships at a higher ticket price.  Thus, for the 
many German immigrants whose final destination was Canada the costs were high.  This 
was intentional as Bismarck hoped to limit the number of people leaving Germany by 
limiting travel opportunities and outlawing advertisements inviting immigration to 
Canada. 
 
Industrialization and the Rise of the German Ethnic Elite 
 
The story of industrialization in Berlin/Waterloo is very much the story of 
prominent German immigrant families who came to Canada in the 19th century.  Among 
them were prominent tanners, the Langs and the Breithaupts, but also manufacturers 
including the Hailers and the Kaufmans   Rounding out this group of community leaders 
were the families of newspapermen, the Rittingers and the Motzes. 
                                                          
14 Jonathan Wagner, A History of Migration from Germany to Canada, 1850-1939 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2006), 76-77. 
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Reinhold Lang and his son George immigrated to Canada in 1849 from the 
Weibstadt (Rhineland) Germany and established a tannery on Foundry Street.15  This 
original structure burned down in 1853 and the Lang Tannery would relocate to Francis 
and Charles Street.  Reinhold died in 1883 and George inherited the business; under his 
leadership, the Lang tannery became one of the largest manufacturers of leather in the 
British Empire.     
The Lang’s had a competitor from a more politically active family of tanners. The 
Breithaupts were Berlin’s first family, and prominent members, specifically in the 
Kreuzberger line, would become community leaders as part of the ethnic elite.  In 1843 
Auswanderer Liborius Breithaupt, a tanner from Allendorf Germany, brought his trade to 
Buffalo New York and St. Catherine’s, Ontario.   His son Philip Ludwig “Louis” 
Breithaupt who inherited the family business would expand the firm into the Waterloo 
region when in 1853 he married Catherine Hailer.16  She was the daughter of Jacob 
Hailer.  Additionally, the Breithaupts also had a hand in land brokerage and mortgages.17  
Much of the land around the tannery in the north ward was purchased in the 1870s as well 
as portions of King Street.    
Together Louis and Catherine had ten children, three born in Buffalo and seven in 
Berlin.  The Breithaupt tannery, which opened in 1857 was built on land obtained from 
Louis’s new father-in-law.  He died in 1880 while serving as mayor of Berlin.  Of the ten 
                                                          
15 According to legend, the Langs originally settled in Chicago and walked to Berlin, Glover, 357 
16 As much as this move has been attributed to a string of fires in his American factories, supply and 
demand, fleeing the American Civil War and family connections, it has also been noted that Berlin offered 
the added benefit of cultural protection since the Buffalo “melting pot” threatened the German culture and 
language.  Andrew McCauley Thompson, “The Breithaupts and Breithaupt Leather: Building a Family 
Business in Berlin Ontario” (PhD Thesis University of Waterloo, 1992), 40. 
17 Chartered Banks were restricted in real estate lending.  The literature on private lending in Ontario is 
severely limited compared to larger firms see ibid, 104-105. 
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children, the eldest son Louis Jacob Breithaupt attended the University of Toronto and 
continued the family business of tanning and politics.  He served as Mayor in 1888, one 
term as MPP for Waterloo North, School Board chairman, and one-time president of the 
Board of Trade.18  The second of the ten, William Henry Breithaupt, was a civil engineer 
who ran the Berlin and Bridgeport Electric Street Railway and would also serve on the 
Board of Directors of Victoria Park and be the first President of the Waterloo Historical 
Society.19  The third son John Christian Breithaupt was also mayor in 1896 at which time 
Victoria Park was opened and the new Grand Trunk Railway station built.  Erza “Carl” 
Breithaupt was also a president of the Board of Trade and was manager of the Berlin Gas 
Company which generated electricity for the city.  He was killed in a gas explosion at the 
plant in 1897. 
Tanning was by nature a conservative enterprise in North America.  In spite of 
advances in Europe in chemistry and automation that simplified the process, 
manufacturing in the hinterland encouraged the maintenance of the traditional tanning 
process.  This involved soaking hides in a lye solution to loosen the hairs followed by a 
shave and the long process of dunking in a solution of water and oak bark.  All that was 
needed for Berlin’s first tanneries was water and a steady supply of bark and hides from 
slaughterhouses.20  Put simply, the road to industrialization and mechanization did not 
come through the tanneries.  Instead mechanization would emerge elsewhere in other 
enterprises.  It was however, dependent on the economic privilege enjoyed by the earliest 
                                                          
18 His son Louis Orville Breithaupt attended the University of Toronto, took over the tannery, served as 
mayor, MP, and Lieutenant Governor of Ontario in 1952. 
19 KPL Central Grace Schmidt Room T.H. Breithaupt, Chronicle of the Breithaupt Family vol II (Hanover, 
1903), 4-6. 
20 Thompson, 24-26 and Peter Welsh “A Craft that Resisted Change: American Tanning Practices to 1850” 
Technology and Culture 4 (1963): 299-317. 
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manufacturers, especially after men like the Breithaupts entered the business of land 
speculation and the municipal regime.   The Board of Trade, dominated by the ethnic elite 
was the force behind industrialization and the ethnic elite of Berlin included other 
German immigrant families that transformed Berlin into an industrial hub.  In fact, Berlin 
has been referred to as the leather capital, the felt capital, the shoe capital, and furniture 
capital of Canada.  Ulysse Pequegnat, a Swiss watchmaker who left Europe to escape the 
decline of protective guilds, settled in Berlin in 1874 and his son established the Arthur 
Pequegnat Clock Company (after a failed attempt to build motorcycles).  In addition to 
his business, Arthur was also superintendent of the Sunday School and a schoolboard 
chairman.21  Cabinetmaker Johan Heinrich Krug and his son Hartman, having emigrated 
from Hessen, founded Krug Furniture in 1880.  The main factory adjacent to the G.T.R. 
railway station, like the Lang Tannery, could claim to be largest of its time in the British 
Empire.  There was also Emil Vogelsang from Baden Germany who built the Canadian 
Ivory Button Works on Queen Street before selling the building to Williams Green & 
Rome in 1884, George Schlee nicknamed “Berlin’s most active builder,” the son of a 
labourer from Mecklenberg Germany who operated the Walper Hotel on King and Queen 
Street, and George Rumpel former mayor and the founder of the Rumpel Felt Company 
whose family came from Saxony.  Ethnic elitism, in this case, was an exclusively male 
enterprise, for the most part, because the public institutions in which the discourse 
                                                          
21 See G. Edmond Burrows, Canadian Clocks and Clockmakers (Oshawa: Kalabi Enterprises Ltd., 1973), 
39-40. 
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occurred were solely male organizations.  Women are highly underrepresented in the 
public discourse and source material.22 
By 1900, it seemed that leather tanning was a thing of the past to be replaced by 
synthetics and rubber.  Albert L. Breitaupt (the sixth son), along with Jacob Kaufman and 
Louis Weber opened a plant on Margaret street, adjacent to the Breithaupt tannery, that 
made rubber boots.  Kaufman, along with his son Alvin, also founded the Merchant’s 
Rubber Company on Breithaupt Street and Kaufman footwear at the intersection of King 
and Francis.23   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1874, Berlin adopted a factory policy at the behest of council members 
Reinhold Lang and Conrad Stuebing.  It promised a five-year exemption from property 
taxes and further annual bonuses for building rentals for new businesses.24  Soon the 
“Dunke block” was built for Berlin’s furniture factories including Hoffman’s and the 
                                                          
22 Audrey Pyée “L’identité des élites canadiennes-allemandes de Berlin (Kitchener) et Waterloo, Ontario, 
1880-1914” (Master’s Thesis, York University, 1997), 7-8.  
23 KPL Grace Schmidt Room, Robert A. Glover, Old Factory Smoke: Berlin Ontario (Waterloo: University 
of Waterloo Bookstore: 2013), 330. 
24 Uttley, 193. 
Figure 1.2 Kaufman Footwear, 1908 
Photo by the author, May 2018 
Figure 1.1 Lang Tanning Co. 1853  
Photo by the author, May 2018 
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Simpson-Aldous and Anthes.  Free market expansion at an unprecedented pace would 
transform the manufacturing industry in Berlin.  Market power and price fixing through 
mergers were found in every facet of Canadian industry after the tariffs of 1879.25  In 
1907, Jacob Kaufmann sold Merchants Rubber Company to the Canadian Consolidated 
Rubber Company, the large Montreal based firm.  It would not end here.  Talmon Rieder, 
a Berliner working in the Consolidated Rubber Company head office in Montreal, 
convinced the company to choose Berlin to open the Dominion Tire Factory in its effort 
to capitalize on the growing demand for automobiles.  In July 1912, voters approved a 
by-law to grant the Canadian Consolidated Rubber Company a long-term fixed 
assessment in exchange for constructing the largest factory in the city.26  The Dominion 
Tire Factory opened in 1913 on the Grand Trunk Railway Line. (figure 1.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The power of the ethnic elites in the municipal regime and manufacturing can be 
seen in the 1911 census records.  Berlin’s population by heads of household heads by 
wards (Figure 1:4) shows that the ethnic Germans made up the majority, with the British 
                                                          
25 See R.T. Naylor, The History of Canadian Business, 1867-1914 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen’s 
University Press, 2006), 184. 
26 Elizabeth Bloomfield “Economy, Necessity, Political Reality: Two Panning Efforts in Kitchener-
Waterloo, 1912-1925 Urban History Review 9, n. 1 (1980): 6.  
Figure 1.3 Dominion Tire 
Factory (Source: Berlin’s Last 
Bonus: How Kitchener Became 
the Rubber Capital of Canada 
WHS 74, 1986) 
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being second in three wards and the combined eastern European, many of whom may 
have spoken German, population in second in the other two.  The Centre Ward included 
the downtown around the intersection of King and Queen Street (and where the 
Merchants Bank was located) and included the historic “Civic Centre Neighbourhood” of 
affluent Queen Anne style homes.  Because of this, the population is lowest of the four 
wards and is more equally divided between Germans and English. The British represent 
the largest group in the East Ward of Berlin where mostly new construction sprawled 
creating a heavily populated area of working-class homes.  The British presence is at its 
lowest in the West Ward adjacent to the commercial centre and the location of the Lang 
Tannery, Kaufmann Furniture and Victoria Park.  The North and West Wards had the 
greatest concentrations of Eastern Europeans, former subjects of the Austro-Hungarian 
and Russian empires.  The North Ward was dominated by the Breithaupt family ownings 
including the Tannery and Consolidated Rubber.  In earning power (and employment) in 
Berlin among heads of households, (figure 1:5) the ethnic Germans narrowly dominated 
the upper level employment categories of manufacturing (62.3%), foremen (61.5%), 
merchants (58.9%) and “Gentlemen” (62.5%) but slipped below the British in the 
managerial (39.5%) and professional (43.7%) categories.27  Such positions were not as 
family oriented and frequently required specialized education.  A number of Berlin’s sons 
(including a Breithaupt) were sent to Toronto for that reason.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 1911 Census summaries, KPL Grace Schmidt Room John K. English Berlin, Ontario-1916, figure 12.  
57 
 
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Centre Ward
South Ward
West Ward
North Ward
East Ward
Nationalities By Wards
Other E. European German British
0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00%
Foreman
Semi-Professional
Professional
Merchant
Managerial
Manufacturing
Gentleman
Contractor
Traveller
City Officials
Ethnic Levels in Upper Employment
British German E. European Other
Figure 1.4 Nationalities by Wards (Source: 1911 Census summaries, KPL 
Grace Schmidt Room & John K. English Berlin, Ontario-1916) 
Figure 1.5 Ethnic Levels in Upper Employment (Source: 1911 Census 
Summaries, KPL Grace Schmidt Room John K. English Berlin, Ontario-1916) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
 The forces behind industrialization in Berlin were dependent also on the 
protective tariffs of the Macdonald era and the free market economy that was enshrined 
in the Canadian liberal experiment.  The Board of Trade in Berlin and the municipal 
regime were inseparable.  Wages in Berlin were low compared to Hamilton, but the 
smaller scale of family-owned enterprises ensured more favourable working conditions.  
In the 1890s, while the Ontario economy had slowed, Berlin prospered.  When Prime 
Minister Charles Tupper arrived on his campaign stop in June 1896, he could not help but 
notice the enthusiasm for his protectionist economic policies.28  Unlike Hamilton and 
London whose economies had been suffering, the National Policy was an easy sell in this 
industrializing city.       
 
Liberalism and the Urban Landscape of Berlin 
 
The 1911 census elevated Berlin to the status of city.  Striking a balance between 
liberty, municipal government and development required negotiation.  As argued by 
Michèle Dagenais, paraphrasing Patrick Joyce, liberal governance while centralizing 
liberty required regulation of municipal institutions to enshrine a repeatable process 
across the country.29  City planning, however, was slow in coming to Upper-
Canada/Ontario, because of constraints placed on municipal power.  Berlin’s first roads 
only needed to connect, one way or another, to Queen Street, which created a plethora of 
trails, and pathways in and around Schneider house.  By the mid-nineteenth century, the 
whole area had been transformed into a grid. 
                                                          
28 See “The Coming of Age, 1880-1912” in John English and Kenneth McLaughlin, Kitchener an 
Illustrated History (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1983).  
29 Dagenais 211. Patrick Joyce, The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City (London: Verso, 
2003), 1. 
59 
 
The commercial center surrounding the historic intersection of King Street West 
and Queen Street North split Berlin’s strictly residential areas into one section to the east 
south east, another section north of Victoria Street and the Grand Trunk Railway Line, 
and a third small pocket surrounding Victoria Park in the west.  Also centered near this 
historic intersection, and built along the railway lines, was the industrial heart of the city.  
Railways and the environment were the most influential forces in the shaping of the old 
city.  Older maps such as the 1853-54 lot survey by M.C. Schofield for George John 
Grange (figure 1.6), show a city sprawling almost exclusively to the northwest around the 
Grand Trunk towards the current demarcation between Kitchener and Waterloo.  Thus, 
the center of the map, insinuating the center of the city, was the old railway station on 
Victoria Street. East of Queen Street shows very little development at the time and the 
Southwest which would become Victoria Park indicated a barrier of unusable swampland 
and the large Schneider farm.  Between 1853 and 1893 the one east-west line became two 
with the addition of a north-south line.  Connecting Berlin to the commercial empire of 
the St. Lawrence, the Grand Trunk also accelerated Berlin’s population growth.  While 
Irish immigrants exploded the populations of neighbouring Guelph, Toronto, and 
London, Dominion immigration in Quebec saw Berlin as the place to send non-British 
immigrants.      
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6 “Map of part of the town 
of Berlin” 1853 (Source: Region of Waterloo) 
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Figure 1.7 “Town of 
Berlin With Views 
of Principle Business 
Buildings” 1892 
Detail 
 
1. Schneider Haus 
2. Canadian Ivory     
     Buttonworks 
   -Later Williams 
Green & Rome 
3. Lang Tannery 
4. Lot 17, Schneider  
    Farm, Soon to be  
    Victoria Park 
The first map drawn to showcase the changes industrialization had brought to the 
region was the 1892 “Town of Berlin” by Toronto Lithograph.  More of a bird’s eye view 
than a map, it was a glimpse of Berlin after the initial industrial boom yet before major 
reconstructions on King Street and before the creation of Victoria Park.  It also predated 
the pre-war crisis of urban development.  Like many maps of this period, the relationship 
between the urban and “nature” is worth mentioning.  Trees are placed in ordered lines 
within city limits with rows of what appear to be cultured cedars (or possibly poplars) 
lining the streets surrounding the factories.  It was a style choice made to balance the 
image of Berlin as both small town and industrial hub and negotiate individualism and 
the collective in a liberal way.  Many nineteenth century maps such as this portray the 
city as standardized, uniform, and meticulously ordered where common identities could 
be realized.30  Most buildings are portrayed in the same colour scheme and construction 
even if they were built decades apart and for quite different purposes. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 Joyce, 44-45. 
 
 
 
 
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In 1894, after a housing boom in the centre of the city, Town Council bought 
Schneider’s farm, lot 17, and appointed a Board of Park Management.  Among the 
members were August Lang, L.J. Breithaupt, and J.S. Hoffman.  The chairman was Karl 
Müller an artist from Germany who had greater longing for the old country than his 
fellow board members.  The new parkland, name in honour of the Queen, was officially 
opened on Dominion Day 1896.    
In 1924, at the British Empire Exhibition, Thomas Adams and Horace Seymore 
presented Kitchener/Waterloo as a model for the future of town planning.  This was a 
significant achievement considering the urban landscape demonstrated in the 1912 map 
“Busy Berlin” by M.S. Boem & Company in Toronto. (figure 1.8) 
“Busy Berlin” like its predecessor highlighted the industrial “progress” that had 
been made transforming a historically Mennonite region of the province into a modern 
city.  Berlin’s industries are all highlighted and numbered in red.  Clearly visible are the 
expansion of the railway lines including a new line to Preston, the urban sprawl towards 
Waterloo and a new housing development project that was in the works to deal with 
Berlin’s housing crisis.  Highlighted in red, this project was a variation of wheel and 
spoke plan on the far side of Victoria Park.  It also shows most residential buildings and 
the results of the building boom on King Street courtesy of money lent by the 
Breithaupts.  In fact, the map is so detailed, the structures of Victoria Park are all labeled 
including the Kaiser’s Bust, the statue of Queen Victoria, the Band Stand, and the 
Pavilion.   
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Figure 1.8 “Busy Berlin” (Source: Region of Waterloo) 
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By 1912, Berlin was facing serious challenges having grown so rapidly.  The city 
was becoming overcrowded, King Street was congested and the street and railway 
crossings were unsafe for most traffic.  Additionally, the automobile was emerging as a 
competitor for road space and safety for horse drawn carts.  The concerns of business 
owners were put forward to City Hall in November 1912 by none other than W.H. 
Breithaupt.  He argued that King Street’s traffic problem was the result of too few 
connections between the city’s individual wards.  The North Ward as one example, above 
Victoria Street and the Grand Trunk Railroad were cut off except for access via King 
Street in the West and Margaret in the East.  King Street was also the only way to travel 
to and from Waterloo.  As one solution, he recommended that Blucher Street be widened 
to create a bypass and ease the traffic flow onto King Street.31  By no coincidence, such a 
project would have improved transportation from the Breithaupt Leather Tannery (on 
Margaret Street) to King Street West towards Waterloo and increased property values 
among the family holdings above Victoria Street.  (figure 1.9) 
 Breithaupt, Kaufman and Daniel Detwieler (the man credited with bringing 
hydro-electricity to Berlin)32 were the loudest voices in Berlin calling for outside planners 
and in 1914 came the “Leavitt Plan.” Their timing, however, was a problem.  According 
to Elizabeth Bloomfield, Berlin was caught between its image of progressive municipal 
policies and its commitment to keep property taxes low.  Large property owners held the 
advantage in determining property values and zoning and small property owners in the 
                                                          
31 “Berlin City Council Minutes” Berlin Daily Telegraph November 5, 1912.  
32 See Jack Lucas, Fields of Authority: Special Purpose of Governance in Ontario, 1815-2015 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2016), 48-49.  Adam Beck was extremely popular in Berlin as well see H.V. 
Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines & Hydro Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 301-303. 
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business district as well as owners of suburban properties were overwhelmingly opposed 
given the potential effects on property value.33  This was especially true since the housing 
boom had just ended in Berlin.  
 
 
  
 The 1914 Charles W. Leavitt, a New York based firm, plan for Berlin/Waterloo 
(figure 1.10) reflected Breithaupt’s concerns.  This plan has a large boulevard circling the 
old city surrounded by an uncompromising wheel and spoke design for new suburbs. It 
includes Breithaupt’s self-serving idea of transforming Blucher Street into a direct route 
to Waterloo and a bypass that solved a minor problem in Breithaupt’s initial proposal: 
that the route would have been blocked by Mount Hope Cemetery in which the 
Breithaupt patriarch, and two brothers, were buried.  This was a plan that W.H. 
Breithaupt staunchly supported and he kept a copy on his office wall.  This copy is now 
part of the collection of the Briethaupt Papers at the University of Waterloo.   
                                                          
33 Elizabeth Bloomfield “Reshaping the Urban Landscape? Town Planning Efforts in Kitchener/Waterloo, 
1912-1926” in Gilbert A. Stetler and Alan F.J. Artibise (eds), Shaping the Urban Landscape: Aspects of the 
Canadian City Building Process (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1982), 295. 
Figure 1.9 The North Ward 
Busy Berlin detail.  This shows 
the disconnect caused by the 
Grand Trunk Railway and the 
potential of Blucher street, the 
Breithaupt Leather Tannery is 
labeled 59 (Source:) 
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Figure 1.10 Charles W. Leavitt Jr. City Plan For Greater Berlin (Source: UWL 
Archives,  Breithaupt Hewetson Clark Collection) 
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There was a serious problem with the Leavitt plan, it was too expensive and the 
municipal power to force the province to recognize the importance of such an endeavor 
was limited.34  It was not until the passing of the Ontario Planning and Development Act 
of 1917 that municipal governments had the authority to appoint planning commissions.35  
By the time Adams and Seymore presented their plan for the city in 1924, there were no 
signs at all of the Leavitt influence.  In the meantime, city council needed to deal with the 
housing problem.  In February 1914, by-laws were passed outlawing new construction on 
undeveloped laneways citing the inefficiencies associated with providing city services 
like water and sewage when the building is erected before the permanent street level is 
established.36  Additionally the Berlin Housing Company was formed, modeled after a 
similar organization in Toronto, to buy property and build houses for mechanics and 
workers.37    
Berlin’s transformation into an urban industrial hub was both a product and 
builder of the city’s ethnic elite.  As the city evolved through industrial expansion and 
strategic plans of the Board of Trade, the ethnic elite’s power and influence was further 
cemented.  This was the product and intent of the allocated powers of the municipal 
regime.   
In Berlin’s “age of transition” problems with overcrowding, sanitation, and traffic 
loomed.  The solutions were found in the powers of the ethnic elite and the municipal 
regime, however, there were external forces at play to contend with.  The German 
identity of the city would face a number of challenges as the governing liberal order came 
                                                          
34 Bloomfield “Reshaping the Urban Landscape?”, 271-273. 
35 Lucas, 52-53. 
36 Elizabeth Bloomfield, “Economy, Necessity, Political Reality”, 19.  
37 Bloomfield “Reshaping the Urban Landscape?”, 271. 
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under attack.  The 1870s brought changes to the education system of Ontario, the German 
language newspapers began a decline, and it became a task of the ethnic elite to defend 
“the German” or as some historians have suggested “their German.” 
 
German Language Instruction and the Ethnic Elite 
The meaning of language as an indicator or staple of cultural identity in the 
Waterloo region has been the subject of debate among historians.  The debate has taken 
place in the literature on German language instruction in Waterloo County and in 
response to Jonathan Zimmerman’s views on language schooling, acquisition and 
ethnicity. From one perspective, a mother tongue is a signifier of a cultural identity and 
thus language would have a special place among the defenders of said cultural identity.  
According to Zimmerman, linguistic power was more complex among immigrant groups.  
Regional divisions in the old country, Italy and Germany in particular which would not 
become united entities until 1871, affected any collective efforts at forging a cultural 
identity in the new world.  The Italians, Poles, Germans, and Jews he studied in Chicago 
fought against Anglicization through language instruction but also against the 
conservative defenders of standardized languages because they preferred a degree of 
agency over their own cultural identity through what Zimmerman dubbed “a babel of 
dialects.”38  Zimmerman’s duality of English-only laws and ethnic leaders denial of 
immigrant communities the right to define themselves, was applied to language 
instruction and the German ethnic elite by Barbara Lorenzkowski.39  Her work shows a 
                                                          
38 Jonathan Zimmerman, “Ethnics against Ethnicity: European Immigrants and Foreign-Language 
Instruction, 1890-1940” The Journal of American History 88, no. 4 (2002): 1385-1386.  
39 She never uses the term “ethnic elite” but it is heavily implied as a world of class privilege. 
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debate in Berlin/Waterloo over language instruction and whether or not language was a 
signifier of German identity.40  The ethnic elite battled the anglicization of the school 
system, and school inspector Thomas Pearce, and an alleged general unwillingness of 
parents to enroll students in German language classes.  Within Canada’s liberal order, it 
would appear that Zimmerman’s duality was ultimately a battle over individualism.  
Liberal hegemony allows an immigrant community to speak its own language and study 
it in school, however, in Zimmerman’s framework, this individual freedom is denied by 
both the attacker and defender of language education.   
Benjamin Bryce sees the power structures differently.  In his 2013 article he 
reinforced the older premise about the importance of language to cultural identity and 
discussed the changing nature of language schooling as an exercise of state power that 
centralized the curriculum in Ontario and intentionally undermined bilingual schooling.41  
Lorenzkowski, he said, while providing an intriguing account of ethnicity, did not 
sufficiently consider the power structures of citizen and state, in this case the German 
language speakers and the language policies, as an expression of linguistic ideology of 
the province of Ontario.42  This focuses our attention on the illiberal nature of centralized 
schooling because as the state enlarges itself and undermines both the municipal regime 
and local schoolboards.   
                                                          
40 Barbara Lorenzkowski “Languages of Ethnicity: Teaching German in Waterloo County’s Schools, 1850-
1915” Histoire sociale/Social History 41 no. 81 (2008), 1-89. 
41 Benjamin Bryce, “Linguistic Ideology and State Power: German and English Education in Ontario, 1880-
1912” The Canadian Historical Review, Vol 94 No. 2 (2013): 207-233. 
42 Ibid, 211. 
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Instruction in German in Berlin had been a staple of the community since the 
beginning, long before the first forms of academic regulation.43  Schooling was another 
dimension of the municipal regime and voluntary society in which the ethnic elites of 
Berlin participated.  Bryce examined the rise of centralized control over core aspects, 
including textbooks and teachers’ certificates by a provincial bureaucracy based in 
Toronto.44  Between 1870 and 1912 the administrative bureaucracy of schooling and the 
influence of politicians had significantly expanded and Bryce unravels the complexities 
beyond a clash of central and regional power.   
In Ontario, the School Act of 1871 centralized education standards for common 
schools, rebranded public schools, brought language issues to the forefront in Berlin and 
Waterloo County.  The act empowered the Boards of Trustees to decide if French, 
German, or other languages should be taught at the request of parents or guardians, 
however, the primary language of instruction for all core subjects would be English.45  
For the German schools this came as a significant blow given that the language of the 
household had been demoted to one class in language instruction rather than the language 
of the school.   With English becoming the standard language of instruction, it was now 
becoming the language of the public, business and politics in Ontario, making it a 
language of necessity outside the household as the schooling legislation was central to the 
transformation of Ontario into a unilingual space. 
                                                          
43 This refers to the first Common School Act, 1843 see Thomas Pearce “School History, Waterloo County 
and Berlin” WHS Vol. 2 (1914), 33 and 41-42.  
44 Bryce, 214. 
45 Werner Bausenhart German Immigration and Assimilation in Ontario, 1783-1918 (New York: Legas, 
1989), 88. 
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New agencies were also created in order to maintain the new standards and Berlin 
needed to appoint an inspector that answered to the Department of Public Instruction.  In 
June 1871, the editorial page of the German language newspaper The Berliner Journal 
included pleas that the soon to be appointed school inspector should be bilingual in 
English and German.  Instead, Thomas Pearce, from Ireland, was appointed and his grasp 
of the German language was limited.46  Barbara Lorenzkowski, in her examination of 
language instruction has challenged the orthodoxy that Pearce was on a crusade against 
German language instruction.  His goal, she said, was to increase attendance and build 
more permanent structures, and as long as the German language instruction did not 
interfere, he would do no harm.47  Still, after 1871 there was serious decline in access and 
enrolment in German schooling.  Both Lorenzkowski and Bryce’s statistical reading of 
Thomas Pearce’s reports show that in 1889, for example, the number of “German pupils 
in Berlin was 745 and only 9% enrolled in German classes.48  Bryce also showed that in 
Berlin there was only one teacher for the 745 “German” students.49 
There were signs within the community that the German language was in decline.  
The St. Peter’s Lutheran pastor Reinhold von Pirch introduced English language sermons 
for the first time and was welcomed with so much enthusiasm, extra chairs were needed 
on Sundays.  Likewise, the Berliner Journal continuously berated the German/English 
hybrid language being spoken on the streets.  In Lehmann’s classic account, the damage 
was done, German schooling was finished and the collateral damage could be seen in the 
                                                          
46 For an overview of the campaign see Lorenzkowski 11-12 
47 Lorenzkowski, “Languages of Ethnicity” 15-16. 
48 Ibid, 18 and Bryce 226. 
49 Bryce, 227. 
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1911 nominal census records.50  The story, however, had an epilogue and in the 
beginning of the twentieth century there was a German language renaissance.   
Fearing the effects of exclusively English education, an attempt was made by the 
German ethnic elite to save German language by adhering to the freedoms they enjoyed 
under the liberal order.  Karl Müler spearheaded a public movement, with the support of 
the German press and the churches, to create the Deutscher Schulverein.  Membership 
also included Rev Boese, Dr. Hoffman and L.J. Breithaupt.51  The Schulverein was 
designed as a protective alliance amongst the surviving German schools.  Within ten 
years, enrolment was at an all-time high as parents were encouraged to send their children 
to schools under the banner of the Schulverein.52  The Berliner Journal announced that in 
six years, enrolment had increased from an alarming 185 in 1900 to 800 by 1906 and 
these numbers would continue to rise throughout the decade.53  In Bryce’s statistics the 
numbers increased to 1,355 1913 and 1,615 by 1915.54 
Lorenzkowski thought it an interesting twist that the Berliner Journal would 
sympathize with the plight of the French who were scorned for clinging to their mother 
tongue while the Germans were praised for abandoning theirs.55  For Bryce, it was the 
same debate.56  In the summer of 1912 came the first draft of the highly controversial 
Regulation 17 presented by the protectionist Conservative government of James Whitney.  
It was drafted in response to the constitutional crisis in Manitoba over French language 
                                                          
50 See Lehmann, 75. 
51 They also feared for the state of the German language in Buffalo, Gottliebe Leibbrandt, Little Paradise: 
The Saga of the German Canadians of Waterloo County, Ontario, 1800-1975 (Kitchener: Allprint 
Company Limited, 1980), 97. 
52 Ibid, 89. 
53 “Deutsche Schulverein” Berliner Journal, December 26, 1906, 6. 
54 These are based on the Reports of the Minister, Bryce, 228. 
55 Lorenzkowski, Sounds of Ethnicity, 58 and “Languages of Ethnicity”, 20-21. 
56 Bryce, 226. 
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schooling and a fear of the decline of English language instruction in Ontario.  At the 
time, opponents, including Napoléon Belcourt and Henri Bourassa, called it tyrannical 
and historians have blamed it for Quebec’s unwillingness to support the war effort since 
it equated English Canada to Prussian ethnic nationalism.57  Commissions had concluded 
that English instruction in Ontario’s bilingual schools was poor, thus Regulation 17 was 
drafted by the Ministry of Education to solve the problem.  Standards were not met in 
spelling, grammar, composition, and pronunciation, and they were to become the central 
focus of the new curriculum.58  The focus for historians, for the most part, has been the 
effect of Regulation 17 on French-English relations, since the intent was to eliminate 
French schools.  Too easy to overlook is the fact that it was an all-encompassing 
regulation that deprived more linguistic minorities of their rights than just the French.  By 
default, German language education would suffer the same fate as French under the new 
regulation.  German would be limited to one hour per day and only at the request of 
parents.  Fortunately for some the regulation was stalled at Queen’s Park, however, in 
March 1915 the school trustees voted to disband German-languages classes. 
 
The Berliner Journal 
The story of German language presses is well known to local historians.  It has 
been written, quite correctly, as a story of gradual decline and amalgamation under a 
single firm, until the Great War ultimately shut down the German language press.  The 
Berliner Journal was owned by Friedrich Rittinger and John Motz, two first generation 
                                                          
57 See for example Patrice A. Dutil “Against Isolationism: Napoléon Belcourt, French Canada and ‘La 
grande guerre” David Mackenzie ed. Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honor of Robert Craig 
Brown (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 97-98. 
58 Bryce, 218. 
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Canadians with extensive backgrounds in printing.59  John Motz came from Prussia in 
1848 and attained naturalization in December 1858.60 Rittinger apprenticed at the 
Deutsche Canadier until 1859 when he partnered with Motz.  The first issue of the 
Berliner Journal appeared that December.  Motz’s immigration to Canada was closely 
tied to another influential family in Berlin.  He was married to Helena Vogt and her sister 
was married to Reinhold Lang, the leather tanner who came to Berlin one year earlier.    
In ethnic elites, family was important in maintaining the business, as the founders 
neared retirement.  In his later years, John Motz was also preoccupied with participation 
in the municipal regime. In 1880, John Motz was made Mayor of Berlin on the sudden 
passing of Louis Breithaupt.  In 1900 he was made honorary sheriff and died in 1911. 
Frederick Rittinger had died in 1897.  Upon the deaths of the founders, Herman Rittinger 
and William John Motz inherited the firm from their fathers.  Herman held the position of 
technical supervisor and William became the senior editor.  During the period of 
amalgamations at the end of the 19th century the elder Rittinger brother John Adam was 
brought in from the Ontario Glocke (Walkerton) as political editor.61     
The centralization of the German Printing & Publishing Company under the firm 
of Rittinger & Motz necessitated relocating to larger facilities.  Fortunately, the ethnic 
elites in Berlin were well connected and the firm was able to acquire a new building 
financed by a $5000 loan from L.J. Breithaupt.62  The building was located at 15 Queen 
                                                          
59 Leibbrandt, 154. 
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Street South and was large enough to print and distribute the Berliner Journal, the 
Walkerton Glock and the Stratford Kolonist.  The partnership of the two Rittinger 
brothers was cut short when on September 22, 1913 Herman died of complications from 
cirrhosis of the liver.   
The amalgamation was a natural result of the local conditions in which the 
German language presses operated.  The cost of printing in German was higher than in 
English, and readership of the German language press had been in decline since 
Confederation directly affecting the publishing firm’s finances.  With new German 
immigrants settling in the West rather than in Berlin, there was little hope of a clientele 
increase unless the entire community could preserve the heritage of the German language, 
which was becoming ever more problematic in an increasingly industrializing and 
English environment.  Compared to the more moderate liberal Berliner Journal, the press 
most aggressively promoting the German language and culture was the Deutsch 
Zeitung.63  The Zeitung devoted its first page exclusively to international events.  It 
catered to internal demand for the promotion of German culture by covering the 
achievements of notable citizens of German descent, at home and even as far away as 
Pennsylvania.64  Lorenzkowsi considered the Berliner Journal to be the conservative 
force behind the preservation of the German language.65  While this is true in that it 
maintained a preference for the purer hoch Deutsche over Pennsylvania German or other 
dialects, the Journal was more liberal in comparison to the Zeitung.  It was also becoming 
                                                          
63 For a time in 1889, The Zeitung would disappear after it had cast the German Canadians as outsiders in 
need of protection, however, it would be resurrected after a merger with the Canadischer Bauerfrend of 
Waterloo County. 
64 See Herbert Karl Kalbfleisch, The History of the Pioneer German Language Press of Ontario, 1835-
1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 83-84. 
65 Lorenzkowski, Sounds of Ethnicity, 22. 
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more difficult to maintain language standards when readership was divided between 
Pennsylvania Germans and the European Germans.66  The editors of the Journal needed 
to find a proverbial middle ground to survive the onslaught of English Canada.  The fact 
that it outlasted the Zeitung is a testament to their foresight. On July 2, 1909, the 
competition ended when the Journal purchased the Zeitung.67  Politically, the Zeitung 
was a Conservative newspaper with a distinct sympathy for the old country. The Berliner 
Journal by contrast was a Canadian newspaper and politically sympathized with the old 
Reform Party (and later the Liberal party after it absorbed the Reform Party).68  Still, the 
editors could not help but weigh in on the decline in the German immigration rates to 
Berlin.  During the decline in the 1860s for example a headline read “Wo bist die 
Immigranten?” (where are the immigrants?).69 The Berliner Journal, along with a number 
of English Canadian newspapers, also sympathized with Prussia during the war with 
France and rejoiced at the victory and return of Alsace Lorraine.70   
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Figure 1.13 Berliner Journal Subscriptions (Source: Canadian Almanac (Toronto: 
Copp, Clark Company, 1911-1919) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Subscriptions Difference (%) 
      
1911 4806  
1912 4480 -6.78% 
1913 4314 -3.71% 
1914 4419 +2.43% 
1915 4029 -8.82% 
1916 3986 -1.06% 
1917 3451 -13.42% 
1918 3198 -7.33% 
Figure 1.12 Rittinger & Motz Printing Office, 1889 
Left to Right: Leo Keifer, Herman Rittinger, William J. Motz, John Motz, Frederich 
Rittinger, John Treusch, William Rittinger 
(Source: Waterloo Historical Society, KPL P002396) 
Figure 1.11 Rittinger & Motz business 
card showing the new location at 15 
Queen Street 
 
(Source: UWL Special Collections, 
Motz Family Fonds Series 3, File 69) 
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Amalgamations brought most German language publications exclusively under 
Rittinger & Motz and the Berliner Journal.  The effects would transform the Journal 
from a four-page to a sixteen-page newspaper with a variety of columns, poetry, and 
advertisements.  The front page was devoted to international events or major national 
news with advertisements occupying the left column.  Front page stories would continue 
on page two followed by local news organized by region: Woolwich, Wellesley, Berlin, 
Waterloo, and Walkerton.  Political news would appear more often on page four.  While 
it might be said to be lacking in overall presentation, because unlike the English language 
competitors the Berliner Journal rarely featured photographs, it made up for in simplicity, 
readability, and print styling, maintaining the traditional German black script characters 
instead of modern Roman.   
Despite the solution amalgamation offered to alleviate the problem of too few 
subscribers to warrant multiple German newspapers, by 1910 readership started a slow, 
but by no means disastrous, decline.  Figure 1.13 shows the only year of gain being 1914 
as the demand for news from Europe increased.  The largest drops occurred in 1915 and 
in 1917 for which the events of the war cannot be overlooked.  1918 was the newspaper’s 
last year of operation in German as it, and all of Canada’s ‘foreign’ language newspapers, 
were shut down by the chief press censor. 
 
 
 
 
German Preservation in the Historical Narrative 
 
Bismarck’s war with France in 1871 brought German Unification under the King 
of Prussia and brought, as was interpreted at the time, peace to continental Europe. This 
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was when the ethnic elites first began the process of attempting to dominate the historical 
narrative in Berlin Ontario as they organized Friedenfest a civic holiday celebrating 
peace.71  A.J.P. Taylor noted that Bismarck’s rise to power and the subsequent expansion 
of Prussia, that brought about German Unification, ensured the survival of the military 
caste system.72  For unification, in the words of Bismarck, could not have been 
accomplished without the military defeat of France, the state with the greatest interest in 
its prevention.73  And yet, despite serious domestic problems, that worried even 
Bismarck, German Unification and the speed at which Germany surpassed its neighbours 
in science, education, and industrial power dominated the image of the German nation 
internationally.74  Speeches delivered at the celebrations in Berlin would promote the 
image of masculinity that had begun to dominate the social construction of the ethnic 
German before 1914.   
The celebrations of peace in Europe, and at long last a mythical notion of unity of 
the German speaking peoples, brought German/Prussian cultural symbolism into Berlin 
Ontario.  This required a degree of synthesis between the contemporary, anachronistic, 
and surviving invented German traditions, for German symbolism and traditions after 
unification needed to establish the Kaisereich as the legitimate heir of the Holy Roman 
Empire.  The first symbol to appear was the oak tree planted in front of the courthouse.  
The oak tree, while originally a symbol of strength and fertility, was by the 1870s a 
                                                          
71 Not to be confused with Sedentag in Germany. 
72 A.J.P. Taylor The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of German History since 
1815 (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1976), 107-708. 
73 See A.J.P Taylor Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 121-122 and 
Geoffrey Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 17-18. 
74 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500-2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 187-188. 
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symbol of Germany as a nation.75  This originated in German Romanticist paintings and 
poetry.  In Caspar David Fredrich’s painting Abbey in the Oakwood, (figure 1.14) for 
example, the ruins of Eledena Abbey are shown surrounded by oak trees on a cold winter 
evening.  Though stripped of their leaves and most of their branches, the oak trees refuse 
to die.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oak trees, and oak leaves which had adorned continental architecture and 
furniture, were the symbol of strength in Romanticist Germany in the aftermath of the 
ravages of the Napoleonic wars.  The abbey may have been destroyed, but vicariously, 
through the oak trees, Germany lives.  Poet Theodor Körner wrote in 1810; 
 
When in joyously bold, deathly sacrifice 
Citizens built firm their nations. 
                                                          
75 Lorenzkowski, Sounds of Ethnicity, 140. 
Figure 1.14 Caspar David Frederich, Abbey in the Oakwood, 1809-1810  
oil on canvas 1.1m x 1.17 m 
(Source: Alte Nationalgalerie Berlin, Germany) 
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Oh what good does it do to think of past grief? 
All are familiar with this pain! 
German nation, you most glorious of all, 
Your oak trees stand; you have fallen!76 
 
The other symbol came on the 25th anniversary of German Unification, with the erection 
of the bust of Kaiser Wilhelm I in Victoria Park.  Having been overshadowed by 
Bismarck, this was part of a transnational attempt to establish “Wilhelm the Great” as the 
true force behind German Unification.77  The design chosen was a bust by renowned 
sculpture Reinhold Begas, and ordered for Berlin by Karl Müller, the man who 
spearheaded the Schulverein.  It stood on a stone pedestal on the north side of Lake 
Victoria in the shadow of the massive statue of Queen Victoria.  Additionally, two of the 
Breithaupt brothers had worked with Müller on the project.  Louis Jacob was a fellow 
member of the park board and John Christian was the mayor who authorized the 
project.78  What the bust symbolized would become a matter of public debate during the 
war, that would continue into the twenty-first century.    
As members of the ethnic German elite attempted to maintain a hold on German 
traditions and language in Berlin, they quickly learned that their mission required 
attaining a level of control over the discussion of identity.  The celebration of Friedenfest 
and the later erection of the bust of the Kaiser in Victoria Park had been public steps 
towards this goal and the German language newspapers, and the Schulverein, continued 
the conversation in the public sphere.  They remained the historical narrative of the 
                                                          
76 Theodor Körner “Die Eichen” translated and quoted in Linda Siegel, Caspar David Friedrich and the 
age of German Romanticism (Branden Books, 1978), 75-76. 
77 The more extensive inventions of traditions through sculpture would occur during the era of Wilhelm II 
see Eric Hobsbawn, “Mass Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914” The Invention of Tradition ed. Eric 
Hobsbawn and Terrence Ranger (Cambridge University Press, 1983), 273-274. 
78 Johnston, 56-57. 
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region which could be utilized to buttress the region’s identity and heritage.  This 
required turning to their Germanic roots and emphasising it in the writing of history.  It 
was this line of thought that brought about the founding of the Waterloo Historical 
Society.  Where Ian McKay considered historical societies part of the fabric in the 
commodification of history, this was a project aligned with what disciples of Foucault 
would later consider to be an alliance between knowledge and power.79  The society even 
acknowledged this recently by publishing an article by Kellie Johnston who argued that 
W.H. Breithaupt used the society to highlight the German element of Berlin’s history.80  
The society was founded in 1912 with W.H. Breithaupt as the first president.  John 
Rittinger and William Motz of the Berliner Journal were also members and Motz was on 
the board of directors.  He donated a complete collection of the Journal dating from 1859 
to 1912.81  Other members included an entire generation of Breithaupts, retired school 
inspector Thomas Pearce, and Waterloo MP William G. “Billy” Weichel.82 The 
promotional tone of the WHS was established in the first annual volume, which appeared 
in 1913, and President Breithaupt’s address: 
The Pennsylvania Germans were the founders of Waterloo County and their 
energy, perseverance and patriotism deserve record in the history of Canada much 
more than has appeared.  Locally, they have, however, been fairly written of...My 
purpose this evening is to give a brief account of some of the first Germans of 
European birth, as distinguished from Pennsylvania Germans, who came here, and 
to whom the County so largely owes its trading and manufacturing 
development.83    
 
                                                          
79 See Ian McKay and Robin Bates, In the Province of History: Making of the Public Past in Twentieth 
Century Nova Scotia (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 8 and 238-239 and 
Michel Foucault Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 27-28. 
80Johnston “‘No one will hold it against them’” 56.  
81 William Motz would continue to annually donate a complete set after 1913 “Donations received in 1913” 
WHS 1 (1913), 19. These would later be microfilmed and stored at the Kitchener Public library.  
82 “Annual Members” WHS 2 (1914), 52-53. 
83 “President’s Address” WHS I (1913), 11. 
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The following year, the defence of German heritage continued with a lengthy article by 
Thomas Pearce, outlining the history of education in Berlin, which made a point of 
highlighting the teaching of the German language.84  This was a report written by an 
educator, and published by Schulverein insiders promoting the educational standards in 
Berlin in opposition to accusations in Ontario about the decline of English language 
education in the province.  The outbreak of war in 1914, would add a sense of urgency to 
the agenda and in that edition, Breithaupt would include in his second Presidential 
Address a brief statement about the wave of patriotism that was sweeping Berlin and 
Waterloo County, the massive donations to the Patriotic Fund and men enlisting for 
overseas service.85  Notably absent from the creation of the society and this last attempt 
to promote Germanism in Berlin was Karl Müller.  Fearing their efforts were doomed to 
failure, in 1910 he had left for Germany and never returned.  The German ethnic elites in 
Berlin, like the Breithaupts and Motz, were left to carry on without him. 
 The same year as the founding of the Waterloo Historical Society came another 
publication, Berlin: Celebration of Cityhood, which was printed by the German Printing 
& Publishing Company of Rittinger and Motz.86 The publishers boldly celebrated the 
uniqueness of their city as the product of a history of struggle and hardship, as well as a 
unique product of Saxon and Teutonic cooperation.87  It was a snapshot of a newly 
declared city and among the pages outlining the history of the city, historians will also 
note the celebration of the culture of male breadwinners.  There are tributes to the 
                                                          
84 Thomas Pearce “School History, Waterloo County and Berlin”, 41-43.  
85 “President’s Address” WHS 2 (1914), 16. (14-16) 
86 It was later reprinted to include street and business directories from the same year. See Paul Tiessen ed. 
Berlin Canada: A Self Portrait of Kitchener, Ontario Before World War I (St. Jacobs: Sand Hills Books, 
Inc., 1979).  
87 Ibid, 3. 
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prominent men of Berlin including, to name a few, Adam Beck, the captain of hydro in 
Ontario, Rittinger and Motz, the Breithaupts, incumbent MP W. G. Weichel, and Harry 
Dales McKellar a captain in the shoe trade. There are also tributes to school board 
leaders, mayors, and even blue-collar workers for union advertisements and praises of 
industrial labour can also be found.  Advertisements for finished goods, while serving as 
a means for funding its publication, also highlight the balance between small town and 
industrial city.  There is a major contrast between, for example, the size and scope of the 
Lang tannery, and products sold in the quaint butcher shop.  
Boasting about the beauty of their city, a nod is given to the architecture in Berlin 
with emphasis on the Queen Anne style mansions of the prominent families.   
 
 
 
 
The Breithaupt mansion at 166 Adams Street, with its extensive grounds and massive 
central turret, is among the standouts.88  Also featured are the homes of George Lang on 
Queen Street, Karl Kaufman, Karl Muller and even William Motz’s more modest family 
home, on Weber Street. 
                                                          
88 Ibid, 108.  The mansion was demolished in 1965. 
Figure 1.15 Prominent homes of Berlin (Source: Paul Tiessen ed. Berlin Canada: A Self 
Portrait of Kitchener, Ontario Before World War I (St. Jacobs: Sand Hills Books, Inc., 
1979) 
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 These publications and societies were efforts to preserve and celebrate the 
German heritage of Berlin Ontario.  This was a concerted effort on the part of the ethnic 
elite who helped to develop the city into an industrial centre to bask in their own glory.  It 
was a celebration of German industriousness, culture and civilization.  The 1912 
commemorative publication, as a historical document, is a crowning example of the 
praising of the industrial middle-class leaders of the community who benefited from the 
post-confederation liberal order. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The German character of Berlin Ontario began with the settlement of 
Pennsylvania German Mennonites and evolved as later immigrants, Auswanderes, from 
Baden Württemberg and Hamburg arrived.  These men were skilled tradesmen who 
brought with them the skills and investment to drive industrialization in the Grand River 
area.  They had left Germany during a period of transition as liberal hegemony created 
free market conditions in Germany that made it impossible to protect traditional guild 
regulated industries.  Canada, being a settler-pioneer society offered a refuge.  Canadian 
liberal hegemony after Confederation, came when these German tradesmen had already 
established their enterprises and offered to protect their market interests.  It also allowed 
for a different experience of culture and language than, as portrayed by Lorenzkowski in 
Sounds of Ethnicity, German immigrant communities in the United States. In Canada’s 
liberal order, the German ethnic elites who conformed to a common sense of property 
ownership and individualism exercised their rights to practice their own religion and 
speak their own language.   
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There was a problem.  By the time of the Great War, the liberal order was being 
challenged.  Linguistic ideology and the growing power of the provincial and federal 
states, as well as the establishment of manufacturing conglomerates, was putting a strain 
on free market enterprise and individual rights of cultural expression.  The Education Act, 
for example, centralized the control of Ontario’s school systems, which threatened the 
teaching of the German language in the region.  The locally owned tanneries, button 
manufactures, shoe and rubber companies while still the economic engine of the ethnic 
elite, were beginning to be overshadowed by larger national industries like the Montreal 
based Canadian Consolidated Rubber Company and the Dominion Tire Factory.  
Still the ethnic elite operated within the ideologies of the liberal order.  The 
municipal regime, which was at ground level the means of implementing and enforcing 
the liberal order, was still dominated by the German ethnic elite.  As described at length 
by R.J. Morris, municipal politics and voluntary organizations was the engine of middle 
class identity and class-based hegemony.  The Breithaupts, the Kaufman’s, the Langs, 
and other descendants of Auswanderes continued to hold public offices in city council 
and the board of trade.  City planning was also their domain as it was essential in 
maintaining or expanding their business interests.  The Breithaupts even engaged in 
private lending shaping the commercial centre of the city.  Voluntary organizations were 
also an important avenue of class and ethnic based identity politics in Berlin.  These 
include the Berlin Board of Trade, The Board of Directors of Victoria Park, the 
schulverein which brought a renaissance in the study of the German language in Berlin, 
and the Waterloo Historical Society which aimed to preserve the history and heritage of 
their society. 
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The Great War would destroy much of the liberal order and Berlin’s ethnic elites 
would lead the struggle to maintain it.  The image of Berlin as a German city would 
become a liability in the eyes of the rest of the province and men like Motz would 
personally combat the smear campaigns in his newspapers and in letters to Ottawa and 
other publishers.  The ethnic elite would also combat efforts to paint the city as disloyal 
and the effort to change the name of the city.  The war would also expand the power of 
the state to control publications, impose linguistic uniformity, and state surveillance of 
subversives.  Berlin would be protected from some of these effects by its size and by its 
robust defense of the principles of liberalism.         
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Chapter 2: The Berlin and Ontario  
German Image War 
 
Public Sentiment in Canada is very anti-
German and so to some extent against 
anything connected with or reminding one 
of Germany  
                           -L.J. Breithaupt1 
  
Today in Victoria Park in Kitchener, a marble pedestal stands as a monument to 
the opening salvo of the war against the German image in Canada, an image that had to 
be defended by the ethnic elite of Berlin, Ontario.  This new pedestal marks the place 
where the original once stood which held the bust of Kaiser Wilhelm I.  The inscription 
reads: 
This new monument honours the history of our city, may it serve in the spirit of 
the original memorial as we seek peace for all its people for all time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 UWL, Doris Lewis Rare Book Room, Breithaupt, Hewetson Clark Collection “L.J. Breithaupt Diaries: 
1910-1922”, Thursday February 17, 1916. 
Figure 2.1 Kaiser Wilhelm Bust in 
Victoria Park, 1912  
(Source: KPL KB1) 
Figure 2.2 Peace Memorial, 
Victoria Park, 1996 
(Photo by the author, 2015) 
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On the night of August 21, 1914, the bust, erected as a symbol of unification and peace, 
became a symbol of Prussian militarism.  Wilhelm I, grandfather of the reigning Wilhelm 
II, capped with the signature spiked helmet, was an obvious target for British imperial 
sympathizers.  It was not a charged emotional reaction to the atrocities committed by the 
German army during the war, those were yet to come.  It was a venting of patriotism and 
a reaction to the fact that the Kaisereich had challenged for some time British imperial 
dominance on a global scale.  It was reported early on, and later confirmed, that Germany 
had done very little to ease the tensions between the Hapsburgs and the Tsar and 
launched a pre-emptive attack against Belgium and France.  On August 23, 1914 at 1 am, 
a splash was heard near the bridge in Victoria Park Lake and the men responsible ran off.  
The next day, with press photographers on hand, the bust was recovered (intact) by police 
from the shallow water.2 
 Rather than restore the bust to its pedestal, it was decided out of fear of further 
vandalism, that the bust be placed in the care of the Concordia Singing Society for safe 
keeping.  Meanwhile the adjacent statue of Queen Victoria was to be guarded should pro-
German vandals seek revenge for the destruction of their beloved Kaiser’s bust.  The next 
morning the Berliner Journal commented; 
We can see in this prank a disguised attack on the peaceable German citizens of 
the country who have helped as much as any group to make Canada a flourishing 
and prosperous land.3  
 
The men responsible were locals: John Alex Ferguson, Fred Bolton and Allan Smith.  
Although charges were laid, they were subsequently dropped as the men had enlisted in 
                                                          
2 The photograph of the recovery has been dubbed “Berlin/Kitchener’s most famous photograph” see Rych 
Mills, Victoria Park: 100 Years of a Park & it’s People (Twin City Dwyer Printing Co. Ltd., 1996),20. 
3 “Wiederum ein Bubenßud: Kaiserbust im Victoria Park abgerißeu” Berliner Journal August 26, 1914, 1. 
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the 24th Regiment, Grey’s Horse, to fight overseas. Two days after the act of vandalism, 
they left Berlin for Valcartier.4  Ferguson would never see Berlin again.  He was killed in 
action in defence of the Ypres Salient on October 30th, 1917.   
The Berliner Journal, local English newspapers, and the associated defenders of 
the integrity, civility, and patriotism of German-Canadians were in for a long war.  
Attacks against their common ancestry would continue within the community and in the 
larger centres of Toronto and London.  In fact, riots and vandalism became so common, 
that members of the community often had difficulty distinguishing one event from 
another in later recollections of the war.5   
 This campaign against all things Germans was also a sign of the weakening of the 
liberal order in Canada.  The Great War transformed the relationships between private 
and public institutions, and state and citizens in Canada’s largest cities.  This new illiberal 
way of reasoning otherwise was most apparent where population and industrial labour 
were hardest to monitor and control.  By contrast, Berlin’s ethnic elite’s response to the 
tensions of the war was to struggle for the fundamental values of the liberal order: 
allowing race riots to diffuse themselves; putting the city’s name change debate to a vote; 
electing an anti-conscription independent Liberal candidate in 1917; and continuing to 
publish German language newspapers throughout the war. While they searched for liberal 
solutions, most of the attacks on Berlin’s German-speaking community, especially the 
xenophobic slandering, came from places where the liberal order was being supplanted 
by the logic of the insecurity state. 
 
                                                          
4  McKegney 57. 
5 For examples see Douglas et al. “Oral History of Waterloo County”  
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The Sinking of the Lusitania and its Repercussions 
The year 1915 began with promise for German-Canadians.  The initial outbursts 
against staples of German culture had begun to subside and there were promising 
developments in Ottawa.  Prime Minister Borden appointed W.G. Weichel, Conservative 
MP of Waterloo North, to comment on the speech from the throne.  Weichel took the 
opportunity to reassure the country of his fellow German-Canadians general disdain for 
the “curse” of Prussian militarism, while praising German contributions to art, music, 
science and nation building.6     
  In the spring, events abroad would re-ignite animosity towards all things German.  
When the Lusitania left New York on May 1, 1915, German spy networks reported a 
cargo of war materials onboard.  There was little cause for alarm on board the Lusitania.  
She, and her sister ship Mauritania, were the two fastest liners in service, capable of 
outrunning any U-boat.  To avoid any confusion on the part of German submarine 
commanders that the Lusitania was still ferrying passengers, unlike the Mauritania, 
which was now a troopship, the Lusitania had been repainted with a large gold stripe.  
Further precautions were also taken by Captain William Turner: Lusitania’s curtains were 
drawn at night; lifeboats were swung out in advance and passengers were not permitted to 
smoke on deck.7  An American Captain told American readers in a published report that 
the Lusitania had been thoroughly inspected by private detectives for explosives, while 
passengers had their baggage and passports thoroughly checked at the dock.8  
                                                          
6 Official Report of the Debates: HOC of the Dominion of Canada, Fifth Session-Twelfth Parliament. Vol. 
119 (Ottawa: 1915), 8-9.  
7 Capt. Frederick D. Ellis The Tragedy of the Lusitania: Authentic Stories by the Survivors and Eye-
Witnesses of the Disaster (Philadelphia: National Publishing Co, 1915), 171. 
8 Ibid, 175. 
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Of the 1,257 passengers, British and Canadians represented 944, and Americans 
numbered 159.  Among the notable Canadians were relatives of Timothy Eaton, the 
founder of Eaton’s Department Store.  His daughter Josephine Burnside and 
granddaughter Iris, were planning on visiting relatives in Ireland.  Also travelling first 
class was Allan Barnes of Berlin Ontario.  He was the superintendent of the Star 
Whitewear Company and was traveling to Britain to secure contracts for the 
manufacturing and shipping of war materials.9   
On May 7, 1915, U-20 on patrol off the south coast of Ireland, by chance, crossed 
paths with the liner travelling well below its top speed.10  At 2:00 pm, Captain Walter 
Schwieger fired one of his remaining torpedoes which struck the ship in the forward 
boiler room.  The Lusitania was critically hit, listed to starboard, and sank in 11 minutes.  
British and Canadian casualties, counted together in the official report, totaled 584.11  
Among them was Iris Burnside, her mother Josephine survived.  Barnes was injured but 
survived and returned to Berlin in July.12   
In the aftermath of the disaster, the British Admiralty, while denying that the 
Lusitania was carrying war materials, was forced by empirical evidence to admit she was 
carrying 5,000 cartridge cases.13  The front pages of English and German newspapers in 
Berlin, Ontario all acknowledged reports from Germany that the Lusitania was carrying 
                                                          
9 “Mr. A.B. Barnes was a Passenger” BDT May 7, 1915, 1. 
10 In 1917 as part of the efforts to bolster American support for the war (and officially endorsed by former 
president Theodore Roosevelt), a sensational version of these events was published in the United States 
suggesting that German intelligence sent false orders to Captain Turner that sent him into a trap John Price 
Jones, America Entangled: The Secret Plotting of German Spies in the United States and the Inside Story of 
the Sinking of the Lusitania (New York: A.C. Laut, 1917), 169-173. 
11 Cmd 8022, 5. 
12 David Menary Lusitania: The Waterloo County Connection (Blue River Press, 2015), 62. 
13Cmd 8022 Shipping Casualties (Loss of the Steamship Lusitania) “Report of a formal investigation into 
the circumstances attending to the foundering on 7th May 1915 of the British Steamship ‘Lusitania’ of 
Liverpool after being torpedoed off the Old Head of Kinsale, Ireland” (London: His Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, 1915), 6. 
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war materials, but condemned the attack for its disregard for civilian lives.14  The 
Berliner Journal, being a weekly, had the good fortune of being able to wait until the 12th 
to report on the sinking.  Other newspapers which reported immediately were full of 
misleading reports including: “the ship took twelve hours to sink”; “the ship was 
beached”; “all passengers were saved”’ and “all passengers were lost.”  The night after 
the disaster, in a special entry at the back of his diary where it would fit, L.J. Breithaupt 
recorded; “Great indignation is manifested over this horrible ‘murder’ by which Germany 
and her cause has lost many thousands of sympathizers, and friends.”15 
Breithaupt could not have imagined the repercussions that would follow.  The 
backlash began when Ottawa printed a warning, which appeared in newspapers across the 
country including the Berlin News-Record, that pro-Germans who celebrate the sinking 
were liable for arrest and internment.16  Across Canada riots broke out targeting German-
Canadians and their businesses.  The hardest hit were Montreal, Winnipeg and Victoria 
where many recent German immigrants had settled.  In Victoria, which had lost James 
Dunsmuir of the 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles and other residents in the sinking, soldiers 
and civilians sacked German clubs and businesses starting with the Kaiserhof Hotel 
Bar.17  In Ontario, while there were no large-scale riots, several incidents smaller were 
reported.  For weeks after the sinking of the Lusitania, the citizens of Berlin, Ontario and 
the presses, were on high alert.  The number of stories peaked as the backlash against 
                                                          
14 See “Heartrending Scenes as Women and Children Battle for their Lives” BDT May 8, 1915, 1, and 
“Deutsches Tauchboot verfenkt ‘Lusitania’” Berliner Journal May 12, 1915, 1. “Tauchboot” (literal 
translation diving boat) was used in place of “unterseeboot” (underwater boat or U-boat). 
15 UWL Library Doris Lewis Rare Book Room “L.J. Breithaupt Diaries”, 1910-1922, Book 5 of 6, May 7 
1915.  No one in the oral histories of Waterloo County spoke of the Lusitania, or the repercussions, having 
either neglected to mention it or were not asked.  
16 BNR May 12 1915. 
17 Tylor Richards, “(Re-)Imagining Germanness: Victoria’s Germans and the 1915 Lusitania Riot” 
(Masters Thesis, University of Victoria, 2012), 59-62. 
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“bloody murder” intensified.  This prompted the editors of the Berlin Daily Telegraph to 
discuss the issue of loyalty in the community and the nation, and brought wartime 
hostility towards the Germans closer to home.  They argued the Germans of Berlin 
Ontario were loyal to His Majesty’s government, The Lusitania was a horrible crime in 
the eyes of their community, and if there were any enemy conspirators, they should be 
jailed or interned.  Furthermore, they demanded that their critics produce the names of the 
disloyal.18 
A fight between Cassel, a British patriot, and Kimpel, a German sympathiser at 
the Car and Coach Company in Preston made the Berlin papers.  Arthur Kimpel had 
gloated about the strength of the German army and praised the achievement of the U-boat 
that sank the Lusitania.  Cassel, who could no longer stand such talk, barged over and 
decked him.19  Both men were identified and arrested later in the day.  Scenes like this 
became commonplace and Ontario’s newspapers proved eager to report them. 
In Berlin, a boy walking down King Street was described as “looking too much 
like a German soldier” based entirely on the cut and colour of his outfit.  The Chief of 
Police, George O’Neil, noticed the boy and the nervous glances of onlookers on King 
Street and pulled him aside.20  The boy was identified as Theodore Hofacker, a recent 
arrival from Germany who was working as a bank clerk, but whose true ambition was to 
become a Canadian farmer.  The clothes were intended to be farm wear but were cut in a 
military pattern and included a pair of knee-high boots.  Hofacker assured the police chief 
                                                          
18 “German Citizens Say Alien Enemies are not being Harboured in Berlin” BDT May 14, 1915, 1 and 6. 
19 “Pro Germans Rejoiced Over the Murder” BDT May 11, 1915, 5. 
20 “Outfit was too German” BDT May 12, 1915. 1. 
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he intended no harm and would only wear his German looking outfit within the confines 
of the farm, away from the public eye.21  
That very same day, the Berlin Daily Telegraph re-printed a letter written by Jack 
Murdoch to the Toronto Evening Star titled “A Canadian.”  In it, he attacked Berlin 
Ontario and all things German.  He argued that while brave Canadians were dying, the 
German clubs of Berlin Ontario were harbouring enemy aliens.  He was also worried that 
since the Home Guard was undermanned and underequipped, it would be easy for enemy 
aliens to attack Canada’s unguarded homeland.22  Further accusations against Berlin were 
printed in the nearby community of Galt: 
It is stated here that a number of pro-Germans in Berlin the other evening in a 
club in that city celebrated the sinking of the Lusitania, and that there was much 
jubilation over the catastrophe.23 
 
The sinking of the Lusitania was not the only incident to stoke the fires of anti-German 
sentiments.  On May 12, 1915, within a week of the sinking, the British published The 
Bryce Committee Findings: The Report of the Committee of Alleged German Outrages.  
This report accused the German army of committing war crimes in Belgium as witnessed 
by Belgian refugees.  Soon every newspaper in Great Britain, Canada, and the United 
States ran stories of the “rape of Belgium.”  At the same time, the story from Ypres of the 
Canadian soldier crucified with bayonets to a barn door, first reported in April, was 
gaining momentum.  A military investigation found eye-witness testimonies to be 
conflicting and inconsistent and yet the story survived even among company commanders 
                                                          
21 Ibid, BDT 4. 
22 Jack Murdoch “Does Berlin Harbour Enemies?” BDT May 12, 1915, 4. 
23 “A Galt Slander Upon Berlin Ontario” quoted in BDT May 15, 1915, 1. 
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who used the rumor to indoctrinate new soldiers.24 Canadian newspapers reported the 
story as fact, and it was this image of the uncivilized “Hun”, desecrating religious 
symbols, that bombarded Canadians that spring.25    
Soon, at least one of the names of the “disloyal” would be known, when the press 
reprinted a shocking story of a threat against the life of Professor Reithdorf.   He had 
been on a speaking tour in early 1915 and on his stop in London, Ontario, he commented 
that the position of Germans in Canada was extremely difficult but their situation left 
them little choice but to prove their loyalty to Canada and the empire.    Long before the 
Lusitania sinking, in the Reithdorf was quoted in the Berlin newspapers as saying:  
For Germans in Canada there is no middle road in this war.  They must not be 
neutral because the land of their fathers is involved. They must give their whole 
hearted support to the cause of Britain and the allies.26 
 
He then embarked on a personal war of words against a local reverend in Berlin, the 
German born, pro-Kaiser, Carl Reinhold Tappert of St. Matthews Lutheran Church. Soon 
thereafter, Reithdorf received death threats from a resident of Berlin for his “slander of 
the German Kaiser”: 
What you say may be true, but you should keep it to yourself, damn you!  
You are a menace to Germany for you have actually succeeded in turning the 
heads of many Germans here and in other places, so that today these people think 
that the cursed British are better than the Germans and they kneel before them. 
Rev. Mr. XXX [Tappert] does his best to keep his people loyal to Germany and 
prays. He is a real German, a friend of the Kaiser and has no use for the perfidious 
English. If you keep on undermining his influence with his people I shall thrust a 
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dagger into your treacherous heart.  I shall feel proud to do that. Stop I tell you. 
Rev. XXX [Tappert] hates you and makes me feel so bitter to you.  Keep your 
mouth shut, will you? 
God bless our dear Kaiser. He will win. Do you know what would happen 
to you in this case? Think it over I tell you. You ought to be killed like a dog.27 
 
Again, Berlin reacted.  Why was the letter published in the newspapers as opposed to 
being turned in to the proper authorities?  For that matter, why did the Berlin Daily 
Telegraph publish the contents of the letter given that it would likely threaten the 
integrity of Berlin’s German population?  Calls were made before city hall for stricter 
censorship of the press in Berlin to curtail the largest English newspaper with its 
“careless publications” that came off as “too British.”28  The question of Reverend 
Tappert’s loyalty did become a thorn in the side of Berlin’s elite as his sympathies lay 
with the Kaiser.  The day after the sinking, his wife Johanna, a schoolteacher, was 
attacked by one of her colleagues.29  The next time anti-German hatred exploded on the 
streets of Berlin, members of the local 118th Overseas Battalion would call on him 
personally.  
In response to the public outcry against the publication of the death threat letter, 
every day for the remainder of the week, the Berlin Daily Telegraph attempted to undo 
the damage they had caused, by publishing letters and stories of loyal German-Canadians.  
From Hanover came a long declaration of German-Canadian loyalty penned by J.S. 
Knechtel of Knechtel Furniture Company, and from Kingston, the story of a naturalized 
German Canadian who had three sons in the Canadian Expeditionary Force; one of whom 
was wounded at Langemarck, one was killed in action, and the other was on his way to 
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the front.30  These were stories designed to fight back against accusations of disloyalty 
coming from outside the German community in the ongoing image war targeting Berlin 
and Ontario’s Germans. 
For the liberal order which denied the primacy of ethnicity, this slandering and 
othering of German culture, aided by the atrocities committed by Germany, would 
present a real challenge.  German-Canadians, despite having adopted the key values of 
nineteenth century liberalism, might no longer be protected by the liberal order.   Hence 
the importance for the ethnic elite of Berlin, along with local authorities and civil society 
to reaffirm what it meant to be a German Canadian within the British Empire, by using 
the language and methods of liberalism to counter the slander.  The shift towards an 
insecurity state, as evident in the newspaper debates, was well underway outside Berlin 
and the clash between this reasoning otherwise and one of the last strongholds of the 
liberal order would be centre stage in the debate over changing the city’s name.  
 
From Berlin to Kitchener 
In this atmosphere, it soon became apparent that the name Berlin Ontario, 
specifically the branding “Made in Berlin” was becoming a liability on the domestic 
market.  One week after the sinking of the Lusitania, the mayor of Toronto voiced his 
objections to an electric advertising sign on Young Street.  It was promoting a German-
Canadian beer, with the made in Berlin Ontario seal.  The mayor threatened the owner of 
the establishment that if he did not remove the sign, the police would do it for him.31  If 
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the “made in Berlin” brand was encountering a resistance in the market place to such 
advertising, it would affect the sale of local goods.  The proposed solution was to change 
the name of the city to a more British sounding name.  This would, as supporters of the 
idea proclaimed, both demonstrate their community was composed of loyal British 
subjects and solve the problem of a hostile reception in national markets to locally 
produced goods.  English language newspapers, including the Berlin Daily Telegraph, 
first reported on the possibility of a name change for the city on May 27, 1915.  They 
noted, with the sinking of the Lusitania, other communities were hesitant to handle goods 
manufactured in Berlin.  The idea was floated by the President of the Board of Trade, 
William Lochead, who was soon to be commander of Berlin and Waterloo’s 118th 
Overseas Battalion.32  Two opposing sides formed almost immediately.  In the first article 
on the subject, the owner of the Rose Millinery found favour with the idea of changing 
the name while the owner of the Western Shoe Company told the Telegram that the 
Germans of Berlin were loyal Canadians and a name change would neither affect 
patriotism nor extinguish rumors of disloyalty.33  Interestingly, later oral history 
interviews would frame the debate entirely as having been a question of heritage, rather 
than access to markets.34 
By the end of 1915, the name change movement had rallied substantial support.  
In February 1916, a meeting of the British League adopted the following resolution: 
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Be it therefore and it is hereby resolved that the City Council be petitioned to take 
the necessary steps to have the name “Berlin” changed to some other name more 
in keeping with our national sentiment.35 
 
The list of potential names to replace Berlin was narrowed to six: Bercana, Huronto, 
Dunard, Hydro City, Renoma, and Agnoleo.36  Soon another sinking would decide the 
issue.  On June 5th, 1916, the cruiser HMS Hampshire, on a diplomatic mission to Russia, 
struck a mine and sank.  On board was Herbert Kitchener, the British Secretary of State 
for War.  The front page of the Berlin Daily Telegraph was a snapshot of the future of 
Berlin Ontario.  The headline read “Earl Kitchener and Staff Lost,” while the column 
below, and to the left, reported on a city council meeting discussing the possibility of 
either changing the name of Berlin or amalgamating with the neighbouring city of 
Waterloo, as recommended by the Committee of 99.37 This committee was established by 
city council for the sole purpose of compiling a list of new names to be placed on the 
ballot.  Stories of “Britain’s greatest soldier” continued for the remainder of the week and 
on June 10th it was suggested that Berlin be re-named in his memory.38  Citing the recent 
disaster and the public displays of mourning for the loss of Kitchener, it was put to 
Council by the Committee of 99 that his name would be the most favoured in the 
community should the decision to change the name be put to a vote.39  The final six 
names submitted for the plebiscite included none of the previous suggestions, leaving 
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only British and Native names; Brock, Kitchener, Corona, Adanac (possibly a joke 
because it is Canada spelled backwards), Keowana, and Benton.40        
Class and ethnic pride clashed in this debate. On the one hand, commercial 
interests pulled a minority of business owners and manufacturers of German descent into 
the grip of the British League.41  Chadwick would observe that the British League could 
easily have been called a subcommittee of Berlin’s Board of Trade, more specifically a 
Board of Trade of British Ancestry.42  Their leader was Scottish born William Gibson 
Cleghorn, a co-owner of the McBride Luggage Company and a city alderman.    
On the other side of the debate, were those for whom protection of regional 
heritage, and all that was good about being of German descent, meant that a name change 
would be a great disservice.  The leaders opposed to the name change formed the 
Citizen’s League which included the firm of Rittinger and Motz, members of the 
schulverein, and the Breithaupt brothers.  After W.H. Breithaupt urged the people to vote 
against the name change, arguing that Berlin was named after the Prussian city that allied 
itself with the British against Napoleon and not the capital of the Kaisereich, the British 
League went on the offensive.  In a lengthy letter to the editors of all the newspapers of 
Berlin, Cleghorn questioned Breithaupt’s patriotism.43  That same day, a column 
appeared in the Berliner Journal reminding readers of the history of the city and the 
humble origins of the name Berlin.44  For readers of other papers, the attack on Breithaupt 
was vicious.  Cleghorn even made the accusation that Breithaupt was a fraudulent voter 
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because he was not a British subject, an alien, worse an alien of German descent.45  
Apparently humiliated, Breithaupt withdrew from the debate.  
This was the moment when the demonization of the German as an enemy (even 
enemy alien regardless of citizenship) spread into the ancestral German middle class of 
Berlin and the fight over what it meant to be a German-Canadian became personal.  This 
was the moment that class privilege could no longer shield a man from a vilifying ethnic 
construct.  By taking a stand for the preservation of a Teutonic name, Breithaupt had 
made himself a target of the anti-German voices in his country.  The Citizen’s League 
having been drawn into the battle over the name change became the front line of defence 
for not just German culture and integrity in the face of such attacks, but for older liberal 
understandings of citizenship. 
With only a few weeks left before the vote, there came more news from Victoria 
Park where the Kaiser’s bust once stood.  The Park Pavilion built in 1902, (and featured 
prominently in the celebration of cityhood), caught fire on the night of March 24 1916.46  
Rumours quickly spread that this was the work of an arsonist, which fueled the public 
debate over the name change.  The morning after the fire, footprints were found in the 
snow and it was discovered that the back door leading into the kitchen had been kicked 
in.  The damage, however, was later determined to have been done by Mr. Strome, who 
first discovered the fire around 7 o’clock.47  He also informed Police Chief O’Neil, and 
Chief Guenn, that he was sure the fire was incendiary in nature because of the smell, 
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which he thought was either gasoline or coal oil.48  If it was an arsonist, then who was it 
and why?  This is a question that Rych Mills, an authority on the history of Victoria Park, 
has researched for years.  Unfortunately, the relevant fire marshal and policing records 
from Waterloo County and Toronto have not survived.  In Mill’s account he presents a 
number of possible motivations.  The first suggests an anti-German act because the park’s 
superintendent, Barney Köhler, was a recent German immigrant.  The second proposes it 
was a pro-German act of revenge for the desecration of the Kaiser’s bust and in 
retaliation of the local 118th Overseas Battalion, which was recruiting at the time, using 
the parklands and the Pavilion for exercises and drilling.49  Mills also noted that the 
stance taken by Berlin’s newspapers aligned with their positions on the name change.50  
The exception was the German language Berliner Journal, as William Motz was not 
about to pit one portion of the population against the other with the plebiscite so close.  
The cause of the Pavilion fire remains one of the many unsolved mysteries of the Great 
War, but for historians it is a clear indication that by 1916 the situation was getting out of 
hand.      
Sensing the possibility of disturbances and ill will, the military took precautionary 
measures. In Kitchener, Lieut. Col. Lochead ordered his men participating in the vote not 
to mingle with crowds and Military Police would accompany them while in the city.  In 
Galt, a reserve of men of the 122nd battalion was placed on alert under Major Osborne, 
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the Provost Marshall of Military District 1, with a railway car at the ready should a 
speedy deployment to Kitchener be needed.51    
While it would be easy to say these precautions were taken because of Berlin’s 
heritage, these precautions were the result of the reputation of the 118th for public 
misdemeanors during the name change referendum.  It was hoped these could be avoided 
during the municipal election.  In a letter to the public, Lieut. Col. Lochead addressed the 
city of Berlin regarding rumours of the roles played by officers and men of the 118th 
Battalion in the vote on the name change.  All reports that they engaged in a campaign of 
persuasion, intimidation, or violence, he said, were untrue and that their continued 
presence in the city was to allow eligible men to register and cast their ballots.52  In fact, 
back on May 2nd, 1916, he had asked special permission to delay the movement of the 
battalion out of the city for that very reason.  Additionally, since the name change vote 
was happening on Victoria Day weekend, there was an added incentive to remain as it 
was an opportunity to use the holiday to hold one last recruiting event.53  Eight months 
later the Battalion returned for the municipal election. 
It was in this tense atmosphere that the first ballot took place in May 1916. This 
ballot would decide if the name should be changed, and the result was a turnout of 3,057 
and in favour of the dropping of the name Berlin by a difference of 81.54  As a gesture to 
the Empire on May 20th a telegram was sent to King George V that the loyal residents of 
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Berlin Ontario had forever cast away the name of the Prussian capital.55  The second 
ballot in June was to decide the new name.  Turnout was poor but when the polls closed 
on June 28, 1916, the final vote saw the name Kitchener narrowly pass Brock, 345 to 
335, with 163 ballots spoiled by writing in Berlin.  
Voting eligibility was a cause of contention between the Citizens League and the 
British League.  According to Arthur Chadwick, in both the name change vote and the 
municipal elections, the British League was accused of voter registry tampering.  The 
accepted rule was heads of household were eligible to vote which would amount to 
approximately 5,000 men but only 892 votes were cast on the second ballot.56  This is a 
significant drop of 2165 (-71%) between ballots.  It is impossible to determine how many 
were actually dis-enfranchised and how many abstained of their own accord, but at least 
100 were confirmed purged from the municipal role.57    
Despite the name change, not everyone was convinced of the loyalty of the people 
of Kitchener.  In Toronto, The Globe reported via special dispatch, that the name change 
was not well received by the editors of the Berliner Journal.  Supposedly the German 
newspaper accused the Ontario government of caving in the face of a handful of agitators 
and had encouraged its readers that the change was temporary.  Kitchener would endure 
for four months when the process would begin to have the name Berlin reinstated.  The 
same article also insinuated that the name change was seen as part of a larger campaign to 
alienate German-Canadians because it so closely followed the passing of the Ontario 
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Temperance Act (prohibition).58  Evidently, the German people hated their government, 
missed their city name, and loved their beer!   
For William Motz, this was slander.  Within a week, he defiantly wrote the Globe 
complaining it had purposely misrepresented the Berliner Journal, and by extension 
German-Canadians.59  While it is true that the German newspapers opposed the name 
change during the plebiscite, and there was a movement to restore the name, the Berliner 
Journal would leave the matter to the voters.  Furthermore, with the Temperance Act 
becoming synonymous with the war effort, the Berliner Journal withdrew its 
opposition.60  For Motz, this meant that the Globe intentionally painted him, his news 
organization, and the community of Kitchener as unpatriotic.  To remedy this, he 
included in his letter, his own background as a graduate of the University of Toronto and 
the son of a naturalized citizen, and that his newspaper regularly reported on the war as a 
crusade against Prussian militarism.61  The fight for the name of the city was lost and 
soon the struggle for the preservation of the German language in Berlin/Kitchener would 
end just as badly.  
   
German Language Suppression in Schools and the Press  
As seen in the previous chapter, with the passing of Regulation 17, minority 
language schooling in Ontario had fallen victim to an ethnic essentialism embodied in 
English language protectionism.  The war brought a new dynamic to the language issue.  
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Should the language of Canada’s enemies be taught in the schools, and should their 
newspapers be distributed since they could be a source of dissention? 
Deutschland Über Alles was removed from school books in Toronto, on the order 
of the Minister of Education.  The melody had been written by Joseph Haydn for the 
Hapsburg monarchy and the lyrics spoke to the pre-1848 liberal project of German unity 
and were written by August Hoffmann.  English newspapers, on the other hand, dubbed it 
“the German War song” adding to the ‘myth of Langemarck,’ where in 1914 during the 
first battle of Ypres, German soldiers sang it while charging the British lines.62  The 
question of German loyalty was now an issue of public policy directly affecting 
education. 
The Ontario language schooling problem had not been resolved before the 
outbreak of hostilities.  In the summer of 1914, the provincial elections returned the 
Conservatives to power, the party which had undermined the liberal order by proposing 
Regulation 17.  Soon schools were closing due to financial problems, because their 
failure to comply with the Regulation meant losing public funds.  Furthermore, early 
enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force siphoned a large number of qualified 
teachers out of Ontario’s school systems.  Appeals, in the winter of 1915 that targeted the 
Regulation (the Belcourt case) were overturned by the Supreme Court of Ontario and 
Quebec soon joined the discussion.  Henri Bourassa condemned the Ontario Government 
calling them “Prussians” who, while fighting to preserve the Empire were splitting it 
apart by denying French language education to its own citizens.63  It would ultimately be 
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the French-Canadian clergy in Ontario that mounted the most successful campaign of 
non-cooperation with Regulation 17.64      
French and bilingual schools were the target of the regulations, but as we have 
seen the German language schools were also directly affected.  The German language 
was reduced to a subject of instruction and no longer the language of instruction.65  In the 
spring of 1915, while the debate raged between the government of Ontario and the French 
Catholic clergy over the fate of French schools, a report from the Public-School Board in 
Berlin recommended that the German language should be eliminated entirely from the 
public school system.  In response, the Schulverein held a special meeting at Concordia 
Hall presided over by L.J. Breithaupt.  The elimination of the teaching of the German 
language was unacceptable.  William Motz feared that without German language 
education, there would be a significant decrease in the willingness of new German 
immigrants to settle in Berlin after the war.66  These efforts were in vain, as the motion to 
eliminate German language instruction was passed 5 to 3 by the Public-School Board of 
Trustees.  While the schulverein felt that this decision had little to do with anti-German 
sentiment caused by the war, Mayor Hett of Berlin was not so sure. He was adamant in 
his statement to the press that the German-Canadians were loyal and the board should 
postpone any ruling until the current atmosphere dissipated.67  L.J. Breithaupt later noted 
in his diary that the decision to eliminate German language instruction was made in spite 
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of the feelings of the citizens of Berlin.68  The schulverein began as an organization of 
community leaders in Berlin to promote the German language in their schools.  
Unfortunately, events outside the control of Berliners would seal the fate of the 
organization and its mission.  The on-going illiberal conflict over French instruction and 
the anti-German paranoia, brought on by the Great War, ensured the end of the teaching 
of German in the community. 
This story was only beginning when fears of the influence of German-born 
Canadians entered the realm of education beyond the language debates.  As with the 
demonization of German businesses and newspapers, the greatest offenders would be 
from the middle class of Toronto, and their stories would resonate in Berlin/Kitchener as 
further signs of the hostility towards German-Canadians and their heritage. 
As soon as the war began, teachers and professors came under scrutiny.  Just 
before Christmas of 1914, the Board of Governors at the University of Toronto handed 
down forced leaves of absence, in lieu of outright dismissal, to three German professors, 
Benzinger, Muller, and Tapper, because they had failed to complete the naturalization 
process before the outbreak of the war.  According to an article published on the matter in 
the Berlin Daily Telegraph, this was a compromise between the University President, 
who saw dismissal as too harsh, and members of the Board of Governors who felt that 
these men, because of their ancestry and failure to naturalize, should not be in the 
employment of a publicly supported institution let alone hold positions of power and 
influence.69 
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The more famous case was Miss Freda Held, a teacher at Carlton Street School in 
Toronto who was suspended in January 1918 for “disloyalty” for not standing during the 
second verse of the national anthem.  To make matters worse, even though she was born 
in England, she was of German descent.  When her request for an investigation was 
overturned by the board, she handed in her resignation, while pledging that she was a 
loyal British subject who deplored Prussian militarism.70       
With a losing battle raging in the schools, the Berliner Journal was faring no 
better.  The German press had become the next target of slander since it allegedly spoke 
for Germany in Canada.  Herbert Karl Kalbfleisch has suggested that despite their 
amalgamation under the firm of Rittinger & Motz, the German language newspapers 
were doomed to disappear because of a combination of declining readership and 
antipathy towards German-Canadians.71 
Before the massive censorship sweep of 1918 under PC 2381, the Berliner 
Journal had already come under suspicion by the Chief Press Censor for disloyalty in the 
war effort and for stirring Canada’s German-speaking working class by linking the war to 
commercial interests of the ruling classes.  The summer of 1915 would bring two severe 
blows from which there was little hope for recovery for the Journal.  On July 29, 1915, 
John Rittinger died bringing an end to the family names of Rittinger & Motz as the 
captains of the German language press industry.  Then, in August 1915, the London 
Advertiser re-printed translations from the Berliner Journal suggesting that William Motz 
was against the allied cause.  It included passages suggesting that no-one was blameless 
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for the war’s outbreak and that war was declared on Germany without provocation.72  
This brought the Berliner Journal to the attention of Ernest Chambers, the Chief Press 
Censor.73  Chambers’ was born in England and his first career was, appropriately enough, 
a newspaperman for the Montreal Star.   He had also made important political 
connections through his involvement with the Canadian militia, which for Keshen were 
key to his ascendency to the position of Chief Press Censor.74 Having received the 
translations from Wallace Laut, the editor of the London Advertiser, Chambers sent a 
warning letter to Motz in which he stated that his newspaper, the Berliner Journal, by 
printing such “misleading statements” was turning his readers against the allied cause.75  
The records of the Chief Press Censor also show that he received another article from the 
Advertiser accusing the Journal of not condemning the sinking of the Lusitania.  Soon 
thereafter, Chambers filed for a warrant for the suppression of the Journal.76  Fortunately 
for the Journal, Chambers did not have sufficient authority to censor a newspaper based 
simply on evidence presented to him.  Only his superior, the Secretary of State, had that 
power, and it would be another three years before that power was fully exercised.  For the 
next few weeks, the Advertiser continued to print translated stories from the Journal, and 
Laut continued to pass them along to the Chief Press Censor.77     
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 With John Rittinger’s passing, the last “defender” of the press was William Motz, 
who by this time had earned a reputation for counter-attacks against any of the English 
language newspapers who dared question the loyalty and integrity of his establishment.  
In this case, since the opponent was now a government official, the task also fell to M.P. 
W.G. Wiechel who pleaded with Chambers to spare the Journal.78  In a letter to Percy 
Sherwood (Chief of Dominion Police), Wiechel pleaded with him to convince Chambers 
not to censor the Journal, arguing that the Advertiser had intentionally mistranslated the 
articles in a deliberate attempt to discredit the Journal; 
Rest assured that the object of the editor of the Advertiser was a malicious one, as 
he has been, during the last twelve months, a violent denunciator of everything 
and everybody that bears a German name.79  
 
That same day, Chambers received a reply from Motz in response to his previous warning 
letter.  Here, Motz also accused the Advertiser of intentionally mistranslating the articles 
and asked for protection from such slander.80   
Historian Jeffrey A. Keshen considered this incident to have incited censorship of 
the Journal in 1918.81  However, a re-examination of the same files studied by Keshen, 
the files of the Chief Press Censor, suggests a different verdict.  After reading Laut’s 
accusatory letter, Chamber’s subscribed to the Berliner Journal to monitor it for 
suspicious publications. He had his own translator of German material on staff, Miss 
Mercer, examine the articles in question.  At the same time, Motz reached out to 
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Chambers arguing that Laut had intentionally slandered him and went further to offer 
Chambers evidence against real propagandists, pro-German American newspapers 
circulating in Ontario.82  Soon thereafter, Chambers ordered the Advertiser to discontinue 
its attacks as Motz’s accusations were proven true by Chamber’s translator.83 Also, 
Chambers gained an ally in Motz in his campaign against pro-German newspapers.84  
By May 1916, as Motz staunchly defended his organization from outside slander, 
and had established an alliance with the Chief Press Censor, The Berliner Journal was 
showing the physical signs of the troubles at Rittinger & Motz.  Overall the Journal was 
reduced from twelve to eight pages and many of the staples included to promote German 
culture (the poems, the music, and the jokes), were sacrificed.  With the change to the 
city name came the subsequent name change of the paper.  First it was called the 
Kitchener Journal and then in January 1917 the name was changed again to The Ontario 
Journal.    
 In 1972, Wener Bausenhart listed six hypotheses on why the German newspapers 
were shut down.  Among them were the issues of loyalty, personal grievances between 
them and Prime Minster Borden and Privy Council president N.W. Rowell over 
conscription and prohibition respectively, and a continuation of the language policy that 
shut down bilingual schools.85  Another possibility that did not make the list, due to the 
fact that Bausenhart’s research focused exclusively on German publications, was a 
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change in priority on the part of the Borden government.  In his research on Canada’s war 
against labour radicalism, Gregory S. Kealey discovered that the suppression of foreign 
language presses in PC 2381 coincided with the stirring of the socialist movements in 
Canada.  The inspiration was the October Revolution that overthrew the Kerenskii 
provisional government and put the Bolsheviks in power in Russia.  This also inexorably 
links PC 2381 with PC 2384, which retroactively criminalized association with socialism 
and organizations believed to promote the overthrow of western democracy and 
capitalism.86  A conservative estimate tallied, that after PC 2384, at least seventy 
socialists in Ontario were arrested by the end of 1918 for their association with such 
organizations and/or possession of material banned under PC 2381.87  Thus the story of 
the shutting down of the German language press becomes part of the story of the 
radicalization of the Canadian left and right. 
Keshen has pointed out, correctly, that the Chief Press Censor, Ernest Chambers, 
conducted a crusade against foreign language presses in favour of what was dubbed 
“Anglo Conformity” or the protection of British imperial ideals and heritage.88  The first 
orders of 1914 regarding censorship of the press related to the spread of sensitive 
information that could hinder the war effort.  By 1917, with the war in its fourth year, the 
initial censorship was expanded to include opposition to conscription.  In May 1918, 
censorship was expanded again this time targeting any remarks that could weaken the 
Canadian fighting spirit through criticism of the conduct of the war. Labour radicalism 
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was included in this category.89  The final mass expansion of censorship was PC 2384 
passed in September 1918 banning all foreign language newspapers.  For Kealey, the 
censorship of foreign language presses was the latest salvo in the government’s on-going 
campaign against radical labour rather than a defensive war measure.90  He based this on 
the fact that the act came during the final Hundred Days when the German army was on 
the verge of collapse and Canadian military participation in the crusade against 
Bolshevism in Russia was just beginning, although it was never mentioned in the process 
that created the order.91  Further strength is added to this argument by the selective lifting 
of the ban in 1919 when all foreign language presses with the exception of the leftist 
Ukrainian, Finnish and Yiddish newspapers, were allowed to resume publication.    
  The Berliner Journal, being a foreign language press (indeed an enemy language 
press), suffered the misfortune of being associated with the radical foreign language 
presses that expressed either opposition to hegemonic practices, or opposition to 
Canada’s participation in the war.  The Yiddish Press in Montreal had even committed 
the “heinous crime” of sympathizing with foreign language instruction in Ontario’s 
schools.92  The socialist Ukrainian presses like the Robochyi Narod in Winnipeg, not only 
commented on the oppression of workers by English-speaking capitalists, but had 
severely criticized wartime security measures as simply an excuse to usurp unprecedented 
power.93      
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 There remains one puzzling question.  Why would Chamber’s ally, the Ontario 
Journal, be included in the press censorship sweep?  If the Borden government was now 
actively hunting both homegrown and international socialism, surely Motz and his 
organization could be of assistance in seeking out German socialist propaganda, 
especially since by the fall of 1918, Germany was on the brink of a communist revolution 
of its own.  For starters, there is no evidence in the files of the Secretary of State that 
Motz was ever asked to turn his attention to these kinds of publications.  Secondly, the 
explanation provided here is ease of legislation.  It had been proven on several occasions 
during the war that attaining warrants for the censorship of a small number of foreign 
language publications was a bureaucratic nightmare for Chambers.  By 1918, with the 
war cabinet feeling the strain brought on by the anti-conscription movement and the anti-
prohibition rhetoric in the Canadian presses, as well as the “red scare”, the banning of all 
foreign language newspapers appeared to be the most streamlined option.94  The Ontario 
Journal, as well as any other foreign language press deemed acceptable or exceptional by 
Chambers, would simply have to apply for a printing permit. It was a small price to pay 
as the developing “insecurity state” shifted its attention. 
Whether the intended target of national press censorship was potential German 
sympathisers or the radical left, the promulgation of PC 2384 ended the German language 
press in Canada.95  The publishers of The Ontario Journal were not ready to surrender.  
William Motz travelled to Ottawa in October 1918 and met with the officials to plead for 
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the continuance of the Journal as a German language newspaper, but this time it was 
conceded that the innocent must suffer with the guilty.  Just as the censorship rules were 
being processed, the firm purchased a new press that could house both German 
blackscript and English Roman characters.  This would enable the Ontario Journal to 
continue to operate in English.  It was a measure that was intended to ride out the storm, 
in hopes that once the war was over, they could return to publishing in the German 
language.  On October 1st 1918, Motz applied for a special licence to resume publishing 
in German and Chambers himself vouched for his old ally the Ontario Journal and its 
editors in this process given the fact that they had become one of his main watchdogs 
against German propaganda.96  It seems the licence was not issued immediately and the 
last German language edition appeared on October 2nd, 1918 and on October 9th the 
Journal appeared for the first time in English.  As Rych Mills recently pointed out, time 
was a factor.  Motz had four days between his return to Kitchener and the publication of 
the next issue which needed to be translated completely into English, including all of its 
advertisements.97  Furthermore, Motz needed to have a new story written on why his 
newspaper was now appearing in English.  While other newspapers at this time used the 
front page to celebrate the advance of allied armies to the German border, the two stories 
that made the front page of the Journal were dire.  The first column retraced the failed 
steps taken to save the Journal from censorship and explained to subscribers why their 
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beloved German language newspaper was now being published in English.  In the second 
column more bad news, Spanish Influenza had reached Kitchener.98 
 The following week, the Ontario Journal found itself, for the last time, in the 
position of having to speak for the Canadians of German ancestry against outside 
criticism.  The London Advertiser, that had spent much of its time slandering the Berliner 
Journal, took the opportunity afforded by the end of German-language publication to 
again question the loyalty and character of German-Canadians, this time without fear of 
retribution from Chambers:    
What will the poor Germans who cannot read any other language do if they 
cannot have their German newspaper? For shame they cannot read English! They 
have been in Canada long enough and if they persist in speaking German in view 
of all that has happened in Germany they are a strange people.99 
 
The Journal’s response, while in English, remained unchanged.  Motz wrote those who 
maintained their German muttersprache were a minority and the reason they had left 
Germany was to seek a better life and to flee from Prussian militarism, which gives the 
London Advertiser no right to criticise them or to spread hate.100  
Like the rest of the country, the Ontario Journal celebrated the end of the war on 
November 11.  Peace had come at last.  Unfortunately, the cost of victory, for the German 
community was freedom of expression itself.  The newspaper that had previously kept 
German-speaking Canadians informed could only celebrate the end of the war in English.  
Further still, the prospects of the continuation of the German language in Berlin had 
faded since the defeat of the Schulverein.  The banning of the German-language press 
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would be lifted and a licence was issued to R&M a year later on December 27, 1919,101 
yet the firm was unable to re-launch a German-language newspaper,102 due to the 
combined effect wartime losses, a decade of cultural assimilation, and the slow erosion of 
liberal values within the broader community.      
 
Elections and Bayonets 
Just after Christmas of 1916 came the municipal elections.  To the people of 
Kitchener, the battle lines had already been drawn during the plebiscite over the name 
change between the Citizen’s League, which opposed the name change and the British 
League dubbed “the autocratic name changers”.  It was hoped or feared, depending on 
one’s allegiances that should Citizens League candidates win municipal offices, 
reinstating the name Berlin could be put on the table. Thus, this municipal election was of 
utmost importance in the defense of German heritage and identity in Ontario.   
The election took place on New Year’s Day and the polls closed at 5:00 pm.103  
As the polls were closing and the results were coming in, King Street became a gathering 
place for soldiers and citizens awaiting the results.  It soon became apparent that the 
Citizen’s League candidates were going to win in a sweep and the news was received 
with mixed feelings on King Street.  The crowds awaiting the results in front of the office 
of the pro-British Kitchener News-Record soon became aggravated and cross words 
escalated into violence.   
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The only account available of what occurred was the official report of Major 
Osbourne which includes second hand information of the men he encountered that day 
making it impossible to fully account for who was responsible to the violent outburst and 
whether men of the 118th Battalion had participated. While Osbourne was in the office of 
the Chief of Police, men arrived saying the mob was going to “clean up” the office of the 
News-Record.  Among them were the editor W.D. Uttley seeking protection and two 
military police officers confirming the rumors that were circulating.104  Soon the office of 
the Chief of Police was crowded.  An elected alderman “staggered in” claiming he had 
been beaten by men of the 118th, and also reported that the front window of the News-
Record had been smashed.  Mayor elect, David Gross Junior also came in shaken because 
men of the 118th had gone to his house looking for him.  Both men were sent away with 
instructions to hide at friends’ houses.  Uttley was sent down the street to the News-
Record office to send the staff home.  Later Major Osborne met J.E. Hett, the unseated 
Mayor, and informed him that if military protection was required an official request 
would have to be made.105      
Osborne then called for soldiers of the 122nd in Galt to take the train and report to 
Kitchener immediately.  It is unclear from Osborne’s report when the office of the News-
Record was ransacked.  He said that the window had been smashed by the time he 
contacted Mayor Hett but could not confirm that the offices had been broken into until 
the streets were cleared, which meant that the ransacking occurred sometime between 
10pm and 11pm, while Osbourne was waiting for the men from Galt to arrive.  At the end 
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of King Street, the men of the 122nd were assembled, with Osborne in command, and 
slowly marched north towards the crowds and the News-Record office.  Alongside 
Osborne was Hett, who would read the riot act to the crowds, so Osborne ordered the 
crowd to disperse.  Osborne recalled that although the crowd did not dare charge at his 
formation, he was worried that the mob would not obey his orders and that his forces 
could be surrounded.  He ordered his men to fix bayonets and continue the march.  This 
evidently, was enough to disperse the crowd.  Once the armed force reached the News-
Record office, Osborne discovered that the front window had indeed been destroyed and 
after sending a few men into the alleyway, that the back of the building had also been 
broken into.106  Leaving a few men to guard what was left of the News-Record offices, 
the troops continued down King Street and stood guard at important points for the rest of 
the night. 
Soldiers of the 118th, who were in town to cast their votes, were said by Osborne 
to have not played an active role in the riot, however, there were allegations that they 
were responsible for the break in at the rear of the News-Record and had assaulted a 
number of the newly elected officials.  At the very least, they had violated orders not to 
participate in any public gathering by mingling with the mob.  As a result, their passes 
were revoked and they were ordered back to Camp Borden.107 
While it would be easy to say that the ethnic lines in Kitchener were the battle 
lines of the plebiscite and the subsequent election, many British voters wished to retain 
the name as much as many German voters wished to change it.  Where the division lay 
was in the belief that commercial interests were at stake since the construction of the 
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Ontario German had shifted into demonization and “made in Berlin” had become a 
liability.  Furthermore, military investigators found that soldiers of the 118th were not at 
fault for the rioting, which directly contradicted eye witness testimony, and their 
established history of brash behaviour in the community.  As an act of good faith, and to 
avoid any further hostility in Kitchener, the Mayor elect, in his first address, retracted the 
electoral promise to discuss changing the name back to Berlin in the near future.108  For 
the time being, opposition would have to await another opportunity, as the time for 
change had passed and it was now time to heal.  In the following weeks, the News-
Record’s front window would again be smashed by a brick in a not-so-random act of 
violence.  In any case, friends and family of the men of the 118th were preoccupied with 
saying goodbye, for the regiment was slated to be deployed overseas after the election.  
 
Conclusion  
The war is remembered in Kitchener Ontario as a struggle to prove that a 
community comprised mostly of people of German ancestry could remain loyal to 
Canada and the British Empire.  The memory of this struggle is appropriately reflected in 
the design of the monuments that now stand in Kitchener as reminders of darker days.  As 
a final show of British imperial loyalty and identity, in May 1929, the cenotaph in 
Kitchener, dedicated to the men who lost their lives in France and Belgium, was unveiled.  
Where German Great War monuments are modelled after medieval Teutonic fortresses, 
                                                          
108 Chadwick, 160. 
123 
 
cemeteries, and crypts, the monument in Kitchener is a replica of the Grecian-style 
British memorial at Whitehall in London, England.109   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the liberal order denied the primacy of ethnicity, preferring instead an 
identity based on individual liberties, the war would trigger illiberal otherings based 
almost entirely on ethnicity, including the idea that the Bolshevik enemy of the Canadian 
state was brought to Canada by foreigners.  The war would also exaggerate pre-war 
notions of ethnic and cultural ideas by escalating the debate over language rights.  In 
Berlin, this resulted in the end of German-language instruction and the eventually an 
outright ban of the German-language press.  In the face of these new assaults on the city’s 
German-speaking community, its ethnic elite through the municipal regime would 
attempt to preserve a liberal order that had proved so beneficial to them.  Draconian 
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Figure 2.3 Edwin Lutyens design for the 
Cenotaph, Whitehall, 1919 (Source: British 
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measures would not be the preferred solution to Berlin’s problems, and outside forces, in 
the form of the Galt regiment, had to be called in only once.  Instead the solutions found 
were in line with 19th century liberalism.  The name change would be decided by a 
plebiscite, and most disturbances would be investigated locally, reflecting the older ideal 
of the relationship between public and private, government and citizen and the municipal 
regime as the enforcer of order.  Furthermore, the schulverien was voted out of existence 
in 1915 and German schooling canceled from within rather than from without as was the 
intention of Regulation 17.   
Local legal records from the period are scarce.  The fire marshal’s records and the 
records of the Berlin police, for example which would have included the investigation 
into the Pavilion Fire and the ransacking of the News Record office on King street are 
missing.  What remains are Major Osbourne’s account and the newspaper accounts.  
Osbourne’s testimony is not without its problems as he personally did not witness any 
initial rioting and could neither confirm nor deny if members of the 118th Battalion 
participated.  What can be taken from Osbourne’s testimony is an approximate timeline 
of events and how the Galt regiment was deployed.  The newspaper accounts are varied 
and reflect the growing divisions in Canada.  As demonstrated here and in MacKegney’s 
published MPhil thesis, Berlin’s newspapers often clashed in their opinions of the 
German-Canadian.  The far greater battle line was between the London Advertiser and the 
Berliner Journal and it was their communications that attracted the attention of the Chief 
Press Censor.  William Motz’s newspaper was a voice for German-Canadians and also a 
line of communication to remind the Germans of Berlin of Canada’s mission against their 
ancestral homeland and Prussian militarism.  The editors of the London Advertiser had a 
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different view of what the Journal’s mission was and painted Motz as a disloyal German 
subject who was spreading propaganda.   
Here class mattered as well.  It was, after all, the dominant ethnic elite of Berlin 
who was best equipped to fight the allegations of disloyalty.  But with the cases of 
William Motz and Louis Breithaupt, class privilege had its limits.  The debate over the 
name change put Breithaupt’s ethnic identity at odds with his commercial interests and 
brought his own loyalty, and even citizenship, into question in spite of having been born 
in Canada.  Suddenly, class privilege could no longer protect a citizen from ethnic 
construction and demonization.  To be German, citizen or not, working or middle-class, 
meant vulnerability. 
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Chapter 3: Berlin for King and Empire, the 118th 
Overseas Battalion 
 
I think I should be excused from putting my 
weight on the side of anything un-British. I 
want you to judge me as having been 
brought up since the war broke out to 
destroy everything that is German. I have 
been trained to destroy everything of any 
military advantage to the enemy. 
          -Company Sgt. Major      
            Granville P. Blood,   
             118th OS Battalion1 
 
 
After terrorizing German Canadians in 
Berlin, Ontario, the 118th Battalion left 
Canada with a mere 246 men 
            -Desmond Morton2 
 
 
 As the ethnic elite of Berlin, Ontario battled to preserve the image of the Canadian 
of German ancestry from outside slander, there was a larger problem in Berlin that was 
beyond their control: the 118th Overseas Infantry Battalion of North Waterloo.  Stories of 
the activities of the 118th have become the stuff of legend.  It has been described as a 
gang of undisciplined thugs frustrated that the city could not recruit the numbers needed 
to become a fighting unit.  This damning reputation of the unit also affected that of the 
commanding officer Lieut-Col. William M.O. Lochead, a man of Scottish descent from 
Waterloo who before the war had been a manager at Mutual Life and president of the 
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Board of Trade.  His failure to raise a full battalion and failure to properly train and 
enforce discipline in his ranks or properly vet men unfit for duty were among the reasons 
why he was refused an overseas command, when the men of the 118th departed for 
Europe.   
 There are a number of questions about the 118th which need to be revisited.  
Conventional wisdom holds that the failure to raise a full battalion is the evidence needed 
to prove that Berlin was disloyal to the cause.  That was the narrative of newspapers 
outside of Berlin and is reflected in much of the secondary literature.  The question of 
loyalty relates to the adoption of Canada by people, more precisely men, of German 
ancestry.  The liberal order promoted free market values and as such presented a 
challenge in Canada to the power of ethnic nationalism that was sweeping Europe.  
According to conventional wisdom, how can it be said that Berliners found the liberal 
order to their liking if they would not contribute a full battalion to the war effort?  
Discipline was also a problem.  Are rioting undisciplined soldiers loyal to the cause?       
The 118th Battalion’s reputation for a general lack of discipline preceded it.  At 
district headquarters in London, they were known for everything from marching with 
their hands in their pockets to causing property damage. Their over enthusiastic 
bayonet practices, which did not conform to training manual standards, resulted in 
damage to the dummy rifles issued to the battalion.3  In Berlin, their lackadaisical 
discipline worried the community.  Because the military had leased Berlin’s old Canadian 
Ivory Buttonworks building on Queen Street from the Williams, Green, & Rome 
Company, an agreement was made to protect the owners and the property beyond 
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expected wear and tear.4  While this agreement covered any changes made to the layout 
of the interior, with the understanding that the building would be returned to its original 
condition, it was vague on the liabilities for damage.  It was therefore a serious concern to 
the owners when, in April 1916, the superintendent spotted men running out onto the 
rooftop.  The flat roof had just recently been repaired and worries of new leaks were very 
real and to maintain goodwill, Lochead had to assure the owners that the men were 
reprimanded and this behaviour would not be repeated.5  But these shenanigans pale in 
comparison with the election riots and soldier’s act of vigilantism that Lochead would 
have to deal with in Berlin. 
Recruiting and discipline merit examination because they are indicative of 
Berlin’s dedication to the cause.  A quantitative spatial analysis is also required in order 
to understand the make-up of the battalion and provide evidence why the 118th battalion 
failed to reach the required full complement of men.  
 
The Concordia Club Raid and a call on Rev. Tappert  
The initial recruiting efforts began at the end of 1915 after the 118th was formed 
out of the 108th militia.  Militia units were not permitted to fight overseas and so their 
members were encouraged to join overseas units.  In the new year, the battalion shifted its 
attention from recruiting from the 108th Militia to finding new recruits and the resulting 
drop-off in recruitment fed suspicions about the loyalties of the community founded by 
German immigrants.  On January 31, 1916, an article appeared in the Toronto World 
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accusing a pro-German element in Berlin, Ontario of hampering the war effort by 
discouraging recruitment.6  The article was wanting of specifics as no pro-German 
organizations were mentioned and no individual persons were identified.  Significantly, 
there was also no mention by name of anyone associated with Berlin’s ethnic elite.  The 
Toronto World had the reputation for political radicalism and sketchy articles, 
nevertheless, it would be a mistake to ignore articles such as those presented in the 
Toronto World as they embodied the political views of radical pro-British Canadians.  
The article simply assumes that a part of Canada settled mostly by ethnic Germans was a 
liability and could not be counted upon to defend the rest of the country. At the same 
time, the London Advertiser also printed a story confirming the narrative that the ethnic 
German population of Berlin was indeed disruptive to the cause of recruitment.  
According to the Advertiser, an unnamed Berlin man had attempted to plant a bomb to 
destroy the 118th barracks.  Fortunately, the sentries on duty had foiled the attempt.7  This 
was based loosely on a story in the Berlin Daily Telegraph from the day before when 
sentry pte. Rich confronted a man who fired a shot near the barracks and ran off.8  At 
some point, a revolver turned into a bomb.  Reports of such an incident are nowhere to be 
found in the battalion fonds or the records of Militia and Defence.  From the outset of the 
war, the editor of the Advertiser had embarked on a xenophobic crusade against German 
Canadians in Berlin that would eventually escalate into a war of words with William 
Motz, editor of the Berliner Journal.  As we have seen, their war of words would 
eventually draw the Chief Press Censor into the fray.  In this instance, The Advertiser 
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7 London Advertiser, March 14, 1916, 4. 
8 “Unknown Man Fires Revolver at Sentinel At Rear of Barracks at Early Hour This Morning” BDT March 
13, 1916, 1. 
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further tarnished the reputation of Berlin and the 118th Battalion.  This newspaper 
controversy signaled the start of a violent series of events in Berlin in February 1916 fed 
by the hatred of men of the 118th Battalion towards all things German.  
Early in February, lieut-Col. Lochead was ordered to report to Ottawa on his 
investigation of allegations of disloyalty in Berlin and Waterloo.  His report to Sam 
Hughes was an attempt to dispel rumors of disloyalty in Berlin.  Hughes would inform 
the house: 
The department was notified of a number of silly rumors questioning the loyalty 
of the people of Waterloo County and other parts.  As a result Col. Lochead was 
asked to investigate. Col, Lochead reports that the great mass of the Canadians of 
German descent are most intensely loyal, as loyal as British, and finds only an 
odd man here or there of German descent, from the United States or elsewhere, 
seeking to create dissent. These will, in all probability, be promptly interned.9  
 
At the same time, Lochead was desperate for recruits.  If he could raise a full battalion in 
Berlin, it would be the ultimate “proof” in support of the arguments he made in Ottawa.  
Thus, on his own prerogative he began to recruit outside of his district, in a practice 
dubbed “sniping.” A thirty-man machine gun section of the 118th was recruited from 
Toronto in February 1916,10 just as the debate began about whether or not to change the 
name of the city.11 
 After the newspaper reports, rumors began to spread in the ranks of the 118th that 
the German clubs in Berlin were sympathetic to the Kaiser.   Around 6 pm on February 
15, 1916, a large group of soldiers, suspected by W.R. Chadwick to have been riled up by 
                                                          
9 “Canadians of German Descent are Loyal to the Empire” BDT February 1, 1916, 1. 
10 Nikolas Gardner, “The Great War and Waterloo County: The Travails of the 118th Overseas Battalion” 
Ontario History, 89 no. 3 (1997): 224.  
11 Lochead would get into trouble with Brigadier-General Logie for “poaching” recruits out of Toronto 
“General Logie stops poaching in Toronto” The Globe February 15, 1916. 
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alcohol, left the barracks and charged into the Concordia Club in Berlin.12  This club, 
located at 39 King St. W, was the new home of the bust of the Kaiser that had previously 
stood in Victoria Park prior to it being vandalized.  Their target was the bust, however, 
they found in the club a scene that triggered their rage, a portrait of King George adorned 
in German flags.13  
 After the bust was stolen, a procession formed on King Street and the men carried 
the bust down the street in triumph.  No one could identify who started or led the 
procession but eventually Corporal Brennan, Sergeant Deal, Private Williamson, as well 
as Private Morneau and Private. Quinn joined in.14 The bust was carried past the Walper 
Hotel and Restaurant where Sergeant Bowden and Sergeant Major Gillespie were dining 
with their wives and witnessed the event.  There was also singing in the streets.  At first 
the men sang “Hail Hail the Gangs All Here!” but this was soon drowned out by the more 
patriotic “Rule Britannia.”15  It was then carried first to the skating rink where more 
soldiers could be found to join the procession and then to the barracks. Once at the 
barracks it was placed in the mess hall and where Lance Corporal Gough, who was on 
guard duty, locked it in the detention room for safe keeping at 9:00 pm along with looted 
German flags and a painting.   
The second wave at the Concordia Club occurred between 8:00-9:00pm when the 
soldiers returned. Flags were torn down and burned, and the rest of the room was trashed.  
The windows and furniture were smashed; cigars and a keg of beer were looted.  Local 
residents joined in the chaos.  In the meantime, the piano was completely destroyed and a 
                                                          
12 Chadwick, 64. 
13 “Bust of Kaiser Wilhelm I was Captured by Men of the 118 Batt” BDT February 16, 1916, 1. 
14 Corporal Brennan denied being part in the parade but corporal Wilkins identified him as a participant 
15 “Bust of Kaiser Wilhelm” BDT February 16, 1916, 1.  
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bonfire lit on the street.  Civilians were seen selling the keys as souvenirs for 10 cents 
apiece.16  There were two items from the club that survived, a Union Jack was taken to be 
paraded through the streets and the portrait of King George V that had been draped in 
German flags.  The painting was removed by Sgt. Major Blood, in what he described as a 
rescue.17  At this point it was a full-scale riot: Sgt. Hayward was injured having been hit 
in the head with a chair, and there was little the Berlin Police could do to bring order.  
Police Sgt. Caswell (who was on the scene but off duty) later testified that there were 
three policemen but had they tried to disperse the crowd they might have been killed.18  
118th commanding offers Captain Fraser and Captain Routley arrived at approximately 
9:45pm and ordered the soldiers back to the barracks.  At this time Lieut-Col Lochead 
arrived as well and surveyed the damage. 
My analysis of these events draws on a variety of sources.  Estimates of the 
damages and insurance claims are available in the University of Waterloo’s special 
collections.  Transcripts of the military inquiry of February 15, 1916, on the other hand, 
were not kept in Kitchener nor do they appear as part of the Lochead fonds at Laurier 
University.  In fact, these events have been so inconsistently documented that some 
historians have confused the order of events let alone their meaning.  This analysis has 
been compiled from the records held at Library Archives Canada in RG24 volume 1256 
labeled “participation of troops of the CEF in a riot” which contained extracts of the 
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17 LAC Testimony of Sgt. Major Blood.  
18 LAC Testimony of Sgt Caswell. 
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Concordia Club inquiry (reconstructed as Appendix C).19  It is important to note that, 
despite the fact that the Machine Gun section recruited out of Toronto is often cited as the 
rowdiest group within the 118th, their testimony is missing.  It would appear that they 
were called upon last and testified together.  Internal investigations or inquiries are rarely 
trustworthy, yet for historians this one has the benefit of having been conducted 
immediately. The inquiry into the destruction of the Concordia Club convened the very 
next morning in Berlin and was overseen by the officers of the 118th, who were also 
belatedly present at the riot the night before.   Thus, the memories of the night before 
would have been fresh in the minds of the participants with little time for them to have 
co-ordinated their stories.  On the other hand, the residual effects of alcohol might have 
caused minor memory impediments.   
When thinking about the lapses in the documentation, it must be remembered that 
this was a hearing and not an investigation, or court proceeding, as the witnesses were 
subjected to cross examination without an appointed defender and at no point was anyone 
asked “describe in your own words what happened.”  Nor were the officers, who had 
been present at the riot, and who oversaw the hearing, required to testify.  Lieut-Col. 
Lochead was not present at the inquiry and he would only certify the results upon its 
conclusion.  There was also no physical evidence presented, no pieces of stolen or 
confiscated property, no flags and no piano keys.  The examinations themselves were also 
brief, as the officers only required specific details from each witness.  The result is the 
establishment of a very basic timeline of events with no verdict passed, no sentencing of 
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the 122nd Galt regiment in the municipal election riot (discussed in chapter 2) and a report on the visit to the 
home of Reverend Tappert. 
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guilt among any of the men, and no follow up investigation into the whereabouts of the 
missing bust.   
 It was difficult for the officers to establish a timeline of events as at no point did 
they ask any of the men to simply recount what happened possibly out of fear of a 
corroborated and a prepared story.  The first witness Sgt-Maj Woodrow when asked 
about his presence in the building, guessed he was inside for twenty minutes after the riot 
started.  Col Martin would then establish (by leading the witness) that the officers, Col. 
Lochead, Captain Fraser and himself arrived at 9:30 to break up the crowds.20  The 
officers had the timeline established in their own minds and chose not to ask for time 
approximations from most witnesses.  The exception was pte. Deal of “A” Company, the 
last witness before the lunch break.  Captain Fraser grew frustrated that Deal could not 
recall a consistent timeline of events, including where he was at specific points in the 
evening.  At the very least, Deal’s timeline clashed with Fraser’s.  Deal encountered 
Fraser on King Street and Fraser told him to “go home” after which Deal testified he 
went back to the Concordia Club to meet his wife before going home.  At this point in the 
examination, Fraser could no longer corroborate Deal’s timeline, but he knew it was a 
short walk and there appeared to be a problem between when he encountered Lochead 
and when Deal encountered Fraser.  Fraser commented that, “you must have had 45 
minutes’ blank in your memory last night.”21 
Following the inquiry, the question arose, who would pay for the damages to the 
club?  It was not out of the ordinary for military inquiries to dismiss insurance claims of 
                                                          
20 “Proceedings of Court of Inquiry Assembled at Berlin Ontario” February 16, 1916, Testimony of 
Sergeant-Major Woodward.  Curiously, 9:30 is much earlier than reported in the Berlin Daily Telegraph 
which reported the officers arriving at 11:00“continued from page 1”, BDT February 16, 1916, 3. 
21 LAC Testimony of Pte. Deal.  
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business owners.  In London, Ontario, when a fight erupted between men of the 70th OS 
Battalion and civilians over the use of a pool table, that inquiry refused to hold the 
soldiers accountable for the broken windows or the subsequent loss of business.22  In the 
case of the Concordia Club, the damages amounted to $2019, (the piano and music books 
alone totaled $600).23  The official inquiry provided the commander of Military District 1 
grounds to not hold the military liable for the damages.24  The soldiers testified that most 
of the damage, including the destruction of the piano, was caused by civilians, and the 
police had stood by and allowed the destruction. 
There were number of questions the inquiry could not answer.  The men proved 
unable, or more likely unwilling, to name their accomplices.  Neither Corporal Brennan, 
nor Pte. Deal, could (or would) identify any of the men who had participated.25  Having 
remembered a few details differently including the timeline, Captain Fraser lost his 
patience with pte. Deal as could not name any of the men who were with him; 
Capt. Fraser: We want a frank statement. If we see you  
are trying to keep back anything… 
Pte. Deal: I am trying my best to give it to you. I can’t  
say I knew anybody.26    
 
 It should be noted that Pte. Deal was part of “A” Company recruited from London and 
would not know any of the locals.  In the case of Pte. Quinn, who was interviewed in the 
afternoon, his inability to remember the names of anyone in the battalion is just as easily 
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explained away.  He first testified that, “we all go by ‘buddy” and every time he was 
asked who he saw and from which company his response was “buddy.”27 This would lead 
the officers to conclude that the men intentionally refused to name names.  Why, for 
example, would Sergeant Deal fail to recognize Sergeant Pawson as the guard when 
asked if the guard opened the door to let the bust carriers in? And why would the officers 
fail to corroborate this when questioning Pawson?28 The issue of name recognition is 
complex.  Enlisted men would not be expected to know anyone outside of their platoon 
but would also not be expected to be found around town with men outside their Company 
let alone their platoon.  Pte. Quinn, for example, was expected to know the names of his 
fellow soldiers in “D” company.29  Curiously no platoon leaders (Lieutenants) were 
interviewed.  The task of identifying men thus fell upon the Section or team leaders 
(Corporals, Brennan, Wilkins and Lance Corp Gough) who would be expected to 
personally know every man in their section. Refusing to cooperate and name accomplices 
may have been considered a less serious offence by the commissioned officers as it 
showed comradery among the men of the battalion which was felt to be crucial in the 
formation of a cohesive fighting unit.   
The other issue that could not be solved in the hearing was the location of the 
Kaiser Bust.  The bust disappeared in the night after its arrival in the barracks and no one 
could (or would) account for it.  This confused both the officers heading the inquiry and 
later historians about the chain of events.  The hearing found, from testimony from Deal, 
that the bust had been placed on the table in the mess before being locked away for the 
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night.  The best that could be determined is that the bust disappeared that night, or the 
next morning, before breakfast.  It was last seen by the men who had keys to the cell, 
Lance Corporal Gough and Corporal Wilkins who testified that they had not reopened the 
room until they heard the bust was missing.30  Sgt. Pawsen found a problem. His 
testimony necessitated Captain Routley to admit that the locks had recently been changed 
and not all the guard officers had access to the room.31  The matter of who had access to 
the room was never addressed again with any other witnesses or guards.  There is also no 
record available to indicate who had access to the brig or if that the lock situation was 
ever resolved.   
Due to the inconsistencies in the source materials, and some questionable news 
reporting, historian William J. Campbell believed that the bust was thrown into the lake 
in Victoria Park after it was looted from the Concordia Club.  The detail was lost on him 
that the bust in Concordia Hall and the bust in Victoria Park, which had been thrown in 
the lake in August 1914,was one and the same.32  Sam Hughes in his official statement on 
the affair was also confused over the order of events and as a result, historian Brock 
Millman in his recent telling of the story, assumed in the same manner as Hughes and 
Campbell, that the Battalion threw the bust into the lake the night of the sacking of the 
Concordia Club.33  This is impossible, according to Rych Mills, the lake has been 
dredged several times with no sign of it.34 Today in Kitchener/Waterloo the fate of the 
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bust is the stuff of legend.  Some believed it was melted down into ashtrays,35 or even 
melted down to make 118th Battalion napkin holders, one of which is displayed in the 
Waterloo Region Museum.  As for the pedestal where the bust once stood, shortly after 
the Concordia Club raid the bronze medallions decorating the pedestal were stolen.  
Within weeks, the pedestal itself would be removed by the city.36    
The inquiry may not have been able to determine the final resting place of the 
missing bust, or the trigger for the riot, but it did expose a great deal about how its 
participants felt about the city of Berlin and its inhabitants of German ancestry.  Sgt. 
Major Blood, and others, attributed the riot to frustration over the low recruiting levels 
and the pro-German stance of the citizens of Berlin they encountered.  He was also asked 
if he knew anything about the newspaper controversy of the previous month and if it was 
a contributory factor in the riot to which he speculated that it most definitely.37 
Corporal Brennan’s testimony indicates that clashes between soldiers and German 
loyalists were a regular event in the city and that Captain Routley was aware of it and the 
reasons why the club would be a target; 
Capt. Routley – You are aware as a citizen of Berlin  
that this is the headquarters of Germanism in this  
town?  
A. Yes sir, I knew that to be a fact. One man two weeks ago…said he would fight 
for his Kaiser any time. He told me that and I whipped him for it.38 
 
He went on to report other incidences including a description of a German man from 
Stratford that he punched for saying “fuck the British Empire!”39   
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 Lieut-Col Lochead hoped to bring the situation under control.  He had spent the 
night of the raid trying to convince his men to stand down (unsuccessfully) and the next 
day felt preventative measures were necessary to discourage any further disturbances, in 
the name of patriotism, against the city of Berlin.  He feared that the publishing firm of 
Rittinger & Motz, The German Printing and Publishing Company, would be the next 
target.  The day after the riot, and the same day the inquiry assembled (February 16th) 
Lochead would make an odd request of Motz.  He requested that the word “German” 
(which can be seen in figure 1.12) be painted over on the signage for Rittinger & Motz at 
15 Queen Street South.  The English Berlin Daily Telegraph took this opportunity to use 
a choice adjective in its headline, describing the issue of signage at the headquarters of its 
competitor, “Objectionable Sign was Painted Over.”40   
 This was not the end of the story of the winter of 1916.  The men of the 118th had 
just ransacked the German club venting their frustrations, and yet one target was absent, 
the Prussian born Lutheran Reverend Tappert who was earning himself quite the 
reputation for the pro-Kaiser sympathies expressed in his sermons.  Lieut-Col. Lochead 
would later tell his superiors that he had warned his men to leave Tappert alone, as 
provocative as he could be.41  As demonstrated in the Concordia club raid testimonies, 
however, the men did not heed Lochead’s wishes.  Tappert had refused to leave Berlin 
after the backlash over the sinking of the Lusitania the year before, and his continued 
presence in Berlin, and criticisms of the British Empire, made him a target of the men of 
the machine gun section of the 118th.  It would appear Tappert had promised to leave the 
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41 LAC RG 24 Vol 1256 HQ 593-1-91 “Lieut-Colonel W.M.O. Lochead to The OC 1st Div London” March 
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city by March 1, 1916, but when that day came and he had still not left, Pte. Simon 
Shaefer and Sgt. Maj G.P. Blood made a call on him at home.42   
Blood claimed to have missed out on the wave of destruction at the Concordia 
Club.  Spurred on by speeches given at the barracks, this time he would be the ring 
leader.  He mentioned in his Concordia testimony in February that he had heard from 
Captain Dancy at a general meeting at the barracks that Tappert ought to be tarred and 
feathered.43  Others in the battalion, evidently, had their own personal vendetta against 
the Reverend.  Sgt. Bowden, for example, told the officers of the 118th that Tappert’s son 
had threatened his at school.44  Others believed that Tappert and his brand of pro-
Germanism was the cause for the apparent “lack of enthusiasm” for enlistment. Tappert 
later described these soldiers in his memoirs: 
Among the recruits were many brawlers and idlers who, under the leadership of 
an ex-convict, had won themselves a reputation for acts of terror and general 
rowdiness.45 
 
He would also recall, that at the moment the soldiers arrived at his house, he had little 
doubt about their intentions.46  While Tappert attempted to call the police, the men broke 
the glass panel of his front door to unlock it.  They then ripped the phone off the wall 
before Tappert could reach the police for help.  Tappert was then beaten and dragged out 
on to the street.  In a scene reminiscent of the New Testament, the Reverend, with blood 
flowing from his forehead, was led in procession through the city to the barracks.  This 
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time however, Pontius Pilate was on the side of the prisoner rather than the mob.  Around 
10:30pm Lieut-Col. Lochead returned from London, was briefed about what was 
happening, and ordered Tappert’s release.47   
 The morning after the attack, a bandaged and bruised Tappert delivered what 
would be his last sermon in Berlin.  In defiance of the soldiers in attendance armed with a 
petition, this last sermon was delivered in German rather than English.48  Thanks to the 
protection and protests of the U.S. Consul, Tappert and his family were given until the 
first of the month to leave Canada.49  Within a week, Tappert left Berlin for New York. 
   
The Recruitment Issue 
The testimonies of the men of the 118th OS Battalion demonstrate a number of 
principles of the service in the imperial forces, and the liberal order.  On the response to 
calls for enlistment in the Great War, military historian John Keegan commented; 
Associations offered an emotional leverage on British male responses which the 
committees of ‘raisers’, middle-aged, and self-appointed in the first flush of 
enthusiasm for the war, were quick to manipulate, without perhaps realizing its 
power.50 
 
Connections within the community as well as professional association provided men with 
unspoken motivation, or rather social pressure and reassurances, to enlist in the military.  
Men would join their club friends, their neighbours, their fellow union members, their 
sports team partners and other acquaintances at the recruiting office.  The intent was to 
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both encourage recruitment and to ensure a level of comradely feelings within the local 
unit.  The unwillingness of 118th soldiers to snitch on their friends and reveal who started 
the riot, who participated in the march, and who stole the bust are clear indicators of this 
pattern.   
It is also clear that they believed that the pro-German element in Berlin was 
responsible for the low recruitment rates of 1916.  Whether their commanding officer 
Lieut-Col. Lochead believed this is debatable.  In his efforts, he would use fear 
mongering tactics and stress to the community the importance of winning the war, and 
played on their sense of community, masculinity, and imperial obligation. Motherhood, 
for example, as an imperial archetype included the patriotic duty of consenting to the 
enlistment of husbands and sons.51  After a few weeks of low enlistment, Lieut-Col. 
Lochead told the press in early January 1916:  
I believe that the reason for the failure of the young men to come forward 
is due to a lack of consciousness of the real necessity which lies before them.  
They do not seem to realize that if it were not for the fact that the British fleet is 
so efficient Canada would now be invaded by the enemy. 
I have been informed that some of the available and physically fit young 
men of the city have gone to the United States and it has been hinted that they 
have done so in order to avoid military service.  I do not say that they have gone 
for this reason but I do say that if their motive for going to the States at this time 
is to evade their duty to King and Country their conduct is most reprehensible and 
cowardly. 
I heard the other day that a mother in the city restrained her boy from 
going by telling him that he would break her heart if he enlisted.  This mother I 
say fell down in her duty. She should be brought to realize that the boy must go to 
protect her home and she should not be so selfish as to allow some other woman’s 
son to go to the front to protect her while her own boy stays home. Mothers 
should be brought to realize their duty in this respect.52  
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At the beginning of the war, volunteers from Berlin enlisted in the 71st and 34th Overseas 
Battalions and the local 108th militia unit.  Many of the men from the latter would later 
transfer to the 118th after its formation at the end of 1915.53   
Recruiting rallies would become regular events in the city and Lochead even 
managed to schedule one while the battalion was temporarily on leave to vote on the 
city’s name change.  The English language Berlin Daily Telegraph, ran recruitment adds 
and subtly played to the sense of community by naming new recruits and boasting about 
their sense of honour or duty.  Recruiting posters were plastered on storefront windows 
and ran in the newspapers.  The Telegraph and the Berlin News-Record posters were in 
keeping with the tone of Lochead’s fearmongering letter about the importance of the war 
effort.  In February, 1916 for example, as seen in Figure 3.1 and 3.2 the advertisements 
shunned callousness and cowardice.   In spite of accusations that the German newspapers 
were disloyal to the cause, the Berliner Journal also ran recruitment advertisements to 
encourage its German readers to enlist.  Rather than play the game of forcing Germans to 
prove their loyalty, the Berliner Journal, like the English language newspapers used the 
language of masculinity with phrases like “there are three kinds of men, which one are 
you?” (Figure 3.3) 
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Figure 3.1 118th Battalion CEF 
(Source: Berlin Daily Telegraph 
February 5, 1916, 10) 
Figure 3.2 118th Battalion CEF 
(Source: Berlin News--Record 
February 7, 1916, 8) 
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Figure 3.3 118th Battalion CEF 
 There are Three Classes of Men: 
1. Those who have heard the call of the land and follow it 
2. Those who have not shown up yet 
3. And—The others 
in which class do you belong, young man? 
Register [enlist] Today! 
Your King and Country [fatherland] needs you 
  now!  
(Source: The Berliner Journal, February 1916, 8) 
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There is also evidence that the men of the battalion practiced what has been 
described by one historian as “impressment.”  In short, men would meander through the 
streets of Berlin seeking out anyone who was not in khaki and literally bully them to the 
recruiting office: “They’d grab you off the street” recalled one Berlin resident.54 
There are a number of theories about the reasons behind the low recruitment rates 
in Berlin in 1916.  These range from the idea that Berlin’s population was too low to raise 
a full battalion, an overlap in recruiting districts with the Guelph regiment, to the idea that 
the German origins of many in the city meant nobody wanted to join up to fight their 
ancestral brothers. 
Indeed, there was a problem, but it was with Canada’s recruiting system.  As 
described by historians Robert Brown and Donald Lovebridge, there was no central 
structure for recruitment which resulted in disjointed efforts.55  When the 118th OS 
Battalion was formed, most of its ranks were filled by the disbanded 108th regiment and 
the rest would be recruited locally, or so it was thought.  As pointed out by the late 
Richard Holt, the changes to recruiting methods in May 1915 meant reallocating 
responsibility away from the Department of the Militia.  Where previously recruitment 
was handled by the Department of Militia, now unit commanding officers were to take 
charge of local recruiting.56  Because of vague boundaries between the recruiting 
districts, there was competition for men among other battalions in the area.  Men in the 
118th could come from areas well within the territory of the Guelph and London 
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battalions.  Attestation papers show many came from Guelph, Elmira, Toronto, London 
and as far away as Walkerton.  The overlap of territory meant fewer men enlisted in the 
battalions they were geographically expected to, which ultimately affected the 
distribution of recruits throughout Military Districts. Then came the slump of 1916 that 
coincided with the formation of the 118th.  
Historians have debated the causes of the sudden drop in the recruitment levels 
that occurred in 1916.  On the one hand, by 1916 the recruiting process had been 
streamlined and no longer relied on militia regiments for volunteer service overseas.  
Men could now enlist directly into overseas battalions, thus recruitment was now the 
responsibility of battalion commanding officers and their recruiting officer, if one was 
appointed.57  For older generations of historians like Desmond Morton and Craig Brown, 
the fault lay with Sam Hughes for not centralizing the bureaucracy of recruitment in 
Canada.58  Morton would also point out that the vast majority of men who volunteered in 
the first year and a half of the war were British-born Canadians, with greater ties to the 
imperial mother country and by 1916, there were fewer eligible men in this group.59  This 
argument was challenged by Holt who pointed out that recruitment in forestry and 
railway units remained steady throughout the period.60  Holt missed a key point.  After 
hearing reports of the horrors of trench warfare and gas attacks the battles of Ypres and 
Mount Sorrell, the majority of volunteers began to choose artillery, engineer, as well as 
non-combat units like railway, forestry and medical outfits over what could best be 
                                                          
57 Paul J. Maroney “Recruiting the Canadian Expeditionary Force in Ontario, 1914-1917” (Master’s Thesis, 
Queen’s University, 1991), 17. 
58 Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 54. Brown and Loveridge “Unrequited Faith”, 60. 
59 Ibid,, 70. 
60 Holt, 104. 
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described as suicidal infantry units.61  In line with British recruiting practices described 
by John Keegan, Paul Maroney pointed out that the greatest strength in Ontario’s 
recruiting efforts was the emphasis on local community values which was a strong social 
force.  He also outright rejects the idea presented by Morton that centralized recruiting 
would have solved the problem.62  
On the matter of men who would be recruited, the majority of Canadian 
historians, until very recently, have focused on psychology and masculinity as it 
pertained to imperial identity. Building on the principle of imperial identity, historians’ 
focus shifted towards the recruitment efforts in the context of Canadian militarism and 
culture that had recently emerged.  This new Canadian militarism, was not as influential 
in Canadian politics as it was in continental Europe because Canada lacked a powerful 
officer class with a direct avenue of control over foreign and domestic policy.  It was 
however, the product of British imperial sentiment in the post Boer War world.  A 
military spirit had become synonymous with manhood and masculinity, order, stability, 
and nationalism, and was also viewed as the perpetual “cure all” for the ills of society.63  
This language is also based heavily on presumptions about class.  As demonstrated by 
Mike O’Brien, an idealized masculinity, inseparable from militarism was an urban 
middle-class construct.  Canada’s working class and farm labourers, from which the vast 
majority of Canada’s enlisted men would be raised, was spoken of using terms like 
“undisciplined” and “childish” in urgent need of character reform through the esprit de 
                                                          
61 Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 60. 
62 Paul Maroney, “‘The Great Adventure’: The Context and Ideology of Recruiting in Ontario, 1914-1917” 
Canadian Historical Review, 77 (1996): 72. 
63 Berger, The Sense of Power, 257-258. 
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corps of military service.64  This was also the conclusion drawn by Mark Moss whose 
work on gender and education in Ontario found that a common belief was that the war 
would give young men the opportunity to prove their manliness in combat in a world 
where de-skilling and mechanization was beginning to undermine traditional masculine 
traits; aggression and self-control.65  
Joy Parr’s study of recruitment of German Canadian men in Hamburg Ontario, 
showed eagerness to prove one’s masculinity extended beyond English Canadians, as 
Hamburg was also a German ancestral town with its own ethnic elite and there emerged a 
clash of ethnic identity for young men.66 Some groups, which included most Europeans 
and select aboriginal groups,67 were welcomed into Canadian military culture.  This, 
however, did not extend to groups considered culturally therefore morally inferior.  East 
Indians, blacks, and Chinese for example would find it difficult to be accepted into CEF 
units during the war, based on the idea that the Great War was a “white man’s war.” To 
gaslight their own racial prejudices, Canadians argued the Germans would not extend the 
courtesies of modern “civilized warfare” afforded to white soldiers, to soldiers considered 
to be members of an inferior race.  There was also outright rejection of the Japanese out 
of fear that their military service would become a talking point for enfranchisement.68 
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Regarding recruitment in Berlin, the theory that the low levels of volunteers was 
directly related to the ethnic ancestry of the city is an alarming one.  On the one hand 
there is very little evidence to support it, and on the other, there are historians who 
continue to subscribe to it regardless.  Historians need to proceed with caution when 
investigating eras of history involving high racial tensions, real or imagined because of 
the ease of explanation provided by ethnic determinism in the writing of history.69   
On the website for the Laurier Military History Archive, where the Lochead fonds 
have been digitized for public access, the former archivist states that the documents show 
a general mistrust of the community on Lochead’s part.  One document in particular 
shows that he felt recruiting efforts had been compromised, by the disloyalty of the 
community and that deserters were seeking refuge in the United States.70  This is 
factually incorrect.  The document sourced is a letter dated January 5, 1916 from Lieut-
Col. Lochead.  While it indeed states that men were fleeing to the United States, Lochead 
never said that he mistrusted the community.71  In fact, as will be demonstrated in chapter 
5, Lochead was far more accepting of recruits whose ancestry might be considered 
                                                          
69 For a discussion see Sweeny, 52-53. Currently, a handful of historians have accepted dominant narratives 
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71 LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 1 Desertion “Lieutenant Colonel W Lochead Fonds, Lieut-Col W.M.O 
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questionable by others.  The issue of loyalty of Berlin during the Great War, and the 
failure to recruit a full battalion, remains a politically charged issue and thus must be 
handed cautiously.  Here it is the historian’s responsibility to look past the imperialist 
propaganda and use basic source criticism.    
Evidence from the Lochead fonds point to a different problem in recruiting, the 
general health of the men of Berlin.  The discourse of ethnicity and gender was also tied 
to public discussions about the health of the nation which became an issue in the 
recruiting process.  Morton pointed out that battalions were losing, on average, a quarter 
of the men they recruited.72  Young men were rejected from overseas services for a long 
list of health reasons.  As the war dragged on, the standards were lowered to meet the 
growing demands, and on occasion, doctors could be ordered to ignore certain ailments.73  
Nikolas Gardner in his article on the 118th Battalion pointed out that the largest problem 
for recruitment was the poor health of the community.  During the final examination of 
the men before their departure, 238 out of 489 men (48%) were rejected for medical 
reasons.74  Many more had already been rejected before December 1916.  It was a 
disaster and the military opened an inquiry into the matter.  What is required is a re-
examination to quantify this disaster and potentially put to rest the propagandist argument 
about the disloyal German and redirect the focus towards Gardner’s initial findings about 
the health of Berlin’s recruits.   
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It becomes even more important given that historians credit the war with 
awakening the need to address the previously ignored crisis of public health in Canada.75  
This is partially because the eugenics movement in Britain and America, upon which 
Canadian eugenicists based their recommendations, had maintained the idea that 
hereditary diseases, deformities, and a predisposition to disease was indicative of a 
problem with the genetic makeup of an individual and not the social environment.76  
Piecing together the fragmentary details about individuals who enlisted in the 
118th OS Battalion, from both the attestation papers and the 1911 census, enables a more 
in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of recruitment in Berlin than was previously 
possible. 
As has been observed by a number of historians examining the recruitment of the 
CEF soldiers, identifying the social background can be challenging.  A starting point has 
been to examine the “occupation” column of the attestation papers.  Unfortunately, these 
are neither precise nor indicative because the question was not to state occupation it was 
to state trade or calling.  As explained by Maarten Gerritsen, for example, a “brewer” 
could have meant anything from a labourer to an apprentice to a master.77  The problem is 
brewer is a skilled trade and a labourer is categorically unskilled.  This leaves for 
historians the most recent census records taken in 1911. These records have limitations in 
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establishing the backgrounds of the soldiers because of the problem with age and 
immigration.  If a man came of age in 1916 when the 118th Battalion began recruiting, he 
would have been between the ages of 13 and 14 in the 1911 census and would either not 
have been working or, would not yet have reached the earning potential of a young adult.  
Furthermore, this is operating on the assumption that the man did not lie about his age to 
the recruiting officer which, as it turns out, was a common practice.  Regarding 
immigration, because a significant number of volunteers were recent immigrants, 
frequently English, they would not appear in the 1911 census.  The census records 
therefore, can only shed light on the social and familial background of the soldier rather 
than their social position at the time of enlistment.  There are, however, a few advantages 
to the use of the census returns.  To begin with, limited social mobility was a multi-
generational symptom of capitalism, especially for working class families.78 Thus, it is a 
reasonable assumption that the social background of the head of household in 1911 would 
have also been that of his male children.  Secondly, where earning power cannot be 
ascertained, the place of residence listed in the attestation papers is indicative of social 
background and class as much as occupation.  Computerized spatial analysis, geographic 
information systems (or GIS) have, in the past, demonstrated population distributions in 
cities large and small and have been instrumental in uncovering patterns of settlement in 
the urban environment based on class, ethnicity, and social background.79    
                                                          
78 For quantitative analysis of six cities using the 1891 and 1901 census conducted and contextualized 
within Canadian liberal individualism see Peter Baskerville and Eric W. Sager, Unwilling Idlers: The 
Urban Unemployed and their Families in Late Victorian Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1998).  
79 The source used here as a guide for the process was Placing History: How Maps, Spatial Data, and GIS 
are Changing Historical Scholarship edited by Anne Kelly Knowles (Redlands: ESRI Press, 2008). 
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 Ethnicity was not asked as part of the recruitment process.  Place of birth was 
deemed adequate for a soldier’s attestation paper.  The intention was to determine if a 
volunteer was a Canadian citizen and not an enemy alien.  Thus, a more reliable source 
for determining ethnicity/ancestry of Canadian soldiers is provided by the 1911 census.  
There are however a number of issues to consider.  On the matter of ethnicity, it was 
based entirely on the male line as children were usually given their father’s nationality 
and race, rather than their mother’s.  Furthermore, instructions for enumerators on 
language contained an oversight.  While the description for recording languages, and the 
assumptions about the meaning of languages, is thorough, it does not give instructions for 
the recording of languages other than English and French for people born in Canada.  
Instead, instructions for languages other than English are applied only to foreign born 
subjects.80 Fortunately, the Berlin enumerators were more thorough than their instruction 
manual and recorded the languages of the household other than English and French for 
Canadian born subjects.81 
 
Geo-mapping a Battalion 
When considering the failed outcome of recruiting efforts in Berlin in 1916, 
which many have been attributed to the Germans in the community, a geographic 
analysis is necessary to see, the results of recruitment.  Utilizing QGIS, an open source 
program, reveals the patterns formed by such individual traits as ethnicity, language 
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spoken, religion, and occupation among the enlisted men.  For this project, the parameters 
were narrowed to the city of Berlin whose German-Canadian population’s disloyalty 
were ostensibly the reason for low recruitment. The 118th Battalion also recruited in 
Waterloo proper and as far away as Toronto, Wellesley, and London, these geographical 
limitations eliminate the non-local contributions to the battalion and, by so doing, the 
analysis is centered on the problem of whether or not the German community of Berlin 
was responsible for the troubles of 1916. 
Much of the groundwork for the creation of a GIS analysis was laid by the 
Waterloo Geospatial Center’s Waterloo County Historical Street Project, which created 
base maps of Kitchener and Waterloo for 1955 and 2011.  Working backwards from the 
1955 street map of Kitchener, (and with the assistance of Robert Sweeny), I created a GIS 
map of Berlin in 1912 utilizing two key sources.  The first source is the period map 
“Busy Berlin,” issued by the M.S. Boehm Company in Toronto (figure 1.8).  The second 
source, essential for inserting the range of street addresses was the City of Berlin Street 
Directory published as part of the commemorative volume Berlin: Celebration of 
Cityhood, issued in 1912.  Once the 1912 map was completed, a point file was converted 
from an Excel spreadsheet containing the details of the soldiers in the 118th based on the 
recruitment files and census data. 
The maps themselves have been reoriented 35 degrees to match the historical 
orientation of the Busy Berlin 1912 and the Leavitt Plan (Figure 1.8 and 1.10).  Berliners 
liked to consider the intersection of King and Queen Street as the centre of their city and 
oriented themselves with Victoria Park, Queens Park and the railway yard to the west.      
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The first result was figure 3.4 which provided a general overview of the 
residences of enlisted soldiers in the 118th.  The spread of the population in general shows 
firstly the proximity of the labour force of young men to the means of production which 
was predominantly in the centre and north wards.  It should be noted that “Queen’s Park” 
in the west between Petersburg Road and Woodland was a new and largely uninhabited 
area.  The fact that recruits are spread across the entire city shows that the 118th recruiters 
had managed, at the very least, to assemble a relatively even spread of Berlin’s 
Figure 3.4 Berlin Ontario: 118th Overseas Battalion Recruitment by 
Address, 1916 (Sources: LAC 1911 Census Records, LAC RG 150 
Attestation Papers, KPL Soldier Information Card series) 
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population into the battalion.  Every ward, every neighbourhood and indeed almost every 
block appear to be well represented.  
The place of birth of the men who enlisted demonstrates the effects of more recent 
immigration in Berlin on the urban landscape.  The most recent group of immigrants to 
come to Canada by the outbreak of the war were British and their distribution shows a 
distinct pattern of settlement.  Figure 3.5 shows a portion living either in small dwellings 
downtown on King Street below Water Street or to the Northwest on the edge of 
Waterloo proper.  The largest area of concentration is in the East with Lancaster Street 
serving as a demarcation line. This is indicative of the relative importance for these recent 
immigrants of the newer housing developments on the edge of the city.  For the next 
decade, the East ward of the city would see significant urban sprawl since there was, with 
the exception of forests, the occasional swamp, and privately-owned farmland, no natural 
barriers to expansion.  There are a number of Scots distributed through the same areas, 
while the Irish have the least presence on the map. It should come as no surprise to see 
this as many Irish would have at best an indifference to the British cause.  For those who 
wished to serve anyway, most in Ontario preferred to enlist with their own unit, the 208th 
Canadian Irish Battalion that was recruiting out of Toronto at the same time as the 118th.  
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Figure 3.5 Distribution of British and Ontario Born Recruits (Sources: LAC 
1911 Census Records, LAC RG 150 Attestation Papers, KPL Soldier Information 
Card series) 
 
England 
Scotland 
Ireland 
Berlin, Ont. 
Waterloo, 
Ont. 
159 
 
Those born in Ontario as well as Berlin and Waterloo proper, which includes a 
number of men of German ancestry, comprise the next highest number of recruits.  Much 
like the English and Scottish recruits, there is again a fairly even spread across Berlin 
with the highest concentration in the centre of town.  There are two additional spatial 
anomalies that are worth noting.  Berlin born recruits are concentrated in the oldest 
sections of the city between Queen Street and Cedar Street near Victoria Park.   The 
dwellings on and around Courtland Ave. were mostly two to three story attached working 
class homes.  Closer to King Street were the larger detached homes in what is now called 
“Cedar Hill.”  Recruits born in outside Berlin are concentrated on the other side of the 
Grand Trunk Railway Line (in the vicinity of the Tanneries, Kaufman Rubber and Mount 
Hope Cemetery) in the suburb that borders Waterloo.  
There were many others living outside Berlin, residents of Waterloo North and 
surrounding townships as well as recruits from more distant districts such as those 
“sniped” from Toronto by Lieut-Col. Lochead. Tracking the recruits of the township of 
Waterloo is near impossible, due to a problem with the 1911 census.82  The purpose here 
is to show the results of the recruiting efforts in 1916 within Berlin itself, the former 
centre of German immigration and the centre of the recruiting failure controversy.  
While some recruits could not be traced in the 1911 census, the ones that are 
recorded in the same dwelling in the census and the attestation papers demonstrate key 
characteristics of the household.   Figure 3.6 shows that a few of the recruits managed to 
maintain German as the exclusive language of the household (at least in 1911), but the 
                                                          
82 Enumerators in the 1911 census incorrectly filled out “number of occupants” in the box designated for 
address number and the recruiters, as evidenced by attestation papers, were satisfied to write only 
“Waterloo” as place of residence. 
160 
 
majority either spoke exclusively English or were bilingual in German and English.  This 
contrast is best seen in the aforementioned concentration of Berlin Born recruits around 
Queen and Courtland Streets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Languages Spoken by Berlin/Waterloo Recruits 
(Source: LAC 1911 Census Records) 
English 
German 
Bilingual 
(English/German)  
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Of recruits born outside the British Empire, the largest group shown in Figure 3.5 
are American by birth.  In 1916, the United States was still neutral and enlisting in 
Canadian battalions was a viable option for men who wished to volunteer.  This map also 
shows that the lowest portion of recruits were born in the Central Powers only three 
German-born recruits are recorded.  While this may be an indication that men of Central 
European birth did not wish to serve, and fight their fellow countrymen, because of the 
recruitment processes in place in the army, men born in Central Power countries would 
find it difficult to enlist in overseas battalions even if they wanted to.  There are, 
however, a number of Poles confined to the north-west side of the Grand Trunk Railway 
Germany 
Poland 
Russia 
Greece 
Spain 
USA 
Figure 3.7 Distribution of “foreign born” recruits (Sources: LAC 1911 Census 
Records, LAC RG 150 Attestation Papers, KPL Soldier Information Card series) 
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line in the same area of high concentration as Ontario born recruits who were not from 
Berlin.   
 Building a GIS of the men who enlisted in the 118th OS Battalion yields a number 
of observations.  To begin with, the spread of enlisted privates is fairly even across the 
districts.  In contrast, most officers of the 118th Battalion did not live in Berlin.  Lieut-
Col. Lochead lived in Waterloo proper and the others came from elsewhere in Ontario.  
Among male breadwinners of enlistment age (18-45) there is also an even spread of blue-
collar workers: shoe cutters, shirt makers, rubber workers, and those categorized under 
the umbrella term of labourer.  While this would suggest that there was not a significant 
class-based distribution of the men recruited in the city, two details must be noted.  The 
first is the scarcity of recruits in the triangle of Weber Street W, Queen Street North and 
Victoria Street.  Here was an area of larger brick Queen Anne style homes with large 
porches belonging to prominent men of Berlin.83   Home to wealthier, established 
families, who if they had any sons, would be serving in roles above that of an infantry 
battalion recruit.  Households such as these can also be found in the East Ward 
surrounding Victoria Park on the farmlands which were purchased from the Mennonites, 
including the large property owned by the Schneiders.  The second observation on class is 
deduced from the attestation papers that show a parent listed as next of kin with the same 
address. As many of these young recruits were still living at home, they were not the 
principal breadwinner of the household.  These soldiers were part of a nuclear family 
with multiple incomes, a common phenomenon of the time period, and easily explained 
by the fact that the army preferred volunteers who were single and without children.    
                                                          
83 In the vicinity of the Kitchener Public Library, it has been declared a historic neighborhood. 
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In short, Berlin was too small, with both its factory owning middle class residents 
and its working class living in close proximity to the means of production, to have 
developed, at least by 1916, a level of urban class or ethnic based segregation comparable 
to larger industrial centres like Toronto or Montreal.  Negative data is still data.  With 
most households located within a 2 km radius of the means of production, this shows a 
more intimate spatial relationship between employer and employee, meaning, 
conventional class and religious mechanisms of social control associated with the liberal 
order would be, hypothetically, more easily enforced regardless of the ethnic makeup of 
the city.  In short, industrialized Berlin was a product of individualist free market 
liberalism that flourished after confederation.  It had become inclusive of Western 
European cultures that shared similar liberal values.  As a result, the city showed in its 
recruitment patterns few signs of ethnic segregation.  
 
Rejected Volunteers 
  
For the recruiters in Berlin, there was another issue in their efforts to fill the ranks.   
The 118th Battalion had a serious problem with the health of its recruits.  Currently, most 
historians focus on the effects of the war on the health of soldiers (physical and mental), 
although there is a renewed interest in the health at the time of enlistment. The authors of 
“Before the Obesity Problem” for example, have argued that the soldiers of the Great 
War can be described as “bulkier” due to a higher body mass index than those of the 
Second World War because they had a more stable childhood which, to the authors, was a 
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pre-disposition to a higher Body Mass Index in early adulthood.84  While this builds on 
the work of Moss, who described the country in which they grew up as essentially a farm 
producing healthy soldiers, it does not account for the physical ailments suffered by 
young men in the industrial age.  The first comprehensive study of this is Nic Clarke’s 
Unwanted Warriors which studied volunteers rejected from the CEF for medical reasons 
and their ensuing struggles after having been emasculated.   
Still, the standard source for the history of health and morality is Marian 
Valverde’s The Age of Light, Soap and Water.    Characterizing individualism as both an 
ally and a  hindrance of “moral character,” she studied the largely non-governmental 
social purity movement.85  Using literary theory, she also linked health (or rather what 
was perceived as a precondition to good health) to sexuality/morality among Canadian 
social Darwinists of the early twentieth century.86  Internalizing self-control was key to 
Canadian sexual health which, in hindsight, can be seen as just one more negotiation 
between society and the individual in the Canadian liberal experiment.  Thus, it had been 
established that there were concerns in pre and postwar Canada with questions of public 
health and moral character. Already influenced by social Darwinism, the problems posed 
by the medical condition of recruits compounded the issue. 
Ethnicity and eugenics were at the heart of the conversation according to Nic 
Clarke as well.  Central/Eastern Europeans would be deemed inferior both culturally and 
genetically.  By contrast, the British people, by virtue of centuries of Parliamentary rule, 
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had “evolved” or internalized what Weber called the Protestant work ethic which brought 
inherent higher moral values and sexual practices.87  At the same time, when examined 
through the lens of early twentieth century eugenics, there were worries that the British 
were the ones who were deteriorating.  Woodsworth himself, who held German 
immigrants in high esteem in Strangers Within our Gates, worried that the recent tide of 
immigrants from England were of a lower order.88  This was one of the theories presented 
by social commentators for high rejection rates at recruiting offices in Toronto.89  Berlin 
was a city at the centre of this debate over the health of the country, being composed of 
recent British immigrants, central Europeans, and descendants of central Europeans.  The 
recent growth of urban industrial hubs brought with it concerns of the effects of 
urbanization on the nation’s health, not only because of pollution and working conditions, 
but also because of the spread of infectious diseases, especially those attributed to the 
urban atmosphere of sin and vice.90 
There were a number of conditions listed in the recruiting manuals that would 
become grounds for immediate rejection.  These included everything from; lung 
problems like tuberculosis, an untreatable hernia, hemorrhoids, ulcers, impaired vision, 
impaired hearing, tooth decay, deformed feet, and mental deficiency.91  The Lochead 
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fonds include cases of men discharged from service for these reasons.  In fact, the 
medical condition of the recruits eventually led to greater reductions than either low 
recruitment or desertion.  We do not know how many men of Berlin and Waterloo were 
rejected for medical reasons because the men rejected by the recruiting officer at 
enlistment are missing from the record. The men accounted for in the files are the ones 
who were not rejected immediately and were only deemed unfit at a later date.  A 
revealing indication of the initial rejection rates is contained in a letter from MP William 
Weichel, in which he made a case that Leonard Paddwick be exempt for bad feet, he 
observed that on March 23 1916, there were 40 applications and 23 were deemed unfit.92  
The medical problems began almost as soon as recruitment started.  On January 4, 
1916, H.M Roedding, Peter Rosenberg and Edwin Finch were discharged.  Roedding had 
loose cartilages in his knee, Rosenberg had a hernia, and Finch had hammer toes.93  
Rosenberg had sought treatment for his hernia and also complained about his knee.  After 
undergoing surgery for his hernia in Guelph, the medical reports show that his condition 
was vastly improved.  According to the Medical Officer, however, Rosenberg’s character 
was also questionable and justified his discharge.  He was considered a malingerer, a 
person who exaggerates symptoms, and had apparently harassed the nurses in Guelph.94  
In the case of Finch, what constituted a curable condition was debateable among military 
commanders and physicians.  Some forms of flat feet were considered curable with 
proper treatment; however, hammer toes were another matter.  The main causes are 
                                                          
92 LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 23 Enlistments “W.G. Weichel to Lieut-Col Lochead” March 24, 1916.  
93 LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 16A Discharges “Lieut Col W.M.O Lochead to A.A.G. 1st Division”, 
January 24, 1916, 1. 
94 LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 25 Medical Reports “Medical Officer 118th OS Battalion to Doctor 
Mearns and Stalker” February 9, 1916. 
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genetic predisposition and deformation caused by ill-fitting shoes.  The resulting swelling 
in the joint causes pain, abrasions, and corns complicated by tight footwear like boots.  
Naturally, marches were causing Finch a great deal of pain and discomfort and the 
medical officer deemed his condition too cumbersome.95  The case of Finch is also 
indicative that the screening process early on was negligible, because here was a 
condition that was easily detectable compared to loose cartilage or a hernia and yet his 
attestation papers (figure 3.8) filled out December 23, 1915, shows he was deemed fit to 
serve with no mention of his condition.  Rosenberg’s attestation papers (figure 3.9) on the 
other hand, confirmed that he suffered from a hernia showing that medical examinations 
could be more thorough. Perhaps overlooking deformed feet was the standard practice, 
whereas because a hernia was considered treatable, Rosenberg was declared fit to serve, 
for the time being.  Time and location are also at play.  Standards changed and these two 
exams are nine months apart with different doctors.    
 
 
                                                          
95 LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 16A Discharges “Lieut Col W.M.O Lochead to A.A.G. 1st Division”, 
January 24, 1916, 1. 
168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Attestation Paper, pte. Edwin Finch96 
                                                          
96 LAC Soldiers of the First World War, 1915-1918 Attestation Papers. RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, 
Box 3082 – 11. 
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Figure 3.9 Attestation Paper, pte. Peter Rosenberg97 
                                                          
97 LAC Soldiers of the First World War, 1915-1918 Attestation Papers. RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, 
Box 8463 – 45. 
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During the time the 118th was still recruiting in Berlin, there were further 
discharges for medical reasons; 
  
Pte. Percy Charles Blackmore: discharged for collapsed arches.98  
Pte. James A. Jeffrey: discharged for asthma and being continuously sickly.99 
Pte. Toni Tazoff: discharged for poor eyesight (near sighted) missed by the 
recruiting officer.100 
Pte. Charles E. Cooper: discharged for being mentally deficient or “simple” and 
the men in the battalion tormented him for it.101  
 Pte Edward F. Hohner: discharged for a hernia  
Pte. Michael Kalapaca: Of Austrian birth, discharged for recurring erythema 
Pte. Archibald Charles Henry Morris: discharged for bad eyesight (near 
sighted) 
Sapper. Irvin C. Schroder: discharged for an ailing wife and the man’s “general 
unfitness physically”.102 
Pte. S Andrezejewski: discharged for not being able to speak English.  
Furthermore, a tumor on his left shoulder caused him pain when holding a rifle.103 
Pte. W.J. Read: discharged for a weak heart.104 
Pte. Fotheringham: transferred and discharged for an injury that resulted in a 
shorter right hand and problems with the right wrist.105 
Pte. Ernest Ringle: Deemed unfit and discharged for deafness and Catarrhal.106 
 
The files also show (occasionally) echoes of the language used by Woodsworth in 
the attempts to ensure a successful discharge of men with minor health issues.  Many 
                                                          
98 LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 16A Discharges “Lieut-Col W.M.O. Lochead to A.A.G. 1st Division” 
February 4, 1916. 
99 LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 16A Discharges “The OC 118th O.S. Battalion to A.A.G. 1st Division, 
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members of the 118th suffered from ailments commonly diagnosed as originating in bad 
moral judgement and these often, had racial undertones.   Whether this is causally related 
is impossible to determine, however, the similarities in the use of language is indicative 
of patterns in social construction based on ethnicity.  Woodsworth argued that years of 
oppression and poverty “animalized” Eastern Europeans into drunkenness and sexual 
deviancy, referring specifically to Galicians.  Furthermore, he said they can be dangerous 
when drunk and left his readers to assume this was common occurrence.107  Pte. 
Frederick C. Essig was discharged for poor eyesight, specifically near sightedness.  The 
secondary reason in his case was his constant state of inebriation.108  In the same letter, 
Pte. Mikotaj Golinski, a Russian Pole was discharged because he could barely understand 
English.  In order to ensure a discharge, Lieut-Col. Lochead went on to use the language 
of sexual demonization arguing that he had contracted gonorrhea, and “either from 
stupidity or deliberateness” was always unclean, which hindered the treatment of the 
disease.109  Gonorrhea, being a venereal disease, was grounds for dismissal if gone 
untreated,110 however, the fact that this was not listed as the primary reason for a 
discharge raises questions.  Another soldier diagnosed with the disease, N.J. Osbourne, 
was sent for treatment rather than being discharged.111   
According to Nic Clark, the minimum health standards for recruits had already 
been reduced before 1916, when the 118th battalion was formed.  With the exception of 
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gum disease, bad oral health and defective teeth were scratched from the list of reasons 
for rejection.112  After the CEF took heavy casualties at Ypres, the minimum height 
requirement was lowered to 5 feet from five feet 2 inches.113  In August 1916, visual 
impairment was overlooked provided it was not serious and a man could wear corrective 
lenses.114  On August 25, 1916, Geo Carrwich, was found to have poor eyesight.  Unlike 
previous soldiers, however, Carrwich was allowed to remain in the battalion after he was 
fitted with corrective lenses.115  Clark’s framework also applies to the aforementioned 
cases of Finch and Rosenberg.  Finch’s deformed feet were overlooked in Berlin in 
December 1916, and Rosenberg hernia was noted in London in August but he was 
deemed fit to serve, nine months after Finch.      
 Four months after Carrwich and Rosenberg’s examinations, and just before the 
118th was scheduled to go overseas, there came one final medical examination in London, 
Ontario that ended the 118th as a coherent fighting unit.  Just prior to this, the medical 
inspection process was reformed in light of recent problems.  An inspection in England of 
Galt’s 111th and London’s 142nd found them to be in such poor health that  up to 30% of 
the men were given medical discharges and sent back across the Atlantic.116  In order to 
avoid a repeat, and in the interest of saving public funds, military district commanders 
were ordered (again) by the Adjutant General to conduct thorough inspections prior to 
departure.117  In the case of the 118th, Lochead complained that his unit was the first to be 
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held to these standards, but he was not worried about the results.118  His optimism proved 
unfounded.  The medical board found that too many men had flat feet and collapsed 
arches.  Evidently, the recruiting officers and the medics decided that if bad feet were not 
a burden for the soldier, as was the case with Edwin Finch, it could be overlooked.  A 
later investigation also found that this was a common occurrence.  The national decline in 
volunteers meant that units, desperate for men, overlooked many ailments in order to 
reach the desired strength of 1100 men.119 In total 238 out of 489 men (49%) were 
rejected in January 1917.  On the final examination that rejected so many men before 
departure Lochead had this to say: 
 
Before leaving London, our men were subjected to a most severe physical test by 
a Medical Board that had received word not to deviate one iota from the stringent 
regulations.  That they stuck strictly to the letter of observance would be obvious 
to you when I add that about 50% of our men were left behind as medically unfit. 
In my opinion and in the opinion of many others more competent to judge, the 
great majority of these rejects were absolutely fit, we having received this 
drubbing owing to the most unfavourable experience of several sister battalions 
that have recently gone over.  To my knowledge, two of these units did have 
many men that were certainly unfit and, as per our usual experience, the penalty 
fell first on the poor 118th.120 
 
As a result, the 118th never fought together as a unit.  As per regulations, undermanned 
battalions were broken up and allocated to reinforce other battalions.  Thus, all of the 
comradery that had been formed in Berlin/Kitchener and London, as evidenced by their 
unwillingness to name fellow conspirators in the Concordia club investigation, was lost.  
 
                                                          
118 LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 17-Private “O.C. 118 OS Battalion CEF to W.G. Weichel” December 
28, 1916. 
119 LAC RG 24 vol 1642, HQ 683-275-7 “Court of Inquiry” Medical Inspection. 
120 LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 17 Lochead-Private “O.C. 118th O.S. Battalion, CEF to Miss I.A. 
Templeton-Armstrong” January 19, 1917.  
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Desertion 
 
Closely connected to the story of the 118th overseas battalion having difficulties 
growing to full strength was the problem Lieut-Col. Lochead was having keeping men in 
the battalion.  The Lochead fonds held at the LCMSDS contain one large file dedicated 
entirely to the problem of desertion.  The size of the file and Lochead’s letters of concern 
to his superiors have led some historians to believe that Lochead did not trust the German 
community, and desertion was related directly to concerns over loyalty.  The problem 
with this assumption is that those born in Berlin account for only 27% of the deserters.  
There is also an assumption that desertion meant completely disappearing from Berlin 
and never returning to duty.  This was not always the case.  Deserters could return to their 
unit either voluntarily or by force.  In other instances, soldiers were charged with 
desertion simply for not making it to the barracks at the required time.   
A noteworthy case is three brothers from Berlin, Oscar, Henry and Walter 
Scharlach who enlisted with the 118th and all identified as ethnically German in the 1911 
census.  All three appear on Lochead’s list of deserters, and yet all three would go on to 
serve overseas, indicating that permanent desertion was less of a problem than previously 
believed.  Furthermore, Walter and Oscar lied about their age upon enlistment.  On his 
attestation paper (figure 3:10) Walter listed himself as born in 1898, meaning he would 
be almost 18 in early 1916 upon enlistment.  On the 1911 census record (figure 3:12), his 
date of birth reads 1900 meaning he was only 15 and that he had lied in order to be 
allowed to enlist.  His older brother Oscar, possibly used the same tactic (in reverse) to 
make himself younger. On his attestation paper (figure 3:11) his date of birth is 1888 
meaning he was 27.  On the 1911 census, on the other hand, his date of birth is 1879 
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meaning he was actually 36.  There is also a problem with either the information given to 
the enumerator or the math.  Oscar’s date of birth is listed 1879 but he is listed as 21 
when he would have been 32.  If Oscar lied about his age in attestation paper as an 
insurance, it was unnecessary, the cut off age for enlistment in Canada was 45 and if the 
census record is inaccurate, only Oscar and the enumerator would know why.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Attestation Paper, Walter Scharlach 
(Source: LAC RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166 Box 8689-35) 
Figure 3.10 Attestation Paper, Oscar Scharlach 
(Source: LAC RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166 Box 8689-34) 
Figure 3.11 Scharlach Family (Source: Fifth Census of Canada, 1911 District 130, Sub 
District 4, Enumeration District, 9, Berlin) 
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While these are not the actions of men who would be inclined to desert, all three 
would flee to Detroit in the fall of 1916.  Oscar was also in the company of another 
deserter, Pte. Louis Albrecht (also of Berlin). Desertion had become, by this point, a 
serious problem in the 118th and in battalions across the country.  Men had grown tired of 
constant drilling and harboured fears that they might never be sent overseas with their 
battalions.  So much so that the Canadian authorities incentivised the return of deserters 
by pardoning any soldier who returned to their units by December 15, 1916.121 The day 
before this order was officially passed, Oscar Scharlach wrote a letter from Detroit: 
Thinking over the events of the last 2 months, we have come to the conclusion 
that we left the country too hastily. We are sorry we ever got out of the battalion 
and we would like to know if you would transfer us to some other battalion if we 
came back and did our little bit for our country.122 
 
Oscar was then informed that he could return to the battalion and was asked if he could 
persuade his younger brothers and Louis Albrecht to accompany him back the battalion.  
It would be a slow return for Oscar because he was stricken with rheumatism and he 
would miss the December 15th deadline.123 This was overlooked by Lochead having 
received a telegram informing him of Oscar’s condition. In the end, they would receive 
their desired transfers and all three would serve overseas. Henry would serve in an 
Artillery unit, Oscar with the Forestry Corps, and Walter would be the last to leave 
Canada in September 1918.     
                                                          
121 LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 1, Desertion “From A.A.G MD No. 1 to OC 118 OS Battalion, Amnesty 
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122 LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 1, Desertion “From Oscar Scharlach” December 8, 1916.  
123 LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 1, Desertion “CPR co Telegram From Oscar Scharlach to Col Lochead” 
December 21, 1916. 
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This incident fed Lochead’s concerns over where deserters were going, as evident 
in his letters to the newspapers and to his superiors, that many men who enlisted were 
fleeing to the United States to avoid service.  Since the military police were working with 
provincial and local police to track down deserters, it made sense to seek asylum outside 
the country.  In the case of 12% of the deserters, they were simply running home.  They 
initially hoped to fight by enlisting in Canadian units since their home country remained 
neutral.  Slowly, for one reason or another, a portion of them had second thoughts and 
returned home.  In total, deserters born outside of Canada (and those running home) 
accounted for 35% of all deserters; somewhat higher than the number born in Berlin. 
There were a few, however, who were not Americans who fled to the United States none 
the less.  Linus Dauberger, for example, deserted and wrote Lochead from Buffalo that he 
had contracted a venereal disease and did not want to be sent to Toronto for treatment.  It 
was also his intention to keep his condition a secret.  The validity of his claim, however, 
comes into question when considering the remainder of the letter and other evidence.  He 
went on to say that he had the condition before enlisting and should never have been 
accepted into the service, which indicates either a fabrication or at best he did not know 
that a venereal disease, if treated, was not considered grounds for dismissal.124  
Furthermore, while he claimed he contracted the disease before enlisting, his attestation 
paper filed out March 23, 1916, deemed him fit for overseas service with no indication of 
a previous disease.   
There are a number of problems in doing a comprehensive quantitative analysis of 
this battalion.  Firstly, Lochead did not keep a nominal roll of the entire battalion, leaving 
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the historian to calculate the size of the battalion by going through the attestation papers 
and soldier cards from the Kitchener Public Library.  This comes to 489, but there are 
still problems with this total.  It does not include men who were discharged for medical 
reasons before the battalion underwent one final medical inspection before deployment 
overseas.  Fortunately, Lochead did keep a nominal roll of the men who deserted which 
totaled 93.  Is 93 out of a minimum of 489 (20%) a high desertion rate? Historian Matt 
Baker at the LCMSDS believed so125 but we need analyses of other battalions, to 
determine if 20% was high, low, or the norm.  The historian must also keep in mind as 
well that not all 93 left for good.   Given these limitations, what follows is as 
comprehensive a quantitative analysis of desertion in the 118th as is currently possible.  
Figure 3.13 which was compiled from the nominal roll of deserters in the Lochead 
fonds, and is not exclusive to those residing in Berlin, breaks down the deserters by place 
of birth and shows patterns inconsistent with the argument that German ancestry in Berlin 
was the determining factor for high desertion rates in the 118th Battalion.  The number of 
deserters of the 118th totaled 93 of which 25 (27%) were born in Berlin.  The highest 
proportion of deserters, at 38%, were born in Ontario outside Berlin, while 35% were 
foreign born.  Thus, desertion rates were lowest among those born in Berlin.  More 
importantly, the lack of clarity in the 1911 census, and the attestation papers, means that 
these figures (Berlin 27% and Ontario 38%) may or may not be exclusively of German 
ancestry.  Therefore, the maximum number of Germans from Berlin who deserted is 27% 
of total desertion and this is based on the generous assumption that they were all of 
German ancestry.   
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Figure 3.13 Deserters by Place of Birth (Sources: LAC RG 150 Attestation Papers, 
LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 1 Desertion)  
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Suffice to say, in order for the argument that the Germans were responsible for the 
high desertion rate in the 118th to be true, one would expect those born in Berlin to loom 
larger in the pie charts (Figure 3.13).   
The general unwillingness to serve championed by some historians is not the only 
possible explanation.  Nikolas Gardner has pointed out that the frustrations of the men not 
only lay in low recruitment numbers but also in a significant drop in the unit’s moral in 
the fall of 1916.  In August, at the precise moment Lochead had hoped to change the 
image of the 118th with intensive training and bring the unit up to fighting level, 160 of 
his men were granted harvest leave.  Upon their return, an inspection found them to be in 
poor shape and under-trained, and so they were not to be sent overseas in the foreseeable 
future.  Soldiers anxious to go overseas, realizing this was likely never going to happen, 
thus started requesting discharges and even deserted on mass.126 It is at this point that 
discontent spread into the higher ranks and faith in Lochead deteriorated. 
Once again utilizing GIS data, further conclusions can be drawn about the 
problem of desertion.  At first glance, figure 3.13 again shows an even spread of deserters 
across the city with no pattern suggesting a number of conclusions.  It suggests that 
deserters from Berlin were representative of the city’s population which itself was not 
segregated based on ethnicity.  Since the vast majority of deserters held the rank of 
private, and Berlin’s working class were spread evenly across the city, neighbourhood by 
neighbourhood, desertion was a familiar problem.  The closest resemblance of spatial 
pattern are the two areas where desertion is comparably low, the sparsely populated areas 
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east of Lancaster Street and in the North ward near Waterloo proper and the Breithaupt 
Tannery.  
 
 
 
When compared to the distribution of Berlin born recruits (figure 3.5), which 
suggest a level ethnic segregation further evidence emerges.  The desertion levels in and 
around the highest area of Berlin born recruits, Queen Street and Cedar Hill, is 
comparably low.  Furthermore, the fairly even spread of the deserters across Berlin 
indicate that those born in Berlin, and of German ancestry, were no more likely to desert 
Figure 3.14 Distribution of Deserters (Sources: LAC RG 150 Attestation Papers, 
LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 1 Desertion)  
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than non-German recruits.  This spatial analysis thus reaffirms the statistical analysis 
compiled in figure 3.13. 
Context is important when understanding recruitment levels.  The year 1916 was a 
perfect storm in Berlin for low recruitment which helped feed the idea that it was a 
community plagued by disloyalty and pro-German sentiments.  These rumors spread 
through the newspapers in January and ignited a violent attack on the Concordia Club 
which led to the disappearance of the Kaiser’s bust.  Simultaneously, it appeared that the 
well of volunteers in Canada had dried up and the majority of Canadians born in Britain 
had already enlisted.  Try as he might, Lieut Col. Lochead could neither control the 
image of Berlin Ontario nor control the actions of his men.  Discipline for the destruction 
of the Concordia Club was minimal as was the punishment for the public beating of 
Reverend Tappert.  It was fortunate that during the referendum on the city’s name 
change, the men of the 118th managed to avoid causing too much trouble.  Much of this 
can be attributed to the presence of troops from Galt deployed to quell any rioting.   
Lochead would also have problems with desertion.  In total ninety men were listed at one 
point or another as deserters, which also fed into the newspaper accounts that Berlin was 
a center for disloyalty and pro-German sentiment.   Such was not the case, but the 
presumption has endured.  Meanwhile in Ottawa, Sam Hughes was dismissed, which 
marked for some historians, the official end of the era of voluntary recruitment in 
Canada.  In order for the Prime Minister to meet his pledge of men to Great Britain, there 
was only one option left, compulsory military service.    
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Conscription  
 
By June 1916, the problem of recruitment was not only Berlin’s problem, it had 
become a national debate.  A majority of eligible men had already volunteered, while 
most of those who remained were indispensable in Canada’s war effort.  Even the most 
patriotic centres of British Canada were beginning to suffer from low recruitment.  The 
Queen’s Own Rifles of the 225th Battalion in Toronto, for example, only managed to 
recruit 385 men.127   
Even after the 118th Battalion departed for England the problems continued.  Sam 
Hughes would become the scapegoat for the slump of 1916, Canadians’ willingness to 
volunteer had simply run out.  After his dismissal, compulsory military service was seen 
as the only solution to the problem.  The Borden government had pledged more men to 
the British imperial cause than could be mustered, which not only caused a shortage of 
men at the front but also caused a labour shortage on the home front.  Furthermore, 
events in Europe were to worsen the situation.  At the end of 1916, Borden was invited to 
the imperial conference and returned with a commitment to pledge more men even if it 
meant compulsory service.  While in Europe, he visited soldiers at the front, soldiers who 
had just been relieved from the slaughter and mud of the Somme and were beginning 
preparations to take Vimy Ridge when the snow melted.  The Battle of Vimy Ridge on 
Easter weekend of 1917 had resulted in a Canadian victory but at a heavy cost.  Canada 
was now tasked with replenishing the CEF, having suffered 3,598 dead and 7,004 
wounded in a single battle.  Total casualty estimates for the spring numbered 14,000. In 
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the months to follow, Canada averaged 5,000 new volunteers a month, nowhere near 
enough to replenish four divisions.128 
The conscription crisis of 1917 is remembered in Canada as a conflict 
predominantly between English and French Canada.  Canadian textbooks, including the 
standard History of the Canadian Peoples, treated conscription as a continuation of 
French and English hostilities rooted in accusations that French Canada was not assuming 
its fair share of the burden.  It also contextualizes conscription within the framework that 
the French speaking population (inside and outside of Quebec) was being mistreated 
under laws such as Regulation 17.129 One historian has attributed this duality in historical 
memory to the development of two corresponding nationalist identities in the twentieth 
century.130   
The question of identity in Ontario and Quebec during the war has also 
contributed to this discussion. Quebec had not experienced the early twentieth century 
zeitgeist of militarization and manliness in the same manner as Ontario.131  Furthermore, 
English Canadians had grown up in an atmosphere of “Britishness” and an imperial 
identity that formed part of Canadian identity encouraging active support for their 
motherland.  In Quebec, on the other hand, cultural ties to France had been in significant 
decline.  Many clergymen in Quebec thought France needed to be punished for its recent 
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turn away from the Roman Catholic Church in favour of secularism.132  At the centre of 
the debate in Quebec was Henri Bourassa and Le Devoir.  Bourassa saw the 1917 election 
as a clash between English Canadian imperialism and Canadian nationalism, for the latter 
the primary concern was Canada’s well-being.133  For the Liberal opposition leader, 
Wilfred Laurier, the imperialist Canadian agenda needed to be resisted in Parliament, as 
the interests of the British Empire were not always compatible with Canada’s own 
interests.  In Laurier’s view, if Britain was at war, Canada was at war, yet since this was a 
British war, Canada should not be obliged to make sacrifices on the same scale as the 
main combatants.134    
Borden outright rejected the French-Canadian idea of “Canada’s well-being” in 
his debates with Laurier and later in his memoirs.  He argued that this obfuscated the 
nature of national defence by ignoring the possibility that Canada’s first line of defence 
was not necessarily the Canadian border.135  For Borden and his supporters, Canada’s 
front line in this clash of civilizations was the Western Front.  On October 12, 1917, the 
Union Government was formed in Ottawa and would seek a mandate from the Canadian 
people on the issue of conscription.  While many Liberals would join Borden’s Union 
platform, Laurier would not out of fear that conscription would divide the country and the 
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resulting wounds would never heal.136  Furthermore, the Union government had 
effectively put the British Empire at the centre of Canada’s priorities. 
It must not be forgotten that conscription did not just target and enrage French 
Canadians despite the fact that they led the charge against it.  It also targeted other 
minority groups in the country, trade unions, and young men of occupations that had been 
deemed too essential to justify enlistment, including seasonal farmers and fishermen.   
By the time of the national debate over conscription, Kitchener/Waterloo 
casualties numbered only 46, and during the summer, only 21 men had enlisted.  The 
Conservative incumbent W.P. Weichel, who had spent the previous years defending 
Kitchener as a major contributor to the war effort, and even defended the Berliner 
Journal in the pivotal summer of 1915, would run for re-election as the Union 
government candidate in favour of conscription. His opponents were plentiful.  Dr. John 
E. Hett, a former mayor who had previously supported Weichel ran against him as a 
Labour candidate. Another former mayor W.D. Euler ran as an anti-conscription 
independent liberal.137  The Liberal Party Candidate was Dr. J.F. Honsberger.  He was 
one of the many Liberals in Ontario who would not support Laurier and instead fell in 
line with the Union government in support of conscription.  This would be another 
motivation for Euler to run as an independent as he and his followers could not support 
Laurier through the Liberal candidate.    
 The results of the “khaki election” favoured the Union government with a 
majority 153 seats.  Laurier’s Liberals took all but three seats in Quebec and two of four 
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in Prince Edward Island, but were beaten badly in the west (2 seats), the Maritimes (10 
seats) and Ontario (8 seats).  A deciding factor was the Wartime Elections Act which 
modified the franchise in favour of Borden.  Immigrants who had not undergone 
naturalization before 1902 were disenfranchised, while the mothers and wives of serving 
soldiers were enfranchised. These measures led to substantial regional disparities in who 
could vote:   Ontario saw the highest level of enfranchisement at 39.4% and Quebec saw 
the lowest at 20.6%.138  Furthermore, the soldier voters made a natural ally to Borden, as 
the narrative was spun that conscription would assure them they would not be abandoned 
by the home front. 
 In Kitchener, the election was a proverbial slugging match.  A Union party rally 
held by Weichel and attended by the Prime Minister on his national campaign tour broke 
down into a riot.  Weichel spoke in defiance of the hostility of the crowds, however, 
Borden was not able to speak.  In his memoirs he recalled that in twenty-five years of 
service, this had never before happened.139  This episode would once again cause 
suspicion and hatred for the city.  That Sunday, Methodist Minister C.A. Sykes blamed 
the riot on Laurier’s immigration policy that had let so many Germans into Canada.  The 
Euler family in attendance stood up, walked out and joined St. Matthews Lutheran Parish 
in disgust.140  Meanwhile, newspapers in Toronto and elsewhere reported the incident not 
as an anti-conscription protest but as a traitorous pro-German one.  Complicating the 
matter, the city council refused to issue a formal apology to the Prime Minister arguing 
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that they needed to remain neutral during the election.  An apology was eventually issued 
nevertheless, but a bitter Borden would later call it an “unqualified and belated” one.141 
This was yet another incident in the city of German ancestry that would call into question 
the loyalty of the city to the British Empire in the eyes of its detractors.  They called for 
Kitchener to demonstrate its loyalty by voting for the Union candidates, be it 
Conservative or Liberal, and assure the independent anti-conscriptionist Euler be 
defeated.  As part of this campaign against him, Euler was smeared as pro-German.  
William Motz at the Berliner Journal refused to comment on this issue because of a 
conflict of interest that would severely damage his newspaper’s reputation.  After the 
death of Rittinger, his shares in Rittinger & Motz had been purchased by Euler.142  So he 
was left to fight on his own.  
On the campaign trail, Euler made his position on the war and conscription clear, 
“the continual parroting of winning the war is becoming tiresome, and all good 
Canadians including myself want the war to be won.”  In order to smear him as pro-
German, the meaning of this statement was twisted.  Mr. Euler wanted the war to be won, 
by the British or the Germans?143  His detractors wish for the defeat of Euler would not 
be granted.  On election day, December 17, 1917, Euler would successfully manage to 
unseat the incumbent Weichel on the issue of conscription. 
It was a symbolic victory at best, as the Union government won the election in a 
sweep.  Much like the debate over language instruction and Regulation 17, where the 
French lost, other linguistic communities lost, when the French-Canadian nationalists in 
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the Bourassa camp lost, other non-imperial nationalists also lost.  Kitchener/Waterloo 
proved an exception to the fix provided by the Union government’s Wartime Elections 
Act which was attributed at the time to its German ancestry.  This added more weight to 
previous charges that the German ethnic elites had impeded recruitment of the 118th OS 
Battalion as it now seemed one of them cost Borden a seat in his Ontario stronghold.   
Historian W.H. Heick, who analyzed the voters list of 1917 proved definitively 
that the ethnic background of Kitchener was not as significant an influence on the results, 
as believed at the time.144  He found that the urban vote was not split along ethnic lines, 
Euler’s supporters were both German and English.  In the countryside, farmers who 
supported the anti-conscription movement feared the depletion of agricultural labourers 
that would inevitably follow conscription.145 Furthermore, William Motz and the Ontario 
Journal, still publishing in the German language at the time, did not dare weigh in on the 
debate in order to avoid attacks from other news organizations, including the KDT and 
the Advertiser.146   
Kitchener, in its response to the conscription issue proved once again to favour 
non-governmental control of Canada’s manpower.  The fact that ethnicity played little to 
no role in deciding the vote is indicative of the centrality class and economic values at 
stake in the passing of conscription.  Above all other things, businesses in Kitchener and 
farmers in Waterloo County worried about the depletion of the labour force.  Thus, the 
same city that cheered Conservative Charles Tupper for the free market that built Berlin, 
booed his party’s successor Robert Borden for dismantling it.  It is also significant 
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anytime an independent such as Euler wins a seat in Ottawa.  Kitchener rejected both 
conscription candidates, Liberal and Conservative, which in itself is indicates the degree 
of opposition to conscription.  That result more than anything else shows that Kitchener 
was not about to go along with the dismantling of the liberal order that was currently 
underway in Ottawa and it did not take a revolt in Kitchener’s labour force to accomplish 
it.   
The passing of conscription brought the war closer to home for Kitchener’s ethnic 
elite.  The sons of the Breithaupt brothers, who had been able to avoid enlistment in the 
118th OS Battalion were suddenly called upon to serve. Carl Lewis Breithaupt, the son of 
John Breithaupt enlisted on September 6, 1917.  His cousin William Walter Breithaupt, 
the son of L.J. Breithaupt, was among the first group to be conscripted (Class 1 men who 
had to present themselves before Nov 10, 1917).147  Williams’ older brother, Louis 
Orville, on the other hand, was exempted. 
While conscription is credited with sustaining the Canadian forces,148 it did not 
put an end to the problems that Lochead had encountered during the voluntary period.  
Desertion and charges of cowardice soon returned to the pages of the Kitchener Daily 
Telegraph. In early July 1918, the Dominion police tracked down two deserters in 
Waterloo. Wilson Mank was called upon at his home and escaped through the back door 
and took refuge at the home of Gordon Lorenz.  Lorenz, at this time was also harbouring 
another deserter, his son Alex.  When officers arrived to apprehend Mank, Alex Lorenz 
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was discovered at the house and was also taken in. Gordon was arrested and charged with 
harbouring a deserter.149    
In another report, Pte. Roy Reist was court martialed for shooting himself in the 
foot to avoid military service.  His defense was to claim it was an accident that occurred 
while trying to keep sparrows away from horses on a farm in Bridgeport.  The result was 
a severed toe.  In military circles, this was considered no accident and the timing of the 
events (just two days before he was to report for duty) was evidence enough for an 
indictment.150      
 
Conclusion 
 
When it came time for the 118th Overseas Battalion to ship out, its ranks were 
decimated by the national decline in voluntary recruitment and an extensive medical 
examination of volunteers, many of whom proved unfit for service.  As a result, the 
battalion would not fight as a single unit as it was broken up to reinforce existing units.  
Timing was crucial as forces already deployed to the Western Front were preparing for 
the Spring offensive against Vimy Ridge.  This attack, while successful came at a high 
cost, necessitating conscription at home.  Crowds in Berlin heckled Borden against 
government control of manpower and voters from all backgrounds would not rally to the 
incumbent or union liberal candidates. The people of Kitchener rejected conscription.  
Further proof that enlistment in that city failed for reasons other than the city’s 
ethnic composition.  It was a matter of eligibility, health in an industrial centre, and the 
need for agricultural labour.  War weariness was also a problem and more offensives 
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were in the works. A mere three months after Vimy, reinforcements including men of the 
former 118th would be deployed back to Ypres for the Summer Offensive.  Sir Arthur 
Currie was instructed by Sir Douglas Haig to advance from Ypres to Passchendaele 
Ridge.  This late summer advance cost the CEF 15,600 casualties including a portion of 
men from Berlin/Kitchener (figure 3.16).  It is interesting to note that casualties from the 
city centre were light.  While most of the casualties from the former 118th occurred in the 
last hundred days, the majority of casualties from Passchendaele are concentrated in 
neighbourhoods in the east ward.  As noted earlier this area was predominantly new 
construction and mostly newer Canadians of British birth.  Among them was Pte. Albert 
Deal, a witness at the Concordia hearing.  
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Figure 3.15 Distribution of Casualties of the former 118th  
(does not account for casualties before 1917,  
for a full list refer to Appendix B) 
 
A Higher concentration appears in the East end of town from which most English 
and Ontario recruits were drawn. It illustrates the effects of the “those who enlist 
together should serve together”, when a platoon suffers heavy casualties, whole 
neighbourhoods are affected. Also note the absence of casualties from the 
predominantly middle-class historic neighbourhood in central Kitchener described 
earlier. (Sources: LAC RG 150 Attestation Papers, KPL Soldier Information Card 
series) 
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The events in Berlin and the actions of the men of the 118th, while extensively 
covered by local historians, are significant in the history of dissention and enforcement of 
imperial loyalty in Ontario. Sergeant Bowden made clear in his testimony during the 
Concordia Club investigation that the task of stamping out disloyalty in Berlin should 
have been the job of the government.  Unknowingly, Bowden and others who participated 
in the destruction of the Concordia Club were active participants in the previously 
outlined self-regulation of the region, which was essential to the functioning of Canada’s 
liberal order. One result was affirmation that the need for a change in Berlin/Kitchener 
was unnecessary.  There was no real need to implement more hardline measures to 
maintain order.  As a result, the appearance of reasoning otherwise was momentarily 
delayed. 
This leaves a significant question for the historian, if not the residents of Berlin.  
If the matter of ensuring “order” in the community, which by definition meant self-
policing Canadians of German ancestry to exhibit loyalty to the British Empire, what 
were government and military organizations doing in Ontario?  Sgt. Blood himself had 
asked this question at the Concordia inquiry and it went unanswered. Was there a 
presence of Canadian Intelligence in Berlin investigating the rumors and reports of 
disloyalty and pro-Germanism especially if the recruitment of a Battalion was at stake?  
And since newspaper smear campaigns were responsible for the spread of violence in 
Berlin, could it be traced somehow to the Chief Press Censor’s involvement as a matter 
of national unity? 
As it stood, the men of the 118th Battalion, when questioned about the destruction 
of the Concordia Club resented that they had been burdened with what was considered to 
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be “the government’s job.”  Thanks to the propaganda campaigns of January 1916 that 
accused the German ethnic elite of interfering with recruiting in Berlin, they had been 
drawn into the discourse of security within the district. They became the muscle sending 
a strong message about Canada’s intent to destroy the German “Hun” when the 
Concordia Club was destroyed.  The fact that the local police stood by and watched, is a 
testament to the power of the mob of soldiers and civilians, and indicative of the message 
they conveyed.  If the soldiers felt that they had stepped into the role of weeding out what 
they saw as subversive German activities, were there not other authorities: civil law 
enforcement agencies, or military intelligence to perform such tasks? The men of the 
118th thought not, were they justified? 
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Chapter 4: German Operatives in Canada and the 
United States 
 
They arose from the praiseworthy initiative 
of friends of the German cause, who were 
not, however, acting under control from 
Germany.  As a result, their self-sacrificing 
attempts were of comparatively little use to 
Germany, and they contained in themselves 
from the very start all the dangers of 
aimlessness and lack of plan.  
 
                                                                                                           - Colonel W. Nikolai1 
 
 
These words were spoken in 1924 by the former chief of the German Secret 
Service in reference to German intelligence activities in the United States during the war.  
He denies that his department had any knowledge of the acts of sabotage and espionage 
in the United States, and at no point addressed any operations carried out in the colonies 
and protectorates of the British Empire.  With the release of British, American and 
Canadian intelligence files, this bold statement begins to unravel.  True, many acts of 
sabotage were committed by sympathizers not connected to German intelligence, 
however, there were instances of authorized actions with specific goals in mind to help 
the German war effort.  Abteilung III B (Section III B) was a branch of the German army 
in charge of espionage and counter espionage, salvage of captured material and state 
censorship (before the formation of the War Press Office). Their ranks also included 
operatives working abroad on missions of observation of men, materials, shipping and 
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communication as well as propaganda and sabotage.2  Unfortunately for intelligence 
historians, the records kept by Abteilung III B were destroyed in an allied bombing raid 
on Berlin during the Second World War. 
Understanding the threat posed to Canada and the national response (by state or 
citizen) is vitally important because of its implications for the application of Wesley 
Wark’s insecurity state thesis to understanding Canadian society.  Fear that redefined the 
parameters of othering in Canadian society proved, as it had with newspaper reports 
emanating from outside Berlin, to be a force that undermined the Canadian liberal order.  
The insecurity state illustrates the Canadian state’s betrayal of the old order.  This new 
insecurity was driven by the reorientation of state fears during the war.  The rise of the 
insecurity state depended on the breakdown of liberal order ideals in favour of an 
othering based on fear, xenophobia and later homophobia.   
As outlined by Wesley Wark, Canadian intelligence working within a network of 
alliances produced a key characteristic of the insecurity state in the disconnect between 
any legitimate threat and the public fear.3 Ironically, such fears were generated and fueled 
by a reliance on the security measures and concerns of Canada’s allies. When Canada 
was the target, most counterintelligence aimed at spies and saboteurs working for 
Abteilung III was conducted by the British and the Americans.   In these cases, it appears 
Canada was content to rely on the findings of others and limited its response to guarding 
its borders and valuable installations.  Because Canada’s domestic capacity for 
intelligence gathering was so limited, intelligence agents and officers were not used in 
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these capacities.  Instead, guard duties were carried out by local police forces, units of the 
Canadian militia and sometimes army units yet to be sent overseas.4  
In Europe, by the fall of 1914, Germany’s initial war plans were beginning to 
unravel.  The Schlieffen Plan had been implemented in spite of fears that the violation of 
Belgian neutrality would draw Great Britain and her empire into the war.  Even after an 
offer from the British on August 1, 1914, that they and the French would remain neutral, 
there was no way to reverse German mobilization in the west and shut down the 
Schlieffen Plan.5  The Germans gambled that the defeat of France would be complete 
before a British Expeditionary Force, let alone a colonial force, could land on French soil.  
This did not occur.  Belgian resistance was vastly underestimated and the French army 
held key points on the frontiers.  The British Expeditionary Force not only arrived in 
time, but dug in with the French on the Marne River bringing a stop to the German 
summer offensive.  By Order-in-Council, and in accordance with British imperial policy, 
Canada officially declared war on Germany and her allies on August 5, 1914.  Given 
Canada’s lack of preparedness an expeditionary force could not arrive on the front lines 
of Western Europe before the end of the year.6 
British authorities had taken the lead on how the empire should handle its un-
naturalized immigrants of enemy nations when the war broke out.  In short, it was 
essential to disallow their departure, so that in the case of reservists, they could not join 
their comrades-in-arms.  For enemy aliens in Canada, as pointed out by Brock Millman, 
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the decision on their fate was ultimately not Canada’s to make, as citizenship policy and 
the handling of enemy aliens was an imperial matter.7  Following the lead of British 
lawmakers, P.C. 2086 was passed in Canada on August 8, 1914 which ordered that 
reservists would be arrested if they were to attempt to leave the country.  Initially the 
powers of arrest lay with the army, and yet before the end of 1914, that power had been 
transferred to the Northwest Mounted and Dominion Police forces.8  Those liable for 
detention were:  
(a) All German or Austrian or Austro-Hungarian officers, soldiers or 
reservists who attempted to leave Canada; 
(b) All subjects of the German Empire or of Austria-Hungary who attempted 
to leave Canada and in regard to whom there was reasonable grounds to 
believe that their attempted departure was with a view to assisting the 
enemy; and 
(c) All subjects of the German Empire or of Austria-Hungary in Canada 
engaged or attempting to engage in espionage or acts of a hostile nature, or 
giving or attempting to give information to the enemy, or assisting or 
attempting to assist the enemy, or who were on reasonable grounds 
suspected of doing or attempting to do any of said acts.9   
 
To ease the burden of monitoring the enemy alien population, a registration system for 
enemy aliens was established under the direction of the Chief of the Dominion Police, 
Percy Sherwood.   
 How the treatment of enemy aliens would play out in Canada depended on the 
economic conditions in a country strained by a recession and soon to be depleted much of 
its male labour force.10  As a result, internment operations mostly targeted unemployed 
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enemy aliens.  Massive lay-offs based on the patriotic prejudices of employers, which 
occurred with Austro-Hungarian railway gangs for example, at times resulted in an entire 
labour force entering an internment camp.11  The man in charge of internment was Sir 
William Otter, and while he was seen as a “catcher” of enemy aliens, he was, for the most 
part, simply following the rules and recommendations of registrars. 
The most significant group to be targeted for internment were Ukrainians.  It was 
an umbrella term referring broadly to Eastern Europeans and often included Galicians, 
Poles, and subjects of both Germany and Austria-Hungary.  It was not the strict form of 
internment as seen with the Japanese during the Second World War.  The internees were 
almost exclusively male and were to be interned until such time as they could be 
employed.12  Wives and children were, however, allowed to join them if they so 
desired.13  Even so internment was a miserable existence.  Camps were often 
overcrowded and under-supplied.  Rioting was common and on a number of occasions 
led to the shooting of prisoners.  Some of these incidences would be used against the 
Canadians by German propagandists.  A consensus among historians is that internment 
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targeted Ukrainians out of long instilled fears of the radicalization of Canada’s labour 
force by foreign workers.14 
Unfortunately for historians and champions of minority rights in Canada 
(including the Canadian First World War Internment Recognition Fund), the majority of 
documents relating to internment during the Great War were destroyed in Ottawa upon 
their deposit at the National Archives.  For that reason, a comprehensive study of all 
groups is impossible.  What remains are the papers of Sir William Otter and Sir Robert 
Borden, from which a short chronicle was written by Desmond Morton, and newspaper 
reports of the activities of local registry offices upon which Bohdan Kordan had to rely.  
Unfortunately, these reports are somewhat unreliable given the imperial propaganda 
agendas of English language newspapers in Southern Ontario.  Historians are thus left to 
puzzle over matters of intent and results.  Was internment primarily designed to protect 
frontiers from enemy sympathizers supporting an invasion force as was the case in the 
Second World War? Was it rooted in Canadian racial policies and social constructs? And 
lastly was it designed as a last resort response to the labour shortage that resulted from 
the race to recruit as many young men as possible for overseas service?   
What can be ascertained is that the Canadian insecurity state turned inwards and 
the Borden government used extensive powers allotted under the War Measures Act, PC 
2381 and PC 2384 to move from what Whitaker, Kealey and Parnaby called “world war 
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to class war.”15   Meanwhile, dealing with the external threat to Canada emanating from 
German intelligence officers would be handled by British intelligence and to a certain 
extent the Americans.  
 
The von der Goltz Defection 
With the transformation of this European war into an imperial world war, came an 
expansion of German operations.  German naval vessels the Dresden and the Emden 
began raiding British shipping routes and threatening port cities, while German 
operatives abroad were activated.  Only the ineptitude of the first German spy-ring active 
in the United States saved Canada from attack in the opening months of the war.  Less 
than a month into the fighting, schemes were hatched in the German Embassy, the Ritz, 
and clubs in New York City, to cripple the Canadian war effort before it even 
materialized.  The first plot involved an elaborate invasion of the Canadian frontier with 
German reservists and gunboats but this was quickly abandoned as the logistical 
difficulties were too great, and the raising of a militia in the United States would violate 
international neutrality laws.  The second was to damage Canadian infrastructure with 
three primary objectives: to cripple the Canadian transportation system thereby disrupting 
the shipment of supplies to Great Britain; to create a diplomatic incident between Canada, 
Great Britain and the United States, which would complicate the possibility of support for 
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Great Britain by the latter;16 and to cause a panic in Canada that would pressure the 
Canadian government to keep a large contingent of troops at home, thus weakening the 
Empire’s troop strength on the Western Front.  
We know of these objectives as they were contained in a statement made by Horst 
von der Goltz (real name Franz Wachendorf) at Scotland Yard in January 1915.  
Unfortunately, von der Goltz’s statement is contradicted by his subsequent memoir, thus 
additional material is necessary to clarify both German intentions and even the sequence 
of events.  
In August 1914, the target of Vol der Goltz’s spy ring was the locks and grain 
elevators of the Welland Canal.  Here was a suitable target that would achieve both goals 
of disruption and panic in a single blow.  The plan was hatched by Captain Franz von 
Papen, the German Naval Attaché in Washington D.C. and one of his contacts, Karl Boy-
Ed.  The man to carry out the operation was alias Bridgeman Taylor, otherwise known as 
Horst von der Goltz.  Von Papen would later call him a “petty blackmailer” who 
repeatedly siphoned money out of him while threatening to expose von Papen for 
fictitious subversive activities.17 Von Papen, in his own memoir, would downplay his role 
in intelligence and sabotage operations in North America, but described delaying the 
arrival of Canadian troops to Europe as a “worthwhile project.”18  British intelligence 
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files19 show that von Papen was indeed a co-conspirator, both financing operations and 
maintaining lines of communication with German intelligence.  
As it happened, according to British intelligence documents, von der Goltz was 
paid handsomely by von Papen to direct a group of saboteurs, based in New York, to 
destroy the locks at Welland.  Two of the men were veterans of the Irish independence 
movement who had quarrels of their own with the British Empire.  They even had a 
newspaper man in their ranks whose job was to report on the occurrences in a manner 
that would terrify Canadian readers and generate sympathy in American readers.  With 
von Papen’s financing, they acquired suitcases of dynamite in New York and transported 
them to the Canadian border.  Unfortunately for them, this is where a communication 
breakdown occurred.  Von der Goltz and his men had no intelligence on Canada’s border 
defence, or knowledge of any protection placed on strategic targets.  Boys, evidently, 
were sent ahead to scout the Canadian security measures but were caught for trespassing.  
At this point the mission was aborted as von der Goltz did not receive further instructions 
from von Papen through his messenger.  It had also become public knowledge, against 
orders, that the first Canadian Corps had left Valcartier and was on its way to the front, 
meaning von der Goltz’s mission had now lost one of its main objectives.20  Von der 
Goltz returned to visit von Papen and was asked if he could leave the country.  Von der 
Goltz suspected that he and his men were under observation by American authorities.  
Von Papen confirmed this but assured him that they had instructions not to intervene.  
                                                          
19 National Archives (Kew) KV 2/519 Declassified October 2001. 
20 This information leak has been described as the most flagrant example of poor security in the history of 
the Canadian Army, see Elliott, 23.  
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Nevertheless, further action by this group was deemed too risky and the group was 
suspended shortly thereafter.  
Von der Goltz, after spending the first four months of the war in the United States, 
travelled to the United Kingdom via Holland on November 14, 1914.  After receiving a 
report from the navy that a suspected spy “Bridgeman Taylor” was on his way to 
England, British Intelligence sent a watcher to track his movements while in the UK.21  
This watcher soon reported that “Taylor” had spent time on the coast and one night had 
met with a number of men on the beach before sending them away on a rowboat to what 
was thought to be a U-boat anchored offshore.22  
After only four months of active duty for the Kaiser, von der Goltz was detained 
in England on charges of failing to register and travelling with a forged passport.23  Based 
on the information attained from the watcher, Scotland Yard also had good reason to 
believe that he had come to Britain to spy, though they had yet to secure enough physical 
evidence for a conviction.  Von der Goltz had travelled to England with no paperwork, no 
written orders, and no ashes were found in the fireplace of his hotel room.  During his 
debriefing, von der Goltz provided information about German Zeppelin raids on Great 
Britain, (more than a month before this was to occur) as well as vital information about 
German raiding operations in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean, including the 
whereabouts of the German cruiser Emden and how the Leipzig was continuously 
supplied with coal.24   
                                                          
21 These files were deposited in The Nation Archives (Kew) HO 144/21710 
22 Harold Brust, I Guarded Kings: The Memoirs of a Political Police Officer (New York: Hillman-Curl, 
Inc., 1936), 127-128. 
23 The National Archives (Kew)KV2/519 “The Case of Horst von der Goltz” Metropolitan Police Office, 
New Scotland Yard, February 2, 1916.  
24 Ibid.  
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While in custody, von der Goltz was indeed on a mission, a mission to save his 
own life.  Under British military law, spying in Great Britain was a capital offence and 
the standard means of execution was by firing squad in the Tower of London.25  As luck 
would have it, papers, which further incriminated him were taken from von Papen by 
British intelligence officers at Falmouth.  Among them cheques made out to one 
“Bridgeman Taylor,” the alias of von der Goltz.  Here was the evidence Scotland Yard 
needed to implicate him as a spy.  Cooperating seemed the only way to avoid the firing 
squad.  To further secure himself, he would claim in his first statement that he personally 
stopped the operation in Canada and felt betrayed and disenchanted with von Papen 
which inspired him to talk. 
The result is a report with a number of discrepancies that the debriefing officer 
could not help but notice.  If, for example, von der Goltz personally prevented the 
sabotage operation, why did he also claim that the attempt was foiled by a lack of 
knowledge of Canadian defence forces?  Why did he point out that the mission was 
deemed unnecessary after the First Canadian Contingent left Valcartier? And why did he 
not receive the zero hour go ahead from von Papen?  Also, why would he remain silent 
on the whereabouts of the dynamite that he carried with him to Niagara Falls?  He also 
never explained why all operations under him, in Canada and the United States, were 
terminated, leaving the question why did von Papen send him back to Europe?  In one 
story, he was to be sent to Turkey, in another, he was going back to Germany via Italy 
and, in the end, he did neither and went first to Holland and then Great Britain.   
                                                          
25 See Leonard Sellers, Shot in the Tower: The Story of the Spies Executed in the Tower of London during 
the First World War (London: Leo Cooper, 1997). 
207 
 
After providing limited information to Scotland Yard, von der Goltz chose two 
defence strategies.  The first was to admit his activities in the United States, including 
travelling with a false passport, transporting dynamite without a permit, and conspiracy to 
disturb the peace.26  Secondly, he claimed that he had not come to Britain to spy but to 
either defect or to seek refuge.  Both these statements ran counter to what was said 
previously.  His apparent cooperation and information proved valuable, thus von der 
Goltz was never formally charged with espionage.  Furthermore, he was still a wanted 
man in the United States and it was the intention of the British to hand him over to the 
American authorities.  Thus, von der Goltz was spared the death penalty and escorted by 
British agent Harold Brust to New York.  Upon his arrival in New York, Brust recalled 
that von der Goltz admitted that he had indeed travelled to England with enough paper 
work to get himself convicted.  Knowing he was being followed the night he had met his 
contacts from the German U-boat and later that night, proceeded to eat his papers rather 
than burn them, and laughed in Brust’s face over this small victory.27  Whether factual, 
tall tales of a German agent with a history of inconsistency, or the fireside story of a 
British agent, it remains true that Goltz had no paperwork on him, or in his safe deposit 
box in Holland that could have convicted him.  The destruction of papers by fire or 
digestion made the job of the intelligence officer even more difficult and by extension, 
that of the intelligence historian. 
In 1917, von der Goltz’s expanded his statements and debriefing documents into a 
memoir.  Written after America’s entry into the Great War, von der Goltz’s agenda was 
to frighten the Americans, claiming that the German spies in the United States were well 
                                                          
26 The National Archives (Kew) KV2/519 “Statement.” 
27 Brust, 134-135. 
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financed and as prepared as ever to cripple America’s war efforts, and that the German 
U-boats would destroy every American transport.  Furthermore, the effort required by the 
Americans to deal with the threat was too great for them to handle and yet were vital to 
an American victory.     
To fit the defiant tone of the book, von der Goltz re-wrote the history of the 
Welland Canal plot, the reason why the plot was abandoned, and why he left the United 
States.  He reiterated that by the time he had all the supplies he needed, the Canadian 
troops had left Valcartier, however, this time, he wrote that he assumed the plan was to be 
carried out anyway.  He then said he had been recalled by German Intelligence (Abteilung 
Section III b) who were requesting first-hand information about the state of affairs 
between the United States and Mexico and von der Goltz volunteered to return to 
Germany via Genoa.28  It is apparent that once the threat of execution at the hands of the 
British had passed and von der Goltz was “safely” in the hands of American authorities, 
he  abandoned the noble story he told British Intelligence of personally stopping the 
German sabotage attempt.  He would also abandon the story that he had no intention of 
continuing to operate as a spy and that the information he initially offered was false and 
merely a means to gain the trust of his captors.  His stay in England was temporary.  His 
true objective was to travel back to the United States via Britain to raise a new army of 
saboteurs to cripple the Canadian war effort.  He also admitted to knowing nothing about 
the Emden, the Leipzig or the Zeppelin raids.   
Von der Goltz was finished, but his accomplices and successors were not.  The 
raid plan, though scrapped in August 1914, would be revisited on several occasions and 
                                                          
28 Capt. Horst Von der Goltz. My Adventures as a German Secret Agent (New York: Robert M. McBride & 
Company, 1917), 170. 
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rumours would spread across Canada.  Such whisper campaigns were an integral part of 
the grand strategy of the German spy rings to spread fear.  
In Canada, the Welland Canal Force was alerted to the situation in August 1914 
through British diplomatic channels, and extra precautions were taken to protect the 
strategically important waterway.  The Canal protection force put on active duty included 
the 19th Regiment, the 44th Lincoln and Welland Regiment and A Squadron of the 2nd 
Dragoons.  The Dragoons patrolled the roadways while the infantry units were placed on 
guard duty at locks, tunnels, bridges, and harbour entrances.  Communication between 
the patrols and the guard positions was made possible by use of the canal’s own 
telephone system.  To assist in security, captains of ships passing through the canal were 
expected to declare if there were any Germans or Austrians on board.29  
In September came the discovery of dynamite in Port Robinson, north of Welland 
and east of Niagara Falls, weeks after von der Goltz’s mission was aborted.  The 
discovery was made by members of the 44th regiment who had been charged with 
protecting the canal.30  Speaking for the Officer Commanding, his Adjutant said it had 
been buried 100 yards away from the canal by a disgruntled American who had since 
disappeared. He then speculated that this was not where the dynamite was to be 
detonated.  It was stored here until needed.  On further inspection, it was found that this 
was precisely where the Canal was most vulnerable.31  Was this the dynamite used in the 
plot involving von der Goltz?  It would be impossible to prove definitively, however, it 
                                                          
29 LAC RG24 4281 31-1-8 MD2 vol. 1 “to A.A.G 2nd Division.”   
30 This task would later be taken on by a special unit of the Dominion Police see Lieutenant Colonel 
William A. Smy “Guarding Niagara: The Welland Canal Force, 1914-1918” (2012):  2. 
31 LAC RG24 4281 31-1-8 MD2 vol. 1 “From OC 44th Regiment Welland to OC Welland Canal Force” 
September 30, 1914. 
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Figure 4.1 Map drawn September 30, 1914 (Source: LAC RG24 4281 31-1-
8 MD2 vol. 1) 
must be noted that in his defection papers and memoirs, he never disclosed where the 
dynamite was stored or where it ended up when the plot was aborted.  
The map drawn by the intelligence officer is vague as it was only intended to call 
attention to the proximity of the dynamite to the canal.  Using historic maps, QGIS and 
data compiled by the Brock University Welland Canals Project, it is possible to 
reconstruct this section of the canal and determine the precise location. (figure 4.2) 
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Figure 4.2 Bridge 12, Port Robinson (Sources:  
Brock University Welland Canal Virtual Project 
Created in Arc QGIS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dynamite itself was buried on private property on the West side of Bridge 
Street between Carl and Hill Street in Port Robinson.  If this was indeed the dynamite to 
be used by von der Goltz, at this location there are two potential targets.  The first is the 
bridge itself (Bridge 12)32 and the second is the Welland River Lock that connected the 
Welland River (formerly Chippewa Creek) just north of the bridge in what is now Port 
Robinson Park.   Public information on the discovery was limited.  In November 1914, 
The St. Catharines Standard reported that dynamite had been discovered in Hamilton and 
a number of Germans had been arrested.33 
Several attacks on Canadian railways occurred in the spring of 1915 and were 
recorded in the official history of the Canadian intelligence service.  This record 
compiled, from Duguid’s unfinished official history is limited to military records.  
                                                          
32 The bridge at this location was destroyed when it was rammed accidently by the ferry Steelton, in August 
1974. 
33 Smy, 44. 
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Furthermore, it covers only the first two years of the war.  Elliot’s Summary is as 
follows; 
 
1914 
 
August 8 – An attempt to blow up the Montreal Light,  
Heat and Power, works 
August 12 – A grain elevator burnt in Saint John 
August 16 – Attempted sabotage of a radio station at  
Sault Ste. Marie 
August 24 – Attempted bombing of the canal at Cornwall 
 
 
1915 
 
February 2 – A German reservist, Werner Horn, blew up  
the center span of the bridge at Vanceboro, Maine  
(it was repaired in six hours and Horn was caught) 
April 29 – Two separate bridges damaged by fire in  
Vancouver 
June – 17 separate attempts to derail trains in Manitoba 
June 22 - A sentry at the Windsor armouries found a  
suitcase containing a clock fuse and 26 sticks of dynamite 
June – A bomb partially wrecked the Peabody Overall  
Plant, Walkerville. (The German Agent responsible  
was caught and sentenced to life imprisonment)34 
 
                                                          
34 See Elliot, 51 and Duguid, 34-35. 
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The precise number of operatives and acts of sabotage committed in Canada is debated 
among historians.  The reason for the discrepancies is that many incidences were labeled 
accidents.  These include fires in munitions factories due to carelessness, classic 
vandalism, or labour unrest.35  It also includes the fire that destroyed the Parliament 
buildings, which was suspected to have been the work of German agents, and the Halifax 
explosion which has been retroactively attributed to German spies in popular culture.   
 
11 Bridge Street 
A new mission began in New York for von Papen when it became apparent that 
moving German reservists from North America to Europe was going to be a problem.  
There was very little he could do to help German reservists living in Canada for they 
were disallowed by law to leave the country.  For reservists living in America, or any 
who managed to slip out of Canada, there were other obstacles.  The Royal Navy was 
determined to stop the flow of German men across the Atlantic.  Ships were stopped, 
searched, and passports were checked.  Anyone caught with a false passport was arrested 
and interned in Britain.  Papen’s first solution was to purchase passports from sailors of 
neutral countries and distribute them among the German reservists.  The man hired to 
direct the operation was Hans von Wedell, a lawyer and former officer in the German 
army.  Von Papen’s check book recovered by British Intelligence showed that, between 
                                                          
35Grant W. Grams “Karl Respa and German Espionage in Canada During World War One” Journal of 
Military and Strategic Studies 8 no. 1 (2005), 15. 
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September 21, 1914, and December 8, 1914, von Wedell was paid a total of $2,190 for 
his services.36     
Wedell and his assistant opened an office at 11 Bridge Street in New York, one 
block away from von Papen’s office, where reservists, for a price and a reference letter 
from von Papen or other German officers, could acquire the passport they needed to slip 
past the British.  Starting in December 1914, American passports presented a new 
problem for von Wedell.  While changing information on passports from neutral 
countries like Spain and Sweden was easy, new American passports were to include a 
photograph.37  Consequently, travelling with an American passport with a photo 
guaranteed apprehension by the British.  Since the practice of attaining genuine passports 
under an assumed identity was years away, the solution was to acquire a handful of the 
new American passports and use them to create forgeries.  A photograph of the reserve 
officer was then affixed and he could pass as an American.  Von Wedell’s work, 
however, was nearing its end.  As described in a letter from von Wedell to Ambassador 
Count von Bernstorff, von Wedell learned that the Department of Justice in the United 
States was watching him.  Furthermore, he had heard that one of his clients, Dr. Stark had 
been caught by the British with one of his forged passports and it would eventually be 
traced back to number 11 Bridge Street.38  Soon thereafter, von Papen ordered von 
Wedell to cease operations and go into hiding.  He fled to Cuba and wrote Count von 
                                                          
36 Cmd 8174 “Selection from Papers found in the possession of Captain von Papen, Falmouth, January 2 & 
3, 1916” His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1916 (Cheque numbers 21,56,57,59,62,65,66, additionally Frau 
von Wedall was paid $800 on December 22, cheque number 22 in Ibid, “Analysis of certain of Captain von 
Papen’s cheques between September 1, 1914, and December 21, 1915” 
37 John F. Dooley. Codes, Cyphers and Spies: Tales of Military Intelligence in World War I (Galesburg: 
Copernicus Books, 2016), 164. 
38 “Hans von Wedell to Imperial German Ambassador Count von Bernstorff, Washington” letter 
reproduced in Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of World War I Intelligence (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2014), 333-334.  
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Bernstorff explaining the situation.39  His self-imposed exile would spare him prosecution 
by the Americans and the British, as the forgeries were traced back to him when von 
Papen’s check book was recovered by British Intelligence.   
 
Watching the Docks and Shipping   
In addition to planning further actions in Canada and sneaking reservists into 
Europe, von Papen’s men also maintained a close watch on international shipping, troop 
movements, and shipments of war materials to Great Britain from Canada and the United 
States.  Cover for these operations proved surprisingly easy.  The New York docks were 
crowded with German sailors trapped in America as their ships could not leave the safety 
of the harbour.  Royal Navy patrols in the Atlantic had made them prisoners in a neutral 
country.  Furthermore, many dockyard workers were Irish and sympathetic to the 
movement for Irish independence, Sinn Fein, and proved willing to render assistance to 
any anti-British operation. Von Papen would later deny direct involvement, but his men 
travelled on board the passenger liner Lusitania on several occasions, and reported cargo 
manifests in hopes of catching the British violating international laws.  This was achieved 
on several occasions.  According to letters sent from von Papen to German Intelligence, 
Section III B of the German General Staff, and intercepted by British Intelligence, von 
Papen had men observing ship arrivals and departures, troop movements, and arms deals.  
In December 1914, for example, von Papen reported that the British were ordering 
massive amounts of arms (50 million cartridges and Remington repeating rifles), 
                                                          
39 Curiously, in another account, von Wedell was reported to have been captured by the British but drowned 
when his ship bound for Britain struck a mine.  Tibor Koeves, Satan in a Top Hat: A Biography of Franz 
von Papen (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1941), 9.  
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believing them to be on route to India.    It was hoped that this news about India would 
aid Germany in the propaganda war for American sympathy since this was in violation of 
The Hague convention.  In the same communication, he alerted the General Staff that the 
British had reallocated the Franconia (which he misidentified as belonging to the White 
Star Line when in fact it was owned by Cunard) to troop ship duty in Montreal.40  It also 
implied that von Papen had contacts in Canada, having been able to ascertain not only 
that a second corps of Canadians was preparing to leave, but that they were 
underequipped and hastily trained.  Von Papen interpreted this to mean that the British 
were pressuring the colonies for more men. 
 The major instance for which von Papen is remembered in the United States, is 
his involvement in the Lusitania disaster.  On May 7, 1915, the Cunard liner Lusitania, 
still conducting regular passenger service while her sister ship Mauritania was converted 
into a troopship, was torpedoed and sunk by U-20 off Old Head, Kinsale, Ireland.  Von 
Papen’s men watching the Cunard docks in New York had reported a cargo of munitions 
on board.  In his memoir, von Papen defended his actions by claiming that his message 
(of May 3, 1915), that British ships were carrying war materials, which included a special 
note on what the Lusitania was carrying, did not reach Germany until after the ship was 
sunk.41  In another memoir of the period, Captain von Rintelen, a naval intelligence 
officer, claimed that he and von Papen were misinformed (by his own admission), that 
not only was the Lusitania carrying war materials, but that the ship had also been secretly 
                                                          
40 The National Archives (Kew) KV2/519 “translation of intercepted letter addressed to Great General Staff 
(Section III b) Berlin” December 7 1914. 
41 Papen, 42. 
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armed with naval guns in order to fire on stalking U-Boats.42  The delay in 
communicating this information to the German High Command resulted from using mail 
service rather than wireless, out of fear the message would be intercepted.  Whether the 
U-boat commander ever received word that the Lusitania was carrying war materials 
remains a mystery.  It is however, a moot point.  The German Embassy had issued a 
warning in the major American newspapers to passengers travelling on ships flying 
neutral flags that even they were subject to attack once entering the war zone.  The 
Lusitania, a British owned ship, was at the time flying the American Stars and Stripes in 
order to continue uninterrupted passenger service.  Never the less, von Papen was 
labelled a menace to the allied war effort and a scourge on humanity, he even earned the 
nickname “Satan in a Top Hat.”  He was deemed a threat to the British war effort as well 
as Canadian and American lives.43   
By December 1915, von Papen and Karl Boy-Ed, were considered by the 
American government to be too much of a liability given their reputation for violating 
neutrality laws.44  As a result, on December 10, The American Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing formally informed the German Ambassador that von Papen and Boy-Ed were no 
longer personae gratae and that they should be recalled immediately.  The German 
ambassador received the order with enthusiasm and arrangements were made for their 
                                                          
42 Captain von Rintelen. The Dark Invader: Wartime Reminiscences of a German Naval Intelligence 
Officer. (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 117. First published in 1933. 
43 “Satan in a Top Hat” was the title of one of the slanderous biographies written by Tibor Koeves during 
the Second World War.   
44 The Americans were not alone, it has been suggested that the Germans also considered him a liability 
given his record of failure, Richard W. Rolfs, S.J. The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: The Life of Franz von Papen 
(New York: University Press of America, 1996), 13. 
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passage back to Germany through Holland by December 18.45  It would be on this trip 
that the ship would be stopped at Falmouth on January 2, 1916 and sensitive documents 
in the possession of von Papen were recovered by British Intelligence.  These were the 
documents the British used to charge von der Goltz who was already in custody.  The 
other man to be recalled was von Rintelen who had hoped to cause havoc among British 
merchant shipping.  Von Rintelen, however, considered Papen, in his own memoir to 
have been “not quite up to the task.”46 Likewise, von Papen and Boy-Ed considered von 
Rintelen to be an interloper.47  Eventually, after traveling to Sweden, von Rintelen was 
captured by the British at Falmouth and returned to the United States on charges of 
violating neutrality laws. 
The British maintained their watch on von Papen for another 30 years, and by 
1945 had accumulated two large files on him and were ready to prosecute him at 
Nuremberg.  The British hoped to prosecute him, as the Chancellor, who handed 
Germany to Hitler, and then willingly served in his government as Vice-Chancellor and 
ambassador to Turkey.  Much of their case was based on his character and his treachery 
during the Great War. 
More by chance than by design, von Papen failed to coordinate any successful 
attacks on Canadian soil. His accomplishments, in his tenure in the United States, were 
limited to transmitting sensitive information on British shipping from Canada and the 
                                                          
45 The Communications were compiled and published “Recall of Captain von Papen, Military Attaché and 
Captain Boy-Ed, Naval Attaché, of the German Embassy at Washington” The American Journal of 
International Law, 10 No. 4 Supplement: Diplomatic Correspondence and Commerce (October, 1916): 
363-366. Information was also made public to the Americans. Earl Evelyn Sperry and Willis Mason West 
“German Plots and Intrigues in the United States During the Period of Neutrality” Committee on Public 
Information, 1918. 
46 Von Rintelen, 90-91. 
47Francis MacDonnell, Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column & the American Home Front (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 15. 
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United States.  At the very least, that was the official findings by British intelligence.  
American newspapers, and Canadian newspapers becoming part of the mechanism of the 
insecurity state, on the other hand, would “find” the German spy-ring in the United States 
responsible for further attacks and one at the very heart of the Canadian government. 
 
“Mr. Speaker, the Building is on Fire!” 
 Fears of German sabotage, at the very heart of the matter of German-Canadian 
loyalty, had been instilled in Canadians ever since it was first reported that a German 
agent attempted to destroy the Welland Canal and had been further electrified by the 
sinking of the Lusitania and allegations that spying was involved in the disaster.  As 
pointed out by historian Robert Rutherdale, fear was extended to local communities by 
naming well known landmarks as potential targets for German saboteurs with the 
assistance of local German aliens.  This was an exercise in instilling in local populations, 
a sense of familiarity and locality with the perceived danger.48  
On the night of February 14-15, 1915, terror spread through Ottawa.  Just after 
10pm, four aircraft were sighted over Brockville heading for the capital.  They could be 
heard but not seen until the lead plane dropped a flare to guide the flight path of the 
others.  At 11:15pm orders were passed by Percy Sherwood for a blackout on Parliament 
Hill and the Rideau Hall, lights were extinguished and curtains drawn.49  Apparently the 
planes had come from New York State without filing a proper flight plan with Canadian 
authorities.  Less than a week later, another miscommunication caused a similar state of 
                                                          
48 Rutherdale, 133-134. 
49 “Ottawa Feared Aeroplane Raid and Capital was in Darkness” BDT February 15, 1915, 1. 
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panic, this time with an aeroplane flying from Buffalo to Toronto.50  Here were two 
instances where the worst-case scenario was instantly imagined.  False alarms this time, 
but perhaps there was a German plot against the capital. 
One year later, on a cold February night on Parliament Hill in 1916, the House of 
Commons was in session debating a fishery bill. In the adjacent reading room everything 
was at is should be, for the most part.   It was standard procedure to have two guards on 
duty, one at the Commons entrance and one at the Senate entrance.  At 8:30pm, however, 
the Senate guard was removed for unspecified reasons.51  After 9:00pm, smoke and 
flames were sighted by Samuel Francis Glass who was conducting research in the reading 
room.  He immediately ran out and found Constable Moore who also saw the flames and 
sounded the alert.52  Meanwhile, Glass raced into the chamber with the smoke behind him 
and yelled “Mr. Speaker, the building is on fire!”  The fire proved too aggressive to be 
brought under control by the constable and guards armed with fire extinguishers, as the 
flames climbed the heavily varnished pine paneling of the walls and ceiling.  Desperate 
fire fighters, and a snap decision on the part of library clerk MacCormac to close the 
fireproof doors, saved the library.53  After the roof of the Centre Block collapsed, the fire 
spread to the Victoria clock tower.  At 1:21 am the bell fell.  Prime Minister Borden 
escaped through smoke filled corridors but had not had time to recover his winter coat; a 
                                                          
50 “Saw Aeroplane in Buffalo” BDT February 19, 1915, 1 
51 Royal Commission RE: Parliament Buildings Fire at Ottawa, February 3, 1916 Report of the 
Commission and Evidence Sessional Paper No. 72a 1916 (Ottawa), 8. 
52 Don Nixon, The Other Side of the Hill: Behind the Scenes Stories of Parliament Hill (Carleton Place, 
2012), 161. 
53 The other portion of the building to survive relatively intact was the 1904-1914 North-West quarter 
expansion because of its steel frame construction. 
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decision he immediately regretted.54  In all, seven people were killed and the Centre 
Block was reduced to icy rubble.    
The immediate question in the minds of the nation was how did the fire start?  
News spread quickly that the most likely cause was a German saboteur.  The next day in 
The Globe and Mail the headline included the phrase “Fire the Act of Alien Foes?” 
Curiously enough, the article that appeared under this heading and on the next page never 
actually addressed that issue and instead summarized events of the previous night.  The 
only passage relative to the headline was one sentence, “all kinds of ugly rumors are 
afloat as to the origin of the fire.”55  Meanwhile, a journalist working in Rhode Island, 
John R. Rathon, said he had received news from an informant in the German embassy 
that the Canadian Parliament buildings would be destroyed within three weeks.  Rathon 
never revealed the identity of his informant and did not testify before the Royal 
Commission investigating the cause of the fire.  An abridged version of Rathon’s story, 
however, appeared in the Globe on the same day as the “Aliens” story with some 
vagueness, as his name was not even mentioned.56  The next day, the story was expanded 
and included reports that explosions were heard at the time of the fire which (in the 
opinion of the editors) was not impossible.57  Curiously, Borden in his memoir recalled 
hearing similar sounds of explosions in the corridor, only he did not consider this 
conclusive evidence.58 He would also recall that he had never given rumours of 
                                                          
54 Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs volume II, 1916-1920 edited by Henry Borden (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart Limited, 1969), 3. 
55 “Fire the Act of Alien Foes?” The Globe and Mail February 4, 1916, 1-2  
56 “German U.S. Ambassador Responsible for the Fire” ibid. 
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explosives and sabotage any serious consideration and instead believed that the most 
likely cause of the fire was the careless disposal of cigar butts in the reading room.59 
Within a week of the fire other newspapers printed stories about German 
saboteurs and arsonists.  The exception was The Berliner Journal.  The Journal was able 
to avoid printing inflammatory remarks about saboteurs in its report on the fire on 
February 10, by virtue of the fact that as a weekly publication the editors had the time to 
investigate the story properly.60 
This renewed anti-German rhetoric was also echoed in the minds of other men 
who had testified before the official inquiry into the disaster.  Albert Sévigny, a Quebec 
Conservative MP who later became Speaker, testified that a shifty looking foreigner had 
repeatedly visited the Parliament buildings and was in the vicinity of the reading rooms 
on the night of the fire.  Sévigny was convinced that this man was a German saboteur 
responsible for the fire.  At one point the man in question even asked Sévigny for 
permission to take photographs of the building’s interior.  Fearing a security breach, he 
refused the mysterious man access.  He was later identified as a French photographer who 
had visited Parliament Hill on several previous occasions to take photographs.61  
Contrary to public suspicions, the Royal Commission could find no conclusive 
evidence that the fire was started intentionally.62  In a more recent study, the commission 
and the Dominion Police were attacked for not having conducted a proper investigation 
by the American historian Heribert von Felitzsch.  He theorized, admittedly with very 
                                                          
59 Borden, Memoirs, 5. 
60 “Erößunug des Dominion Parlaments” Berliner Journal (February 10, 1915), 2. 
61 Royal Commission evidence pg 149. 
62 Ibid, 9. Commission.  Additionally, Maj. Elliot never referenced the Parliament fire as a potential result 
of German sabotage in his official history.    
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little evidence, that if the fire was set by a German saboteur, the most likely device was 
the “pencil bomb” developed by Walter Scheele who was a weapons specialist employed 
by von Papen in 1915.63  Its design purpose was to burn cargo on board supply ships 
since slipping enough explosives onboard to sink them was deemed impossible.  
While conducting its investigation, the commission learned of a curious incident 
in the reading room which to them, gave credence to the idea that the fire was an accident 
caused by carelessness.  William G. Weichel, M.P. for Waterloo North met with Lieut. 
Col. Lochead of the 118th Battalion on Parliament Hill to discuss a newspaper story 
regarding the Berlin Trades and Labour Council and, after lighting two cigars, walked to 
the reading room to examine the Berlin Daily Telegraph and the Berlin News-Record.  As 
they read, cigar ashes and embers drifted onto the bottom shelf where newspapers were 
stored and this started a fire.  Before it could spread to the floor below, or the shelf above, 
Lochead and Weichel managed to pull the papers onto the floor and stamp out the fire.64  
In hindsight, it is fortunate that they had managed to extinguish this first fire, knowing 
how quickly fire spread through the buildings from the reading room.  The consequences 
of a member of the Canadian military in command of a battalion raised in a German 
community, and a Conservative MP, who staunchly spoke of the loyalty of his fellow 
German Canadians, destroying the center of the Canadian government in a jittery country 
at war would have been an unqualified disaster.  It is a curiosity that after this fire, no 
extra precautions were recommended in the reading room and quite the coincidence that 
                                                          
63 The mechanism is described in Heribert von Felitzsch The Secret War on the United States: A Tale of 
Sabotage, Labor Unrest, and Border Troubles (Ammissvile: Henselstone Verlag, 2015), 27-29. 
64 “Testimony of W.G. Weichel M.P.” and “Testimony of Colonel Lochead of the 118th Battalion” in Royal 
Commission, 139-140. 
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the fire that entirely destroyed the building should originate in the same place less than a 
week later.   
A more recent investigation by Tom Korski concurred that the most likely cause 
was faulty wiring in the desk lamps.65  Today the smoking accident story has also 
endured, due in part, to the fact that two men from Waterloo started a blaze a week before 
the disaster.  Because the Royal Commission never ruled on the exact cause of the fire, 
the story of a German spy, or at the very least a sympathiser, deliberately destroying 
Parliament as an act of terrorism is a recurring theme in popular literature.   
 
Preparations for Attack in Southern Ontario 
Responses to wartime threats to Canadian security in the border region have 
presented a number of challenges to historians beyond the limitations of the available 
archival material.  In response, there has been a trend towards studying the transnational 
experiences of life in the border regions.  In a recent work, Brandon R. Dimmel has 
argued that a cross-border culture between workers in Windsor and Detroit created a 
common sense of belonging and any increase in border security was perceived as an 
intrusion on their way of life.66  While Dimmel did not make extensive use of Department 
of Milita and Defence records, it can still be understood that their presence in Windsor 
                                                          
65 Tom Korski “Burning Down the House: When Canada’s Parliament was Destroyed by Fire, A Jittery 
Wartime Nation First Suspected a Hun Conspiracy, the Blamed it on a Smouldering Cigar, A Fresh Look at 
the Evidence Suggests Another Matter” Postmedia News, (January 31, 2011). 
66 See Brandon R. Dimmel, Engaging the Line: How the Great War Shaped the Canada-US Border 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 24-25. 
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was minimal and the only enforcing presence was that of the Dominion Police.67  The 
question remains why would this be the case? 
An examination of the files labeled “defence of the frontiers” shows that 
intelligence gathering was key to assessing the threats of invasion and sabotage in 
Southern Ontario.  The man in charge of Military District 1 was Colonel Shannon and it 
was he who planned the defence of Southern Ontario. It was standard procedure for the 
officers commanding the military districts to appoint an intelligence officer to aid in this 
process.    In August 1914, Shannon received orders from the Militia Council in Ottawa 
to appoint an intelligence officer; 
I beg to suggest that it might be found advisable if Officers Commanding 
Divisions could have the services of a Secret Service Officer to aid him in 
investigating and dealing with reports made to him from time to time as to the 
movements and actions of German and Austrian Officers and Reservists, as well 
as that of any suspected characters or gatherings, and in order to enable the 
Officer Commanding Division to make full and complete reports of any such 
matters.68   
 
These orders would be followed to the letter in the military districts where the 
commanding officers deemed it necessary.  Military District 2, for example, was so large 
and so ethnically diverse, officers would be deployed throughout the war. In Military 
District 1, on the other hand, Captain G.N. Weeks, the incumbent intelligence officer 
concluded his tenure in September 1914, and would not be replaced for the duration of 
the war, except for a brief two-month period from July to September 1917.69   
                                                          
67 Ibid, 59-60. 
68 LAC RG 24 vol 4262 MD1 c-252 Protection of the Frontiers “Secretary, Militia Council to Officer 
Commanding 1st Division” August 13, 1914. 
69 See Elliott, 578. 
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While Colonel Shannon did not see fit to deploy an intelligence officer to observe 
home grown threats, he did deploy watchers into the United States to monitor the German 
communities there.  Standing in sharp contrast to the commanding officer of Military 
District 2 (and even Australia’s German populated Military District 4), he was content to 
rely on local police forces, which his orders allowed.  In May 1916, he would receive 
disturbing reports from Cleveland and New York that German reservists as well as 
Australians, Hungarians and Poles, no longer able to depart for Europe, had amassed a 
well-led fighting force. The anonymous report claimed they were well armed, and 
secretly conducting drills.  That same report claimed that American authorities were 
working to quietly quell such activities.70  There were also concerns about the potential 
for an attack by Irish nationals in the same area.71  Many of these reports would be 
dismissed as rumors or German propaganda.  The mass movement of Germans and 
Austrians from Minnesota to Detroit, for example, was dismissed.  They had been drawn 
to Detroit en masse by the promise of employment and higher wage prospects.72   
By 1917, the Canadian forces stationed in Southern Ontario, to be called upon in 
the event of a massive raid or invasion, consisted of two depot batteries and four overseas 
battalions at nearly full strength, including the 122nd of Galt which had been called upon 
to suppress the riot in Berlin/Kitchener the night of the municipal election. Their primary 
concern however, was not with the German communities in Ontario.  Their perceived 
threat was foreign and their actions were at best precautionary.  Briefing documents sent 
                                                          
70 LAC RG 24 vol 4262 MD1 Protection of the Frontiers “extract of report dated 8th May 1916.” 
71 LAC RG 24 vol 4262 MD1 c-315 HQC 95-2-13 Protection of the Frontiers “From the Chief of the 
General Staff, Canadian Militia to The Officer Commanding Military District No. 1” May 10, 1916. 
72 LAC RG 24 vol 4262 MD1 HQC 965 Protection of the Frontiers “Memo to Col. Shannon” May 19, 
1916. 
227 
 
to Major-General Gwatkin show that his officers felt that by 1917 a raid was highly 
unlikely.73  Nevertheless, arrangements were made for the military to quickly 
commandeer rail and auto transportation in the district and to seize control of the wireless 
stations on a moment’s notice if necessary.74   
The final preparations concerned points of deployment for defence forces based 
on the most likely places for any engagement on the frontier to occur.  Shannon’s officers 
concluded that the most likely points of departure for invaders from the United States 
would be Port Huron Michigan, Detroit Michigan, and Cleveland Ohio.  The crossing 
points on the Detroit River were also noted; between Point Edward and Port Lambton, 
between Amherstburg and Windsor, and across Lake Erie to Port Burwell, Port Stanley, 
Rond’Eau and Leamington. South-east of Lake St. Claire was deemed too swampy and 
hazardous for a successful crossing.75  There remained one issue which Colonel 
Shannon’s documents did not address.  Was the local immigrant population likely to 
support an invasion through intelligence gathering and acts of sabotage? 
 
Conclusion 
Nikolai was right, German intelligence and sabotage operations in Canada and the 
United States were indeed poorly organized.  If anything, German Intelligence achieved 
the opposite of its goals by swaying the United States to join the war on the side of the 
Entente by striking fear with acts of sabotage, an unrestricted U-boat campaign, and the 
                                                          
73 LAC RG 24 vol 4262 MD1 c-315 HQC 95-2-13 Protection of the Frontiers “Colonel Shannon to Major 
General Gwatkin” March 3, 1917, 1. 
74 Ibid, 2. 
75 LAC RG 24 vol 4262 MD1 c-252 Protection of the Frontiers “Officer Administering 1st Divisional Area 
to Chief of General Staff”   
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Zimmerman telegram.  Consequently, Colonel Shannon in Military District 1, on the 
front lines of the potential invasion of Canada, saw no reason to worry and his decision 
was not due to neglect, but rather because he assessed it was not necessary. The following 
chapter examines the effects of Shannon’s decision in contrasts to the methods used in 
Toronto.  The result is a marked break from the popular tales of spies and saboteurs like 
Horst von der Goltz, career intelligence men like Colonel Nikolai, and high-profile men 
like Franz von Papen, to stories of individuals sometimes lost to history; newspaper men, 
teachers, librarians, average citizens, police officers and lone recruits in the CEF.  Their 
stories and the power structures of the society in which they lived are all recoverable 
through the lens of intelligence history. All the more so where the usual practice of 
leaving intelligence to the military was neglected and substituted with the traditional 
power structures of the liberal order in communities like Berlin. 
Liberal conceptions of the relationship between society and the individual were 
not universal.  In Berlin/Kitchener, the soldiers of the 118th Battalion, when questioned 
about the Concordia Club, wondered where the government and military authorities were 
when reports of German disloyalty were circulating.  They wondered why the insecurity 
state had not come to Berlin when it had so clearly arrived in larger centres.  Countering 
real and perceived threats was a matter for the military authorities.  Colonel Shannon 
deployed his watchers to the United States.  How “homegrown threats” were handled was 
another matter, which ultimately depended on the social structures and the state of the 
liberal order in the specific communities involved. 
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Chapter 5: Canadian Intelligence and the 
Perceived German Enemy 
 
I venture to say that not one percent of the persons 
who are engaged in spying for the German 
Government at the present time are either of 
German birth or descent. 
                       -Horst von der Goltz1 
 
 
These words, spoken by a German spy turned defector at the beginning of the 
war, undermines the central focus of the slander campaigns against Canadians of German 
ancestry.  It confirms that the vast majority of the accusations of disloyalty or 
collaboration, and the use of enemy aliens for spying and sabotage, are not based on 
empirical evidence as much as emotions.  Othering of the Canadian of German ancestry 
in Ontario’s newspapers was a relatively new phenomenon and it was fundamentally 
illiberal.  From within the perspective of the liberal order, because “the German” shared 
the key liberal values of respect for private property, possessive individualism, and free 
market capitalism, they would not be othered.  To do so would be to adopt an illiberal 
position. 
The Department of Militia and Defence and their official position on Canada’s 
ethnic Germans was the domestic muscle of Borden’s dismantling of the liberal order and 
its officers were major contributors to the founding of the insecurity state. An 
examination of the surviving documents of the department shows that the intelligence 
officers held xenophobic positions similar to Ontario’s English-language press.  Race 
                                                          
1 Von der Goltz, 272. 
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became the central criteria for suspicion and the word “foreigner” appears wherever there 
is doubt about the identity of a suspect.  This is seemingly a more precise term as it 
implies “foreign born” and would exclude naturalized citizens.  Unfortunately, it did not.  
It was a widely cast net used to describe any unwanted element in Canadian society and 
carried the insinuation that a foreigner always meant a deviant troublemaker.  Whether 
this attitude was born in the tense atmosphere that followed the outbreak of war or 
whether it was rooted in pre-war opinions against open door immigration policy is up for 
debate.  Either way within months of the beginning of the war it had become the 
terminology of choice.  
Intelligence work is a naturally secretive process.  That is not to say that public 
discourse could not enter the discussion, but the discussion itself could not be expressed 
publicly.  Oftentimes, public pressure demands action or at the very least influences it.  
Desmond Morton long ago suggested that his process began with works of fiction2   such 
as the best-selling Victorian spy thriller The Riddle of the Sands (1903) by Erskine 
Childers.  In it, two graduates of Oxford, Carruthers and Davies, uncover a plot in North 
East Germany to secretly expand the canal system to facilitate the movement of the 
German fleet into the North Sea.  Our protagonists later learn that the German Army was 
conducting drills and tests of their transport barges with the intention of invading 
England.3  This othering of Germans as militaristic Prussians was rendered explicit by an 
epilogue where the author opines that while this is just a novel, the threat of German 
                                                          
2 See Desmond Morton “Sir William Otter and Internment Operations in Canada during the First World 
War” Canadian Historical Review 55, 1 (1974): 33. 
3 Thomas J. Price “Spy Stories, Espionage and the Public in the Twentieth Century” Journal of Popular 
Culture 30, 3 (1993): 81-82.  
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invasion is real.4  Indeed, the First Lord of the Admiralty ordered an investigation into the 
feasibility of such an invasion after reading this book.5    Beginning in 1907, Germany 
did indeed embark on a vast expansion and widening of the Kiel Canal to accommodate 
the German High Seas Fleet.  Just as described in The Riddle, the intention was to 
expedite their deployment into the North Sea.  This was seen as a danger to Britain, as 
their naval bases were located on the south coast in Portsmouth and Plymouth. The 
British Grand Fleet had to be relocated to the North East to counter this new German 
threat.6  
In 1914, the immediate security response of the Borden government to the burden 
of mobilization and national security was the passing of the War Measures Act, which 
could best be described as a suspension of habeas corpus.  It gave the government 
unprecedented powers of search, arrest, deportation, censorship, and control of public 
information.  Further amendments were passed in the fall of 1914 requiring the 
registration of enemy aliens and authorising the confiscation of firearms and explosives.  
This was the first step on the road to internment.  Suddenly the Commissioner of the 
Dominion Police, Percy Sherwood, held enormous investigative powers.  He was a 
former militia officer and close friend of Ernest Chambers, the Chief Press Censor, with 
whom he would correspond throughout the war.7  Sherwood had served in the office 
                                                          
4 Erskine Childers The Riddle of the Sands: A Record of Secret Service (New York: Dodd, Mean and 
Company, 1915), 826-827.  Russophobia was also apparent in British literature.  See for example William 
Le Queux, The Great War in England in 1897 (London: Tower Publishing Company Ltd., 1894) And was 
reinforced by a “skirmish” off Dogger Bank between British fishing boats and the Russian Baltic Fleet on 
its way to the Pacific, as well as by Russia’s increased pressure on the Ottoman Empire to open the Straits 
after 1905.  
5 Christopher Andrews Her Majesty’s Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community 
(New York: Viking, 1986), 36-37. 
6 Specifically, Scapa Flow in Scotland.  
7 Whitaker, Kealey, Parnaby, 62-63. 
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since 1909 and had been promoted based on the recommendations of Canada’s 
intelligence officers attached to the department of Militia and Defence.8  With the War 
Measures Act, his position rose above that of intelligence officers. The final decision 
whether or not to prosecute suspects depended entirely on his personal recommendation.  
Ultimately, this left a great deal of power in the hands of civil rather than military 
officials.  Perhaps, this could explain Canadian intelligence’s later obsession with the 
labour movements in the country after the war.  It also reflected the limited men and 
resources available to the department of Militia and Defence and its dwindling Corps of 
Guides.9  
Background and the Corps of Guides 
To minimize jurisdictional problems, the country’s intelligence districts 
conformed to the Military District structure already in place.10  Sub-districts, however, 
had more flexible boundaries.  Ontario was divided into four (see Figure 5.1) Military 
District 1, London and southwestern Ontario; Military District 2, Toronto and central 
Ontario; and Military District 3 Kingston and eastern Ontario, and Military District 10 
which was an extension of the Winnipeg-based district and covered the northwest of the 
province.  MD1 spanned from Owen Sound to Port Burwell and included a bulge that 
engulfed Wellington and Waterloo Counties.  MD3 spanned from Mattawa to Durham, 
following the county lines between Peterborough and Victoria. MD2 headquartered in 
Toronto stretched from the Niagara Peninsula into northeastern Ontario, from Nipissing 
                                                          
8 Michael Butt, “Surveillance of Canadian Communists: A Case Study of Toronto RCMP Intelligence 
Networks, 1920-1939” (PhD Thesis: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2003), 17. 
9 In 1914, for example, Sherwood’s budget was doubled, see Butt, 17. 
10 Directorate of History and Heritage Go 61 d/- April 1, 1903 in 112, 3M1013 (D1) CDN Int. Service up to 
1918, Org & Work of Cdn. Int. Service in the Great War 1914-18 & Earlier Background.  
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to Sault Ste. Marie, including the nickel belt, the clay belt and the Timmins region. The 
northern border between MD2 and MD 10 was the county line between Algoma and 
Thunder Bay, Cochrane and Kenora.    
 
From the time of the Fenian Raids, the Canadian Militia had no centralized 
intelligence force and its main priority was border defence.  This changed with the 
Figure 5.1 Ontario Military Districts 
(Sources: Created in QGIS from information provided in Elliott and Duguid)  
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passing of General Order 61, in 1901.11  Based on British recommendations, and the 
lessons learned in South Africa, the order created an independent force specializing in 
intelligence gathering.  Each military district would be assigned a District Intelligence 
Officer (DIO) a Sub-District Intelligence Officer (SDIO) with men of the Corps of 
Guides serving under them.  Their duties included mapping the borderlands and assessing 
the military and strategic capabilities of friend and foe.  While General Order 61 solved 
the organizational problems, it could not solve the issue of manpower.  There were very 
few active District Intelligence Officers, the guides were severely undermanned, and the 
post of Director General of Military Intelligence in Ottawa, which oversaw all 
intelligence operations was left vacant.12  Orders issued in August 1914, created the 
Director and Assistant Director of Military Intelligence.  Due to this vacancy, the 
Intelligence Officers fell under the command structure of their respective districts.  So 
ultimately, district priorities, be it mapping or analysis of agricultural capacity and public 
works, varied according to the agenda of the Commanding Officer of each district.13  The 
Intelligence Officers themselves were recruited from specific niches in Canadian society.  
Like most officers in the Canadian Army, they came from well educated, English-
speaking, upper middle-class families and introduced core values of the liberal order to 
the command structure of Canadian Intelligence.  That was not all, as part of their 
masculine culture, commissioned officers in the Corps of Guides were expected to 
participate in an annual 15-mile equestrian competition.14   
                                                          
11 Elliott, 11. 
12 Wesley K. Wark “The Evolution of Military Intelligence in Canada” Armed Forces and Society 16 no. 1 
(Fall, 1989): 79. 
13 Ford, “Dreaded Tempest”, 10. 
14 Elliott, 599. 
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The outbreak of the war forced a complete overhaul of the Canadian Milita.  Elliot 
observed that Canada had prepared for the “wrong war.”15 The reorganization marked the 
beginning of the end of the Corps of Guides.  It was too small a force to handle the war-
time demands of national security and intelligence gathering.  The intelligence field 
training of officers and men of the corps, however, would prove invaluable in the 
reorganization of Canada’s domestic security forces.  In the end, the Corps was disbanded 
and officers were absorbed into staff duties in other units.   Many would volunteer for 
overseas service for frontline intelligence work since they were the only men in uniform 
with training in intelligence work.  District Intelligence Officers and field agents would 
also be recruited from the Corps and assigned to districts familiar to them, maintaining 
their duties, if not their positions, on the home front.16  The difference was in the 
command structure.  Under orders of the Department of Militia and Defence, the DIOs 
came under the command of the Military Districts which were already struggling to 
recruit and equip an expeditionary force.  The results of any investigation would be 
reported to the District Commander and, in cases of intelligence and propaganda, be 
duplicated and forwarded to the Assistant Director of Military Intelligence, Major F.E. 
Davis, in Ottawa17   
                                                          
15 ibid, 22. 
16 Directorate of History and Heritage Extract from Major J.E. Hahn “The Intelligence Service within the 
Canadian Corps, 1914-1918” 1 in 112, 3M1013 (D1) Canadian Intelligence Service. 
17 Additionally, years of struggle between military and civilian authorities in Canada had created a 
Department of Militia and Defence, under which the Corps of Guides originated that differed greatly from 
the Imperial model.  The militia bill effectively removed the generals from the upper levels of 
administration thereby placing the department under the control of the cabinet. Desmond Morton, 
Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1970), 196-200. 
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An important source in investigating the workings of the Department of Militia 
and Defence is the incomplete list of Divisional/District18 Intelligence Officers 
appendixed to Elliot’s official history.19    The names and dates of service for Intelligence 
Officers serving in Military Districts 1, (London) 2, (Toronto) as well as 5, (Quebec City) 
during the war years are missing.  An examination of the files inherited from the 
Department of Militia and Defence and those of the RCMP fills in some of those gaps:  
Military District No. 1, London Ont. 
Capt. G.N. Weekes, C of G.                   1 Apr 1912-14 Sep 1914. 
Capt. W.G. Kerr, 30th Fd. Bty. C.F.A     10 Jul 1917-31 Mar 1919. 
 
Military District No. 2, Toronto   
Capt. C.H. Mitchell                                1 May 1011-28 Aug 1914. 
Capt. A.F. Coventry (Acting)                16 Aug 1915-Apr 1918. 
Capt. C.W.G. Gibson (Acting)              20 Apr 1918-5 Nov 1918.20     
 
At some point before they were received by Library Archives Canada, these files were 
reassembled by subject.  Thus, files created by DIOs were broken up and recombined 
according to the people of interest, in this case, recombined into a series entitled “German 
Activities in Canada.”  What was lost in the process was the respect des fonds which 
means for historians, the chronology and process/procedures that created the documents.  
The reports of the District Intelligence officer for MD1 are missing from the 
combined files.  Perhaps the files created by the District Intelligence Office did not 
survive the initial reorganization of the files.  This documentary lapse is compounded by 
the fact that, given the sensitivity of their duties, none of the DIOs were able to write 
memoirs about their wartime experiences.   
                                                          
18 On April 1, 1916, Divisional Areas were renamed districts thus the Divisional Intelligence Officer were 
renamed District Intelligence Officer. See “Note on Military Divisional Areas and Districts” in Duguid, 10.  
19 See Elliot, 575-600. 
20 See Elliot, 578-582. 
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Colonel Shannon in command of MD1 focused his efforts on strategic defence 
and monitoring the German population in Michigan.  Those files survive under the 
heading “Defence of the Frontiers.”  As for the domestic intelligence in MD1, the most 
likely conclusion is that Colonel Shannon never appointed a DIO.   
 Fortunately, we can discern what were the duties and responsibilities of the 
intelligence officers based on other districts. These files show a pattern in how 
information about potential spies and enemy aliens, as well as censorship violations and 
other forms of suspicious publications, were processed.  In MD2, the DIO was 
responsible for a number of key tasks: investigating reports of enemy intelligence 
operations and sabotage; investigating the enlistment of enemy aliens; and serving in an 
advisory capacity to the Secretary of State’s monitoring of press publications for 
violations of the censorship laws.21    Their primary task was to search for 
German/Austrian sympathisers in the military and in the communities.  “German 
sympathiser” was all too often synonymous with “enemy alien.” 
As the intelligence branch of the Department of Militia and Defence itself was 
severely undermanned (even after a period of reform), the investigations were carried out 
by the police forces, in most cases this meant relying on the Dominion Police.  Like 
Canadian intelligence services, the Dominion Police was undermanned and under-
resourced, and so local police could also be involved.  Once an investigation was opened, 
it would appear that the services of the DIO were no longer required.  The power to 
investigate and, if necessary, make arrests was in the hands of the police.  Similarly, 
                                                          
21 This indicates a domestic intelligence and press censorship relationship that was entirely different than 
the British system, Elliott, 48. In Britain, press censorship had been handled by the intelligence office since 
the Boer War. Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community 
(Kent: Sceptre, 1987), 61. 
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when investigating enemy aliens in the CEF, only the battalion or district commander had 
the power to investigate and, if necessary, discharge an enlisted man. 
 The following discussion illustrates this pattern in MD2. Similar cases from MD1 
are then examined with the intent of demonstrating that the tasks of the intelligence 
officer in MD2 were taken up by other authorities in MD1.  These procedural differences 
within the Department of Militia and Defence in differing parts of Canada are important.  
They point to where the insecurity state had taken hold and to those areas, such as MD1, 
where the decline of the liberal order, with its associated security concerns, had yet to 
materialize.  
Military District 2: Central Ontario/Toronto 
Military District 2 was large in geographic area, but for the most part sparsely 
populated.  Given the population and the ethnic distribution of Ontario, the vast majority 
of cases are confined to the south.  Furthermore, the south also included the industrial 
areas, factories, and infrastructure, deemed too valuable to leave unguarded.  The cases 
can be divided into four categories; concerns over the printing of sensitive information; 
enlistment of suspected enemies; border and guard duty; and general suspicious activities 
and complaints brought to the attention of authorities by community members.  These 
ranged from suspicious activity such as drilling, to accusations of disloyalty, such as 
praising the Kaiser. Sometimes, these complaints never made it to the intelligence office 
and instead became public knowledge through acts by residents or local authorities.  
Complaints included the suspicions of employers, particularly those working in 
munitions, of foreign-born workers with Central Power sympathies, or socialist leanings.  
In general, the guidelines for suspicion and observation were taken from The Laws of 
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Land Warfare that were sent to the officers of the Corps of Guides immediately following 
the outbreak of war: 
(a) Movements of foreigners 
(b) Rumours of their actions 
(c) Points where damage could be inflicted upon canals, waterways, and 
railways 
(d) General feeling towards ourselves 
(e) Any suspicious moves, meetings or assemblies held 
(f) Local affairs (German)22   
    
The majority of extant records for MD2 passed through the office of R.W. Leonard and 
William Ford Howland.  These men served successively as DIO for Toronto during the 
war and both had been recruited from the former Corps of Guides.  Neither of these men 
appear in Elliot’s appendix.  Where Leonard and Howland are missing, two acting senior 
officers appear, (and by contrast, no names appear at all under Military District 1). 
Leonard was appointed to the post on August 15, 1914 and, was highly suspicious 
of foreign workers, especially in cases involving contraband.  His replacement was 
Howland, a partner in the Toronto architectural firm of Langley & Howland, known for 
their revivalist style churches.23  He had designed a neo-Georgian home for his mother on 
Crescent Road.24  In the early years of the war, Howland wrote his intelligence on 
Langley & Howland letterhead.  Evidently, the war awoke his inner patriot and he 
became a stand out officer reaching the rank of Captain in June 1915, before taking over 
the duties of Divisional/District Intelligence Officer (2nd Division) in Toronto.  His tone 
is similar to Leonard’s and he would spend much of the war raising alarm bells.  In 1918, 
                                                          
22 LAC RG24 4281 34-1-8 MD2 vol. 1. “Excerpts from The Laws of Land Warfare, 15-16 in ADMI Capt 
L.H. Stidwell to The OC detachment Corps of Guides” August 7, 1914. 
23 A prominent example is the Byzantium style St. Anne’s Anglican Church (1907) on Gladstone Avenue 
in Toronto. 
24 Patricia McHugh Toronto Architecture: A City Guide (Toronto: McClellan & Stewart Inc., 1985), 258. 
The Architectural drawings of Langley & Howland are now available at Archives of Ontario, F4359. 
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with the rank of Major, he volunteered for overseas service with the 16th Infantry Brigade 
for service in Siberia against the Bolsheviks.25   
 
Censorship in MD2 
Because Canadian censorship differed from Britain, being under the direction of 
the Secretary of State and not military intelligence, censorship was a collaborative effort 
involving multiple agencies, publishers’ self-regulation, and the public.  After the 
potentially disastrous and embarrassing leaks to the Canadian Press about the movement 
of the first Canadian Contingent from Valcartier, the Borden government decided that the 
provisions outlined in the War Measures Act were insufficient. As a result, the office of 
Chief Press Censor was created.26  Ernest J. Chambers, a former military man with close 
ties to Percy Sherwood of the Dominion Police as well as to high-ranking officers in 
Canada’s military districts, was appointed.27   
That is not to say that the intelligence branch of the Department of Militia and 
Defence had no role in censorship.  Lieut-Col. C.F. Hamilton, the man in charge of 
monitoring cable and wireless transmissions, was a former officer of the Corps of Guides.  
Links were also maintained between the Militia department and the office of Postmaster 
General.28  District Intelligence Officers, at least in the opening months of the war, were 
to play an important role in the process of preventing leaks to the press regarding troop 
movements.  This was, however, before the office of the Chief Press Censor was created.   
                                                          
25 He is on the list of officers in the Siberian Expeditionary Force in RG24-C-6-e vol 1840 GAQ WWI file 
10-26-10 (10-29) and his attestation papers were signed in Victoria BC on September 9, 1918. RG150 
Accession 1992-93/166, Box 4591-19. 
26 Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship, 66.  The Montreal Gazette even printed the number of horses and 
the weight of ammunition loaded on the last ship, Keshen “All the News that was fit to Print”, 321. 
27 Whitaker, Kealey, and Parnaby, 63-64. 
28 Elliott, 48. 
241 
 
Military District 2, intelligence officer Major Leonard, enforced censorship rules 
based on his own judgement.  As early as August 1914, he ordered a story be pulled from 
the St. Catharine’s Standard outlining the reduction of the size of the force protecting the 
Canal, as so many men had volunteered for overseas service.29  It was believed that any 
leak of this nature to the press would entice an attack while the defenders were most 
vulnerable.  The massive leaks, involving the men departing from Valcartier, soon 
followed, diminishing the role of district COs in the process.  Chambers would on 
occasion contact DIOs for further information about subjects under investigation by his 
department,30 however, these communications were too scarce to be considered routine.  
His main contacts were the Chief of the Dominion Police and the publishers themselves.  
The other concern in MD2 was the distribution of enemy propaganda.  Leonard’s 
successor to the post of DIO, Howland, reported little to no propaganda activity in 
Toronto.  The third DIO in Toronto, A.F. Coventry, who took over for Howland when he 
volunteered for the Siberian Expeditionary Force, inherited an office riddled with reports 
of German propaganda.  These cases had been investigated, for the most part in the 
summer of 1917, one year before PC 2384 shut down foreign language newspapers, 
easing Coventry’s burden. 
In some cases, it was not even publishers who found themselves under 
investigation.  For example, reports were coming out of Toronto that the firm of Otto 
Heinemann Phonograph Supply Company, headquartered in New York was spreading 
German propaganda.  The company itself was not a printing house.  It was a supplier of 
                                                          
29 LAC RG24 4281 34-1-8 MD2 vol. 1. “Major R.W. Leonard to Major J.H. Elmsley” August 27, 1914.  
30 For example an inquiry into the identification of E.C. Perry of the Niagara Peninsula Realty Co. LAC RG 
24 4281 34-1-8 MD2 vol 3 “From The Chief Press Censor for Canada to The Divisional Intelligence 
Officer 2nd Division” February 14, 1916. 
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phonograph parts and maintenance services; however, this did not shield them from 
accusations.   The local branch was run by Cornelius Pott, a Dutch citizen who 
immigrated to Canada in 1909, but was labeled an American citizen of German origin.31 
 Coventry was ordered to investigate the matter and after receiving reports from Toronto 
and from other branches in New York and Chicago concluded that there was little 
evidence to support the accusations.32 In this case, simply sounding like a German 
company and being operated by a “foreigner” was enough to justify suspicions. 
Furthermore, the manufacture of phonograph parts, as it turned out, did not include the 
manufacture and distribution of recordings on wax cylinders, a method though which 
propaganda could have been distributed.33      
The censorship of books was another concern of the Chief Press Censor.  Much as 
with the press, Chambers was on the lookout for anti-imperial sentiment, criticisms of 
Canada’s war effort, information that would compromise the war effort and eventually, 
radical views on Canadian capitalism and labour, in Canadian as well as American 
publications.  The censorship of books required approval from Chamber’s superiors in the 
State department.  Here again, Chambers needed watchdogs outside the Militia 
Department.34  The biggest problem was the publishing giants in the United States with 
their massive distribution networks.  Circulars were sent to Canadian publishing houses, 
                                                          
31 LAC RG 24 vol 2021 HQC 965 V 22 “Memorandum for the Assistant director of Military Intelligence 
from the Chief Commissioner of Police” August 17, 1917.   
32 LAC RG 24 vol 2021 HQC 965 V 22 “A.F. Coventry to the Assistant Director of Military Intelligence” 
August 17, 1917. 
33 LAC RG 24 vol 2021 HQC 965 V 22 “W.L. Fubersher Chicago Illinois” July 6, 1917. 
34 These would come to include “unofficial censors”; newspaper editors, cable and telegraph owners, as 
well as film and gramophone distributors, see Keshen “All the News that was fit to Print”, 322. 
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book sellers, and distributors (including libraries) requesting assistance in identifying 
subversive materials.35   
In response to the circular, the Memoirs of Horst von Der Goltz, in which he 
described his attempts to destroy the Welland Canal came to the attention of Chambers.  
In May 1918, a librarian, F. M. Dela Fosse at the Peterborough Public Library noticed a 
number of provocative passages in von Der Goltz’s book and sent a letter to Chambers.  
The problem was not with his account of his operations or the way in which he was 
captured and delivered to the Americans, or even his opinions on the capabilities of the 
German Secret Service in Canada and the United States, the complaint focused on four 
pages of the first chapter describing the relationship between the Kaiser, his mother 
Victoria (Empress Frederick), and his grandmother Queen Victoria.36  In his description 
of the Dreikaiserjahr, (Year of Three Emperors, 1888) the woman known as “Victoria’s 
favourite daughter” is accused of having attempted to interfere with the succession of a 
monarch, specifically Wilhelm II.  According to Goltz, she knew that her husband 
Frederick, next in line for the throne of Germany was ill with cancer while Kaiser 
Wilhelm I was dying.  There was a law in place to prevent a sick and dying man from 
taking the throne, thus Frederick was ineligible and their son Wilhelm was next in line.  
However, the Empress thought Wilhelm unsuitable, given his attitude towards her mother 
(his grandmother), Victoria.  To keep Wilhelm off the throne, she had her husband 
declared mis-diagnosed and thus he was crowned Emperor Frederick III.  Ninety-eight 
                                                          
35 Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship, 98. 
36 LAC RG 6-E vol 599 file 269-92 microfilm reel T-84 “F.M. Dela Fosse to Ernest J. Chambers” May 14, 
1918. 
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days into his reign he died and Wilhelm became Wilhelm II against the wishes of his 
mother.37 
Dela Fosse sent Chambers the library’s copy of the book and he in turn passed it 
on to journalist Ernest Boag for examination.  A week later Boag reported to Chambers 
that the statements about the Empress, while unpleasant, were not strong enough in an 
anti-British stance to present a case for censorship to the Secretary of State and the 
Postmaster General.38  Chambers was forced to accept this verdict, however, he did 
consider it provocative enough to suggest to the Peterborough Public Library that its 
circulation be limited to discriminating readers.39  The book’s value as a revelation into 
the operations of the German Secret Service at the beginning of the war, far outweighed 
four pages of slander against the Royal Family.  In spite of the fact that von der Goltz’s 
memoir could not be censored, it was clear that for some, Chambers among them, that 
slander of this kind was akin to treason in Canada and worthy of note.  In this particular 
case, the feelings were mutual between the Chief Press Censor and a librarian in 
Peterborough.           
 The operations of the Chief Press Censor are noteworthy in that they could 
overlap with the operations of the DIOs.  Unlike Britain, in Canada these operations were 
outside the Militia and Defence because of their failure to maintain the secrecy on the 
movement of Canadian troops from Valcartier.  It is also a curiosity that the very book 
that exposed the weakness of Canada’s defences around the Welland Canal in 1914 
                                                          
37 He rotates usage of her title Empress Frederick and Victoria, Von der Goltz, 11-14.   
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should have escaped the boot heel of the censorship office.  Since Chambers had been 
alerted to a matter of imperial image in the book rather than national defense, this 
potential threat was missed as he was not under the command of the military authorities. 
In Military District 1, in the area dominated by descendants of German settlers, Chambers 
would have a more reliable ally in searching out undesirable printed material.    
 
Spies, Sympathisers, and Suspicions in MD2  
Military District 2, DIO Howland would keep his superiors and Chief Inspector 
Kennedy of the Dominion Police busy during the war by bombarding them with requests 
for investigations based on suspicions handed to him from oftentimes anonymous 
sources.  Howland’s first case in the Militia and Defence fonds is a concern about 
airplanes flying over the Welland Canal dated September 26, 1914.  Howland was 
concerned that this was somehow connected to the dynamite plot described by von der 
Goltz and investigated by the 44th Lincoln and Welland Regiment reconnaissance. 
However, Leonard reassured him that it was an amateur pilot from Buffalo who regularly 
made this trip using the Canal as a navigational reference.40  Alerts like these would 
warrant continuous investigation even with limited information and sources.   His first 
few months of duty as the DIO would include other such reports including one before the 
war even started:  
July 12 – Austrians in Cobalt purchased large number of  
weapons and began drilling (report proved false) 
 
August 11 – A “foreigner” reported making sketches of  
the Toronto shore line 
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August 16 – Radio station in Sault Ste. Marie attacked  
at 3:15 am; assailants chased into the woods and vanished 
 
September 26 – Aeroplanes sighted flying over the  
Welland Canal 
 
September 30 – Dynamite cache discovered in Port  
Robinson 100 yards from the Welland Canal 
 
On occasion, Howland would also be included in decisions for awarding War Office 
contracts.  In January 1915, for example, the War Office placed an order for fuses from 
the Canadian Carbon Company.  After a preliminary investigation into the background of 
the owners, Howland was alarmed.  The proprietor was a forty-year-old man by the name 
of Alfred Landau who, as it turned out, was born in Germany, emigrated to Canada and 
had become a naturalized citizen only weeks earlier on December 31, 1914.41 Here class 
could not save the endeavors of business men.  Men like Landau were betrayed by their 
ethnicity, because even after having received favorable reports on the background of 
Alfred Landau, Howland felt the deal with the war office was too risky and they should 
deal exclusively with firms under British born executives.  This is in line with what 
Elliott referred to as “preventative industrial espionage” in which DIOs on occasion 
participated.42 
 This case is important because it highlights a key moment in the decline of the 
liberal order and the rise of the insecurity state.  Here, the free market economy has been 
disrupted by a government official warning the War Office not to award a contract.  It is 
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42 See Elliott, 50-51. The one Intelligence Officer mentioned is Lt. Col. Burns and asbestos shipments from 
his district in Montreal to Sweden and Greece see idem, 52-53.   
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also an example where othering based on ethnicity was the root cause of disruption of the 
free market.  Landau was a businessman with a liberal understanding of ownership and 
commerce and yet he would not be awarded a contract because he was of German birth.      
There were also cases that did not reach the office of the DIO because of the 
nature of the informant.  On January 4, 1915, Major General F.L. Lessard of the 
Canadian Militia in Toronto received a letter from a concerned citizen, Annie Williams of 
Maple Ontario (north of Toronto) whose friends had noticed activities they deemed 
suspicious;  
Dear Sir,- 
Last Thursday a friend from Maple called to see me, and told me of six 
Germans out there who are acting very suspiciously.  They have been seen going 
into the woods with loads and returning without them. And frequently go there 
with an auto. A few days ago my friend’s son-in-law went into the woods and 
came across the Germans. When they saw him they put up a target and began 
shooting at it, at least three of them did, while the other three remained with the 
auto. They do not know just what they are doing but suspect they are building a 
wireless station.  If they do that what would it mean? What would the German do 
if the case was reversed? 
 
It is well known in that vicinity that the Germans are very antagonistic. 
 
I am only a lame little woman, but every woman as well as every man, 
should be alert in these dreadful times. 
                        Yours truly, 
                            Annie Williams43 
 
While this matter was never investigated because of the unreliability of the source, it does 
illustrate the widespread fears that fueled the rise of the insecurity state. During the 
winter of 1916, as part of the proverbial witch-hunt against foreign born teachers in 
Toronto that had previously targeted Freda Held, Gertrude Arner (a school teacher) and 
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her widowed mother came under suspicion from Howland.  The AAG of the Stationary 
Hospital in February 1916, reported to Howland that they were of German birth and their 
loyalties were therefore in question. When an intelligence officer called on the Arner 
residence at 2 Bain Ave in Toronto, he discovered them knitting socks for the Canadian 
army.44  The case was immediately dismissed as this was considered a most loyal act if he 
ever saw one. 
Clearly the process of identifying potential threats in Toronto was a shared 
responsibility of a number of departments, all of which remained in contact with the DIO. 
Public worries about German neighbors and their disloyalty often drew the attention of 
the authorities, more often than not on false leads.     
 
Enemy Aliens in the Battalions of MD2 
The discussion of enemy aliens by historians has exclusively focused on 
registration and internment, and it has been established hat Canada’s military had specific 
guidelines for dealing with them.  The story of “enemy aliens” enlisting in the CEF, on 
the other hand, has been relatively limited.   Acting on orders issued from Britain issued 
in September 1914, Canadian Divisional Commanders were ordered to arrest all German 
army and navy reservists residing in Canada and to keep a close watch on Austrians, not 
allowing them to leave the country.45  Furthermore, enemy aliens that had not filed for 
naturalization were barred from enlisting in the CEF.  Should this detail be overlooked by 
the recruiting officer, the matter would be investigated later, and discharges would be 
handed down.   
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Attestation papers for men joining the CEF (depending on the year), included 
allusions to ethnicity of a recruit to keep out undesirables.  The precise definition of an 
undesirable by ethnicity was, however, vague and usually left to individual discretion.  
The attestation papers only asked for “place of birth” and no information about 
ethnicity/ancestry can be taken from them.46  Thus, on the surface, country of birth was 
all that mattered at the recruiting office.  If Germany, Austria, Turkey, or other allies of 
the Central Powers appeared in the column, it became standard practice to make further 
inquiries.  In MD2, that practice often included informing the DIO, starting a line of 
communication between him, the people who know the subject, and the commanding 
officer, in order to determine if he is fit to serve or a threat.  Usually these investigations 
were an internal matter carried out within the battalion.  Nevertheless, the DIO case files 
are dotted with reports of enemy aliens enlisting in the CEF.  
A key source for information about the lineage and loyalty of soldiers and citizens 
was often the public.  References were requested as part of the background check of 
questionable enlistees and in some cases, it was a member of the public who triggered the 
initial alert to an individual.  
 
I wish to call your attention to a matter which I think should be 
investigated. 
A Mr. Harris (supposedly to be an English pronunciation since the 
outbreak of the war) has volunteered for active service overseas in one of the 
recent forming battalions in Toronto as Engineer and is at present training for his 
work and if later on he passes examinations, will be accepted. 
This same man is a German born and boasts of it proudly around the 
neighbourhood.  He lives at 15 Laurier Avenue, Toronto. His mother is still living 
in Berlin, Germany. 
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This man has been heard to make remarks against the allies especially the 
English.  It is these men who get unknown into our army who turn out to be one 
of the worst type of spies when arriving at the front. 
Why are not these men kept under closer supervision or interned and 
prevented from gaining admission to our fighting forces!? 
        
Respectfully yours, 
A citizen of Toronto47 
 
This alert on the part of an anonymous source was taken as authoritative and it was 
passed to the DIO and then to the Chief Commissioner’s office.  In the ensuing 
investigation, it was discovered that he was not “German born”, but of German ancestry.  
It was further discovered that Harris was not the man’s real name, his real name was 
Reginald Walter Kiltenhauser.  He was born in Chicago, to German parentage, and had 
been in Canada working for the C.P.R for over twenty years.  What troubled the 
Department of Militia and Defence was that he never filed for naturalization and was 
dismissed from service on those grounds.  This dismissal stood despite the fact that the 
investigation revealed no pro-German sentiment on his part.48 
 The case of Herbert Henry Seidler is an interesting one as it demonstrates the 
power of rumor-mongering that could, and in this case did, undermine the official 
position of the Canadian Army when dealing with the enlistment of naturalized Germans.  
Seidler was born in Berlin, Germany, and immigrated to Canada becoming a naturalized 
citizen in 1910 and had even converted to Anglicanism.49  At the time of his enlistment in 
the 81st Battalion in Toronto, he was employed as a librarian at the Bureau of Municipal 
Research.  He also had two brothers, both of whom were serving in the French Army.  
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Regardless of all these facts, Seidler was discharged as an “undesirable” in December 
1915.50  The official position of the General Officer in command of the district, was that 
Seidler was Austrian born and had spent several years in Berlin, Germany; 
“Notwithstanding that he is a naturalized Canadian, it was not considered desirable that 
he should be a member of the Canadian Overseas Forces.”51    
The story that he was Austrian was also included in the letter written to Seidler 
informing him that he had been discharged.  More importantly, his particular case was 
not in the hands of the Commanding Officer of the 81st Battalion.  Instead, he was 
following orders from Howland on the recommendation of the Adjutant General.52 
Seidler was discharged without explanation but later demanded one.  The letter informing 
him of the reason he had been discharged, dated Christmas Eve 1915, came not from his 
CO but from William Howland the intelligence officer.53  Clearly, Howland and district 
intelligence had taken over the process of vetting enemy aliens’ enlistment in the CEF.   
Howland’s investigations, and those delegated to the Dominion Police often 
reveal a glimpse into the lives of the men in Toronto, and the opinions of close friends 
and associates of suspected enemy aliens, and this case was no exception.  It was this part 
of the investigation that showed the power of slanderous rumors.  In the case of Seidler, a 
piece of hearsay information was fed through the grapevine to the Dominion Police 
during the search for character references.  His former landlady in Toronto informed the 
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letter carrier that she did not trust Seidler because he was German.54  This information 
was then passed to the Postmaster General and then to the Dominion Police.  While his 
former landlady had trust issues, Seidler’s employers did not.  His superior in the 
paymaster’s office of the 81st considered him trustworthy and submitted to investigators a 
copy of the reference letter he had received from Seidler’s supervisor at the Bureau of 
Municipal Research.55  In spite of the fact that Seidler was a naturalized subject, and had 
many men vouch for his character, the decision was made to discharge him from the 
CEF.  Here was a case where established regulations about the acceptance of naturalized 
Germans were outright ignored and where the fears harbored by a few members of the 
public, and the Divisional Intelligence Officer translated into immediate reaction.  
 
Military District 1: Gap or Substitution?  
Can it be assumed that in Southwestern Ontario including Berlin and Waterloo, 
the same process was implemented by the DIO for MD1?   Were the identical cases to the 
librarian in Peterborough, letters identical to the anonymous citizen of Toronto, or cases 
like Seidler trying to enlist?  If so, were they handled in the same manner?  There is a 
problem with such assumptions stemming from these leading questions.  Files exist 
showing the investigative process and the duties previously described were indeed carried 
out during the war in MD1, however, none of them lead back to a DIO confirming that 
Colonel Shannon had not appointed one.  Furthermore, in a memo dated December 31, 
1916 it was stated that small groups from the Corps of Guides were on duty in major 
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urban centres hosting large populations of foreigners; Berlin Ontario did not make the list 
indicating it had a lower priority.56  It can only be concluded from Col. Shannon’s papers 
that a DIO was never appointed to the London MD1 during the war and thus the DIO’s 
duties and responsibilities were allocated elsewhere; predominantly voluntary 
organizations, civic and military authorities.  In Berlin, monitoring press publications was 
handled on a volunteer basis by the editors of local papers, while investigations of alleged 
spies were conducted by the local Chief of Police who did not answer to a DIO, and 
investigations of the enlistment of enemy aliens was conducted by the Commanding 
Officer and the Assistant Adjutant General for the district also without a DIO.  This 
means a fundamentally different process of counter-intelligence existed in MD1 and 
therefore in Berlin Ontario.  It was not, however, unheard of in MD2.  As established 
previously, Howland would rely on the local police to investigate cases for which he did 
not have the manpower or resources and often assigned such cases to Inspector Kennedy 
of the Dominion Police.     
 
Censorship in MD1 
The records of the DIO in Toronto and MD2 indicate that the intelligence branch 
of the Department of Militia worked with the office of the Chief Press Censor on a 
limited scale.  The DIO in Toronto had become a source, though not the primary source, 
for reports on violations of the censorship laws regarding the movement of men and 
materials as well as reports on subversive, specifically socialist or central power 
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sympathising publications.57  In the case of MD1 the office of the Secretary of State and 
the Chief Press Censor were faced with a dilemma as evidently there was no appointed 
DIO to rely on for such information.  Fortunately, Chamber’s office operated outside the 
parameters of the Military District system and was able to utilize similar contacts as he 
would in MD2 and the rest of the country.  As the publishing industry was self-
regulating, this informal alliance with the Chief Press Censor created an atmosphere of 
fear and suspicion in the offices of the foreign language presses. 
In Jeffrey A. Keshen’s examination of censorship in Canada, he stated that 
Chambers’ main criteria for Canadian newspapers was “Anglo-conformity and 
imperialist-connected philosophy” and credits him with monitoring American German 
language newspapers since the German government ran an information office in New 
York to distribute German perspectives on the war.58  According to Chad Fulwider, these 
American newspapers, like their counterparts in Canada, were also in decline due to 
limited readership and had slowly abandoned their pro-German leanings.59  Until the 
American declaration of war, the German Information Service supplied war news from a 
pro-German perspective regardless of readership.  Monitoring this source was an 
essential measure since the British, having cut the trans-Atlantic cable, effectively 
eliminating direct communication between Canada and Germany, left information filtered 
through German operatives un the United States as the primary propaganda source. 60 
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How did these pro-German newspapers published in the United States and flowing over 
the border, come to the attention of the Chief Press Censor?  Chambers needed a 
watchdog ally in this operation especially since a DIO was not appointed to the district 
with direct access to German publications in Buffalo.  On the matter of suppressing 
enemy language publications, for Keshen, the main ally was the Great War Veterans 
Association with their rampaging through Toronto ransacking German businesses and 
beating foreigners, which put a great deal of pressure on Chamber’s superiors.61 Such an 
ally was only useful against domestic publications.  
As we have seen, newspapers in MD1 bombarded each other with accusations of 
violations of the censorship laws and/or disloyalty to the imperial cause.  The Berliner 
Journal, being an enemy language newspaper, became the target of the London 
Advertiser as well as the Galt Daily Reporter and the Toronto Sun.  When Chambers 
became involved in the dispute between the Advertiser and the Journal, he not only found 
that the unregulated system resulted in false accusations against the Journal but 
surprisingly found an ally in the editor William Motz in his search for German language 
propaganda flowing into Ontario from the United States.  This runs contrary to the 
conclusions established in Keshen’s classic account of the affair between the London 
Advertiser and the Berliner Journal.  Missing from Keshen’s research was the fact that 
Motz, in addition to successfully discrediting the Advertiser, went on the offensive and 
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sent Chambers a list of German language publications he considered to be the real 
offenders.62   
The first report, to Chambers from Motz, translated passages from the Deutsches 
Journal based in New York. The paper announced that a secret society existed in London 
England, called the “Agitation Bureau for the Realization of Political Aims,” and it was 
connected to political crimes in Europe including the murder of political leaders.  It was 
not lost on the editors that just such an assassination had triggered the war in 1914.  
Additionally, the Deutches Journal was reported to have criticized British imperialism in 
India on August 20th 1915; 
 
England’s War loan in India is announced as an enormous success.  One can 
imagine the enthusiasm with which the stripped (literally undressed) Indian 
people are giving their money.  British mismanagement has brought things so far 
that 6 cents constitutes a day’s wages, and that hundreds of thousands die 
annually of hunger.63     
 
Although it is doubtful that Chambers and Motz were aware of it, this article was part of 
a larger German propaganda campaign.  It was Germany’s intention to exploit the 
weaknesses of its opponents and if possible fuel the disintegration of the British Empire, 
knowing that the growth of its own overseas empire depended on it.  This required 
measures that would ensure the loss of India, and drive the British controlled parts of the 
                                                          
62 That these American newspapers were in decline due to limited readership and had slowly begun to 
abandon their pro-German leanings would explain their search for new markets in Canada considering they 
operated within a limited niche.  See Chad R. Fulwider, 58-61. 
63 LAC RG6E vol 525 File 158 Microfilm Reel T-36 “enclosed Motz to Ernest J. Chambers” August 27, 
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Islamic world to revolution.64  This involved the use of propaganda campaigns, including 
those conducted by the Deutsches Journal, to generate sympathy for those oppressed 
under British imperialism.  The Department of Militia and Defence was made aware of 
German activities in the United States through “watchers” sent to Buffalo, for example, 
who sent regular reports to Davies.  Assessing the flow of information over the Canadian 
border by German propagandists was outside of their jurisdiction leaving the Department 
of Militia and Defence and Ernst Chambers to seek other avenues of information.65  
As if the attacks against British imperialism were not enough, the next set of 
articles dated August 23, 1916, translated for Chambers by Motz, included accusations 
that the Canadian camp in Amherst Nova Scotia was mistreating German POWs.  One 
rather bold headline read “England Fights to the Last Man and Dollar of Other Nations”66   
This was precisely the information Chambers needed.  He had already, 
unsuccessfully, attempted to persuade the Postmaster General to ban the Deutsches 
Journal from Canada.  With Motz’s translations in hand, he was then able to exert greater 
pressure.  He replied to Motz:  
I hope by continual hammering away, that we shall be able to produce some 
action in this matter.  In the meantime I hope you will continue to take an interest 
in this work, and to keep me provided with translations of any objectionable and 
dangerous paragraphs that your editors may notice.67    
 
                                                          
64 See for example Fisher, 120-121.  At the very least, Chancellor Hollweg had hoped that with German 
support, Indian nationalists (Ghandarites) would discourage India’s participation in the war and force 
Britain to deploy a larger expeditionary force to India relieving pressure on the Western Front.  The 
American State Department did investigate this “Hindu-German Conspiracy” and indicted those involved 
after the arrest and confession of Chandra Kanta Chakravarty.  See Karl Hoover, “The Hindu Conspiracy in 
California, 1913-1918” German Studies Review 8 no. 2 (1985): 251 and 257. 
65 Michael Butt did not believe that Canada had any capacity for foreign intelligence operations, Butt, 7.   
66 LAC RG6E vol 525 File 158 Microfilm Reel T-36 “enclosed Motz to Ernest J. Chambers” August 27, 
1915. 
67 LAC RG6E vol 525 File 158 Microfilm Reel T-36 “Ernest J Chambers to Rittinger & Motz” August 30, 
1915 Chamber’s message to the Postmaster General read “don’t you think this is pretty violent stuff to have 
circulating through the Canadian mail? Believe me.” Idem.  
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This note cemented the mutually beneficial relationship between the Berliner Journal and 
the Chief Press Censor.  As long as the editor was required to find and translate 
subversive German news materials, he enjoyed protection from the slandering of his own 
work by rival English-language newspapers.  What brought an end to the relationship, 
was a shift of focus from German propaganda to socialist propaganda at the end of 1918.  
For the moment, Chambers had a reliable source. 
 German language newspapers in the United States would continue to cover stories 
about the treatment of POWs and Motz would again take action in the capacity as 
Chamber’s watchdog.  The Taeglicher Buffalo Volksfreund published an account of a 
German-Bohemian stoker on an American steamship who was arrested by the British and 
imprisoned in Halifax.  While in the camp, he witnessed soldiers provoking POWs, 
inciting them to violence and thereby provided an excuse for the soldiers to murder them 
with shot and bayonet.68  This was a serious charge and Chambers took the matter up 
with Sir William Otter, the officer in charge of internment operations in Canada, to 
determine if a retraction of the story should be published in the United States.  Otter 
opted against such measures but did confirm that the story was plagued with falsehoods.69       
Thus, Motz conducted the duties, on a volunteer basis, of a district intelligence 
officer.  His mission, to use the resources available to him as a German-language 
newspaper man to uncover German propaganda efforts in Ontario.  The editor of the 
Berliner Journal assumed a position of relative power over the flow of public information 
in the German language.  In so doing, he provided reassurance that the German-Canadian 
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69 LAC RG6E vol 525-B-2 File 158 Microfilm Reel T-36 “Sir William Otter to Ernest J. Chambers” 
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press was nothing like its American counterpart.  It did not participate in the Kaiser’s 
global propaganda campaign.  
 
Spies, Sympathisers, and Suspicions in MD1 
The matter of intelligence gathering in Berlin Ontario poses a significant problem.  
Lacking a DIO, and therefore a significant presence of the Department of Militia and 
Defence, could have been a serious oversight if Berlin had indeed served as a host 
community for German sympathizers.  William Motz could only monitor German 
publications so who would have conducted investigations of suspicious activities? Was 
this to be left to the vigilantes of the 118th Battalion?  
The actions chronicled in Chapter 3 certainly suggests this, but officially the task 
was left to the local police forces.  Cases coming out of Berlin, however, were rare 
occurrences.  The atmosphere of fear in Ontario was such that stories of spying and 
sabotage found their way into the local newspapers with or without official confirmation.  
The German ethnic elite’s desire to maintain the image of the Berlin German as a loyal 
subject, might explain the absence of such stories in newspapers printed by the firm of 
Rittinger & Motz.  They would however, appear in the English Berlin Daily Telegraph.  
The local police forces conducted the investigations into suspected spies and enemy 
sympathisers and that the number of reported incidents in Berlin was surprisingly low, 
especially considering the repeated outbreaks of vigilante violence in the area.  Reports of 
sabotage in Berlin but published in newspapers outside of Berlin, such as in London or 
Toronto, were almost invariably unreliable fabrications designed to slander the German 
community.  A plot mentioned earlier, of an attempt to blow up the barracks of the 118th 
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OS Battalion was never verified by local sources and historian Brock Millman even 
commented that the man was never apprehended “if he even existed.”70  
There were a few stories of suspected spies that appeared in local English 
newspapers.  In May 1915, as the people of Canada mourned the loss of friends and 
family on board the Lusitania, fears of German spies playing a critical role in the disaster 
would reach Berlin as quickly as it had the rest of the continent.  On Saturday May 15, 
1915 a mysterious letter was recovered on King Street, by the Berlin police, saying that 
Cunard’s brand-new Transylvania, a liner turned troopship, was the new target and the 
ship itself and all onboard were doomed.71  Here at last was “confirmation” that the 
German spy networks operating in secret had earmarked the Lusitania for destruction. 
The letter itself was not a letter of communication between spies, it was an insider 
warning to the authorities. Judging by the letter it was written by a German man with a 
very basic understanding of the English language. He reported that an English man was 
working with a German spy ring, for money, and his job was to monitor the movements 
of the troopships and report times of departure and destination; 
The S.S.T. is doomed. Still getting alle changes from W.T. Some Eng. Dog is 
doing it for money. If they put away it would help them: Yet hope not. I pass as 
Eng: I look the dictionary und grammar in when writing.72 
 
It is worth noting that rather than leave the investigation to the military authorities, the 
matter was investigated, according to the report, by the local police and Chief O’Neil.73  
He had been appointed to the post in 1902 and was a highly-respected citizen.  The 
                                                          
70 Millman, 79. 
71 “Mysterious Letter Found on King Street on Saturday” BDT May 17, 1915, 1. 
72 Quoted in ibid. Transylvania was sunk in 1917 in the Mediterranean en route to Egypt by U-63. 
73 LAC RG24 c-1-a 2018 pt 9 H-Q-C 965 
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people of Berlin trusted him.74  In addition to the mysterious letter, he had also 
investigated an incident mentioned in a previous chapter about a man who walked the 
streets of Berlin looking suspiciously “too Prussian.”  
Clearly, investigations into suspicious characters in Berlin were not handled by 
the Department of Militia and Defence and remained within the jurisdiction of the local 
police authorities.  A search of the county records office yielded no results.  The papers 
of Chief O’Neil and the local police force for this time period, did not survive the century 
leaving only public sources for the historian.75         
In the files of the Assistant Director of Military Intelligence, the name Carl Pohl 
appears as a subject of interest in Kitchener.  According to Percy Sherwood, this man 
became a naturalized citizen of Berlin in September 1914, one month after the declaration 
of war, and this was suspicious.76 American intelligence confirmed that he was a pro-
German sympathizer, but had also informed Canadian authorities that, although he had 
become a naturalized citizen, he had been residing in Montana since May 1915, when 
anti-German sentiment in Canada increased after the gassing at Ypres and the sinking of 
the Lusitania.77  Pohl’s activities in Berlin warranted no concern in local sources 
indicating that he had been less publicly vocal than the Reverend Tappert, and yet he, like 
Tappert eventually left the country.  
Neither the story of the letter warning of a threat against the liner Transylvania, 
nor the mysterious case of Pohl (nor the outlandish reports coming from newspapers 
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outside Berlin) were followed up on by the Dominion Police or the Department of Militia 
and Defence.  The dominant worry in Berlin apparently lay not in espionage but in the 
infiltration of the local battalion by enemy aliens.  
Enemy Aliens in the 118th OS Battalion of MD1 
As the local police chief took charge of investigating spies and disloyalty in 
Berlin Ontario, there remained the matter of keeping undesirables and potential spies out 
of the local battalion.  Canadian military records and intelligence files that survived, 
indicate that the process of determining the loyalty of foreign-born enlistments in the 
CEF varied by district.  The determining factor was whether or not the district had an 
intelligence officer appointed to the region.  MD1 is an example where there was no DIO 
and thus it was the duty of the unit COs, under direct orders from the Adjutant-General of 
the Department of the Militia and Defence, and the CO of the District, to investigate 
claims of disloyalty, and the enlistment of enemy aliens who, in the worst cases, had 
enlisted with the intent of spying or defecting.  Thus, in Berlin and for the 118th Battalion 
the task fell on Lieut. Col. Lochead.  Reports of the investigations, however, were still a 
matter for the Department of Militia and Defence, which would indicate that there was an 
established procedure to pass information through the same channels as though there was 
a DIO.  This meant that the reports would be filed directly to the Commander of the 
district and the Adjutant-General of the Canadian Militia. 
In April 1917, the Department of Militia and Defence received word that six 
members of the 118th OS battalion were classified as “enemy aliens.”78  In MD2, this 
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notice would have then been sent to the battalion commander through the office of the 
DIO, however, here the line of communication was direct from Lochead to the AAG of 
the district.79  Lochead reported that of the six men, John Baker, Anthony Sykora and 
John Zackoruk should be discharged.  He deemed them loyal subjects, however, legally 
they had yet to file for naturalization which was grounds for discharge.80  Of the 
remaining men, George Zow was deemed not of enemy nationality as he was Greek, 
Walter Simon was a Pole with no loyalty to Austria and was in the process of filing for 
naturalization, and Anthony Hopf was Austrian by birth but had come to Canada at the 
age of 11 and his father was naturalized.81   
It is a curiosity that the Department of Militia and Defence reported no German 
born men in the 118th and instead focused on the issue of naturalization.  Lochead, 
understood this focus but, in order to clear up any foreseeable charges against the 118th, 
took the initiative and compiled his own list of foreign born men in the battalion and 
included his thoughts on them in his reply about the aforementioned six.  His own list 
included four Germans, three Greeks, two Poles, one Bohemian and one Brazilian.  He 
reported them all as naturalized, did not consider any of them disloyal, and did not 
recommend any of them for discharge.82  Since they were all naturalized, this is the 
reason they were not included in the initial investigation indicating Lochead wished to 
clear them in advance of any rumor that they had not been naturalized.  Lochead’s 
apprehensions seem founded as the Officer Commanding MD1 was unconvinced of 
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Lochead’s assessment of the men.  By May, five of the original six were discharged and 
the case of Anthony Hopf was still open, with possibilities of further investigations into 
the other men mentioned in Lochead’s report.83  The final word was passed from the 
Adjutant General of the Canadian Militia, there would only be five discharges; Hopf and 
the others investigated by Lochead were cleared. 84 
As a matter of procedure, a failure to have attained naturalization papers, 
regardless of character, always meant discharge or refusal.  A good example is the case of 
German born Paul Timm of King Street in Berlin as it predated the investigation 
conducted by the Department of Militia and Defence.  In March 1916, Timm enlisted in 
the 118th Battalion and stated that he had undergone naturalization.  In order to assess his 
credibility and loyalty, Lochead sent a series of identical letters to Timm’s former 
employers asking for character references.85  The responses were entirely positive as he 
was described as a good and honest man.86  Naturalization however, was the deciding 
issue and Timm was refused enlistment on those grounds.87   
Despite the frequent accusations that Berlin was harbouring enemy German 
aliens, being German born did not automatically warrant investigation of the 118th.  
Instead the matter was resolved by the simple question of whether he had become a 
naturalized citizen and, unlike MD2, it was accomplished without the watchful eye of a 
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District Intelligence Officer.  In the case of the 118th Battalion, it was the task of the CO 
under the orders of his direct superiors.  This was a completely different process from 
that which was in place in Toronto where, even though a CO was only responsible to his 
superiors, a DIO would intervene in the process on behalf of the Ministry of Militia and 
Defence to ensure national security, and that of the CEF.  
As a final measure to ensure the security of the CEF and the loyalty of its foreign-
born soldiers, and given the makeshift means determined by military district resources 
under which enemy aliens and undesirables were investigated and discharged, the 
screening process was continued even after a unit was shipped to England.  This time, 
however, it was conducted by British intelligence officers.  Orders were issued to 
informally interrogate suspect aliens in the CEF and, to avoid arousing suspicion, to leave 
the subject with the idea that it was standard procedure that every man in the outfit be 
interviewed.88 It was also outlined in the orders what type of person, in their minds, was 
most likely to be a danger; 
1. The present active spy who is all the time gathering information and giving it 
to the enemy.  This requires a clever, artful man. 
2. The man who has no present communication with the enemy, but who will 
watch his chances, on the field of battle, to communicate with the enemy, with 
or without desertion. 
3. The man who has no present, formed evil intentions, but whose heart is not in 
our work, and who, if things went ill with us, would desert to the enemy, 
buying a welcome with such valuable information as he might have. 
It is this third class I would place almost every alien who can speak 
German, even a little. 
4. The alien born man of the adventurous type, even of original British stock, 
willing to sell to the highest bidder, and who would make any little tiff with 
his N.C.O or a comrade a sufficient reason to his own heart to go and seek out 
a buyer 
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5. The man who enlisted thinking the war would end before he would be sent to 
the front.89 
 
In this final stage of vetting potential foreign-born enemy aliens in the CEF, Wark’s 
insecurity state at work are clear.   
Conclusion 
The legitimate threat to Canada from German saboteurs during the war originated 
entirely outside the country and especially in the United States.  Canadians of German 
ancestry had embraced their new homeland and many would go on to serve, if eligible, in 
the CEF.  The Department of Militia and Defence, established itself out of the Corps of 
Guides with the assumption that the greatest threat came from within.  This left Canada 
vulnerable to external attack from the United States and disaster was averted only by the 
ineptitude of the German operatives.  The attempt to destroy the Welland Canal was a 
debacle, the attempt to destroy the Vanceboro Bridge was ill conceived and other plans 
were never realized.  The spy networks in the United States would be dealt with by 
British intelligence officers and later American law enforcement for violating neutrality 
laws.  Upon America’s entry into the war, they would come to dominate continental 
security bringing an end to the ability of German spies to use the United States as a base 
of operations.  One of the final triggers for America’s entry was, as it turns out, the 
German intelligence officers’ attempts to draw Mexico into the war in order to keep the 
American Army out of Europe.90  Historian Desmond Morton once commented that the 
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267 
 
essence of Canadian defence policy was to do nothing and get away with it.  Canada’s 
approach to domestic intelligence suggest a different dynamic was at work. 
 MD2 was a cradle of Canada’s insecurity state with its overemphasis on internal 
security based on threats perceived by its allies.  Britain had a greater reason to fear the 
German element in British society than Canada did.  Intelligence and German espionage 
meant that Britain could lose the war in an afternoon.  Whereas Canada, at the very worst, 
would be forced to maintain a larger force on the home front to reassure its citizens of 
their safety.  But as the experience of MD1 so clearly indicates, where the informal local 
structures of the liberal order and municipal regime still held sway, the need for measures 
characteristic of the insecurity state was much less evident.  
Another major difference between Britain and Canada, central to understanding 
Canada’s wartime intelligence program, was unlike Britain, Canada was a nation of 
immigrants.  The intelligence officers were recruited from a class and ethnic specific 
background, to ensure their loyalty and compassion for patriotic citizens of his Majesty, 
and it was this set of ideals that would most influence policy within the Department of 
Militia and Defence.  Gregory S. Kealey has consistently argued that Canada’s 
intelligence was designed primarily as a mechanism for defending Canada’s exploitive 
capitalist program.  In this struggle, Canada’s enemies were identified in 1919 and 
remained unchanged for seventy years.  What is clear from my study is that the struggle 
for hegemony emerged from a prior order based on ethnicity.  The exact definition of 
what made a nation pure was a matter of debate. The German was seen by men like 
Woodsworth as part of a good stock, followers and beneficiaries of nineteenth century 
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liberal values, however, the events of the first two decades of the twentieth century 
reshaped how the Canadian state classified “the other” and so came the image of the 
German as a militaristic animal.  One result of this image was a war of words in which 
the hyper patriotic London Advertiser slandered the surviving German language 
newspaper in Berlin.  Soon the Chief Press Censor was forced to intervene and, in the 
process, found that the German newspaper editor, William Motz, made an ideal ally in 
seeking out pro-German propaganda flowing into Canada from the United States.  
Alongside the debate over the value of the German was the value of the Eastern European 
in general; the Galicians, Ukrainians, Austrians, Hungarians, Slavs, Poles, and Jews, each 
of which was said to carry their own social disease be it: barbarism, alcoholism, disease 
or worse socialism.   
What has been uncovered here is that the insecurity state thesis is most applicable 
in those areas where industrialization and the growth of Canada’s working-class identity 
had reached its most advance state by 1914, in the largest urban centres like Toronto and 
Montreal.  Working in concert with this uneven adoption of the insecurity state was the 
uneven decline of the liberal order.  In MD1, on the other hand, where industrialization 
and class segregation were not as advanced the need for an insecurity state was not in 
evidence.  Instead enforcement of wartime ideals was taken up by members of the ethnic 
elite, social programs, newspapermen and local law enforcement.  This importance of 
respecting local structures of power was apparently understood by Colonel Shannon who 
saw no need to deploy a DIO, and Lieut-Col Lochead in his screening of men 
volunteering for overseas service.  All this suggests that Berlin remained a bastion of 
loyalty to the liberal order.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Canada-as-project can be analyzed through the 
study of the implantation and expansion over a 
heterogeneous terrain of a certain politico-economic 
logic – to wit, liberalism.  A strategy of 
‘reconnaissance’ will study those at the core of this 
project who articulated its values, and those 
‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ who resisted and, to some 
extent at least, reshaped it. 
                       -Ian McKay1 
 
 
This thesis has been predominantly a story involving leaders, law enforcers, and 
middle-class men.  It is also a study of the other and the effects of the relationships 
between class and ethnic values in a changing Canadian society and the decline of 
Canada’s predominant liberal order.   
When Ian McKay reimagined the course of Canadian history as the realization of 
a dream of creating a nation based on English/Scottish liberal values which emphasized 
the respect of private property as its cornerstone expression of individualism, he also tried 
to understand its decline.  In Reasoning Otherwise, we see the rise of the socialist 
movement as a backlash against not only the liberal experiment of Confederation that 
continued to gentrify Canadian social relations but also against the efforts to undermine 
the liberal order from the other direction.  Wartime press censorship, targeting the foreign 
presses and/or socialist presses and the centralizing of Canada’s manpower management 
and economy were all fundamentally illiberal and a threat to the socialist movement.  
While studies of this alternate attack on Canada’s liberal order are few, this thesis is a 
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glimpse in that direction: a rejection of liberal values by those determined to use an 
interventionist state to advance their own interests against those of the ordinary citizen 
and in contrast to the long-held beliefs in the appropriate, limited role, for state action.  
The rise and fall of the liberal order was dependent on the growth of capitalism, 
urbanization, and by extension class and ethnic based segregation of the urban 
population.  Thus, the liberal order and its replacement by reasoning otherwise on the left 
and the insecurity state on the right occurred unevenly.  In Military District 1, despite 
being a centre of German immigration, the liberal order lasted much longer than more 
urbanized, and more segregated areas like Toronto Vancouver, Montreal and Winnipeg.   
 
The Liberal Order and the Ethnic Elite 
The first phases of industrialization in Berlin brought with it the rise of an ethnic 
elite which shaped the image of the German-Canadian.  Among them were middle-class 
manufacturers like the Breithaupts and newspaper men like Rittinger and Motz.  When 
war came, their efforts became one of cooperation, and utilization of their standing in the 
community, to counter the threat of external propaganda, slander, and vigilantism and to 
encourage a balance between being German and being a patriotic British subject. 
The ethnic elites of Berlin had maintained favourable relationships with Canada’s 
wider middle class and, thus, were active beneficiaries of liberal hegemony.  They had 
emerged out of the nineteenth century as industrialists, businessmen, newspapermen, and 
community leaders, and took it upon themselves to promote the region’s German 
heritage.  They celebrated the end of the Franco-Prussian War and German Unification 
by adorning their city with German cultural symbols.  They also formed an integral part 
271 
 
of the municipal regime and further solidified their position through associations, groups 
like the Waterloo Historical Society to preserve their history, and the schulverein to 
combat the illiberal centralization of education with the School Act. In 1912, the ethnic 
elites appear prominently in the commemorative of the city’s charter celebrating Berlin’s 
unique heritage.   
Having spent decades promoting the German identity of their city, war became 
problematic for both their businesses and their city.  This thesis has traced the complex 
history of popular agitation in the city, from the attacks on German symbols and their 
defence, to the debate on changing the city’s name and the reassertion of a liberal identity 
through the Khaki election. Overall, despite the slander campaigns of editorialists and 
soldiers’ violence, liberalism would triumph. In Berlin, principles of Canadian liberalism 
were defended, allowing locally rooted forces of agency and constraint to serve the same 
purpose as the insecurity state in the major urban centres. As a result, Colonel Shannon, 
head of the military district that included Berlin, decided that despite the presence of a 
large ethnically German population, the deployment of an intelligence officer was not 
necessary.  The job of maintaining order and alerting authorities to any problems of 
disloyalty would be carried out within Berlin.   
For a time, this was peaceful.  No major acts of spying or sabotage were ever 
reported in the area, and Berlin managed to avoid falling into the type of hysteria after the 
sinking of the Lusitania, seen in Toronto, where othering based on ethnic constructs 
dominated public discourse.  The one incident of note for the first two years of the war 
was the vandalizing of the bust of the Kaiser in Victoria Park in the very early days of the 
war.  For soldiers of the 118th Battalion on the other hand, this peaceful self-regulation 
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was unacceptable.  Having read propaganda reports about Berlin in London Ontario, they 
saw the German population as the cause for their low recruitment rates.  This resulted in 
an explosion of vigilantism in the winter of 1916 in Berlin.  In the inquiry to follow, they 
felt that the government needed to do more to crush German dissidents in the area that 
they themselves saw firsthand.  Within a week, Reverend Tappert, the minister who had 
defended the Kaiser at the outbreak of the war, was dragged into the streets by the same 
men.  
The main front in the image war was between Berlin and London newspapers that 
had stirred the men of the 118th and the local German newspaper.  The war of words 
between the Berliner Journal and the London Advertiser became so intense that the Chief 
Press Censor needed to intervene.  In William Motz, Chambers found a much-needed ally 
and so sided with the Berliner Journal.  From that point on, Motz became a valuable 
informant for Chambers on the lookout for pro-German propaganda in the area.  
Furthermore, Chambers was convinced by the content of the Berliner Journal that Motz’ 
news organization was a patriotic and loyal source of information for its German 
speaking subscribers.  Shutting it down, which was the hope of the editor of the London 
Advertiser, would have destroyed a mechanism of the self-regulation in Berlin.  Motz 
used his prominent position in the German ethnic elite to promote loyalty and patriotism 
in his newspaper.      
It was to be a short-term victory as the schulverein voted to end German 
schooling and the city’s name was changed by a plebiscite.  Here the ethnic elite lost a 
significant battle, as the business community was divided, however it did not sacrifice its 
liberal principles.  The name would not be changed by executive order, it would be the 
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choice of Berliners.  For the ethnic elite, on the one hand the name of the city was part of 
their heritage, on the other it was becoming a liability in Canadian markets; “made in 
Berlin” was hurting the local economy.  When a prominent member of the ethnic elite, 
Breithaupt spoke in favour of keeping the name, he was attacked along racist lines and 
his citizenship questioned.  With this attack, he withdrew from public debate.  Also, 
relatively silent on the matter was Motz and his German-language newspaper.  In the end, 
the plebiscite was not decided strictly along ethnic lines.  Some German Canadian men 
voted to change the name and some English Canadian men voted to keep it.   
 
Berlin for King and Empire? 
In the winter of 1916, “Busy Berlin” struggled to raise an overseas battalion for 
King and country.  Newspapers in Toronto and London began accusing the Germans, and 
their ethnic elite, of sabotaging recruitment efforts.  Some soldiers, if their testimonies 
after the Concordia Club raid is any indication, saw merit in this narrative.  In the years 
since the war, historians have also causally linked the city’s German heritage to the high 
desertion rate.  This interpretation fails to acknowledge the two biggest obstacles to 
recruitment:  the fitness of the men and Canadian disillusionment, by 1916, as Canadians 
learned the nature of trench warfare from Ypres.  It was clear to all that the war would not 
be over by any foreseeable Christmas. The era of voluntary recruitment in Canada was 
rapidly coming to an end, filling an overseas infantry battalion was becoming impossible.  
Neither Toronto nor London, both much larger cities and whose presses accused Berlin of 
disloyalty and low recruitment, would raise a full battalion in 1916  
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Quantitative analysis and geo-mapping conducted here has also challenged the 
conventional narrative born in English language propaganda.  Utilizing the 1911 census 
records, the 1912 street directory, and soldiers’ attestation papers, reveals Berlin as an 
integrated community with few spatial divisions along class, ethnic, or religious lines.  
Recruits joined the 118th OS Battalion from all quarters of the city.  While men born in 
England were, predictably so, the largest group, men born in Berlin of German ancestry 
are well represented.  They are also well represented in the percentages of deserters 
which at first glance might confirm the narrative that German-Canadians were to blame 
for the high desertion rate.  On closer examination, however, they account for only 26.7% 
of those deserters, while the majority consisted of men born outside of Berlin. 
Furthermore, not a single first-generation German immigrant deserted.  
The arguments that Berlin’s situation was unique and the failure to raise a full 
battalion must have been related to its German heritage ignores the fundamental issue 
with recruitment and manpower management in Canada.  Voluntary recruiting in 1916 
was nothing short of a disaster across Canada and this forced the Borden government to 
propose compulsory service.  The issue would be decided in the 1917 election and once 
again represented a significant shift in the values systems, specifically the centralization 
in government of manpower management.  Berlin rejected the Conservative candidate 
and the pro-Union Government Liberal in favour of an independent liberal anti-
conscriptionist.  While the debate over conscription has been largely confined to the 
divide between Quebec and Ontario, Berlin demonstrated that in small town Ontario, 
long-held liberal values about the proper role of the state could defeat the new insecurity 
state being promoted by the both major parties.    
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Social History and Intelligence 
The study of Canadian intelligence history has evolved beyond the limits of 
military/operational histories, which are still popular in Great Britain and the United 
States.  Canadian labour historian Greg Kealey pioneered the study of Canadian 
intelligence as an integral part of a wider social history of Canada.  He has argued time 
and again, using the insecurity state premise of Wesley Wark, that Canada used its 
intelligence capabilities to target radical labour movements in Canada under the guise of 
national security.  Key to where and when this new relation developed was the speed of 
industrialization and the degree of social segregation.  In larger more diverse centres, like 
the Toronto extensively studied by Kealey and Michael Butt, the insecurity state 
developed earlier because the middle class did not have the same measures of control of 
its population as in smaller industrial city like Berlin. 
Reading the works of Ian McKay, Don Nerbas, Reg Whitaker, Gregory S. Kealey, 
and Andrew Parnaby, the radicalization of Canada’s left and right shows essentially a 
developing storm that would explode in Winnipeg in 1919.  Canadian state power had 
rapidly expanded during the war.  Not just through wartime purchases, but in buying 
controlling interests in two of the country’s three national railways. It took hardline steps 
to crush opposition coming from the newly radicalized left.  Canadian socialists were 
hardened by the censorship of “their” press, their mail, and by greater state control over 
manpower management.  Thus, the insecurity state developed  where the state abandoned 
the values of a liberal order.  The reorganization of domestic security illustrates this well.  
The RCMP was the product of the state’s need to combat what it saw as foreign 
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bolshevism.2  At the same time, Canada was sending a volunteer army to fight against the 
Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War.  Among the volunteers was non-other than William 
Howland, the DIO of MD2.  Herein lies the strength of unifying seemingly disconnected 
fields of study, social history and military intelligence.   
Ian McKay was able to pinpoint key moments in Canadian history where 
socialists abandoned the principles of liberalism in his first of a projected three studies.  
By integrating an analysis of Canadian intelligence, including Wesley K Wark’s 
insecurity state thesis, moments can be identified when the other side betrayed these 
principles.  The deployment of intelligence officers who undermine the principles of free 
market capitalism under the banner of “industrial espionage”, interfere with the free 
press, and determine fitness to serve in the military undercuts the agency of individualism 
thereby undermining with intent the foundations of Canada’s liberal order.  Thus, the rise 
of the insecurity state, alongside the censorship of foreign language newspapers, and the 
rise of Canadian socialism described in Reasoning Otherwise, serves as an additional 
yardstick in measuring the shelf life of Canada’s liberal order.  This metaphor “yardstick” 
originated during an exchange with Andrew Parnaby at the thesis defence.  Because of 
the differences between liberal values and the characteristics of Canadian liberal order, 
defining how exactly this established order is undermined in the twentieth century is 
dependent on which values are betrayed, when, and by whom and by contrast which 
values are defended where, when and by whom.         
                                                          
2 See Chapter 4 of Kealey, Whitaker, and Parnaby Secret Service and Steve Hewitt, Spying 101: The 
RCMP’s Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2002).  
277 
 
These steps were taken in the interest of national security.  Since the publication 
of bestselling novels like the Riddle of the Sands, the perceived threat facing Canadians 
was German spies and saboteurs.   In 1914, fiction became fact through the plots by the 
Military and Naval attachés, Franz von Papen and Karl Boy-Ed.  One of their operatives, 
Horst von der Goltz, was captured in Great Britain and revealed that he had been paid by 
von Papen to destroy the Welland Canal.  However questionable the details of his 
statements their basic premise and the larger threat posed by German operatives in North 
America were confirmed when von Papen was declared persona non grata. His failure to 
destroy incriminating personal documents, linking him to these activities, confirmed the 
suspicions when they were seized by the British at Falmouth.   
In Canada, the response to the German threat was diverse.  Only the ineptitude of 
von Papen and his men prevented a disaster.  When examining the activities of Canadian 
intelligence in the Department of Militia and Defence, the majority of operations were 
more sublime than conspiracy narratives allow for.  The military had in place measures to 
prevent the enlistment of unnaturalised citizens of the Central Powers in order to, in their 
minds, prevent a saboteur or spy from entering the military.  Admittedly, the Corps of 
Guides was in decline prior to the outbreak of the Great War and its ranks were seriously 
depleted by voluntary enlistment in the first Canadian contingent.  As a result, the 
Department of Militia and Defence prioritized its operations based on the perceived 
threats and where the agencies of social control were at their weakest.       
Military District 2 included both major industrial centres, such as Toronto and 
Hamilton, but also new extractive industries of Northern Ontario.  In both areas the 
spatial disconnect and barriers between workers and employers was a concern, thus, it 
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was deemed essential to develop during the war new structures within the Department of 
Militia and Defence.  In short, Military District 2 was too big, and class conscience too 
well entrenched to rely on self-regulation by citizens for the security of the state.  By 
contrast, southwestern Ontario, Military District 1, despite the fact that it was a centre of 
German settlement, had a quite different profile.  It was not prioritized by the Department 
of Militia and Defence during the war.  Colonel Shannon, did not appoint a district 
intelligence officer and instead prioritized preparations for invasion from the United 
States.  His officers and watchers deployed in Michigan considered all possibilities and 
had battle plans prepared, but in general considered an attack highly unlikely.  Their 
assessment of the situation proved correct, as invasion plans had been called off by the 
German High Command and most reservists preferred to fight in Europe. As a result, 
there was no state sanctioned Department of Militia and Defence network in the centre of 
German Ontario.  There was no spy planted in the schulverein, the Waterloo Historical 
Society, or the Citizen’s League, and there is no evidence that the Department attempted 
to prop-up the British League to influence the results of the name change vote, municipal 
elections, or even the khaki election.  There is also no evidence to suggest that the 
Department attempted to influence recruiting in Berlin/Kitchener in spite of the 
propaganda that suggested that low recruiting levels were caused by the city’s German 
element.   
      
Where do we go from here? 
It would be fascinating to explore under similar parameters German-Canadian 
social relationships in the Second World War.  In McKay’s original text, he estimated the 
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end of Canada’s liberal order as 1940 stating outright that the fundamentals would not 
survive the Great Depression and another world war.  This was his original yardstick. 
Much has been written about the policy and effects on the Japanese population in Canada 
and the United States.  Here is one example where a group who did not enjoy the perks of 
inclusion in Canada’s hegemonic order, or a prominent social/economic position in BC 
society comparable to the German ethnic elite pf Berlin, would suffer the worst illiberal 
forms of racism and exclusion.  After Pearl Harbor, Japanese-Canadians were interned in 
massive detainment centres, away from the Pacific coast, while their assets were sold off.  
This was all done in the interest of national security and rooted in traditional racist 
attitudes towards Asians.  Canadians of German ancestry were spared this treatment in 
the Second World War.   
 There would be no repeat of the recruiting and desertion problems because the 
Canadian government would learn valuable lessons about raising an army.  The men of 
Kitchener joined with enthusiasm with their fellow countrymen.  There was also one 
more crucial ingredient and that was the extreme disconnect felt by the Germans of 
Kitchener towards Nazism.  In the words of John English and Kenneth McLauglin 
“Kitchener was a different city, Canada another country, and the Second World War a 
different war.”3  One result was further name changes.  In Waterloo Country, New 
Germany, in response to Hitler’s declaration of a “New Germany” in the European order, 
was renamed Maryhill in 1941.4  German Mills was renamed Parkway ten days earlier.  
Outside Galt, Swastika Beach was renamed Berber’s Beach.  In Swastika Ontario (near 
                                                          
3 John English and Kenneth McLaughlin, Kitchener: An Illustrated History (Kitchener: Wilfred Laurier 
University Press, 1983). 
4 Dianne Stricker “How Did New Germany Become Maryhill? WHS 103 (2015): 204. 
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Kirkland Lake) on the other hand, residents fought to keep the name as it brought good 
luck in the gold mine.5   
Names were not all that had changed.  In the interim, Canadian intelligence had 
also evolved.  Intelligence gathering and policing had been unified under the RCMP and, 
having gained experience in day to day operations during the labour revolt in Winnipeg 
in 1919, and the depression.  Canadian intelligence was practically the only state 
organization prepared for another war. 
For surviving members of the ethnic elite, however, the experience of the last war 
had not left them.  In the Great War, Motz had managed to work out a deal with the Chief 
Press Censor to protect Berlin from propaganda emanating from the London Advertiser.  
In the Second World War, L.O. Breithaupt in his capacity as President of the Kitchener 
Board of Trade would remember the war of words and asked the new Chief Press Censor 
to protect Kitchener from slanderous rumors. 
The maintenance of the traditions of liberalism in Berlin may not be the exception 
to the rule, and likewise the undermining of the liberal order by “rebels reds and radicals” 
as well as the Canadian state itself through the mechanisms of the insecurity state may 
very well be more complex than can be determined by spatial relations, geography and 
urbanization.  It has been argued here that it was based on the development of Canadian 
capitalism.  A logical next step is to expand.  At the end of the war there were thirteen 
districts some of which, like Toronto, (as well as those not discussed here 4 Montreal, 10 
Winnipeg, and 11 Victoria) incubated the new insecurity state.  A national comparison is 
now needed examining the ethnic and gender-based histories, propaganda and censorship, 
                                                          
5 Rych Mills, “More Ontario Name Changes” WHS 103 (2015): 207-208. 
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of all thirteen though the lens of the Department of Militia and Defence in order to fully 
examine the extent of the destruction of liberal hegemony in Canada, during the war, by 
the state that for McKay forced “rebels, reds, and radicals” to “reason otherwise.”    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
282 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Archives of Ontario 
 
RG 23 Criminal Justice Records (Ontario Provincial Police) 
 
Brock University 
 
Brock University, Digital Repository  
Historical Maps of Niagara Collection 
Welland Canal Virtual Project 
 
The Directorate of History and  
Heritage (C.P. Stacey Building) 
 
112, 3M1013 (D1) CDN Int. Service up to 1918, Org & Work of Cdn. Int. Service in the  
Great War 1914-18 & Earlier Background 
 
157, 046 (D1) Orders, Memos, Notes etc. re. org. & History of Corps of Guides as  
Prepared for DMI – Jul 55 
 
Department of National Defence Treatment of Enemy Aliens During the Great War 
 
 
The Doris Lewis Rare Book Room 
University of Waterloo Library 
 
Acadian Club Documents 
 Copies of insurance claim LAC RG 24 1158 
 
Concordia Club Fonds 
 
Breithaupt, Hewetson, Clark Collection 
Catherine Olive Breithaupt Diaries 
L.J. Breithaupt Diaries 
 William Walter Breithaupt Letters 
 
Motz Family Fonds 
Rittinger & Motz 
283 
 
Geospatial Centre 
University of Waterloo 
 
ArcGIS Kitchener-Waterloo (1955-Present) 
 
Kitchener Public Library 
Central Grace Schmidt Room 
 
Breithaupt, T.H. Chronicle of the Breithaupt Family vol I-II, Hanover, 1903. 
 
English, John K. Berlin, Ontario-1916. 
 
Robert Douglas et al. “Oral History of Waterloo County”,  
Wilfred Laurier University, 1975. 
 
Waterloo Historical Society photograph collection 
 
World War I Soldier Information Card series 
 
 
Laurier Center for Military  
Strategic and Disarmament Studies  
 
Lieut-Col. Lochead Fonds 
 
 
Library Archives Canada  
 
RG 6E     Department of the Secretary of State Fonds 
RG 9 III  Ministry of the Overseas Military Fonds 
RG 13     Department of Justice Fonds 
RG 18     Royal Canadian Mounted Police Fonds 
RG 24     Department of National Defence Fonds 
RG 25     Department of External Affairs Fonds      
RG 150    Soldiers, First World War Attestation Papers 
 
Rose, Kathryn (transcribed) The Diaries of Sir Robert Borden, 1912-1918. 
 
 
 
 
284 
 
The National Archives (Kew) 
 
HO 144/21710 Home Office: Registered Papers Aliens: Horst von der Goltz: Wartime  
Activities 
 
KV2/519-520 Security Service Personal Files, Captain von Papen Case 
 
Newspapers 
 
Berliner Journal/Ontario Journal 
Berlin Daily Telegraph 
Berlin News-Record 
The Canada Gazette 
The Globe and Mail 
The London Advertiser 
The Ottawa Citizen 
Ottawa Free Press 
The Record 
The Toronto Star 
The Toronto Sun 
 
 
Published Sources and Compilations 
 
Baylor, Michael G. The German Reformation and the Peasants War: A Brief History with  
Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2012. 
 
Bourassa, Henri. Conscription. Montreal: Le Devoir, 1917. 
 
Cmd. 8022 Shipping Casualties (Loss of the Steamship Lusitania) “Report of a formal  
investigation into the circumstances attending to the foundering on 7th May 1915 
of the British Steamship ‘Lusitania’ of Liverpool after being torpedoed off the 
Old Head of Kinsale, Ireland” London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1915. 
 
Cmd. 8174 Miscellaneous No. 6 (1916) “Selection from Papers found in the Possession  
of Captain von Papen, Late German Military Attaché at Washington, Falmouth,  
January 2 & 3, 1916” London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1916.  
 
Cmd. 8232 Miscellaneous No. 13 (1916) “Sworn Statement by Horst von der Goltz alias  
Bridgeman Taylor” London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1916. 
 
 
285 
 
Duguid, Colonel A Fortescue. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War,  
1914-1919: Chronology Appendices and Maps. Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1938. 
 
Capt. Frederick D. Ellis The Tragedy of the Lusitania: Authentic Stories by the Survivors  
and Eye-Witnesses of the Disaster. Philadelphia: National Publishing Co, 1915. 
 
Jones, John Price. America Entangled: The Secret Plotting of German Spies in the United  
States and the Inside Story of the Sinking of the Lusitania. New York: A.C. Laut, 
1917. 
 
“Fifth Census of Canada, 1911: Instructions to Officers, Commissioners and  
Enumerators” The Canada Gazette, April 22, 1911.  
 
Leact, F.H. ed. Historical Statistics of Canada 2nd ed. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1983.  
 
Official Report of the Debates: HOC of the Dominion of Canada, Fifth Session-Twelfth  
Parliament. Vol. 119 Ottawa: 1915. 
 
Peace Souvenir: Activities of Waterloo County in the Great War, 1914-1918. Kitchener:  
Kitchener Daily Telegraph, 1919. 
 
Pearce, Thomas. “Inspector’s Reports: Public School Board” Archive of the Waterloo  
District Schoolboard. 
 
“Recall of Captain von Papen, Military Attaché and Captain Boy-Ed, Naval Attaché, of  
the German Embassy at Washington” The American Journal of International 
Law, 10 No. 4 Supplement: Diplomatic Correspondence and Commerce (October, 
1916): 363-366. 
 
Sessional Paper No. 72a 1916 (Ottawa) Royal Commission RE: Parliament Buildings  
Fire at Ottawa, February 3, 1916 Report of the Commission and Evidence  
 
The Popular Works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, vol 1-2. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999. 
 
Tiessen, Paul ed. Berlin, Canada: A Self Portrait of Kitchener, Ontario Before World  
War One. St. Jacobs: Sand Hills Books, Inc., 1979. 
 
“Transcript of German Company Tract Deed, Waterloo” Waterloo Historical Society 7  
(1919): 87-90. 
 
Wilson, Barbara M. (ed.) Ontario and the First World War: 1914- 1918: A Collection of  
Documents. Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1977. 
 
286 
 
Printed and Published Memoirs 
 
Borden, Robert Laird. Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs, Vol I-II. Henry Borden (ed.)  
Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1969.   
 
Brust, Harold. I Guarded Kings: The Memoirs of a Political Police Officer. New York:  
Hillman-Curl, Inc., 1936. 
 
Goltz, Capt. Horst Von der. My Adventures as a German Secret Agent. New York:  
Robert M. McBride & Company, 1917. 
 
Kleist, Franz Rintelen von. The Dark Invader: Wartime Reminiscences of a German  
Naval Intelligence Officer. London: Frank Class, 1998. 
 
Nikolai, Col. W. The German Secret Service. George Renwick tans. London: Stanley  
Paul & Co. Ltd, 1924. 
 
Papen, Franz von. Memoirs. Brian Connel trans. London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1952. 
 
Tappert, Carl Reinhold. Memoirs of an Octogenarian. Philadelphia, 1946. 
 
 
Masters and Doctoral Dissertations 
 
Bird, John Clement. “Control of Enemy Alien Civilians in Great Britain, 1914-1918”  
PhD Thesis: University of London, 1981. 
 
Butt, Michael. “Surveillance of Canadian Communists: A Case Study of Toronto RCMP  
Intelligence Networks, 1920-1939” PhD Thesis: Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, 2003. 
 
Ford, Trevor R.O. “Dreaded Tempest: How the Military Intelligence Branch of the  
Department of Militia and Defence Conducted Intelligence Operations against 
One Big Union and Sinn Fein in Montreal, 1920-21” Masters Thesis: Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, 2013. 
 
Fulwider, Chad R. “The Kaiser’s Most Loyal Subjects?: The German View of America  
and German–Americans During World War I” PhD Thesis: Emory University, 
2008. 
 
Gerritsen, Maarten. “Corps Identity: The Letters, Diaries and Memoirs of Canada’s Great  
War Soldiers” PhD Thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2008.  
287 
 
 
Maroney, Paul J. “Recruiting the Canadian Expeditionary Force in Ontario, 1914-1917”  
Master’s Thesis Queen’s University, 1991. 
 
Pyée, Audrey. “L’identité des Élites Canadiennes-Allemandes de Berlin (Kitchener) et  
Waterloo Ontario, 1880-1914” Master’s Thesis, York University, 1997. 
 
Richards, Tylor. “(Re-)Imagining Germaness: Victoria’s Germans and the 1915 Lusitania  
Riot” Master’s Thesis: University of Victoria, 2012. 
 
Richardson, Lynn Elizabeth “A Facile Pen: John Motz and the Berliner Journal, 1859- 
1911” Master’s Thesis: University of Waterloo, 1991. 
 
Thompson, Andrew McCauley. “The Breithaupts and Breithaupt Leather: Building a  
Family Business in Berlin Ontario” PhD Thesis, University of Waterloo, 1992. 
 
Vey, Waldraut Elisabeth “The German Immigrants of Waterloo County, 1840-1900”  
Master’s Thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1977. 
 
 
Books and Articles 
 
Alder, Hans and Wulf Koepke. A Companion to The Works of Johan Gottfried Herder.  
New York: Camden House, 2009. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of  
Nationalism. Revised ed. London: Verso, 2006. 
 
Andrew, Christopher. Her Majesty’s Secret Service: The Making of the British  
Intelligence Community, New York: Viking, 1986. 
 
---. Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community. Kent: Sceptre,  
1987.  
 
---. The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 Toronto: Penguin Canada,  
2010. 
 
Angell, Norman. The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to  
National Advantage. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1913. 
 
 
288 
 
Ashworth, Lucian M. A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the  
Modern State to Academic International Relations. New York: Routledge, 2014. 
 
Avery, Donald. ‘Dangerous Foreigners’ European Immigrant Workers and Labour  
Radicalism, 1896-1932. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1979. 
 
---. Reluctant Host. Canada’s Response to Immigrant Workers, 1896-1994. Toronto:  
McClelland and Stewart, 1995. 
 
Backhouse, Constance. Colour Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900-1950.  
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. 
 
Barnard, F.M. Herder on Nationality, Humanity and History. Montreal & Kingston:  
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003. 
 
Baskerville, Peter and Eric W. Sager.  Unwilling Idlers: The Urban Unemployed and  
their Families in Late Victorian Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1998. 
 
Bassler, Gerhard P. “The German Canadian Identity: Artificial Construct or Historical  
Reality?” Revisited Paper presented to the 18th German-Canadian Studies 
Symposium, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1997. 
 
---. The German Canadian Mosaic Today and Yesterday: Identities, Roots and Heritage.  
Ottawa: German-Canadian Congress, 1991.  
 
---. Vikings to U-Boats: The German Experience in Newfoundland and Labrador.  
Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006. 
 
Bausenhart, Werner A. “The Ontario German Language Press and its Suppression by  
Order-in-Council in 1918” Canadian Ethnic Studies (January 1972): 35-48. 
 
Becker, Howard S. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. London: The Free  
Press of Glencoe, 1963. 
 
Berger, Carl. Ed. Conscription 1917: Essays by A.M. Wilms, Ramsay Cook, J.M. Bliss,  
Martin Robin. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969. 
 
Berger, Carl. The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867- 
1914. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970. 
 
 
289 
 
Bernhardi, General Friedrich von. Germany and the Next War. Toronto: McLelland,  
Goodchild & Stewart Ltd., 1914. 
 
Bjorklund, Beth and Mark E. Cory (eds.) Politics in German Literature. Columbia:  
Camden House, 1998. 
 
Blackbourn, David, and Richard J. Evans (eds) The German Bourgeoisie: Essays on the  
Social History of the German Middle Class from the Eighteenth to the Early 
Twentieth Century. London: Routledge, 1991. 
 
Bloch, Marc. The Historian’s Craft, Peter Putnam trans. New York: Vintage Books,  
1953. 
 
Bloomfield, Elizabeth. “Economy, Necessity, Political Reality: Two Planning Efforts in  
Kitchener-Waterloo, 1912-1925” Urban History Review 9 (1980): 3-48. 
 
Blum, Howard. Dark Invasion 1915: Germany’s Secret War and the Hunt for the First  
Terrorist Cell in America. New York: HarperCollins, 2014. 
 
Breithaupt, W.H. “President’s Address” Waterloo Historical Society 6 (1918): 11-13. 
 
Bricker, I.C. “The History of Waterloo Township up to 1825” Waterloo Historical  
Society 21 & 22 (1934): 81-122. 
 
---. “Trek of the Pennsylvanians to Canada, 1805” Waterloo Historical Society 21 & 22  
(1934): 123-131. 
 
Brown, Lorne and Caroline Brown, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP Toronto:  
James Lorimer & Company, Publishers, 1978. 
 
Brown, Robert Craig. Robert Laird Borden: A Biography, vol 1: 1854-1914. Toronto:  
MacMillan of Canada, 1975. 
 
Brown, Robert Craig and Ramsay Cook. Canada, 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed.  
Toronto: McLeland and Stewart Ltd., 1974. 
 
Brown, Robert Craig and Donald Lovebridge “Unrequited Faith: Recruiting the CEF,  
1914-1918” Canadian Military History 24, no. 1 (2015): 61-87. 
 
Bryce, Benjamin. “Linguistic Ideology and State Power: German and English Education  
in Ontario, 1880-1912” Canadian Historical Review 94. No 2 (June 2013): 207-
233.  
290 
 
Buchner, P.A. “Acadiensis II” Acadiensis I (1971): 3-9. 
 
Buitenhuis, Peter. The Great War of Words: British, American, and Canadian  
Propaganda and Fiction, 1914-1933. Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 1987. 
 
Bumstead, J.M. A History of the Canadian Peoples, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University  
Press, 2003. 
 
Burridge, Kathryn. “Pennsylvania-German Dialect: A Localized Study within a part of  
Waterloo County” Canadian-German Folklore 11 (1989) 
 
Burrows, G. Edmond. Canadian Clocks and Clockmakers. Oshawa: Kalabi Enterprises  
Ltd., 1973. 
 
Butterfield, Herbert. History and Human Relations. MacMillan, 1952. 
 
Carr, E.H. The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of  
International Relations. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1939. 
 
---. What is History? London: MacMillan & Co Ltd., 1962. 
 
Chadwick, W.R. The Battle for Berlin Ontario: An Historical Drama. Wilfred Laurier  
University Press, 1992. 
 
Campbell, William J. “‘We Germans are British Subjects’ The First World War and the  
Curious Case of Berlin Ontario” Canadian Military History 21, no. 2 (2015): 45-
57.  
 
Chávez, Alicia Fedelina and Florence Guido-DiBritto “Racial and Ethnic Identity and  
Development” New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education 84 (Winter 
1999): 39-47. 
 
Childers, Erskine. The Riddle of the Sands: A Record of Secret Service. New York: Dodd,  
Mean and Company, 1915. 
 
Clarke, Nic, John Cranfield and Kris Inwood “Fighting Fit? Diet, Disease, and Disability  
in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918” War and Society 33, (2014): 
79-96. 
 
Clarke, Nic. Unwanted Warriors: Rejected Volunteers of the Canadian Expeditionary  
Force. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015. 
291 
 
Constant, Jean-Francois and Michel Ducharme (eds.) Liberalism and Hegemony:  
Debating the Canadian Liberal Revolution. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2010. 
 
Conzen, Kathleen. “Mainstreams and Side Channels: The Localization of Immigrant  
Cultures” Journal of American History 11 (1991): 5-20. 
 
Cook, Tim. Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars.  
Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006. 
 
Cranfield, John, Kris Inwood, and J. Andrew Ross “Before the Obesity Epidemic: The  
Body Mass Index of Canadians in the First and Second World Wars” Canadian 
Bulletin of Medical History 32 no. 2 (2015): 319-335. 
 
Creighton, Donald. The Empire of the St. Lawrence. Toronto: The MacMillan Company  
of Canada Limited, 1970. 
 
Cron, Herman. Imperial German Army, 1914-1918: Organization, Structure, Order of  
Battle translated by C.F. Colton. Solihull: Helion & Company Ltd., 2001. 
 
Darton, Robert. Censors at Work: How States Shaped Literature. New York: W.W.  
Norton & Company, 2014. 
 
Dimmel, Brandon R. Engaging the Line: How the Great War Shaped the Canada-US  
Border. Vancouver, UBC Press, 2016. 
 
Dummit, Christopher and Michael Dawson (eds.) Contesting Clio’s Craft: New  
Directions and Debates in Canadian History. London: Institute for the Study of 
Americas, 2009.  
 
Dutil, Patrice and David Mackenzie, Embattled Nation: Canada’s Wartime Election of  
1917. Dundurn, 2017. 
 
Elliot, Major S.R. Scarlet to Green: A History of Intelligence in the Canadian Army,  
1903-1963. Toronto: Canadian Intelligence and Security Association, 1981. 
 
Enns, Gerhard. “Waterloo North and Conscription, 1917” Waterloo Historical Society 51  
(1963) 
 
Epp, Marlene “Pioneers, Refugees, Exiles, and Transnationals: Gendering Diaspora in an  
Ethno Religious Context” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 12 
(2001): 137-154. 
292 
 
Evans, Richard J. Death in Hamburg: Society and Politics in the Cholera Years, 1830- 
1910. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.  
 
Fair, Ross. “‘Theirs was a Deeper Purpose:’ The Pennsylvania Germans of Ontario and  
the Craft of the Homemaking Myth” Canadian Historical Review 87, no. 4 
(2006): 653-684. 
 
Fay, Sidney B. The Origins of the World War, vol 1: Before Sarajevo. New York: The  
Free Press, 1966. 
 
---. The Origins of the World War, vol 2: After Sarajevo. New York: The Free Press,  
1966. 
 
Felitzsch, Heribert von. The Secret War on the United States: A Tale of Sabotage, Labor  
Unrest, and Border Troubles. Ammissvile: Henselstone Verlag, 2015. 
 
Fichte, Johann Gotfried. Address to the German People. trans. Issac Nakimovsky et al.  
Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 2012. 
 
Fischer, David Hackett. Historians’ Fallacies: Towards a Logic of Historical Thought.  
New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970. 
 
Fischer, Gerhard. Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia,  
1914-1920. Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1989. 
 
Ford, Trevor R.O. “Desertion in the 118th Battalion” July 8, 2014  
http://lmharchive.ca/desertion-in-the-118th-battalion/  
 
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison. New York: Vintage Books,  
1995. 
 
Friesen, Gerhard. “The Presentation of German-Canadian Concerns in the Berliner  
Journal, 1914-1917” German-Canadian Studies Annals 6 (1987): 138-153. 
 
Fujiwara, Aya. Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity: Japanese, Ukrainians and Scots,  
1919-1971. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2012. 
 
Gardner, Nikolas. “The Great War and Waterloo County: The Travails of the 118th  
Overseas Battalion” Ontario History 89, no. 3 (1997): 219-236. 
 
Gimblett, Richard H. “Reassessing the Dreadnought Crisis of 1909 and the Origins of the  
Royal Canadian Navy” Northern Mariner/Le Marin du Nord 4, 1 (1994), 35-53. 
 
293 
 
Ginzburg, Carlo. The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller  
trans. John and Anne C. Tedeschi. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
2013. 
 
Goebel, Stefan. The Great War and Medieval Memory: War, Remembrance and  
Medievalism in Britain and Germany, 1914-1940. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007. 
 
Goode, Erich and Nachman Ben-Yehuda “Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social  
Construction” Annual Review of Sociology 20 (1994): 149-71. 
 
Granatstein, J.L. and J.M. Hitsman. Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in  
Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977. 
 
Granatstein, J.L. Who Killed Canadian History? Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd.,  
1998. 
 
Grenke, Art. “The German Community of Winnipeg and the English-Canadian Response  
to World War” Canadian Ethnic Studies/Etudes Ethniques au Canada 20, no. 1 
(1988): 21-44. 
 
Hamerow, Theodore S. Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in  
Germany, 1815-1871. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. 
 
Harzig, Christine and Dirk Hoerder (eds.) The Press of Labor Migrants in Europe and  
North America, 1880s-1930s. Bremen: Publications of the Labour Newspapers 
Preservation Project, 1985. 
 
Heathorn, Stephen. Haig and Kitchener in Twentieth-Century Britain: Remembrance,  
Representation and Appropriation. London: Routledge, 2013. 
 
Hessel, Peter. Destination: Ottawa Valley. Ottawa: The Runge Press Limited, 1984. 
 
Hewitt, Steve. Spying 101: The RCMP’s Secret Activities at Canadian Universities,  
1917-1997. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002. 
 
Hobsbawn, E.J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press, 1990. 
 
Hoerder, Dirk. “Towards a History of Canadians: Transcultural Human Agency as Seen  
Through Economic Behaviours, Community Formation, and Social Institutions” 
Histoire sociale/Social History 38 no. 76 (2005): 433-459. 
 
294 
 
Holt, Richard. Filling the Ranks: Manpower in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914- 
1918. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017. 
 
Hoover, Karl. “The Hindu Conspiracy in California, 1913-1918” German Studies Review  
8 no. 2 (1985): 245-261. 
 
Humphries, Mark O. “War’s Long Shadow: Masculinity, Medicine, and the Gendered  
Politics of Trauma, 1914-1939” Canadian Historical Review 91, no. 3 (2010): 
503-531. 
 
Innis, Harold A. The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic  
History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962. 
 
Johnston, Kellie “‘No one will hold it against them…’ Breithaupt Family Resistance to  
Anti-German Sentiment in WWI Berlin” Waterloo Historical Society, 102 (2014): 
52-76. 
 
Jones, David. Fichte’s Republic: Idealism, History and Nationalism. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
 
Joyce, Patrick. The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City. London: Verso,  
2003. 
 
Kalbfleisch, Herbert Karl. “Among the Editors of Ontario German Newspapers” Ontario  
German Folklore 1-4 (1961-71) Pennsylvania Folklore Society of Ontario, 78-85. 
 
---. The History of the Pioneer German Language Press of Ontario, 1835-1918. Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 1968. 
 
Kealey, Gregory S. “Introduction” The Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers  
canadiens de sociologie 13, no. 2 (1988): 1-7. 
 
---. “The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, The Canadian Security  
Intelligence Service, The Public Archives of Canada, and Access to Information: 
A Curious Tale” Labour/Le Travail 21 (1988): 199-226. 
 
---. Spying on Canadians: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service and the  
Origins of the Long Cold War. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017. 
 
---. “State Repression of Labour and the Left in Canada, 1914-1920: The Impact of the  
First World War” Canadian Historical Review 73 no. 3 (1992): 281-314. 
 
 
295 
 
Keegan, John. The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme. New  
York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978. 
 
Keene, Jennifer D. and Michael S. Neiberg (eds). Finding Common Ground: New  
Directions in First World War Studies. Boston: Brill, 2011. 
 
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military  
Conflict from 1500-2000. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. 
 
Keshen, Jeffrey A. “All the News that was fit to Print: Ernest J. Chambers and  
Information Control in Canada, 1914-1919” Canadian Historical Review 73, no. 
3 (1991): 315-343. 
 
---. Propaganda and Censorship During Canada’s Great War. Edmonton: University of  
Alberta Press, 1996. 
 
Kinsman, Gary. “Character Weaknesses” and “Fruit Machines”: Towards an Analysis of  
Anti-Homosexual Security Campaign in the Canadian Civil Service” Labour/Le 
Travail 35 (Spring, 1995): 133-161. 
 
Kinsmen, Gary et al (eds) “Whose National Security?” Canadian State Surveillance and  
the Creation of Enemies. Toronto: Behind the Lines, 2000. 
 
Kitchen, Martin. “The German Invasion of Canada in the First World War” The  
International History Review, 8 (May 1985): 246-260.   
 
Kordan, Bohdan S. No Free Man: Canada, The Great War, and the Enemy Alien  
Experience. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016. 
 
Korski, Tom. “Burning Down the House: When Canada’s Parliament was Destroyed by  
Fire, A Jittery Wartime Nation First Suspected a Hun Conspiracy, the Blamed it 
on a Smouldering Cigar, A Fresh Look at the Evidence Suggests Another Matter” 
Postmedia News, January 31, 2011. 
 
Lehmann, Heinz. The German Canadians, 1750-1937: Immigration, Settlement &  
Culture. Translated by Gerhard P. Bassler. St. John’s: Jesperson Press, 1986. 
 
Le Queux, William. The Great War in England in 1897. London: Tower Publishing  
Company Ltd., 1894. 
 
Levitt, Joseph (ed.) Henri Bourassa on Imperialism and Biculturalism, 1900-1918.  
Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970. 
296 
 
Liddell, Peter and Walter Riedel (eds.) Proceedings of Symposium VII on German- 
Canadian Studies. Victoria: University of Victoria, 1990. 
 
Liebbrandt, Gottlieb. Little Paradise: The Saga of the German Canadians of Waterloo  
County, Ontario, 1800-1975. Kitchener: Allprint Company Limited, 1980. 
 
Löchte, Von Anne. Das Berliner Journal: Eine deutschprachige Zeitung in Kanada,  
1859-1918. Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2007. 
 
Lorenzkowski, Barbara. “Languages of Ethnicity: Teaching German in Waterloo  
County’s Schools, 1850-1915” Histoire Social/Social History 41, no. 81 (May 
2008): 1-39. 
 
---. Sounds of Ethnicity: Listening to German North America, 1850-1914. Winnipeg:  
University of Manitoba Press, 2010. 
 
Lucas, Jack. “Berlin, Ontario, in the Age of ABC” Urban History Review 41, no. 2  
(2013): 19-29. 
 
---. Fields of Authority: Special Purpose of Governance in Ontario, 1815-2015. Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 2016. 
 
Mackenzie, David, ed. Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert  
Craig Brown. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005.  
 
Mackinder, Halford J. “Geographical Conditions Affecting the British Empire: I The  
British Isles” The Geographical Journal 33, 4 (1909), 462-476. 
 
MacMillan, Margaret. The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. Toronto: Penguin,  
2013. 
 
Macpherson, C.B. (ed) Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions. Toronto: University  
of Toronto Press, 2013. 
 
Macpherson, C.B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke.  
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. 
 
---. The Real World of Democracy. Concord: House of Anansi Press Ltd., 1992. 
 
Mährlein, Christoph. Volksgeist und Recht: Hegels Philosophie der Einheit und ihre  
Bedeutung in der Rechtswissenschaft. Würzburg: Konigshausen & Neumann,  
2000. 
297 
 
Marder, Arthur J. From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era,  
1904-1914 Vol 1: The Road to War. London: Oxford University Press, 1966. 
 
Maroney, Paul J. “‘The Great Adventure’: The Context and Ideology of Recruiting in  
Ontario, 1914-1917” Canadian Historical Review 77 (1996): 62-98.   
 
Massie, Robert K. Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War.  
New York: Random House, 1991. 
 
McHugh, Patricia. Toronto Architecture: A City Guide. Toronto: McClellan & Stewart  
Inc., 1985. 
 
McKay, Ian and Jamie Switt. Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety.  
Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012. 
 
McKay, Ian and Robin Bates. In the Province of History: Making of the Public Past in  
Twentieth Century Nova Scotia. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2010. 
 
McKay, Ian. Reasoning Otherwise: Leftists and the People’s Enlightenment in Canada,  
1890-1920. Toronto: Between the Lines, 2008. 
 
---. Rebels, Reds, and Radicals: Rethinking Canada’s Left History. Toronto: Between the  
Lines, 2005. 
 
---. “The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian  
History” Canadian Historical Review 81, no.4 (2000): 617-645.    
 
McKay, Ian et al. “MacDonald Prize Roundtable on Why Did We Chose to Industrialize”  
Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 28 no. 2 (2017): 90-113. 
 
McKegney, Patricia P. The Kaiser’s Bust: A Study of War-Time Propaganda in Berlin  
Ontario, 1914-1918. Wellesley: Bamberg Press, 1991. 
 
McKernan, Michael. The Australian People and the Great War. Melbourne: Nelson,  
1980. 
 
McIntire, C.T. Herbert Butterfield: Historian as Dissenter. New Haven: Yale University  
Press, 2004. 
 
 
 
298 
 
Meinecke, Friedrich. The German Catastrophe: The Social and Historical Influences  
which led to the Rise and Ruin of Hitler and Germany. Trans. Sidney B. Fay. 
Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950. 
 
Menary, David. Lusitania: The Waterloo County Connection. Blue River Press, 2015. 
 
Miller, Ian Hugh Maclean. Our Glory and our Grief: Torontonians and the Great War.  
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002. 
 
Millman, Brock. Polarity, Patriotism and Dissent in Great War Canada, 1914-1919.  
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016. 
 
Mills, Rych. Images Canada: Kitchener (Berlin) 1880-1960. Charlestown: Arcadia  
Publishing, 2002. 
 
---. “More Ontario Name Changes” Waterloo Historical Society 103 (2015): 207-208. 
 
---. “The Ontario Journal’s First English Language Issue” Waterloo Historical Society  
104 (2016): 71-74.  
 
---. Victoria Park: 100 Years of a Park & it’s People. Twin City Dwyer Printing Co. Ltd.,  
1996. 
 
Moogk, Peter. “Uncovering the Enemy Within: British Columbians and the German  
Menace” BC Studies 182 (2014): 45-72. 
 
Morris, R.J. Class, Sect and Party: The Making of the British Middle Class: Leeds, 1820- 
50. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990. 
 
Morton, Desmond. “Did the French Canadians Cause the Conscription Crisis of 1917?”  
Canadian Military History 24, no. 1 (2015): 89-99. 
 
---. Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904. Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 1970. 
 
---. “Sir William and Internment Operations in Canada During the First World War”  
Canadian Historical Review 55,1 (1974), 32-58. 
 
---. When Your Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War. Toronto:  
The Random House of Canada Ltd., 1993. 
 
 
299 
 
Morton W.L. The Kingdom of Canada: A General History from the Earliest Times.  
Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1975. 
 
Moss, Mark. Manliness and Militarism: Educating Young Boys in Ontario for War.  
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
Moyer, Bill. This Unique Heritage: The Story of Waterloo County. Kitchener: CHYM  
Radio, 1971. 
 
Naylor, R.T. The History of Canadian Business, 1867-1914. Montreal & Kingston:  
McGill Queen’s University Press, 2006. 
 
Neilson, Keith and B.J.C. McKercher (eds.) Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in  
History. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1992. 
 
Nelles, H.V. The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines & Hydro Electric Power in  
Ontario, 1849-1941. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005 
 
Nerbas, Don. Dominion of Capital: Politics of Big Business and the Crisis of the  
Canadian Bourgeoisie, 1914-1947. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013. 
 
Nixon, Don. The Other Side of the Hill: Behind the Scenes Stories of Parliament Hill.  
Carleton Place, 2012. 
 
Nossal, Kim Richard. “Defending the ‘Realm’: Canadian Strategic Culture Revisited”  
International Journal 59, 3 (2004): 503-520. 
 
O’Brien, Mike. “Manhood and the Militia Myth: Masculinity, Class and Militarism in  
Ontario, 1902-1914” Labour/Le Travail 42 (1998): 115-141.  
 
Overy, Richard. The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilization, 1919-1939. New  
York: Penguin Books, 2010. 
 
Panayi, Panikos. Prisoners of Britain: German Civilians and Combatant Internees  
During the First World War. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012. 
 
Parr, Joy. The Gender of Breadwinners: Women, Men, and Change in Two Industrial  
Towns, 1880-1950. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990. 
 
Pearce, Thomas “School History, Waterloo County and Berlin” Waterloo Historical  
Society, 2 (1914): 33-48. 
 
300 
 
Price, Thomas J. “Spy Stories, Espionage and the Public in the Twentieth Century”  
Journal of Popular Culture 30, 3 (1993), 81-89. 
 
Robinson, Curtis B. Caught Red Starred: The Woolwich Spy-Ring and Stalin’s Naval  
Rearmament on the Eve of War. Bloomington: Xlibris, 2011.  
 
---. “Conflict or Consensus? The Berliner Journal and the Chief Press Censor During the  
First World War” Waterloo Historical Society 104 (2016): 60-71. 
 
---. “Review of Reg Whitaker, Gregory S. Kealey, and Andrew Parnaby, Secret Service:  
Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress America” (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2012) Canadian Military History 24, no. 2 (2015): 
306-309. 
 
Rome, David. trans. Pierre Anctil ed. Through the Eyes of The Eagle: The Early  
Montreal Yiddish Press, 1907-1916. Vehicule Press, 2001. 
 
Roth, Ralf and Robert Beachy (eds.) Who Ran the Cities? City Elites and Urban Power  
Structures in Europe and North America, 1750-1940. Burlington: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2007.  
 
Roquette, Robert. Language and Religion: A History of English-French Conflict in  
Ontario. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1975. 
 
Russel, Harold. “Berlin/Kitchener’s Most Famous Fire-A Century Later” Waterloo  
Historical Society 104 (2016): 30-32. 
 
Rutherdale, Robert. Hometown Horizons: Local Responses to Canada’s Great War.  
Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004. 
 
Sarty, Roger. The Maritime Defence of Canada. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of  
Strategic Studies, 1996.  
 
Sellers, Leonard. Shot in the Tower: The Story of the Spies Executed in the Tower of  
London during the First World War. London: Leo Cooper, 1997. 
 
Sharp, Chris. “Enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force: A Re-evaluation”  
Canadian Military History 21 no. 1 (2015): 11-54. 
 
Schultze, Marthis et al (eds.) German Diasporic Experiences: Identity, Migration and  
Loss. Kitchener: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2008 
 
301 
 
Siegel, Linda. Caspar David Friedrich and the Age of German Romanticism. Brandon  
Books, 1978. 
 
Silver, Arthur Isaac. The French-Canadian Idea of Confederation, 1864-1900. 2nd ed.  
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982. 
 
Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of The Wealth of Nations.  
London: T Nelson and Sons, Paternoster Row, 1887. 
 
Stacey, C.P. Canada in the Age of Conflict. Toronto: Macmillan, 1977. 
 
Stetler, Gilbert A. and Alan F.J. Artibise (eds.) Shaping the Urban Landscape: Aspects of  
the Canadian City Building Process. Ottawa: Carlton University, 1982. 
 
Stricker, Diane. “How did New Germany Become Maryhill?” Waterloo Historical  
Society 103 (2015): 203-207.  
 
Sweeny, Robert C.H. Why Did We Choose to Industrialize? Montreal, 1819-1949.  
Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2015. 
 
Takai, Yukari. “Transcending the National in Migration History in North America”  
Labour/Le Travail 77 (2016): 243-256. 
 
Taylor, A.J.P. Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman. New York: Vintage Books, 1967. 
 
---. The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of German History  
since 1815. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1976. 
 
“The German Reformation” The Church of England Quarterly Review vol. 32 (1852). 
 
Theobald, Andrew. “Divided Once More: Social Memory and the Canadian Conscription  
Crisis of the First World War” Past Imperfect 12 (2006): 1-19. 
 
Thompson, E.P. Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act. New York: Penguin  
Press, 1975. 
 
Thornton, Martin. Churchill, Borden and Anglo-Canadian Naval Relations, 1911-1914.  
New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013. 
 
Toynbee, Arnold J. A Study of History, Vol 1-2. D.C. Somervell (Abridged) New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1961. 
 
302 
 
“Under Uptown Waterloo, 2016” Waterloo Historical Society Vol. 104 (2016): 194-195. 
 
Utley, W.B. “Joseph Schneider: Founder of the City” Waterloo Historical Society 17  
(1929): 111-119. 
 
Valverde, Moral. The Age of Light, Soap and Water: Reform in English Canada.  
Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1991. 
 
Wagner, Jonathan. A History of Migration from Germany to Canada, 1850-1939.  
Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006. 
 
Walker, James W. St. G. “Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible  
Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force” Canadian Historical Review 70, 
no. 1 (1989): 1-26. 
 
Walker, Mack. Germany and the Immigration, 1816-1885. Harvard: Harvard University  
Press, 1964. 
 
Wark, Wesley K. “The Evolution of Military Intelligence in Canada” Armed Forces and  
Society 16 no. 1 (Fall, 1989): 77-98. 
 
Wawro, Geoffrey. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870- 
1871. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003  
 
---. Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914. London: Routledge, 2000. 
 
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Talcott Parsons (trans.)  
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958. 
 
Welsh, Peter. “A Craft that Resisted Change: American Tanning Practices to 1850”  
Technology and Culture 4 (1963): 299-317. 
 
West, Christopher. Canada and Sea Power. London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1914. 
 
Whitaker, Reg. Gregory S. Kealey, and Andrew Parnaby, Secret Service: Political  
Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress America. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2012. 
 
Woodsworth, James S. Strangers Within Our Gates: or Coming Canadians. Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 1972. 
 
 
303 
 
Zimmerman, Jonathan. “Ethics Against Ethnicity: European Immigrants and Foreign- 
Language Instruction, 1890-1940” The Journal of American History 88, no. 4 
(2002): 1383-1404 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
304 
 
Appendix A 
Canadian Forces Stationed in MD1 in event of a Raid 
(source: LAC RG 24 vol. 4262 MD1 c-315 HQC 95-1-13) 
 
122nd Overseas Battalion, CEF: 757 men at Galt Ontario 
149th Overseas Battalion, CEF: 413 men at London Ontario 
153rd Overseas Battalion, CEF: 799 men at St. Thomas Ontario 
185th Overseas Battalion, CEF: 642 Chatham Ontario 
63rd Depot Battery, CEF: 50 men at London Ontario 
Section Divisional Ammunition Column: 56 men at London Ontario 
64th Depot Battery, CEF: 188 men at Guelph Ontario 
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Appendix B 
Orders to Appoint a Divisional/District Intelligence Officer 
(source: LAC RG 24 vol 4262 MD1 Protection of the Frontiers) 
 
Confidential        I.D. c-252 
 
         13th August   4. 
Officer Commanding, 1st Division 
   London, Ont. 
Secretary, Militia Council, 
   Ottawa, Ont. 
 
Sir, - 
 
I beg to suggest that it might be found advisable if Officers Commanding Divisions could 
have the services of a Secret Service Officer to aid him in investigating and dealing with 
reports made to him from time to time as to the movements and actions of German and 
Austrian Officers and Reservists, as well as any suspected characters or gatherings, and in 
order to enable the Officer Commanding Division to make full and complete reports of 
any such matters.  The Report Secret Service Officer, if furnished at the same time, 
should be of value to Militia Headquarters in dealing with such cases.  If the special 
services of a Secret Service Officer could not be spared then possibly the names and 
addresses of such officers, if residents of, or quartered or working within the different 
Divisional Areas, could be furnished to the Officer Commanding Division and three 
officers instructed to communicate and cooperate with him, it would, I venture to think, 
be of value, and the service might thereby be more effectively and secretly done in 
important or difficult cases, than by the employment of local police who are more or less 
known in their respective localities.  This suggestion is not intended to preclude the 
utilizing of the local police where possible. 
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Appendix C 
List of Internment Stations or Camps in Ontario 
(Source: The Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence 
Treatment of Enemy Aliens During the Great War) 
 
 
 
Name                 Dates of Operation          Description 
 
 
 
Kingston          Aug 18, 1914-May 3, 1917        Fort Henry 
 
Petawawa          Dec 10, 1914-May 8, 1916        Militia 
                                                  Camp  
 
Toronto*          Dec 14, 1914-Oct 2, 1916        Stanley  
                                                  Barracks    
 
Kapuskasing       Dec 14, 1914-Feb 24, 1920       Bunk                  
                                                  Houses 
 
Niagara Falls*    Dec 15, 1914-Aug 31, 1918       Armory 
 
Sault Ste.  
Marie*            Jan 13, 1917-June 29, 1918      Armory 
 
 
*receiving stations where detainees were only kept until they could be sent to a 
permanent station 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
307 
 
Appendix D 
 
Reported Desertions in the 118th OS Battalion 
(Source: LCMSDS Lochead Fonds, File 1-Desertion) 
 
751255 pte. Modrzynsky, John 
751174 pte. Noble, Edward 
751431 pte. Green, Frederick John 
751527 pte. Kuempel, Edward Emil 
751527 pte. Mulholland, George Washington 
751633 pte. Miller, James 
751637 pte. Kemp, Robert Meredith 
751667 pte. Webb, William John 
751288 C.S.M. Robertson, Allan 
751302 pte. Woodman, Simeon 
751318 pte. MacHenry, Stuart 
751638 pte. Shoemaker, Austin 
751599 pte. Swett, Michael 
751429 pte. Taraboa, Paul 
751274 pte. Sadjak, Joseph 
751501 pte. Modrowski, Stanley 
751733 pte. Young, Winford Willis 
751609 pte. Krauter, James William 
751495 pte. Hauser, Walter George 
751665 pte. Mihm, John Henry 
126513 pte. Burkholder, Lloyd 
751642 pte. Rahmel, Louis 
751727 pte. Boettger, Harry D. 
751179 pte. McMillan, Archie 
126321 corp. Cline, Arthur Bertram 
751512 pte. Thomas, Philip 
751575 pte. Kuempel, Oscar Stanley 
751458 pte. Lorentz, Alexander 
751425 pte. Ratz, Lincoln 
751229 pte. Krulicki, Joseph 
751162 pte. Thomas, Jim 
751150 pte. Vasiloff, Thomas 
751212 pte. Stewart, Ross McKenzie 
751096 pte. Ward, Leslie William 
751214 pte. Ball, Clarence Joseph 
751687 pte. Cook, Frank 
751615 pte. Bowen, Frank Leo Edward 
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751523 pte. Courter, Calvin Edward 
751133 Sgt. Pedlar, Charles Arthur 
751278 pte. Bivour, Stewart George 
751502 pte. Roth, Albin 
751315 pte. Runstetler, Sidney York 
751161 pte. Yanchus, Joseph Francis 
751724 pte. Lindsay, Roy Alexander 
751546 pte. Kelterbon, Alfred August 
751651 pte. Schutz, Edward Antoine 
751242 pte. Bosy, Stephen 
pte. Wanklin, Harold James 
751106 pte. Wildfang, August Gordon 
751706 pte. Bach, George Conrad 
126089 pte. Thoman, Albert Franklin (sp?) 
751539 pte. Gooding, Sim 
751304 pte. Reiber, Frederick 
751083 pte. Hoffman, Clayton Alexander 
751588 pte. Schnarr, John 
751713 pte. Lossing, Frank 
126199 pte. Daum, Joseph 
751148 pte. Brown, William Conrad 
751415 pte. Gingrich, Menno 
751247 pte. Moore, Frank Patrick 
751390 pte. Ware, Ivan Harold 
751163 pte. Kehn, John 
751284 pte. Ratz, Gordon Alexander 
751082 pte. Toni, Maik 
751594 pte. Demeulenaere, Cyrial 
751723 pte. Dauberger, Linus 
751067 pte. Streiss, Manford Emanuel 
751118 pte. Close, Charles Samuel 
751682 pte. Bushour, Joseph 
751732 pte. Deckert, John Frederick 
751717 pte. Clayton, Percy Lawrence 
751308 pte. Salm, Egidius 
751510 pte. Scharlach, Oscar 
751647 pte. Melchin, Oscar 
751718 pte. Scharlach, Henry John 
751475 pte. Scharlach, Walter Michael 
751532 pte. Kaiser, Albert William 
751623 pte. Rosekat, Frederick Adam 
751640 pte. Boll, Irvin William 
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751322 pte. Hinshaw, Douglas 
751321 L/Corp Hinshaw, Stuart 
751393 pte. Mackenzie, Robert George 
751504 pte. Albrecht, Louis John 
751730 pte. Rueffer, Walter Henry 
751297 pte. Baechler, Norman Arthur 
751192 pte. Darlow, Leonard 
751619 L/Corp. Clarke, Malcom 
751078 L/Sgt. Stauffer, Joseph Roy 
751573 pte. Rausch, William Frederick 
751073 pte. Hebebrand, Albert 
751313 pte. Wakely, Leonard 
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Appendix E 
 
Casualties from Berlin/Kitchener 
(includes men who enlisted in units other than the 118th OS Battalion and Conscripts. 
Does not include Waterloo or Waterloo County) 
(Source: Kitchener Public Library, Soldier Information Cards) 
 
 
 
Albright, Capt Solon 
Barlow, Pte. Frank. 
Beal, Pte. Alfred. 
Beaumont, Lieut. George J. 
Bissett, Pte. J. M. 
Bluhm, Pte. B. 
Bonfonte, Pte. A. 
Bowlby, Major George H. MD. 
Bradley, Pte George 
Brown, Corp. Frank R. 
Buller, Pte. G. 
Bullick, Lieut H.L. 
Capling, Pte. Milton L. 
Carthew, Pte. C. 
Carthy, Pte. Eric 
Carthy. Pte. Percy 
Clemens, Flt-Lieut. W. Ewart 
Clement, Gnr. David W. 
Clement, Lieut. F. 
Conrad, Pte. Franz 
Craig, Pte. G. 
Craig, Pte. J.H. 
Davidson, Pte. G. 
Davis, Pte. J.L. 
Davis, Col. William M. 
Deal, Pte. A.E. 
Delion, Pte. Harry C. 
Desmond, L/C. D.J. 
Diefenbacher, Pte. I. 
Dudley, Pte. Harold. 
Dudley, Pte. William 
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Dyer, Pte. H. 
Eby, Pte. Alexander R. 
Evans, Pte. William 
Ferguson, Pte. J. 
Ferguson, Pte. Leo 
Figuers, Pte. H. 
Fleming, Pte. W. 
Flynn, Capt. J. 
Francis, Pte. J.S. 
Fyle, Pte. A. 
Garden, Pte. C.S. 
Gehl, Pte. John A. 
Gerbig, Pte. John 
Gibbard, Pte. Stanley 
Gorman, Pte. J. 
Greene, Capt. Carlton C. 
Grosz, Pte. A.H. 
Hall, Pte. Arthur M. 
Harnack, Pte. W.E. 
Haskins, Corp. William H. 
Hatchman, Pte. Percy J. 
Hewitt, L/C. A.S. 
Hoyland, Pte. C. H. 
Hudson, Pte. Henry 
Hummel, Pte. Vernon 
Jansen, L/C. Peter 
Knechtel, Pte. Gordon 
Kuener, Pte. E. 
Lamke, Pte. C.E. 
Lawson, Pte. H. 
Looker, Crp. Henry J. 
Lossing, Pte. G.W. 
Marr, Spr. Lavergne O. 
MacCallum, Pte. J. P. 
Messett, Pte. Rollie 
Millard, Pte. G.W. 
Moody, Pte. William 
Oraysek, Pte. J. 
Pawson, Corp. G. 
Pawson, pte. Clifford 
Pequegnat, Pte. Emanuel 
Phillip, Pte. Walter 
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Purdon, Pte. G.R. 
Raines, Pte. G.T. 
Reid, Hon. Col. R. 
Reid, Lieut Stanley 
Robertson, L/C. Andrew B. 
Rosenberger, Pte. Norman 
Ross, Pte. Stewart 
Rudow, Pte. A. 
Schierholtz, Pte. Walter C. 
Schreiter, Gnr. Stanley W. 
Simpson, Pte. John 
Smith, Pte. William H. 
Snider, Lieut. Harry 
Soper, Pte. Oliver 
Sosnowski, Pte. Frank J. 
Stauffer, Lieut. J.E. 
Stauffer, Sgt. G.H. 
Steckenreiter, Pv. L.P. 
Stewart, Pte. R.M. 
Stokes, Lieut. Clifford 
Strub, Pte. George A. 
Stuebing, Pte. Earl 
Teroi, Pte. A. 
Thompson, Pte. Percy 
Underwood, Pte. C. 
Van Auderaude, Pte. Philip 
Voelker, Pte. H. 
Waddell, Pte. H. 
Walker, Pte. W.H. 
Washburn, Lieut. Robert G. 
Weaver, Lieut. Ralph L. 
White, Pte. J.A. 
Willis, Pte. James 
Woodward, Pte. B. 
Zapfe, Pte. A 
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Appendix F 
 
Concordia Club Raid Hearing 
[Descriptions added by the author] 
 
Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at Berlin Ontario, 16 day of February, 1916 
by order of Lieut-Col W.M. Lochead, O.C. 118th OS Batt for the purpose of inquiring 
into certain disturbances alleged to have been created by certain soldiers of the 118th 
Battalion C.E.F on 15th February 1916, and inquiring into the nature and extent of the 
damage (if any) caused by them 
 
(Source: LAC RG 24 Vol 1256 HQ 593-1-87 “Participation of Troops of the C.E.F in a 
Riot at Berlin, Ont. Feb, 1916”) 
 
 
Opening Statement 
 
The Court of Inquiry having assembled pursuant to order proceed to read the 
order convening the Court and call witnesses to give evidence relevant to the matters 
subject to investigation. 
 From the evidence heard by the Court it appears: 
1. That about eight o’clock in the evening of February 15, 1916, the men of the Machine 
Gun section of the 118th Battalion, C.E.F, marched in a peaceable manner to Concordia 
Hall, King Street West, Berlin, and removed therefrom the bust of Kaiser Wilhelm I.  
Later on in the evening (shortly after nine o’clock) a body of the soldiers, about fifty in 
number, paraded the main street of Berlin singing patriotic songs.  Learning that said 
Concordia Hall was decorated with German flags, bunting and pictures, about twenty-five 
of the soldiers entered the hall for the purpose of removing same and found a picture of 
His Majesty, King George V draped with German flags, upon which the men were 
enraged to the extent of doing certain damage to the Hall and contents hereafter appear 
2. That no damage to property was premeditated 
3. That the primary cause of the raid on the Hall are 
 (a) The spirit of pro-Germanism rampant in certain circles of this city and the 
general belief that this spirit is founded largely in the Concordia Society which occupies 
said Hall. 
 (b) The general knowledge that the bust of Kaiser Wilhelm I was contained in 
said Hall. 
 (c) The desperation of the men at the slowness of recruiting which they attributed 
to an unchecked anti-British sentiment, well knowing that the membership of said Society 
includes a great number of young men. 
314 
 
4. That the immediate cause of the damage to property was the finding in the bar-room of 
the Society of the picture of King George V surrounded with German flags; the general 
decoration of the walls with German flags and red, white and black bunting; the presence 
upon the walls of a large number of pictures of the present German Kaiser and other 
German notables; the entire absence of any British emblems except the King’s picture 
and a Union Jack which is the property of the Berlin School Board; the finding of 
evidence of habitual occupation of the rooms as a Club in the face of assurances given 
publicly by the Society officials at the time of the sinking of the Lusitania that the club 
would be closed until the expiration of the war. 
5. That this Court cannot fix individual responsibility for destruction of property. 
6. That in the second return to the Hall and in the destruction of property the soldiers 
were accompanied, aided and abetted by throngs od civilians. No civilian, police officer 
or municipal or other official interfered or attempted to interfere at any time nor was any 
notification of the disorder communicated to Battalion Headquarters until nearly the 
conclusion of the disturbance, and notice was then given only by a non-commissioned 
officer of the Battalion. Immediately the O.C. with other officers went to the scene and 
sent all soldiers on the streets back to the barracks. 
7. That the following damage appears to have been occasioned. 
(a) removal of the bust of Kaiser Wilhelm I. 
(b) breakage of a number of window panes, glass in partitions, chairs, German pictures. 
(c) removal and destruction of two kegs of beer and certain bottles of whisky. 
(d) removal and burning of German flags, bunting and books.  
(e) removal of the picture of His Majesty King George V. 
(f) destruction of a piano by civilians. 
Much of the destruction was done by civilians who were actually selling on the 
street souvenirs of the occasion, such as piano keys, etc. 
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This court has examined the following witnesses whose evidence was taken in 
shorthand and certified extended copy is attached here. 
 
1. Battalion Sgt-Major Woodrow 
2. Company Sgt-Major Blood 
3. Corp Brennan 
4. Sergt. Hayward 
5. Sergt. Deal 
6. Sergt. Bowden 
7. Sergt. Pawsen 
8. Coy Sgt.-Major Gillespie 
9. Corp. Wilkins 
10. Pte. P. Quinn 
11. Lance-Corp. Gough 
12. Pte. Williamson 
13. Pte. Morneau 
14. All the men of the Machine Gun Section 
 
Dated at Berlin this 17 February, 1916. 
 
Lieut.-Col H Martin 
Captain H.A. Fraser 
Captain W.H. Gregory 
Captain F.S. Routley 
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Witness: Battalion Sergeant-Major Woodrow 
 
Woodrow defended the actions of the men of the 118th OS Battalion stating that they had 
been treated poorly by the community and felt lied to in regards to the closing of the 
Concordia Club.  Evidence on the scene suggested to him that the club had continued to 
operate in spite of public statement otherwise.  He also testified, like others, that civilians 
who also participated destroyed the piano and sold keys as souvenirs.  
 
Col. Martin: Were you there last night when the affray took    
place? 
A: No sir, not when it first took place. 
Q: What in your opinion, or can you give us any opinion that  
might lead up to the circumstances causing this disturbance? 
A: Well sir, in regard to the treatment the boys of the  
118th have received, I think the boys are perfectly justified in what they did.  We 
were always given to understand that Concordia Hall was closed, but such could 
not have been the case because of beer and everything else that was in the place. 
Q: You were not present? 
A: No sir, not a first. 
Capt. Routley: Where is the bust now? 
A: I don’t know, sir. 
Col. Martin: Were you there say in 15, or twenty minutes or  
a half hour after? 
A: About half an hour. 
Q: What was the attitude of civilians? 
A: They were helping as well. 
Q: What proportion? How many soldiers? 
A: That I could not say, sir. 
Q: How many civilians in your opinion were taking part? 
A: I guess there must have been a couple hundred. 
Q: On the street?  
A: Yes, sir, and in the hall was the King’s picture with a  
German flag hanging over it. 
Capt. Gregory: Did they get the King’s picture? 
A: They were carrying it away. 
Capt. Fraser: Did you see them do anything in the hall? 
A: I seen quite a bit of stuff broken. Oh, no. I never saw  
anything done. 
Q: Well, if you did not see anything done, there is nothing  
from you. 
Capt. Fraser: What was the attitude of civilians on the  
street and the police? 
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A: The police kept clear. They were not there when I went  
up. They came later. 
Q: About what hour?  
A: About half past nine. 
Q: Col. Martin: You don’t know any of the names of those  
connected? What soldiers were there? 
A: There was quite a bunch there. I took no notice of any  
particular one. 
Q: How long were you in the building? 
A: Twenty minutes, and then on the street again. 
Q: During the time of the breaking of the glass, chairs,  
etc? 
A: Some was broken, and then afterwards cooled down. 
Capt. Routley: Did I understand you were there when the raid  
was on? 
A: After it started. 
Q: You may not have been there after 9:30? Col. Lochead,  
Captain Fraser and I were there about 9:30. It may have been after the show. 
A: No sir, Col. Lochead was there after I came out. 
Q: It would be between 9:30 and 10 o’clock? 
A: I spoke to you about twenty minutes to ten. 
Q: You did not see civilians breaking things? 
A: Yes, they were pulling things out. 
Q: Capt. Gregory: This was in the street? 
A: No sir, up in the hall too. When I first went up, there  
was not a key off the piano. 
Co. Martin: You may have been over in what they call their  
beer room? 
A: No, no. 
Col. Martin: I am not insinuating. I am just saying you may  
not have been there. 
A: I saw the civilians taking the keys out of the piano as  
souvenirs. 
Capt. Routley: Did you think the soldiers there had anything  
to do with the breaking? 
A: They came around to see what was done. 
Q: Did you see a German flag up there? 
A: Yes, sir, it burned in the street. There is not another  
flag, except the Belgian, with black in it. 
Q: I understand the Mayor says there was not a German flag  
there. 
A: There was one in there to the best of my knowledge. 
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Col. Martin: When you go out you might bring that flag up. 
 
Witness dismissed 
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Witness: Company Sergt. Major Blood 
 
Sgt. Major Granville Blood was part of the Machine Gun Section.  He served for a time 
in the Royal Canadian Navy and returned to Berlin to serve in the 118th in November 
1915. He would testify that the low recruitment rates were the result of pro-Germanism 
in Berlin and this caused resentment among the men in the Battalion.  He would play 
down his role in the events at the Concordia club saying he was not part of the first wave 
of men who took the bust and in the second wave “rescued” the portrait of King George 
V. He would later be the ringleader in the public beating and parading of the Prussian 
born pro-German Lutheran Reverend Tappert.  
  
Col. Martin: We would like Sergt. Major Blood, some evidence  
this morning from you as to what possibly led up to the  
disturbance of last night, and the attitude of civilians and policeman about and the 
damage done by soldiers and possibly the names of those who took part in the 
disturbances. 
A: Well I heard remarks amongst the boys that they did not  
intend to leave that bust of Kaiser Wilhelm I in town.  
They didn’t intend to leave it, as it had no place in a British city, in the British 
empire. 
Q: This was when? 
A: Oh, possibly extending over a period of three or four  
days. 
Q: What in your opinion has led up to this talk of the men? 
A: The restless feeling sir, has been intensified by the  
prolongation of the war, and due to the fact that the people of this city have 
refrained from joining. 
Q: Do you suppose that the newspaper controversy had  
anything to do with the inflaming of this situation? 
A: Newspaper controversy? 
Q: Letters in the Star, etc? 
A: That newspaper controversy tended to intensity the  
friction which already existed to a more or less degree in different parts of the 
city. 
Capt. Routley: Did our two Sunday meetings have anything to  
do with it? 
A: No sir, the feeling was just as bitter prior to the  
meetings of last Sunday as what it is today sir. In  
fact, Capt. Dancey did nothing but endorse what was already in the minds of the 
soldiers. 
Col Martin: He told pretty plainly that Tappert ought to be  
tarred and feathered. 
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A: I heard him say he ought to be sent across the line where  
he came from. 
Capt. Fraser: When did you go up town? 
A: I came up town with Quartermaster-Sergeant Cottingham. We  
both live in the same part of the city. I called for him as I came back and we 
reached the post office about 28 minutes after eight sir.  I remember looking at the 
clock as we came down here. It was exactly half past eight. When we arrived on 
the corner we met constable Blevins. He said, “you missed the fun.”  I said “what 
fun is that?” He says “the boys have been up taking the bust of Kaiser Wilhelm I 
and taken it down to the barracks.” I saw no soldiers on the street and took a walk 
down to the barracks myself and saw a bunch of men talking in groups and asked 
to see the bust and he was interned in the detention room and they unlocked the 
door and I saw it. 
Capt. Fraser: Was there a crowd there? 
A: There was a bunch of men gathered around talking while I  
was there.  They had a flag down there. 
Capt. Gregory: What flag? 
A: The flag they paraded the streets with. They had a Union  
Jack. They had just returned with it. Then the colonel came out and was giving 
some of the boys a speech, out on the parade ground where the men gathered. I 
listened to part of that speech. 
Capt. Fraser: Who else would be there then? 
A: Listening to that speech? Not more than thirty men,  
perhaps twenty-five, perhaps only twenty at times.  
Q: Did you know any of them? 
A: I saw the Colonel speaking personally to Corp. Brennan. I  
didn’t take the trouble to ascertain any one present  
there. 
Capt. Fraser: Did Brennan ever say anything to you  
about what they were going to do that night.   
A: There was nothing organized. I would say that the bunch  
that started last night was not organized. 
Q: You personally had nothing to do with it? 
A: I personally had nothing to do with it. I was not  
surprised. 
Capt. Routley: I understand they made two trips. 
A: After the Colonel spoke to them, he spoke to me. He gave  
me certain advice. I said, now we have the flag we will go and have a recruiting 
parade and as soon as the crowd gathers around, make recruiting speeches. We 
right wheeled up to the post office, and left wheeled down to the Roma. 
Capt. Gregory: How many men? 
A: not more than 35. 
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Q: How many non-commissioned officers?  
A: We started with about four and gradually more. 
Q: Did the NCOs assume control? 
A: Yes, sir, on parade. We had them all marching in sections  
of four with the standard bearer carrying the flag.  
Capt. Fraser: Who would that be? Brennan? Deal? Hayward? 
A: I couldn’t say who it was. I have a notion it was Sergt.  
Elvy. We called all the boys to join us in the parade that we saw in the streets. We 
got to the Roma Theatre and left wheeled again and came back on the other side 
of King Street. 
Capt Gregory: On the right? 
A: Yes, sir.  
Col. Martin: How far did you come? 
A: As we were coming up sir, a few from the previous raid  
came down from Concordia Hall and carried some framed pictures of the 
Emperor of Germany. 
Capt. Gregory: The present emperor? 
A: Yes, sir. As soon as the boys saw that… 
Q: What time would this be? Nearly 9 o’clock? 
A: It would be a little after nine, probably. We were not  
down there very long. 10 or 15 minutes and they joined the parade. In fact, the 
parade had already left the barracks. While Col. Lochead was speaking to me in 
the mess room giving me advice as a non-commissioned officer, the parade left 
barracks and were some way up around the AXXsen’s place and I doubled all the 
way up and fell in with them. 
Col. Martin: What happened down at Concordia Hall? 
A: When the boys came in from of the ranks with these  
pictures or stood on the edge of the parade the boys reached for them.  They said 
that there were German pictures, of the Kaiser, and others in Concordia Hall and 
they gave that evidence to the parade. 
Q: What happened to the parade then? 
A: After this evidence had reached the parade of where these  
pictures came from, and that there were more similar pictures and also flags and 
German standards, the parade says “we will go and get them.” They turned about 
and marched back again. They had passed the Concordia Hall, and were 
somewhere near the recruiting office.  They turned about to get the pictures in 
Concordia Hall. These boys who discovered the flag and pictures said “come and 
we will show you where the others are.” 
Capt. Gregory: Who said that? 
A: I could not say sir. Evidently the men in the first raid  
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had paid another visit and found the stuff, and when they saw the parade coming 
by, they broke the parade up, especially since they had evidence to prove it, and 
the boys rushed it; getting the pictures. 
Capt. Routley: Anybody there to stop them? 
A: No sir.  I was thinking they had just gone to get those  
pictures and they didn’t return immediately as I went up myself. When I got there 
I found a group of boys, soldier boys, smashing up a picture of the German 
emperor, framed pictures of the German emperor. 
Capt. Fraser: Did you make any effort to stop them going up  
there? 
A: No, sir. Not to get pictures. I had no desire to stop  
them from getting those pictures. 
Col. Martin: How many pictures were there of the Kaiser? How  
many did you see? Did you know how many there were? 
A: Well I saw six, possibly more. 
Q: The Kaiser, the Crown Prince were they? All Kaisers or some Crown Princes? 
A: As evidence of the kind of pictures I brought one down or  
rather passed one down.  Somebody started to mutilate it, and last night that same 
picture rested in the detention room.  This morning the boys went in and ripped it 
up.  Some one came in and said “here is your part of the picture.” 
Capt. Routley: Off the screen on the stage? 
A: No sir, this picture did not come off the stage. There is  
a part there (producing a portion of it). Other men had gotten the head of the 
Kaiser off that same picture. 
Capt. Gregory: Did they have framed pictures? Or only  
lithographs?  
A: No sir. 
Q: more than one picture of the present Kaiser? 
A: We wrecked three or four of them. 
Q: Did you see the picture of King George with the German  
flag over it? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Where was it? When you saw it? 
A: It was hanging in the center of the wall in the place  
where they sell the beer. 
Capt. Gregory: In the beer room? 
Capt. Routley: In the card room? 
A: On the wall towards the Assembly Hall. 
Capt. Gregory: Were there other pictures on the wall, and  
what class of pictures? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Surrounding King George’s picture? 
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A: When I went up, all the German pictures had been taken  
off the wall. 
Q: Was the German flag around the picture? 
A: When I went up there it was not.  The boys reported to me  
that in the previous visit the King’s photograph was draped with German flags. I 
can’t name the boys. But I can name some who can. Corp. Brennan says he can. 
Q: The destruction was going on when you went up there? 
A: Yes, sir. Things were going fast and I took the picture  
of King George off the wall to protect it. And I brought it down out of the 
building. 
Col. Martin. Were there any windows broken at this stage? 
A: Yes, sir. At this state, windows were rattling all over.  
And from there I went into the theatre room and when I entered, there was a 
whole bunch of boys. 
Capt. Gregory: Were they all soldiers? 
A: While I was there in the room, there were crowds of  
people rushing up the stairs. 
Q: You mean civilians? 
A: Yes, sir. At that stage when I reached the beer room  
everything was demolished. I took the picture of King George and left the 
building. 
Col. Martin. You brought the King’s picture down? 
A: Yes, sir. When I came down King Street, the windows were  
being knocked out and all the upstairs, falling out onto the sidewalk.  Groups of 
civilians went into the building while I was down. 
Capt. Fraser: You didn’t see it? 
A: I can bring witnesses that saw civilians wreck windows.  
Col. Martin. What happened to the picture? 
A: It is now hanging in “B” company room. 
Capt. Gregory: Have you any German flags available? 
A: I had the picture of the German emperor from which his  
was taken (showing a piece of the picture) and a big German flag in the detention 
room. This morning, they opened the detention room and tore it up. 
Capt. Fraser: Who let them in? 
A: I don’t know sir. One of the boys came into the  
Sergeant’s Mess this morning and reported that the Kaiser’s bust had been 
removed from the detention room during the night. 
Q: What time did you leave the building first to go  
downtown. 
A: A little after six sir, and I went down to MacCallums for  
a newspaper and went home with Q.M.S. Cottingham.  
Q: You were home? 
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A: Yes, Sir. I had just been home. 
Q: You didn’t have any drink last night? 
A: I had one drink after I came back. 
Capt. Gregory: Were any of the men under the influence of  
liquor in the parade. 
A: I don’t think I should be asked that question sir. If I  
see a man under the influence of liquor and likely to become a disgrace I tell the 
nearest two privates to take him to detention or put him to bed. 
Capt. Gregory: were any of the men on the street acting  
disgraceful? 
A: No sir. None that could not act like gentlemen. I saw non  
of them on the street. 
 
[In answer to another question, the witness answered: I saw one big German flag, that 
would reach two-thirds of the way across King street.] 
 
Capt. Routley: What became of that flag? 
A: The boys brought it down and unfolded it on King Street.  
One man stood at each corner so everybody could see it. The fellows threw boxes 
of matches on it and it would no burn and a fellow poured a bottle of gasoline on 
and it was burned on King Street. The Wrecking was going on meanwhile in the 
building. 
Capt. Gregory: You didn’t see that flag in the building? 
A: I saw a man bring it out of the building folded up. As  
soon as he got near the door, it was partially opened. 
Q: Can you say who that was? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Did you see any broken glass strike a woman? 
A: No, sir. 
Col. Martin: What would be the extent of civilians on the  
street when that flag was burned? 
A: A huge crowd. The sidewalk was probably packed for a  
distance of 75 yards. We had this picture of the King and requested the soldiers to 
hold it up while we sang God Save the King. 
 
[Capt. Fraser asked about a man being knocked down, and if soldiers had anything to do 
with it.] 
 
A: Yes, sir, that man complained to me and I took him to you  
sir. 
Q: You didn’t see the thing did you? 
A: No, Sir. 
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Col. Martin: He was the C.P.R. agent out here. 
Capt. Fraser: You had a book and were taking down some  
notes? 
A: No, sir. I had a little black book and the membership  
cards of the Concordia Society. 
Q: When I sent you home, where did you get to? 
A: You told me to go home and I went up to King Street. I  
went in the restaurant and had a cup of coffee. When I came out of the restaurant, 
I was told that a bunch of men had gone over to visit Tappert. I, with Brennan and 
Hayward, and I believe Sergt. Kuhl, I am not sure about the latter… 
Capt. Fraser: Deal? 
A: No, he didn’t leave with me. I went into the restaurant.   
I said that the men had gone far enough, and that we better go up to Tappert’s and 
see that no damage is done.  When we got to Alma street, there was not a soul in 
sight, and we returned to King Street. 
Q: Where did you go after that? 
A: I came back the post office way and as I was going down  
by the post office I saw a group of men marching down Queen from King St. and 
they marched to the barracks. 
Q: What time? 
A: I don’t know. A bunch marched down before you (col.  
Martin) marched us down. I saw a group of men coming down and I stood on the 
corner. While I was there, a Toronto traveller came up and we entered into 
conversation. Crowds of people anxious to hear the conversation gathered around 
and made another recruiting speech, as did Corp. Brennan. After recruiting 
speech, the adjutant came along and ordered me back to the barracks. 
Col. Martin: You were making recruiting speeches as Col.  
Lochead came along. 
A: Yes, sir, and then we marched back to the barracks. 
Capt. Fraser: When we were coming down the street a lot of  
hurrahing was going on. What was that? 
A: They were cheering my recruiting speech or Brennan’s. 
Q: When did you join him?  
A: Brennan was coming down with many other soldiers towards  
Concordia Hall from an easterly direction. Where he came from I don’t know. 
Q: There was nothing organized between you and Brennan  
during the night? 
A: No, sir. I didn’t know where Brennan was while this racket  
was going on. 
Capt. Gregory: Did you see any police officers? 
A: No, sir. 
Capt. Fraser: They were there when I came down. 
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A: None of them said anything to me or the soldiers. 
Capt. Routley: Did any of the civilian population try to  
stop you. 
A: No, sir. They cheered everything, all the recruiting  
speeches. Several of the boys tried to persuade the boys to go and do another 
search the same night. 
Col. Martin: What would be the number of civilians? 
A: Width of the sidewalk for a distance of 75 yards. 
Q: On the street? 
A: No, sir. Only on one side. 
Capt. Routley: In that case there would be about 300 people,  
in the width of the sidewalk. 
A: I think there would be three or four hundred people.  
Perhaps more than that. They gathered all the time. 
Col. Martin: What did Col. Lochead tell you? 
A: As far as I remember he said to me “you are a non- 
commissioned officer. If you are up town with these men anytime you see that 
they moderate themselves and don’t let their enthusiasm run away with their 
better judgement.” Something of that kind. I can’t remember it word for word. 
Capt. Routley: Col. Lochead said something to all of you men  
about bringing the bust of the Kaiser? 
A: I heard him make a speech to a bunch of 25 or 30 men. As  
a matter of fact, I stayed myself, as I wanted to see the bust. I was going up town 
and nearly walked passed before I heard the colonel at all.  I turned around and 
marched back, and he was giving a confidential talk to Corp. Brennan. 
Capt. Fraser:  Didn’t you think that you should have used  
your influence to stop this? Apart from any sentiment of pro-Germanism. 
A: No, Sir. I do not believe that any such thing has any  
place in the British empire. 
Capt. Fraser: A part from that? 
A: I don’t think it should be necessary for the boys to have  
to clean up these things. 
Q: Anybody thinks that. 
A: I think there should be sufficient legislation in the  
Dominion of Canada to keep it clean. 
Q: You think it is all due to pro-German sentiment? You  
think it is due to feeling? 
A: Insulting remarks of civilians. The night before last we  
met some boys on the street and we said “would you like to be in khaki?” and a 
German looked around with a sneer at us. That is what we have to take when we 
ask them to join the army. 
Capt. Gregory: What definite object was there in going to  
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Concordia Hall in the first place? 
A: To get the bust of the pro-German organization which is  
working against recruiting. 
Q: Primarily to get the bust? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: It is a matter of general knowledge in this city that  
this bust was to be in the charge of the Concordia society. 
A: Yes, sir. Civilians in the last few weeks have approached  
soldiers and told us about the Bust of Kaiser Wilhelm I in Concordia Hall, saying 
why don’t you go and get it? 
Capt. Gregory: Did any of the officials of the town use any  
deterring influence? 
A: No, sir. I never say any men with any social or municipal  
standing say anything to anybody. I think I should be excused from putting my 
weight on the side of anything un-British. I want you to judge me as having been 
brought up since the war broke out to destroy everything that is German. I have 
been trained to destroy everything of any military advantage to the enemy. 
Q: So far as you know, you have never heard any suggestion  
of any destruction of property. 
A: No, Sir. 
Q: Was there any plans to destroy any property in Concordia  
Hall. 
A: No, sir. There was nothing premeditated to destroy any  
property in Concordia Hall. 
Q: Did you find beer there? How much? 
A: I saw one keg rolled down the street. Somebody was about  
to open it and I stopped them. I said there would be no drunkenness on this street. 
I told men to take it off King St. 
Q: Was there anything in the hall except the picture of King  
George as would ordinarily be found in a hall? 
A: No, sir. That was the only thing I saw in there worthy of  
being saved while I was there. The rest was German;  
everything.    
 
Witness dismissed 
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Witness: Corp Brennan 
 
[Brennan, like Blood, would also point to pro-Germanism in Berlin as a trigger for the 
hostility among the men of the Battalion.  He included a number of earlier instances 
where German men refused to enlist and spoke unfavourably about the British Empire.] 
 
Col. Martin: You were out last night? 
A: Yes, Sir. 
Q: What time did you leave the barracks?  
A: I left the barracks with Sergt. Deal about 6:30 
Q: Where did you head for? 
A: We went up town and we met Sergt. Hayward, and him and I  
went and had supper. 
Q: At the restaurant? 
A: Yes, Sir. We came out of there five minutes to 8 and the  
boys were coming past the street then with the Kaiser’s bust. 
Q: Who was carrying it? 
A: I don’t know the boy’s names. We went and helped them to  
carry it then. We took it down to the barracks and put it in the detention room. 
The boys said while they were up there, they said they noticed German flags. 
Q: Would it be twenty feet long? 
A: Yes sir, all of that. There was also a little flag about  
four feet long right along the side of King George’s picture. We burned those 
flags.  One was too green to burn and then we burned the big flag. We took them 
down and put them into the detention room. This morning the men went down 
there and the corporal of the guard opened the door, when it was found the bust 
was gone.  They then tore the picture and the flag and everybody took a little 
piece of it. 
Capt. Routley: Did you see any liquor up in there? 
A: In the card room. Yes sir there was liquor and a lot of  
glasses and two kegs of beer. We have one keg now. 
Q: Where? 
A: I couldn’t exactly tell you where it is. But I know where  
it is. 
Col. Martin: it is not in headquarters? 
A: No, sir. 
Capt. Routley: Whisky? 
A: Yes sir, I had one drink out of a bottle. I saw two  
civilians and they each had a bottle that they had taken. 
Col. Martin: Where were these bottles? 
A: I believe they were in the drawers. 
Capt. Fraser: Who did the smashing?  
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A: These civilians. They threw something out the window.  
They took a picture and were going away with it. I didn’t know what they were, 
German, and they took it and kicked it in. The other pictures of the Kaiser was 
carried down and put in the detention room, and then one of the boys stuck a cane 
through it. 
Capt. Gregory: Did this liquor look as if it had been stored  
away? 
A: I couldn’t tell about that, but I can tell you there was  
no dust in the glasses. 
Q: Did you see this German standard in the room upstairs? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Capt. Routley: You were not in the party then that got the  
bust? 
A: No, sir. 
Capt. Fraser: When did you join them? 
A: About at the recruiting office. 
Q: When they came back? 
A: Coming with the bust. I helped to carry it around, we  
took it up and showed everybody, and then we came down and put it in the clink. 
Col. Martin. Did Colonel Lochead say anything to you? 
A: Yes sir, I told him we were going up the street singing  
patriotic songs. He told us not to do anything in any way destructive and to be 
soldiers, and we promised him we would.  We went up street and were walking 
down the sidewalk when we started to hear about flags being up there. 
Capt. Fraser: Who started it? 
A: The boys. Practically everybody was hollering about the  
flags being around the King’s picture. 
Capt. Routley: Did the police or any civilians try to stop  
you? 
A: No, sir. Nobody. 
Q: Were the civilians in favour of your actions? 
A: The majority that I seen were telling us to go on it, and  
the policeman was laughing. 
Q: You saw some policemen there? 
A: Yes, some standing over on the corner laughing. 
Capt. Gregory: So far as you know there was nothing  
premeditated? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: The only thing premeditated was the removal of the bust  
in a peaceable manner? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Capt. Fraser: Did you see anybody touch any books. 
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A: No, sir. No soldiers touched any to my knowledge, except  
the flags. The civilians started to pull the pictures down and about ten of them 
were around the piano so that I could not get near it. 
Capt. Routley: The civilians helped then from the first? 
A: As soon as we started, the civilians started. 
Q: You are aware as a citizen of Berlin that this is the  
headquarters of Germanism in this town? 
A: Yes sir, I know that to be a fact. One man two weeks ago,  
the Sunday before last, said he would fight for his Kaiser any time. He told me 
that and I whipped him for it. 
Capt. Gregory: It was down here at some house? 
A: We were talking. He had a couple of drinks in him, but he  
was not drunk.  Another night in the saloon, with a bunch around, I was talking to 
a man from Stratford. He was telling me about the British empire and a big 
German standing there said “Fuck the British empire!” I hit him and cut my finger 
there. That was in the Brunswick Hotel, and the proprietor came to me and began 
to talk. I think that bunch are all pro-Germans.  
 
Witness dismissed 
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Witness: Sergt. P. Hayward 
 
[Hayward would testify that there was no intention to destroy the premises of the 
Concordia club and only to take the bust.  The sight of the flags, on the other hand, was 
the breaking point for them men.  He would also say that civilians were far more rowdy 
than the soldiers and he, at one point, was hit in the head with a chair.] 
 
Col. Martin: We are taking evidence here this morning in  
reference to the affair last night. You tell us what you know about it.  
A: I was downtown last night, leaving here about five o’clock. 
Q: Where did you go? 
A: Downtown to the restaurant, and had supper there. 
Q: All alone? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Where did you go? 
A: I was just simply walking up and down until the crowd  
came down. 
Q: What was the nature of the parade on the street? 
A: it was just a bunch of soldiers walking down. 
Capt. Gregory: They had come from the barracks? 
A: I don’t know where they came from. 
Capt. Routley: Did you join the parade going after the bust? 
A: No, sir.  
Q: After they got the bust? 
A: Yes, sir. I came down to the barracks and then turned  
around and went to town again. 
Capt. Fraser: Alone? 
A: No, sir. Some more went down with me. 
Q: You didn’t go with Sergt. Blood at any time? 
A: Yes, sir. I was with Sergt. Blood. 
Capt. Routley: You know that after they got the Kaiser’s  
bust, the broke up the premises? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Finishing up after nine o’clock. What do you know about  
that? 
A: I saw the crowd bringing the big German flag down. That  
just got me a little mad and I went up into the breaking up. 
Capt. Gregory: Any civilians up there? 
A: Yes, sir, a whole lot of them. 
Q: Were they doing any damage? 
A: Yes, sir. Kicking the piano when I was there. 
Capt. Fraser: Young men? 
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A: Yes, nearly all young men. 
Q: Did you see any liquor up there? 
A: I saw a keg of liquor coming out of there. 
Q: Did you have any liquor last night? 
A: Yes, sir. A couple of drinks. 
Q: How did you get that scar on your head? 
A: A chair hit me. 
Capt. Routley: Why did all you men want to go up there and  
break things up last night? 
A: We had no idea of doing that until we saw the chairs  
coming down, and the flags. 
Q: That seemed to be the breaking point? 
A: I could not hold my temper any longer. 
Q: Any civil authorities trying to stop it? 
A: No, sir. 
Capt. Gregory: what was the attitude of the civilians. 
A: They seemed to be enjoying it. 
Capt. Fraser: How many of the troops up in that hall when  
you went up? 
A: Forty or forty-five I would say. 
Q: In the hall? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: How long would that be before I told you to go home? 
A: I could not say. 
Capt. Routley: The commanding officer Captain Fraser and I  
arrived there about one quarter to ten. Was it nine o’clock? Any ideas? 
A: I think it was between nine and ten. 
Q: Then it lasting half an hour? 
A: When I got up there it was pretty nearly all smashed up. 
Q: You mean it was lasting nearly half an hour and the  
police never went up to stop it? 
A: No, sir. When I got up there it was nearly all smashed  
up. When I got there, the piano was being tumbled over on the floor. 
Capt. Gregory: Wrecked by civilians? 
A: Yes, sir. But there were soldiers around too. 
Q: What evidence of pro-Germanism did you see around there? 
A: I think there was a German flag alongside of King  
George’s picture. 
Col. Martin: The lights were on then? 
A: Yes, sir. The flag was draped and I could not tell what  
it is. 
Capt. Gregory: How close was it? 
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A: Right alongside of it on the wall. 
Q: That picture was in the beer or card room? 
A: I would not say which room. 
Q: Were the pictures all destroyed when you were there? 
A: Two or three were left. 
Q: And they were all pictures of Germans? 
A: I didn’t take notice. 
Q: Was there any premeditated scheme of destruction? 
A: Absolutely none as far as I am concerned. 
Capt. Fraser: Where did you go to when I told you to go  
home? 
A: I didn’t go home, I just stood down. 
Q: Who did you stay with? 
A: I stayed with Sergt. Major Blood. 
Q: You went into the restaurant? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: What time did you get in the barracks at night? 
A: I could not say just what time. 
Q: You came in with the last bunch? 
A: Yes, sir. Of the time I could not say. 
Col. Martin: You marched in? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Capt. Fraser: You knew what you were doing all the time? 
A: Oh, yes, sir.  
Capt. Gregory: Were there any men in any state of  
intoxication that you saw? 
A: No sir, I didn’t see any. 
Capt. Routley: To sum up the whole thing, the finding of  
these flags and beer put destruction in you boy’s minds? 
A: Yes, sir. Absolutely.  
 
Witness dismissed 
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Witness: Sergt. Deal 
 
[Deal transferred to the 118th from the 71st Battalion, London and took part in the initial 
parade of the Bust from the Concordia Hall to the Barracks.  He also stated that the 
procession made a stop at the skating rink to show that they had recovered it. He would 
be drilled by the examiners, especially Captain Fraser and Colonel Martin, for failing to 
produce a logical timeline of events of the night and for failure to remember the names of 
any of the men in the procession that he himself lead.  He was killed in action and is 
buried in Abbeville France.] 
 
Col. Martin: This Court of Inquiry is enquiring into the  
affair of last night. You can tell us in a few words what you know 
A: I saw all the men going along King St. in the direction  
of Concordia Hall and I had nearly reached that place when I met the procession 
heading up the street, headed by the Union Jack. 
Capt. Fraser: Did you have anything to do with the  
procession? 
A: No sir, none whatsoever. Of course seeing the parade lead  
by the Union Jack, I jumped in, and practically lead the procession. 
Capt. Routley: Did you know about this? 
A: No sir, I was on my way home. I was uncertain where  
Concordia Hall was. 
Capt. Gregory: You were in the 71st Battalion. You would know  
all the men of “A” Company? 
A: By sight, not by name.  
Q: You knew practically all of them. Who was carrying the  
bust? 
A: It was not carried expressly by anybody in particular. 
Q: Who were they that were carrying the bust? 
A: I couldn’t say for sure who was carrying it. No sir I  
could not say. I was so excited on seeing the procession, I turned my back on the 
parade. As far as I was concerned I knew nothing. 
Q: Who was carrying the flag? 
A: He was a stranger to me, sir. 
Q: A 118th man? 
A: I’m pretty sure of that. 
Q: Where was the bust in the procession? 
A: In the front, or near the front most of the time. 
Q: What men were walking beside you in the procession? 
A: Sometimes two or three, and sometimes only one. Sometimes  
I was walking alone. 
Q: Who were they? 
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A: As far as I am concerned, I told you I practically led  
the procession. 
 
[In answer to another question about the procession: I noticed they were singing this 
bugle march, Hail! Hail! the Gangs All Here! I stopped that singing, and started them 
singing Rule Britannia, and the parade proceeded on again.] 
 
Col. Martin: You didn’t know who the men were that went to  
get the bust? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Can you give us the name of any men in the procession? 
A: Corp. Brennan. 
Q: Where did you join the parade? 
A: It was somewhere about there (pointed to the recruiting  
office on the map) 
Q: Who were the others carrying the bust? 
A: I think they were mostly privates. 
Capt. Gregory: Did you see Sergt. Elvy there? 
A: No, sir. I would not have considered I had any right to  
put myself in front if any other sergeants were there. 
Q: What private did you see there? 
A: One fellow I noticed in particular. 
Q: What does he look like? 
A: A fair fellow. 
Q: Elmslie? 
A: I could not say. 
Capt. Fraser: We want a frank statement. If we see you are  
trying to keep back anything… 
A: I am trying my best to give it to you. I can’t say I knew  
anybody. My wife was on the street and she shouted and said, “Albert don’t get so 
excited!” That was the state I was in. It was merely a state of excitement. 
Capt. Gregory: How many men were there in the parade? 
A: I would judge at the time I was there, some 45. 
Q: Do you mean to tell us there was not a single man in the  
parade whose name you knew? 
A: Yes, sir. I do mean to tell you that, unless I was given  
a little time maybe I could think of somebody who was in it. 
Capt. Fraser: Where did you go to. 
A: Up to the skating rink. 
Q: What did you do in there? 
A: The boys were exhibiting the bust in the gallery. 
Q: was there skating? 
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A: Yes sir, mostly young couples. The manager, I don’t know  
who he was, some young fellow came up and seemed terribly excited because his 
skating rink was upset.  I told him not to worry and the boys will go along in a 
few minutes. They were holding the bust over the gallery then. I said “left turn” 
and we went away. 
Capt. Routley: Who was holding the bust over the gallery? It  
was 200 pounds. 
A: Not over the gallery. 
Capt. Gregory: What gallery were you in? 
A: Are there two? 
Capt. Gregory: Yes. 
A: That has got me. 
Col. Martin. The one immediately above the entrance? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Capt. Fraser: Then you came out of the rink, what did you  
do? 
A: Came out of the rink and came to the barracks. I opened  
the door and let them into the barracks. 
Q: What did you do when you went in? with the bust for  
instance? 
A: Placed it on the table and a few little speeches were  
made about it. 
Q: What table? 
A: In the left corner of the mess room. 
Q: Did you deliver a speech with it? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Who delivered the speeches? 
A: Brennan. 
Q: Who else was about there? 
A: The same men that were in the procession. 
Q: Did you know any of them? 
A: No, sir. I was in that excited condition 
Q: And yet you told the man you had them under control at  
the rink? 
A: No sir, I had no control. I did not know they needed it. 
Q: You took them into the hall? 
A: They said the skating rink, and naturally I turned. 
Q: And what happened to it after the speeches were finished? 
A: Well, we came outside the barracks and then Col. Lochead  
came up and he addressed both me and Brennan then, and told us that we were 
non-commissioned officers and would be held responsible for anything that 
happened. 
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Capt. Gregory: Who made the speeches at the rink? 
A: At the rink? No speeches were made there to my knowledge. 
Col. Martin: I can’t understand Deal how you can walk with  
all those men down there and not recognize any, not even their faces. You have 
been with them four months, right from London till down here. It strikes me I 
would have been very excited if I could not have known some of them. 
A: Perhaps if I was given some time I might possibly think. 
Capt. Fraser: What happened after Col. Lochead made those  
remarks? 
Capt. Routley: Was the Kaiser’s bust still on the table? 
A: No sir, in the detention room. 
Capt. Gregory: Who opened the detention room door? 
A: I think the corporal of the guard. 
Q: Did Sergt. Pawson open the door? 
A: No, it was the corporal of the guard I am sure. 
Q: Where did you see Sergt. Pawson first? 
A: I didn’t know he had anything to do with that. 
Capt. Routley: Where did you first have knowledge of Pawson?   
A: In quarters. 
Q: Where did you see Bugle Sergeant Bowden first? 
A: In quarters. 
Capt. Gregory: Did you see him in that procession 
A: No, sir. 
Capt. Fraser: Where did you go when the bust was put in the  
detention room? 
A: Went back towards King St. until half way between the  
Armories and King St. where I met my wife. 
Q: How many men were there then? 
A: There was Brennan, and we met Pte. Clarke. 
Q: How many when they met up town again? 
A: They dispersed out there. I was going away myself. I  
asked how many had midnight passes, and said that those not having midnight 
passes better stay in barracks. Then I met Pte. Clarke and two or three minutes 
later ran into my wife. When I reached the corner of the Walper House, I said 
excuse me, come straight along I can see something else going on. I believe I 
stopped and you (Capt. Fraser) said go home. 
Capt. Fraser: I didn’t stop you, you were standing there. 
A: Yes sir. You said “go on home Deal.” I didn’t exactly go  
home because I went back with my wife and took her home. 
Q: You went straight down to Concordia Hall after her? 
A: I did, yes. 
Q: It must have taken you considerable time? 
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A: No, it did not. I was not much more than the time of  
walking. In fact, I think I got there rather quickly. 
Q: How long after Col. Lochead spoke to you before you went  
up town? 
A: As soon as he finished, we started and went down.  
Q: I can’t reconcile your statements. The Commanding Officer  
came to the Orderly Room. We were out skating, and went down about fifteen or 
twenty minutes after you finished. You were dismissed twenty minutes before by 
the Commanding Officer and then I went down there. If you would say that you 
were there when I arrived. 
A: I took my time to get there. Naturally I would not walk  
as fast with my wife as if I was alone. And after I left here I hurried on, but you 
were there when I got there. 
Capt. Gregory: Who was the corporal of the guard? 
A: I believe it was corp. Wilkins. 
Q: You are quite sure that it was him that opened the door? 
A: Anyway I saw him close the door. 
Q: He was there; you were clear on that? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You must have had 45 minutes’ blank in your memory last night.  
A: I don’t know how to account for it, sir. 
Q: Is Pte. Clarke of “A” Company? 
A: He is of “A”. 
Q: He was walking to barracks? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: He was alone? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Witness dismissed 
Adjournment for Lunch at 12:15 pm 
 
Reconvened 3:30 pm 
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Witness: Sergt. Bowden 
 
[Boden was a witness to the bonfire in the street and the lack of police intervention and 
denies being an active participant.  He did however, harbour a degree of hostility to the 
local German population and had a personal conflict with Reverend Tappert.] 
 
Col. Martin: This court has been assembled to elicit the  
truth. We want straightforward evidence and not hearsay. You might  
proceed and tell us what you know about the situation  
A: Yesterday evening my wife and I went to the Grand. While  
in there I heard a crash and glass falling somewhere. When we came out I found 
out a number of people, civilians as well as soldiers had raided the Concordia 
Society. There was a bonfire still going on in the street with the remnants of flags 
and so forth being burned. We went over to the restaurant. In in there a number of 
people came in and a number of civilians. They were exhibiting anything from 
pieces of the piano, flags or legs and chairs. From what I can gather the citizens as 
well as soldiers did what they considered their duty in cleaning up some of the 
German element in the city.  I took my wife up as far as the post office and came 
back to the next corner when Capt. Routley called me and told me I better get 
down to the barracks. As far as I know that is a straight forward story. 
Q: Anything that led up to the affair? 
A: Nothing at all, sir. From what civilians said, it was a  
job that should have been undertaken by the Government. 
Q: You took no part in it? 
A: Nothing except to cheer. If you had a mother that came  
within 100 yards of a German bomb you would have done more than that. 
Capt. Routley: How do you know what civilians felt like? 
A: They told me about it. 
Capt. Gregory: From men or boys? 
A: No sir, mature men 
Capt. Martin: Up in the building? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: You saw the German flag burned? 
A: Scraps of it sir. 
Capt. Routley: You didn’t see the police interfere with it? 
Capt. Fraser: The thing was all over when you came out of  
the Grand? 
A: Yes, sir. No police on the street at all last night. We have several and I don’t know 
why. As far as I know it was not premeditated, just spontaneous when the boys saw the 
emblems of the enemy. And there is too much of it going on sir. I might say, that 
personally Mr. Tappert’s boy threatened my boy. 
      Witness dismissed 
340 
 
Witness: Sergt. Pawsen 
 
[Upon Sergt. Pawsen’s examination, it was discovered that the locks to the detention 
room in the barracks where the bust was being held were recently changed. And men in 
procession of keys to the store room no longer had access.] 
 
Col. Martin: This Court of Inquiry, Pawson, is to elicit the  
truth. We want something definite. If you have any evidence, definitely let us 
have it. 
A: I was in the show last night, and coming out I saw a  
great bonfire in the street and heard civilians say that they had raided Concordia 
Hall. I went upstairs and saw they were carrying things out, and saw civilians 
breaking the piano and not the soldiers. There was with me, Mrs. Pawson and Mr. 
and Mrs. Locker. 
Capt. Fraser: No police up there at all? 
A: I never saw any sir. 
Col. Martin: On the street? 
A: I never saw any on the street. 
Capt. Routley: The job was all done when you came out? 
A: Yes, sir.  
Capt. Fraser: Any police in that building, whatever? 
A: Not what I saw sir. 
Col. Martin: Were you at the show until the end of the  
program? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: They were taking things away? 
A: Everything they could get hold of. I know two persons,  
civilians, who bought keys at 10 cents a piece. 
Capt. Fraser: Do you know anything about the key that opens  
the detention room? Did you open the detention room? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Have you a key that fits it? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Does the key which you have to the store room fit it? 
A: No, sir. It did. About a month ago we changed the lock  
when we found it cut? 
Capt. Routley: Some little time ago we changed the lock,  
when we found that the detention key fitted it.  
 
Witness dismissed 
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Witness: Sergt. Major Gillespie 
 
        [Wounded at Cambrai] 
 
Col. Martin: Tell us your account. 
A: No, sir, I was not implicated. I was in the Grand with my  
wife and I judge about a quarter to nine there was quite a racket starting. I turned 
around and everybody was chasing out of the gallery. They must have been 
frightened that they were going to get hurt. After the show, I came out and I went 
over to see what was going on and saw the bonfire of pictures and flags. There 
were no soldiers around, all civilians. 
Q: You know nothing about the taking of the bust? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Did you hear anything about it during the day? 
A: No, sir. I got to the piano and there was no chance of my  
getting a piece of it, there were too many civilians around. 
Capt. Gregory: There were no soldiers in the building? 
A: Yes, Corp. Locker 
Q: The damage was being done by civilians? 
A: Yes, sir. They were about six deep around the piano. 
Capt. Fraser: There was no police up there? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: None in the room? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Anybody stop anybody from going in the building at the  
door? 
A: No, sir. 
Capt. Gregory: There was a policeman standing along the  
sidewalk and he made no attempt to stop it? 
A: No, sir. 
 
Witness dismissed 
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Witness: Corp Wilkins 
 
Col. Martin: You were Corp. of the Guard last night? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Col. Martin: In connection with your duties I understand  
this bust was brought down about 9:30 and landed in the detention room. 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Can you explain how it managed to get in there? 
A: Four or five fellows carried it in. 
Q: How could it get through the door? 
A: The policemen let it in sir. 
Q: Who had the key? 
A: I had one sir. 
Q: It must have been Gough? 
A: Yes, sir. I didn’t let him in. The flag came later on. I  
certainly let that in beside the other. 
Q: They wanted to go out again? 
A: I warned them that all men who didn’t have midnights,  
better stay in or they would be reported. 
Capt. Gregory: What door did they come in? What company did  
they belong to? 
A: That I could not say sir. 
Q: were they all strangers to you? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Who were they? 
A: One of them was Sergt. Deal. 
Q: Who else did you recognize? 
A: There was Brennan, and Gough. 
Q: Helping to carry it? 
A: I don’t think so. 
Capt. Routley: Was private Kail among them? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: What others did you recognize? 
A: Deal, Brennan. There was a lot of Machine Gun men and I  
don’t know them. I think that there was more of these than anybody else. 
Capt. Routley: Did you go into the Mess Room and hear the  
speeches? 
A: No, sir. I was on guard. I didn’t go out to any speech. 
Q: What time did they bring the bust in? 
A: About half past eight. It was about twenty past nine when  
I warned Deal about the midnights. I certainly opened the door for the flag to go 
in. 
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Capt. Fraser: Did you see them when they were going out  
earlier in the evening? Did they go out in bunches? 
A: No, sir. The majority of them go through the other door  
and down the other stairs. 
Capt. Routley: Did you know they were going to get that  
bust? 
A: No, sir. No idea whatever. 
Q: You know no others. 
A: As I say, most of them were Machine Gun men. 
Capt. Gregory: Did you open the detention room this morning? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: About what time? 
A: It was, well the men were washing. 
Q: About seven o’clock. 
A: No, sir. A little later than that. They came and told me  
the bust was gone. I said I was sure the key had not left the guard room. 
Capt. Gregory: Who were they that told you? 
A: The majority of the men said so. 
Q: Who was around when you opened the door this morning? 
A: Brennan. 
Q: Was there a big crowd around there? 
A: No, sir. They came and said the bust was gone and I would  
not believe it. Gough said he slept on his key. 
Q: The flag and the picture were in there? 
A: Yes, the flag was lying on the floor. 
Q: When was it torn up? 
A: I locked the door. The flag was untouched. There was just  
a slight rant in the flag. This one was like an emblem flag. 
Capt. Routley: Did you leave the door open so they could get  
in? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Would you know any of these Machine Gun men? Could you pick one or two of 
them? 
A: I daresay I could if I was confronted with them. I don’t  
know any of their names at all. 
Capt. Gregory: Would you know the men carrying the bust? 
A: No, sir. I can honestly say I could not. In fact, there  
was such a flock, and they were al crowded in between those two doors. 
Q: Who was the sentry on the front beat? 
A: I could pick him out sir. After these men came in I said to the sentries it is up to you to 
keep a strict look out. And after what, I went around the building four times myself.  
Witness dismissed 
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Witness: Pte. P. Quinn 
 
Col. Martin: You were up street last night? Were you? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: You tell us in a few words as to your where-abouts last  
night. 
A: I don’t know any of the fellows here at all. 
Capt. Routley: You helped carrying the bust down didn’t you? 
A: No, sir. 
Capt. Gregory: Did you see the bust? 
A: I saw the bust coming down the street and I followed the  
procession. 
Q: That is down the street? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: What men out of “D” Company were carrying it? 
A: I don’t think any were sir. 
Q: Who were the “B” Company men? 
A: I don’t know any of their names. 
Q: You ought to know the names of “D” Company? 
A: We all go by “Buddy.” 
Capt. Fraser: Were you drunk last night? 
A: I had a few drinks, sir. 
Q: The colonel sent you back and you ran away? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: You were standing at the fire when I sent you home? 
A: Yes, sir, and I went home, and the boys said if I had a  
midnight I didn’t need to. 
Capt. Routley: How many kegs of beer were there up there? 
A: Just two I saw sir. 
Q: Were there liquors there? 
A: I didn’t notice any sir. 
Q: Did you and Brennan have a drink last night? 
A: No sir, I never spoke to him last night. 
Capt. Fraser: What happened to the beer you helped to carry  
out? 
A: I don’t know. I got one drink. I was at the flag, sir. 
Q: You mean to tell me you can leave a keg of beer? 
A: I can say that sir today. 
Col. Martin: Was the keg empty? 
A: It was running when I left it. They just pumped it and  
let it run. 
Q: On King St.? 
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A: Yes. 
Capt. Routley: What other men helped break up the chairs and  
tables? 
A: I don’t know, I knew them as “buddy.” 
Capt. Gregory: Did you see any “A” Company men there?  
A: I can’t say. I know them as “buddy.” 
Q: Did you see any Machine Gun Section men there? 
A: There was a few of them fellows there. 
Capt. Fraser: How did you know they were Machine Gun? 
A: I saw one fellow there. I think he was Machine Gun. 
Col. Martin: Any civilian up when you were there? 
A: No, sir. Not when I went up there. 
Q: What hour was this? 
A: I could not say. 
Q: Did you march down with the boys that came in? 
A: Yes, up to the barracks. Yes sir, I carried the flag. 
Capt. Routley: This racket started about half past eight? 
A: It must have been quarter to nine, sir. 
Capt. Fraser: When did you leave? 
A: I was down there and told to go home and I was going and  
the boys said if I had a midnight I didn’t need to. 
 
 
Witness dismissed 
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Witness: Lance-Corporal Gough 
 
Col. Martin: You are provost corporal? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Where were you last night when the boys brought in the  
bust? 
A: I was in the barracks. 
Q: Did you see it come in? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: What became of the bust? 
A: I put it in the detention room thinking that it would be  
the best place as it would not be disturbed. 
Q: That hour was this? 
A: About nine o’clock. 
Q: How did you come to open the door? Did the boys request  
it? 
A: Well, I was talking to Mr. Coyne, and I thought it would  
be a good place to put it to keep the fellows from smashing it up, and I suggested 
they put it in the detention room. 
Capt. Routley: Who were carrying it? 
A: Just one I could recognize. 
Q: That is all you recognize. 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Which way did they bring it in? 
A: Through the guard room. 
Col. Martin: When they got in the mess room, which way did  
they go? 
A: They put it on the table in the mess room and made a  
speech. 
Q: Who made the speech? 
A: One fellow from the Machine Gun. Brennan made one. Mr.  
Coyne made one. 
Capt. Gregory: Would you know the Machine Gun man? 
A: No, sir, he was just on the table two or three seconds. 
Capt. Gregory: How many of the men did you recognize of the  
crowd in the mess room? 
A: Just the two who gave the speech, sir.  
Q: How many did you recognize in the crowd? 
A: There were a lot of men there. Several from the Machine  
Gun. 
Q: What faces can you remember? Who was the tall fellow  
there? 
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A: Williamson was there. 
Capt. Gregory: Was not Morneau there? He used to be in “B”  
Company? 
A: I could not say whether he was there. 
Capt. Gregory: Did you see any other men there? You have  
charge of the C.B’s. 
A: I recognized one other. That was McCaffrey and he could  
not have been out. 
Q: Did you know the names of any Machine Gun men? 
A: No, sir. 
Capt. Routley: Could you not go through and recognize them? 
A: I might but I would not be sure of it. The one was  
speaking only two or three seconds when Mr. Coyne stopped him. 
Q: He also proposed going down to wreck the building? 
A: There was nothing said about the building. Just about the  
minister. 
Capt. Gregory: When did you first open the detention room  
this morning? 
A: Just after I had my breakfast. 
Q: And who got the bust then? 
A: There was no bust there. There were three or four fellows  
who wanted to see it and I took then in to see it and when I got in, it was gone. 
Q: Any idea? 
Col. Martin: Where was the key? 
A: In my pocket in my pants. And I rolled them up and slept  
on them. 
Capt. Gregory: Any other keys? 
A: Yes sir, two more. I asked him (Pawson) about it this  
morning, and he said he turned two keys in. 
Capt. Routley, Yes, sir. 
Col. Martin: There are other men in quarters who know you  
carry the key? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Do you suppose they would remove it? 
A: They could not take my key. I can swear my key never left  
my ring, as I always sleep on my pants. 
Capt. Routley: You don’t know where that bust is now? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Who was the first man who asked about the bust this  
morning? 
A: We were talking about the bust this morning. One of the  
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men said, “has the Kaiser had his breakfast?” I said, “no and we better take him 
some in.” 
Capt. Gregory: Who was that? 
A: I think it was Starkey, but I could not swear to it. 
Q: And that is the first you knew that the bust was gone? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Who else came around? 
A: They all flocked in. 
Q: Did any of the Machine Gun men go in? 
A: Yes, sir. They all came in. They were mad. 
Capt. Fraser: Why should they be mad? 
A: Because they said they wanted to take it up to their room  
last night. 
Q: Why should they be interested at all? Do you think they  
have any particular interest in the bust at all? 
A: I could not tell. They seemed to be the fellows who  
wanted it. 
Q: How many would there be in that parade? 
A: I should say close to 40 or 50. 
Capt. Fraser: And when the bust was taken into custody, what  
Happened? 
A: Well they all went outside and Col. Lochead talked to a  
bunch of them. 
Q: What happened after that? 
A: They formed up and went down the street. 
Q: Where did they go? 
A: They went down as far as Water St. and turned back. They  
went as far as the recruiting office and turned around and saw some fellows 
coming with pictures in their hands.  
Col. Martin: Pictures of Kaiser and Emperor? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Was that before the big flag was burned? 
A: Yes sir, way before. 
Capt. Gregory: Were you in the hall last night? 
A: No, sir, I have never been in that hall. 
Capt. Routley: Did the policemen try to stop you? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Did you see any policemen around. 
A: Two or three standing around. 
Capt. Fraser: Were you down locking up? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Did you see anybody at the windows? 
349 
 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Who did you see coming down? 
A: Machine Gun Section. Fellows I didn’t know anyway. 
 
Witness dismissed 
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Witness: Pte. Williamson 
 
Capt. Gregory: You were coming home behind the bust last  
night? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Who was carrying the bust? 
A: I don’t know who was carrying the bust. I know I was back  
of the fellows. 
Q: Were you away at the back? 
A: Back and sides. I was never against the bust as I could  
not get near it. 
Q: Who was there in the procession you recognized? 
A: Gough, we got down to the New Grand and they were  
carrying the bust. 
Q: Then you met them? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Who was carrying it? 
A: We could not get near the bust. 
Capt. Routley: Who was helping to carry it? 
A: I would say if I could say so. 
Q: Did you recognize any one? 
A: No, sir. 
Capt. Gregory: Were they all strangers to you? 
A: All strangers, yes. 
Q: You were here when the bust was put on the table in the  
mess room? 
A: Yes. The felloes were strangers to me. Brennan spoke and  
said we are going to carry him off the table and we will put him in the clink. After 
that, we put him in the clink and went outside again. Sergt. Major Blood came and 
wanted to see it so they opened the detention room door and went outside after.  
Col. Lochead made a speech to us, and told us not to do any breaking of property, 
and they said they were not going to do anything. 
Q: Did you go up town? 
A: Yes, I fell in with them. They said they were going to  
sing patriotic songs. 
Q: Were you up in the Concordia Hall? 
A: Not until the raid was over. 
Q: Where were you? 
A: We were outside among all the people, among the women and  
civilians. 
Q: Any policemen there? 
A: Yes one, I didn’t know his name, but I could recognize  
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him again. 
Capt. Routley: Did anybody try to stop you? 
A: No, sir. I didn’t see two kegs of beer come down, but I  
saw one, and an automatic pump. 
Capt. Gregory: Did you see the big Union Jack? 
A: Yes, sir, I saw that one on the pole. 
Q: What became of it. 
A: I don’t know sir. 
Q: Did you see the big German flag as it came out of the  
building? 
A: Yes sir, and I saw a little German flag. 
Capt. Routley: The citizens were quite in accord with what  
you were doing? 
A: Never heard anyone say anything against it. They all kept  
saying hurrah. Heard Blood say if we have to get to fight them in Berlin, we 
might as well fight them here and in Germany too. I saw some spectators brought 
some books down and things, and threw them out. 
Col. Martin. Civilians? 
A: No, sir. Soldiers. 
Q: It was music? 
A: I don’t know if it was music. Yes some of it was music. I  
never heard nothing about the piano. I don’t know they were breaking the chairs 
against the car tracks. 
Capt. Gregory: Soldiers? All of them? 
A: Yes, sir. All soldiers.  The Kaiser’s picture was brought  
out and they were going to bring it to the armouries, when past the recruiting 
office someone threw something at it and cut a hole through it.  
 
Witness dismissed 
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Witness Pte. Morneau 
 
Col. Martin: Do you know anything about this business last  
night? 
A: Very little sir. We went up the street and went down but  
we didn’t do any damage I know of. 
Capt. Fraser: Yourself you mean? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: What part did you take in the procession? 
A: I was just leading in the procession. 
Q: In taking the bust up? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Capt. Fraser: Who else? 
A: Brennan and Sergt. Fotheringham. 
Q: Who was carrying the bust? 
A: I don’t know that sir? 
Q: Who carried it down the stairs? 
A: I don’t know sir. 
Q: You were standing at the door? 
A: yes, but outside. 
Q: You have no idea? 
A: No, sir. 
Capt. Routley: You joined in the procession? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Capt. Fraser: Why didn’t you go upstairs? Did you stay  
downstairs to watch? 
A: I thought that it would be better for me to be on watch, 
Q: Kind of sentry. 
A: That was my attitude. 
Capt. Routley: You know that they were going to get that  
last night? It was all fixed. 
A: No sir, I didn’t know anything about it. 
Capt. Fraser: When did you join them? 
A: It was about 8:15 or 8:20. 
Q: Where did you join them? 
A: Near the recruiting office. 
Col. Martin: How many would be in the crowd? 
A: 75 or 100. 
Capt. Routley: Went down to the Roma Theatre? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Capt. Routley: You helped break up the furniture in there  
later on. What do you know of the bust? You didn’t help bring it up here? 
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A: no, sir. 
Capt. Fraser: How many went up to the hall? 
A: There must have been fifteen or twenty. 
Q: Instead of going upstairs, you remained downstairs at the  
door? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Capt. Routley: You sleep beside the Machine Gun Section.  
Their faces are familiar to you. Were there many of the Machine Gun men in this 
crowd? 
A: I will admit there was more of the Machine Gun section  
than somebody else. Not that I want to put the blame on anyone else. 
Capt. Fraser: We want to clean up this thing. It is nothing  
to us. 
Q: Your idea is that you think most of the Machine Gun men  
were there? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Capt. Routley: Did the police or anybody try to stop the men  
going up there? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: You stayed on guard? 
A: No, sir. I was not there all the time. 
Col. Martin: What was your intention of standing there? Did  
you know the bust was being raided? 
A: No sir, I didn’t. I never knew there was anything up  
there. 
Capt. Gregory: Was there any discussion as to what they were  
going after? You never heard Concordia Hall mentioned? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: How did you know where they were going? 
A: I found out where they were. 
Q: Who led the procession? 
A: I don’t think anyone really led to the procession. I  
would not say for sure, but it was either Sgt. Blood or Coporal Brennan. When 
they came by, they asked for me to join in and I fell in the rear. 
Q: And they didn’t tell you where you were going? Who asked  
you to stand downstairs and watch? 
A: Nobody sir. I did that of my own free will. 
Capt. Fraser: I can’t see any reason why you should watch.  
What put the idea of watching in your mind? 
A: Well of course… 
Capt. Routley: This must have been formerly arranged. 
Capt. Fraser: What was the idea of watching? Was it the  
354 
 
police you were afraid of? 
A: No, sir. My own idea of it was not that it was made up or  
anything, but to see there was not too many civilians going up at the same time. 
Q: You think it was them doing the damage? 
A: Yes, sir.   
 
 
Witness dismissed 
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Machine Gun Section 
 
The entire Machine Gun Section was next called, and gave evidence in unison. 
 
Questioned by Capt. Fraser, they said they all took part in the affair, and put the 
bust in the clink. There was no particular leader, and Sergt. Blood and Corp. Brennan 
were not leading. They Stated that such a bust should not be allowed in Canada. They 
stated that they saw no big German flag draping the King’s picture. 
 We wear the King’s uniform and we intend to stand by the King all the way. 
 
Witness: Provost Sergeant W. Caswell 
 
Capt. Fraser: Did you know anything about this last night. 
A: I was there last night. There is part of the German flag  
torn off of the large one. I had a row with the Mayor  
after going to hold a masquerade on Friday night. 
Capt. Gregory: It is to be a protest against the changing of  
the name? 
A: The Mayor criticized me and asked why I wasn’t wearing my  
policeman’s uniform and attempting to stop the affair. I told him I was no longer 
on the force. 
Capt. Gregory: You are not a police officer any longer? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Were there police officers around? 
A: There were three but they would have been killed. 
Capt. Routley: As far as you could see, last night the  
civilians were with the boys? 
A: Yes, sir. 
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I certify that the above is an accurate copy of the evidence of the Court of Inquiry taken 
at Berlin, Ont. On February 16th 1916 
 
Sergt. G.W. Martin 
 
Declared before me at Berlin, Ont. February 19th 1916 in the County of Waterloo, the 
Dominion of Canada 
 
Lieut-Col. W.M. Lochead 
 
 
 
